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THE NEW EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Special Editor of this Volume

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Professor of Political Science

University of Pennsylvania

President, The American

Academy of Political and

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FOREWORD

The dramatic veto by President de Gaulle of Britain's application for membership in the Common Market injected a special element of interest in the discussion at the 1963 spring meeting of this Academy.

Nine of the papers in this volume are the addresses delivered at the annual meeting held in Philadelphia on April 5 and 6, 1963. The remaining six papers were specially written for this volume, with the result that each subtopic of the general theme receives a rounded treatment. Each of the articles originally presented as a speech is identified by the editors as such.

In my Foreword to the July 1960 volume, I explained why the topic for the annual meeting of this Academy is usually foreign affairs. Events since that time have heightened the interest of our members and delegates in continued study of international relations. It is, therefore, possible that the subject of the next meeting will also relate to some of our troubles beyond the seas.

Political scientists who are members of the Academy, and perhaps more particularly members who are not political scientists, will be interested in the second installment of the periodic Summary of Disciplines, which appears as a Supplement to this volume. It is entitled "American Government and Administration: Recent Developments."

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Britain and the New Europe

By THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR DAVID ORMSBY GORE

ABSTRACT: Any discussion of European economics and European defense will not be practical and realistic unless based on the assumption that Britain is essentially a part of Europe. Economically, Europe, including Britain, is playing a vital role in the development of the underdeveloped countries. Britain's contribution represents a greater proportion of its resources than that of the United States. Militarily, for the purposes of collective defense, including nuclear defense, all the nations of the North Atlantic alliance, both North American and European, are interdependent. Their collaboration must be organized on a basis of equal partnership. With this end in view, we are now seeking to enable Europe to play a more influential part in the policy-making, the management, and control of the nuclear power of the alliance. Western economic and defense policies must support each other. The Cold War is, in many ways, a total war. The Communist total challenge must be met by a total response—political, economic, and strategic.

His Excellency, The Right Honourable Sir David Ormsby Gore, K.C.M.G., is the Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States, a position he had held since 1961. He was a Member of Parliament, 1950–1961; Delegate to the United Nations, 1951 and 1954; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1956–1957; Minister of State, 1957–1961. He has been the leader of various British delegations to international disarmament conferences.

I WOULD like to discuss with you today the role of Europe, including Britain, in the economic development and the nuclear defense of the free world. You will note that I say "Europe including Britain," and I want to emphasize from the start that, whether we are talking about the New Europe or the Old Europe, about its economics, its politics, or its defense, any practical and rational definition of it must include Britain. It may seem strange that it should be necessary to emphasize a point so obvious. But, unfortunately, in the course of the long debate over whether the Common Market part of Europe should be enlarged to include the British part, we have begun to identify the Common Market with the whole of Europe. People then go on to talk about Britain's relations with Europe as if Britain were separate from it in accordance with some law of nature and had to create a relationship to it that would not otherwise exist. Finally, the false definition comes to be accepted as the basis for all sorts of unwarranted conclusions and loose talk about Europeans and Anglo-Saxons. Why some people pick on the Anglo-Saxons in this way I have never been able to make out. It frequently causes some restlessness among the descendants of the Celts, Picts, Danes, and Normans in my country who regard themselves as just as British as the Anglo-Saxons and therefore entitled to their fair share of opprobrium and insult from anyone who wishes to criticize Britain. I recognize, of course, that Anglo-Saxon is an even more inaccurate description of the American people.

In the course of the last four centuries, like most of the countries who

are now members of the Common Market, we have projected our influence onto other continents, established colonies which have now largely achieved independence, and built up world-wide commercial and financial connections. We are a world power today in the sense that we have capabilities, commitments, and close associations throughout the world. But we have never ceased to be a European power, never broken our links with Europe, and never been able to remain indifferent to European affairs. We derive our civilization from Greece and Rome. We have taken a part, and often a leading part, in all those great movements of the human spirit which have, in the past, provided the true grandeur of Europe. There has not been in this century, and there is not likely to be, a European war from which we could be excluded.

The unification of Europe including Britain is one of the fundamental objectives of British policy. After World War II, we were frequently the initiators of programs to unite Europe for the purposes, first of rehabilitation and recovery and, then, of defense. More recently, we have welcomed the formation of a limited European economic community involving the removal of barriers between the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe. Now, we want to see this area of unity expanded to include those other European countries whose economic and political systems makes their membership in it logical and feasible.

In Brussels in January 1963, this next radical move in the process of European unification was blocked when France, against the wishes of practically all of Europe, used its constitutional power of veto in the Common Market to exclude Britain from membership. I do not wish to go into all the issues involved in this highly controversial affair

This article is the text of an address to the Annual Spring Meeting, First Session, Friday morning, April 5. The question-and-answer session which followed the address is reproduced at the end of the article.

or to attempt to analyze its consequences or measures which could be taken to offset them. It has, of course, been a major setback to Western unity as well as to the expansion of European trade with the rest of the world.

EUROPE AND FREE-WORLD DEVELOPMENT

But, grave as this setback is, it does not invalidate the basic premises of the political and economic policies which we have been pursuing since the end of the war. It is these which, in effect, determine the role of Europe in the political and economic development of the free world.

These basic principles were set forth repeatedly in various international agreements and declarations after the war, a number of years before the Common Market was founded. Most of them find expression in one form or another in the Treaty of Rome itself. All the leading industrial countries of the free world are solemnly committed to the removal of barriers to trade, to the preservation of monetary stability, to the strengthening of world currencies, and to the allocation of part of their resources to increase the productive capacity and the living standards of the free world, particularly the less-developed part of it. These objectives have been proclaimed so often that they have come to sound like clichés; the phrases are worn so smooth by constant use that the mind sometimes slides over their practical significance when it comes to giving priority to various courses of action. In sum, these principles and objectives amount to a worldwide rejection of the concept of economic self-sufficiency and the acceptance of international interdependence as opposed to national, sectional, or even regional interests as the arbiter of policy.

EUROPEAN AID AND INVESTMENT

The objective which I would like to focus upon now in somewhat greater detail is the last one, namely the allocation of the resources of the industrialized countries to the development of the free world. It is timely to emphasize Europe's role in this because, despite the many statements made to the contrary by your experts and officials, there still seems to be a widespread impression that the European contribution is not comparable to that of the United States or even, as expressed in its most extreme form, that the European countries who have now achieved unprecedented prosperity with American assistance are somehow shirking their responsibilities.

The United States has indeed made massive contributions in foreign-aid programs since the end of the war. The most successful of these was, of course, the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery. A true measure of its success was that it was completed in a comparatively few years and that the recipient nations are now able to embark on aid programs of their own. Subsequent aid programs directed at other parts of the world have not followed this neat and highly desirable pattern. There is a not unnatural tendency for the worried taxpayer to express anxiety, particularly when a new foreign-aid program emerges just at a time when he is filling in his income-tax forms. At such a traumatic moment, he can reasonably be expected to ask whether the highly publicized "New Europe" he hears so much about is bearing its share of the burden.

Not unmindful of this sort of feeling, a committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development on which the leading industrial countries are represented has recently been compiling statistics on this sub-

ject. It should be reassuring for the taxpayer to find that, in recent years, Western European programs have been growing faster than United States programs. In fact, over the period 1956-1961, aid expenditure to the underdeveloped areas by European countries—including Britain, Canada, and Japan—were more than doubled, rising from \$1.2 billion to \$2.5 billion.

In magnitude, the United States contribution is, of course, still considerably greater than this, although it is diminishing from the high peak achieved in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The United States contribution is, of course, very much greater than that of Britain or any other European country. But so also are the resources available to the United States and the value of its gross national product. In fact, the United States gross national product is over seven times that of Britain.

BRITISH AID AND DEVELOPMENT

The best approach, therefore, to a fair comparison of burden-sharing would be to compare the proportion of the gross national product devoted each year by each country to aid and development including grants, grantlike aid such as the distribution of United States surpluses, and loans from both governmental and private sources to the developing countries. If you do this, you will find—perhaps it will come as an agreeable surprise to the taxpayer—that Britain contributes a greater proportion of its resources annually to the underdeveloped countries than does the United States.

The last year for which complete figures are available is 1961. In that year, we devoted 1.32 per cent of our gross national product to the development of these countries, while the United States devoted 0.98 per cent of its gross national product to this end.

The difference may not seem very great when expressed in percentages; expressed in dollars and cents it is quite considerable. In effect, it means that, if the United States had attempted to match the British contribution in proportion to its resources, your government and your investor would have had to put up between one and two billion dollars more on top of your actual outlay for 1961. These are only the figures for 1961. We did, however, substantially increase our overseas lending in 1962, and we should, therefore, make an even better showing for that year.

In calculating the effectiveness of British efforts as well as the burden which they impose upon us, another point should be borne in mind. A large part of the funds provided by the United States must, by law, be spent in the United States. In fact, according to the President's aid message in the first week of April 1963, 80 per cent of United States economic-aid funds for the coming year will be spent in the United States. There are strong balance-of-payments reasons for this, but, in our case, the proportion provided in "tied" loans is much smaller. The major part of the funds provided by the British investor can be spent freely by the recipient country wherever it can obtain the goods it needs at the best price.

Foreign aid and investment imposes a heavier burden on our balance of payments. Like the United States, Britain could, of course, relieve itself of periodic balance-of-payments headaches simply by eliminating all overseas programs and restricting British investment overseas. We believe, however, that, in the long run, such policies would be self-defeating, particularly if they were generally adopted by all the industrialized countries of the West now distributing aid. Ultimately, this would restrict international trade, hold up the flow of development capital, and finally

increase, not decrease, our balance-of-payments difficulties.

EUROPE AND THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE

I now come to the second half of my subject, the role of Europe in the defense, particularly the nuclear defense, of the free world. Here again the underlying fact which determines our policy is the inescapable interdependence of the nations of the North Atlantic alliance. No nation is in a position today to defend itself alone against the kind of military pressures with which the Communists confront us around the globe. Nor is it likely that any nation or unit smaller than the whole alliance will ever be able to act in isolation for the rest of our lifetime. Even if we restrict our considerations to the European area, it would be futile to think that Western Europe is able or will in the foreseeable future be able to defend itself against an attack from the Soviet Union without the assistance of the United States divisions now in Europe and the strategic force which the United States holds in reserve for the defense of Europe and the deterrence of any attack upon Europe. Likewise, the United States, despite its present nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, could not go it alone and ignore the European contribution to defense and abandon Europe strategically without involving itself in intolerable expenditures, inevitable isolation, and, ultimately, a disastrous and decisive swing in the balance of power to the Communists.

This being so, some form of close partnership between Europe and North America is essential and inevitable, and it is up to all of us to do whatever is required to make that partnership work as smoothly and as harmoniously as possible, to distribute the responsibility among the partners as evenly as the

actual distribution of power permits, and to strengthen the various institutions in which the partnership finds expression.

The solidarity of the will of the partners is vital to this at every stage, and, ultimately, it is upon this solidarity and upon any potential aggressor accepting and believing in that solidarity that the deterrent power of the alliance depends. We must, therefore, continually be on our guard against anything which spreads distrust among us of each other's intention or undermines confidence in the availability to each member of the alliance of the military resources of all.

The last British Ambassador to address this Academy was Lord Halifax. He spoke to you in March 1942, a few months after the United States had joined the United Nations alliance against Hitler. I read the text of his address the other day. He devoted practically the whole of it to warning against the dangers of distrust between the members of the alliance, a distrust which was being fed by Nazi propaganda, stressing such themes as alleged attempts by the United States to dominate the alliance, the subordination of British to American commanders, and the alleged refusal of Britain to contribute its fair share to the common effort. Communist propaganda today follows similar lines, but it has little impact in your country or mine. Some of these themes have, however, a familiar ring, and there is a by no means negligible danger today of distrust weakening the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. The consequence of such distrust today would be just as serious as the weakening of the war effort in the 1940's. The danger is that we might present an appearance of disunity to the Communists which would tempt them to enter upon some aggressive act through miscalculation and that this might start

the process of escalation towards global catastrophe.

We have had a fair measure of success to date in maintaining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance and in organizing collective planning and collective action. It has been claimed that this alliance has lasted longer than any other comparable alliance in history. Not an inch of territory has been conceded by a NATO country to the Communists since it was formed. But the problems involved in its organization are infinitely more complex than those of any previous alliance, and it requires a higher degree of integration. What we are seeking to organize within the alliance is a single collective system of defense, both conventional and nuclear, which will demonstrate, to friend and foe alike, our will to resist any aggression. But, in terms of nuclear warfare, such a system requires a single allied policy governing and controlling the forces of the alliance from the smallest conventional unit in the front line up to the strategic nuclear strike itself. It also requires a unified allied command system capable of executing this policy in a time of crisis.

If such a collective system is to work harmoniously, it must be based upon acceptance of the principle of equal partnership. Our most pressing problem today is to find a means of reconciling this principle with the fact that nuclear power is so unequally divided between the members of the alliance—more specifically, so unequally divided between the United States and Europe. Our objective, therefore, is, within the terms of the alliance, to enable Europe to play a more influential part in the policy-making, the management and control of the nuclear power of the alliance. That is the problem which we have been attempting to resolve through the Nassau agreement and the

current negotiations between the members of the alliance. It involves highly technical questions of civilian control over the use of force from the first moment of a crisis and on through all stages of possible conflict. It also involves the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need to strengthen the integrated power of the alliance as a whole without running into the risks which might follow such proliferation.

The proposal for an interallied nuclear force which your President and my Prime Minister sketched out at the Nassau conference last December is one attempt to meet these requirements. Our hope is that this will be a genuine interallied effort in which all the countries making contributions to the force will have an effective voice in its management and control.

CONCLUSION

I have referred to the interdependence of the Western nations in their efforts to advance free-world economic development and to organize their nuclear defense. It is important to remember that the economic and defense policies which we pursue are also themselves interdependent and must support each other. In the kind of struggle in which we are engaged, communism cannot be successfully resisted by a nineteenth-century system of purely military alliances covering this or that geographical area of the world. We can only defend our way of life against Communist efforts to bury us through increased collaboration and the harmonization of our efforts in many fields other than those traditionally covered by old-fashioned treaties of alliance. That is why those voices in Europe which suggest that the importance of NATO is diminishing are out of touch with the realities of the modern world.

For the Cold War is, in many ways, a total war. We must meet the Communists' total challenge by a total re-

sponse in which all our policies—political, economic, and strategic—support each other.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: What comment do you have as to the necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency of foreign aid in the light of reports that there has been waste in our program?

A: I think that there are two quite separate problems here. One, is there a necessity for foreign aid? Second, if you have established that there is a necessity for foreign aid, are you providing it in an effective and efficient manner?

I am not going to enter into any arguments as to how efficient American aid is. That quite clearly is not my job. But I suspect that, in all human endeavors, there are, in fact, cases of inefficiency, and where you find cases of inefficiency quite obviously you ought to try to remove them. I rather doubt that you will ever have a perfect foreign-aid program, because it is not in the nature of human affairs that you have a perfect anything. Of course you can find cases—we have had cases in our own foreign-aid program—of waste of money, of inefficient use of resources.

I think the major problem that we have to face is what proportion of our resources—what proportion of the resources in the highly developed part of the world and in those countries, like the United States, which have an exceptionally high standard of living—ought reasonably to be provided to help countries that are much less well off.

I have no doubt that all of us feel that quite a substantial proportion of our gross national product ought to be provided for this purpose—on moral

grounds, on grounds of self-interest even. We feel this very strongly in the United Kingdom, and we are going to do our best gradually to increase our foreign aid over the years. We feel that this is an absolute necessity in the modern world. So I do not think that the finding of a piece of inefficiency in the operation of foreign aid really in any way runs contrary to the main principle which I have tried to enunciate during the course of my speech.

Q: How deep-seated is Labour opposition to the Common Market? How might a Labour victory in the next election affect Britain's position toward the Common Market?

A: The Labour party did not in fact come out as opposed to British membership in the Common Market. They did attach to any attempts to enter the Common Market a number of conditions which I think the present Government felt would be quite difficult to achieve—if not impossible to achieve. I do not think that the Labour party in Great Britain wished to make a final judgment until they had seen the end of negotiations.

In the summer of 1961, when the Government decided to enter upon these negotiations for the full membership in the Common Market, there was a debate in the House of Commons at which a resolution was passed in favor of proceeding with these negotiations, which was not voted against by the Labour party. There were sections

within the Labour party that were very enthusiastic about Great Britain getting into the Common Market. It is true that some of the leadership were not so enthusiastic, but they never actually opposed it. What they have said from time to time is that they would require rather specific terms before they would go in. One of the conditions that they would lay down is that the Common Market itself must prove that it is an outward-looking organization. That is to say, it would not conduct its economic policy in such a way as seriously to damage a number of Commonwealth countries, particularly the primary producers. I think that this is a concern of all of us. Perhaps our concern is misplaced. But we would all feel disturbed if any unit, like the Common Market, pursued policies which excluded goods flowing from the underdeveloped countries, particularly the primary-producer countries, because this would be a rather reactionary move and in the opposite direction to the way we have been trying to go in the years since the war, since the formation of the GATT and so on. So, I think that this was a concern that was very much in the minds of the people of the Labour party but was to some extent in the minds of everybody in Great Britain—that we should be joining an organization that was outward-looking and liberal in its trading policies and not one that was autarchic and anxious to build up a self-sufficient unit and to exclude imports from the other parts of the world.

Q: Would it be true to say that an appreciable part of our future prosperity will depend upon the amount of foreign aid that we give?

A: I think, if you look to the future, one of the things that we must

hope for is a steady expansion in world trade. In many countries which we would like to trade with, there will not be significant growth in the economy unless someone goes and primes the pump. It may not just be money, but technical aid, all different sorts of aid. Unless we give aid to some of these other countries, they will not be able to expand their economies and, therefore, there will not be that growth in general world trade which all of us wish to see. One of the reasons we wish to see it is that our productive capacity is expanding rapidly year by year in both the United Kingdom and the United States. At the present time, there are unused resources. This is what I have already described as a pump-priming operation. If we can give help to other countries which will start them on the road to economic expansion themselves, this will in the end redound to our advantage as well as to the advantage of the country that receives the aid, because there will be a substantial increase in production both in that country and, resulting from that, greater demands on the productive capacity of our country that is giving the aid. Therefore, this is something which generates new trade, a new expansion of industry, both in the recipient country and in the giving country.

Q: Assuming that Britain will eventually join the Common Market, what conditions regarding the Commonwealth countries might be made and what type of economic effects might this have on those Commonwealth countries?

A: This is a difficult question to answer because, while I do believe that one day we will be full members of the Common Market, I think it is very

hard to forecast at the present time when that will be. If one does not know when it will be, it is hard to see exactly what the conditions would be at the time we obtain membership.

Taking the situation which developed during the negotiations which lasted from October 1961 to January 1963, the Commonwealth problem was really divided into two parts.

There was the problem of industrial goods from Commonwealth countries—that is to say, manufactured goods from Canada or Australia or, in some cases, manufactured goods from India or Pakistan, chiefly textiles. You had to deal with them separately. I think it was understood that, by the end of the transition period, when the Common Market came into full operation, say by 1970, the United Kingdom would have to have exactly the same external tariffs as the other members of the Common Market. That meant that Commonwealth preferences in tariffs would have to be phased out over this period so that, at the end of the road, industrial goods, manufactured goods, coming in from any Commonwealth country to the Common Market, including the United Kingdom, would then have to pay the full external tariffs.

This, if phased out over a period of time, I do not think would have caused too much difficulty for the Commonwealth countries. In the case of Canada, for instance, you have a very diversified economy. If given time, the disruption in her economy caused by the slight change in tariff structures would not have been too much of a burden for her to bear. There were greater difficulties over the more simply manufactured goods like textiles. Indeed, I think textiles have become a problem for all of us. If we are going to encourage developing nations to set up industries, they very likely will start off by setting up textile industries.

Having begun the manufacture of textiles, if we then say we will not allow any of these into our country or only a very limited proportion, we are not really giving them very much assistance. Therefore, we worked out with the Common Market a scheme by which quite large quotas of textile goods would come in from India and Pakistan and Hong Kong and so on to the Common Market in much the same way as they do into the British market without any tariff against them.

Perhaps the Commonwealth countries were not all wholly satisfied with the way we had dealt with the manufactured-goods problem, but they recognize that, if we were to go into the Common Market, everybody would have to make some sacrifices if this was in the general good. We had to make sacrifices ourselves in many areas. I think that the difficulties over trade with the Commonwealth and the Common Market in industrial and manufactured goods were solvable and had, indeed, to a large extent, already been solved.

Where we were in much greater difficulty was over raw materials and particularly temperate foodstuffs. Here again, this is really a global problem and not one just confined to the difficulties we ran into in the negotiations over the Common Market. In those countries like Australia, New Zealand, and, to some extent, Canada—Canada with her wheat, New Zealand with a large quantity of dairy products—we were trying to get an arrangement which would ensure that, after we went into the Common Market, barriers would not be put up against agricultural products coming into the United Kingdom or into the Common Market in such a way that it seriously disrupted the economies of these countries. This was the problem that we had not yet solved. We had gone some way toward solving it. There had been

agreement on the calling together of a general conference on some of the main commodities. I think that this is really the only way we are going to solve it world-wide in any case. Perhaps it will be possible to proceed in this direction even though we have not gone into the Common Market.

Then there were very special cases, like New Zealand, whose main exports are, in fact, agricultural products, and the Six had promised to treat New Zealand as a very special case. It is a comparatively small country—2.5 million inhabitants. We felt that it was not beyond the wit of man to find some arrangement which would allow a continuation of agricultural exports from New Zealand to come into the European market on more or less the same terms as they have done in the past. This would have been satisfactory for New Zealand, and, for a small country like that, it should not have too much impact on a community which, with our accession, would have amounted to something over 250 million people. We believed that we could find a solution to that, but it would be fair to say that we had not found one by the time the talks were broken off in January.

Q: My question concerns the allocation of resources. Would you discuss the problem of meeting all of your commitments—in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, throughout the world—within the limited resources of Great Britain.

A: The problems that face us seem to be very similar to the problems that face the United States at the present time, although ours are all around on a slightly smaller scale, even a substantially smaller scale. It is a problem, particularly in an age in which your weapons systems become more

and more expensive. Even in 1939 you could buy a fighter aircraft for about £30 thousand, about \$100 thousand, not much more than that. Now the price of an equivalent airplane would be at least ten times that. Therefore, there is a tremendous pull from one direction or another on our resources.

We have had to give up our commitments in a good many parts of the world. We used to have more bases in the Middle East, in Africa, and in the Far East. We have had to whittle these down substantially. Our main overseas bases, apart from our commitment in Europe, are in Aden, which is placed so as to give us a good defensive capability in this very important area of the Persian Gulf where something between 60 and 70 per cent of all the oil reserves in the world are located. We have additional bases in Singapore and smaller bases in Cyprus in the Mediterranean and in other places around the world. But this does stretch our resources very thinly on the ground.

Sometimes, I know, we are criticized for not having a larger commitment on the continent of Europe. I think it is fair to say that, with the exception of the United States, nobody else who is contributing to the forces in Europe has the same world-wide commitments. When we look at those particular commitments, if we withdrew from them—for instance, in the particular areas where we now operate in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia—there would really be nobody else who could take over that commitment. The United States does not have territory or bases in the Middle East which would enable them to take over from us the commitment which we would lay down. Therefore, we do give these overseas commitments outside Europe a very high priority. That has meant that we do not make a contribution on

the continent of Europe such as people might expect us to make if they look at the size of our population and ignore these other considerations. We have undertaken to keep 55,000 ground troops in Western Europe, and we have various tactical air forces in addition to that. I should think that the total of our forces on the continent of Europe is about 70,000. Of course, our reserves are very close by—only twenty miles across the Channel—and we do have reserve divisions which can be taken across in very quick time. We feel, under present conditions, that this is about the maximum we can do. If we tried to do more in Europe, it would mean withdrawing from these other areas, where there would be nobody else who could undertake the commitment.

Q: Was the option at any time open to Great Britain to combine her nuclear potential with that of Europe and thus to obtain membership in the Common Market?

A: I do not think that option was in fact open to us—on a number of grounds. First, the co-operation between the United States and the United Kingdom in atomic weapons goes right back to the war period. It was some of our scientists who very largely established the theory of the atom bomb, and it was agreed between us that the whole operation should be transferred to the United States in wartime because we were under constant bombing. Therefore, the decision to go ahead with the development of atomic weapons was a joint United States-United Kingdom decision, and the actual development, it was decided between us, was to take place in the United States. With a short gap in the late forties and early fifties, that co-operation has

continued. The result is that, at the present time, it would be almost impossible to say that certain parts of the atomic weapon were wholly British or that they contained absolutely no know-how from the United States. And the United States uses information they obtained from us. The thing is completely intermingled. Therefore, we could not have made an offer to France to hand over all our know-how on nuclear weapons without the agreement of the United States. I do not think that agreement would have been forthcoming, and we never asked to be given that agreement.

To get down to some of the fundamentals of this whole situation, we are not really anxious to see Europe built up as a separate entity in contradistinction to our allies on the other side of the Atlantic—in Canada and the United States. We envision the alliance as an Atlantic alliance in which the United States and Canada play an absolutely vital part. The concept of a Europe which is designed to exclude the United States influence from Europe is not a design in which we have any confidence. I think it would be fair to say—certainly this is the impression we got—that we were not excluded on economic grounds. Indeed, if you read General de Gaulle's press conference, I do not think you would suppose that it was on economic grounds. It seemed to be that we were regarded as a country which wished to see the United States influence in Europe retained, that we wished to see a continuing partnership—and a very close partnership—between Europe and our friends and allies on the other side of the Atlantic. I think it was the feeling that we would pursue this policy inside the Common Market which made General de Gaulle feel that it would be much better if we were excluded. I think, probably, so long as General de Gaulle is there, the

price of our getting into the Common Market is to show that we are less closely aligned in our policy with the United States. This goes for nuclear weapons and our general political approach to the problems of the world. That is why I do not think simply to have handed over some nuclear weapons or some nuclear know-how to France would have been very significant even if we could have done it legally—which I do not think we could without the agreement of the United States.

Q: I would like to challenge three theses which you advanced today. The first relates to Britain's part in the post-war movements toward European unity. I speak as a member of the Labour party at the end of the war. There was no doubt that our main concern was with what remained of the Empire and with domestic affairs, and the great opportunity to move forward in Europe was completely neglected and lost. Second, during the Conservative regime, when the Coal and Steel Community was being discussed, I think I remember the then Prime Minister—who has recently been honored with American citizenship by Congress—saying that he did not feel that anybody should tell the British farmer how many tomatoes he should grow or the British miner how many tons of coal he should dig. There has been in British policy, I submit, a certain alienation in our relationship toward Europe. It has been easier for a man from Pakistan or the West Indies to come to Britain to find work than from a German or a Frenchman. The only job a girl from Europe could get in England would be a domestic job; someone from a member of the Commonwealth could come to work without any trouble at all.

The second point relates to foreign aid. I feel that foreign aid and its

desirability must be regarded in terms of the economic life of the country itself, and I believe that the present economic depression in England can be traced to the fact that an undue amount of taxable income has been sent abroad rather than been used in the private or public sector for reinvestment in British industry. I hope that the United States will not make a similar mistake in the future.

Third, in the matter of defense, I would say that it is incorrect to assert that Europe cannot defend herself either actively or in terms of deterrent power against Soviet expansion. I think that 250 million people who are well-educated and have brains and ability could defend themselves against the Soviet threat and that the United States could withdraw under certain circumstances and devote its power and its money more to this hemisphere.

A: The first point is the extent to which we dragged our feet about going into Europe. I think that it is a criticism that could be leveled at a series of British governments since the war. I would like, if I may, to put the historical facts right. The Coal and Steel Community—the Schuman Plan—was advanced during the last period of the Labour Government. It was, therefore, a Labour Government in England that refused to take part in the Schuman Plan. It was a Conservative Government that stood aside from the Rome Treaty negotiations. There was then a period in which there was an attempt to form a free-trade area in Europe, which fell to the ground, no doubt for what seemed to be perfectly good reasons to the other European countries. Again, I think, at that time, it was true to say that most of the European countries, with the exception of France, wished to see the free-trade area agreed upon.

How well one can make the charge stick that the United Kingdom was very slow about going into Europe, I am not quite sure. As you know, I was, at one time, a politician. When I see the reluctance of many British people to support the negotiations, even as late as 1962, I am not sure whether, in any earlier year, any party, of any color or denomination, would have been able to get full support from the British people for a negotiation to go into Europe. I think that it was quite a transformation which was required in the minds of the British people. For reasons of history, they had felt themselves independent, had felt no necessity to tie themselves up with the continent of Europe for the past four or five hundred years. They had come victorious out of the war. They found it very hard to understand why it should now be necessary to form a single unit in Western Europe. Therefore, you could argue—in terms of history over many generations—that a decision by a British Government, perhaps even more surprisingly a decision by a Conservative Government, to try to become a full member of the European community by 1961 is in some ways a rather remarkable and significant fact—that you could have persuaded the population that this was a necessity by that date.

I would say, viewed *in vacuo* without the need to persuade the population to support the policies, there seems, looking back at it, to have been great advantage in our going in at a much earlier date. Perhaps we would have had much greater say in the gradual build-up of Europe and the form which that build-up should take. I think, in that respect, that the Coal and Steel Community was the first missed opportunity. Therefore, I would not say that we are without error in this, but, if we were in error, we were trying to correct the error in 1961, and I do not

think it is helpful at this stage to say whether it would have been wiser to have gone in earlier. We did finally take the decision that we should become full members of the Common Market, and I think it is a great misfortune for Western Europe and for us—indeed, for the Western world—that we have not been able to become members of the Common Market this year.

Your second point dealt with foreign aid, whether by providing too much foreign aid you do not starve your home industries. I think that there is something in this argument, but it is really a question of how you divide up your resources. If there is a feeling that capital investment at home, the modernization of our factories, has not gone forward fast enough, the additional resources needed must not necessarily come out of foreign aid. They could come from lower consumption at home, not quite so many of the frills of life. I am bound to say, when I look at the standard of living in the United Kingdom or in the United States, I do not think it is an unfair burden on either of our countries that we should try to find one per cent of our gross national product to help the less fortunate countries in the world.

The final point was the question of the ability of Europe to defend itself without the United States. I think, if you project your mind into the future, it certainly would be possible in time for Western Europe to provide the conventional forces to meet the Communist conventional forces in Europe. I agree that, with 250 million people, technically highly efficient, it should be possible in time. At the moment, I think that the withdrawal of the five American divisions would be absolutely disastrous for NATO. When it comes to nuclear defense, the question is whether it is wise—knowing that the United

States has overwhelming nuclear power, knowing that so long as we remain allied with the United States the United States has the power to destroy the Soviet Union several times over—whether it makes sense to build up in Europe exactly equivalent nuclear power when we think we are going to be on the same side—at least, that is what I hope. Therefore, I would agree with you that one day it should be possible for Europe to defend itself conventionally. I think it would be fruitless for Europe to build up the same kind of nuclear potential that is provided already by the United States of America.

Q: Is it correct to say that Great Britain wishes the developing European community to be open ended, rather than closed? And, as to federation or confederation, which is Britain's preference? What of Atlantic federation?

A: The first part of your question, whether our wish would be that Europe should develop in an open-ended way, as you put it—that is to say, with the prospect of other people joining—yes, that is our concept. We would have hoped that this unit gradually would come to include all countries of Western Europe, including neutral ones as well as the ones committed to NATO. That was our concept, and we believe that it was the concept of those who actually negotiated the Treaty of Rome, because, if you read the text of the treaty, you will find that it does hold open the door to full membership or associate membership to all the other countries of Europe. That was the view we took of it. We do not like the prospect of a closed unit which would exclude us and a lot of other people as well.

On the question of federation or confederation, we are rather pragmatic in the United Kingdom. We are not too keen on having rather elaborate blueprints about what would be the ideal world or the ideal solution to all our problems some many years ahead. I think we would shy away from the idea of early federation with political institutions which would virtually exclude the existing sovereignty which we retain in the United Kingdom. Using the term very loosely, I think we would have favored something more in the nature of a confederation of independent sovereign states. We think that it is more likely that co-operation will develop along those lines. I think that we would be happy to see it gradually develop on an Atlantic basis. I think in this respect, perhaps, the prospects do not look as good on this side of the Atlantic as on the European side. The desire to see a kind of organization set up which requires the abandonment of a certain amount of sovereignty is something which individual nations, each of them, have to get used to. I do not think that we in Great Britain are prepared to surrender a great deal of sovereignty. We were prepared to surrender some in going into the Common Market. Indeed, in every organization one goes into, one surrenders some sovereignty if one undertakes to pursue action by general agreement without insisting on a veto for oneself. So, we have moved some way from total sovereignty, and we were and are prepared to move farther away from it. Whether there is the same feeling on this side of the Atlantic is not for me to judge, but, I would say, looked at from the point of view of the United Kingdom, the gradual development of a society which would embrace both sides of the Atlantic is something which most of us find an agreeable prospect.

Community Economic Relations with Associated African States and Other Countries

By JACOB J. VAN DER LEE

ABSTRACT: Associated with the six European countries in the European Economic Community, or Common Market, are a number of independent states in Africa and Madagascar. At the time of the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome, these states were, for the most part, dependent overseas territories of the European countries—especially of France, who had to reconcile her membership in the European Economic Community with the economic system in operation between metropolitan France and the overseas dependencies. The system of association which became part of the Treaty of Rome was designed to establish a commercial preference for the benefit of the associated countries and territories and to assist them in their infrastructural social and economic development through investment aid from the Community. During the first five-year period of the Common Market, 1958–1962, many of the associated territories became sovereign and independent states. In 1962 negotiations took place in Brussels among the governments of the associated states in Africa and Madagascar and the Six. Just before the end of the year, a convention—undoubtedly an improvement over the previous system—was initialed. The challenge which now faces the European Economic Community is whether or not the system provided under the new convention can be extended to other countries in Africa and the West Indies.

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A CONTROVERSIAL subject was introduced to the negotiations on the treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) when, in 1956, the French government of Prime Minister Guy Mollet demanded that a system of association for the dependent territories of the member countries of the Six be established.

Germany and the Netherlands in particular disliked the principle of associating the dependent overseas territories of the Six with the Common Market. The German Federal Republic had no direct responsibilities in overseas countries, and the Netherlands was afraid of jeopardizing its postcolonial policy of establishing relations with the newly independent nations of the world through the intermediary of the United Nations.

Belgium, responsible for the Congo, and Italy, which held the trusteeship of Somalia for the United Nations, however, were willing to support the French demand.

France herself undoubtedly was right in suggesting a system of association. She had already granted a large measure of internal autonomy to her dependencies in Africa and Madagascar, and she was faced with the dilemma of reconciling her membership in the European Economic Community with the economic system established between metropolitan France and the overseas dependencies of France.

Within the framework of the French colonial system, metropolitan France had to a very large extent reserved her market for imports of tropical commodities from the overseas dependencies. Prices, which in many cases were artificial as compared with world-market prices, had been guaranteed to the overseas producers. France's overseas dependencies had been assured of outlets and guaranteed prices by means of this system.

It was obvious, on the one hand, that

such a system would not be compatible with the treaty of the European Economic Community and, on the other hand, that the overseas dependencies could not possibly absorb the shock of having to adjust to the requirements of an integrated European economy unless a system of aiding them in such adjustment were established in the treaty. Therefore, the system of association in the Treaty of Rome was designed to establish a commercial preference for the benefit of the associated countries in the Common Market and to assist them in their infrastructural social and economic development through investment aid from the Community.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP

Preferential treatment of imports from the associated overseas countries was to be promoted by granting them the advantages of the tariff reductions that, under the treaty, would apply to the six member states. Once the common external tariff of the Community would definitely have been established, the associated countries would enjoy free entry of their commodities in the Common Market, whereas third countries would only enter the Market by getting across the tariff wall established by the common external tariff. As far as investment aid was concerned, the Treaty established a \$581 million Investment Fund for a first period of five years, from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1962. A third element in the system of association was the principle of nondiscrimination in the establishment of nationals of the six EEC countries in the associated overseas territories.

The associated overseas territories were not required to reciprocate the preferential treatment gradually granted to them. The Treaty of Rome specifically asserted their right to "levy such custom duties as are necessitated by

their need of development and industrialization or are of a special nature and are intended to contribute to their budgets." This important clause was designed to protect infant industries in the associated countries against competition from the member countries of EEC.

Under the system described above, the Six finally agreed to bring into association with the Common Market the French and Belgian dependent territories in Africa and Madagascar, Italian Somaliland, and Netherlands New Guinea. The majority of the associated territories are situated on the African continent.

There was some hesitation among African leaders over the benefits of the system. They had not participated in the negotiations among the Six and were afraid that association might become a block on the road toward the independence of the colonies in Africa.

In declarations of intention attached to the treaty, the Six provided for negotiations with other overseas countries with which the member countries entertained close economic relations. Such declarations of intention were established for the benefit of the then independent countries of the franc zone (Tunisia and Morocco), for the Kingdom of Libya, and for the autonomous overseas countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Surinam (Netherlands Guiana), and the Netherlands Antilles. In 1962 Surinam became associated under these provisions with the Community, and negotiations for the Netherlands Antilles also were concluded in 1962. Formal negotiations with Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya have so far not been initiated.

DEVELOPMENT, 1958-1962

As long as the status of the associated countries and territories remained subject to control from a metropolitan country, the development of the system

of association remained a somewhat hazardous undertaking. The EEC treaty had endowed the European Commission with certain powers concerning the investment projects to be carried out in the associated countries, the right of establishment, and the trade relations between the Community and the associated countries. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Brussels institutions and the authorities in the associated countries remained subject to a certain measure of control by the metropolitan countries which were responsible for the over-all relationship between themselves and their dependencies.

This situation, however, was entirely changed in 1960, the year of African independence, during which practically all the associated countries in Africa and Madagascar became sovereign and independent states. With the exception of Guinea, the governments of these countries all required that the association between their countries and EEC be continued.

In 1960, therefore, the Community was faced with the problem of how to adjust the system of association to the new status of independence of the overseas associates. The Community decided in October 1960 that the association would continue "until further order," which meant until December 31, 1962, the date of expiration of the five-year period of investment aid provided for under the treaty. It was also decided at the same time that relations between the European institutions in Brussels and the governments of the associated states would henceforward be direct relations and that the governments of the associated states could, if they wished to do so, accredit representatives with the European institutions in Brussels.

Finally, it was decided that in 1962 a multilateral negotiation should take place among the Six and the associated

states for the purpose of determining the system of association to be effective from January 1, 1963.

WHAT ASSOCIATION HAS MEANT

The system of association established by the Treaty of Rome has been severely criticized during the past five years, especially because of the so-called preferential system. Such criticisms have been voiced in particular by countries producing tropical commodities of the same type as those produced by the associated countries. Latin-American countries and Commonwealth countries in Africa and in Asia have repeatedly stated that the system of association established by the treaty would endanger their trade with the European Economic Community. It has also been argued that the Community, through associating the former French, Belgian, and Italian territories in Africa with the Community, was dividing Africa itself, at the very moment of independence, into two groups, associated and nonassociated African states. The United States government, which, over the years, has loyally and faithfully supported European integration, has, on various occasions, voiced her anxiety about the discriminatory effects of the system of association.

The figures for trade between the European Economic Community and third countries producing tropical commodities over the last five years do show that, so far, the fears expressed about the preferential system have been unfounded. Trade between nonassociated producers of tropical commodities and the Common Market has increased to a far greater extent than trade between the associated states and EEC. This development is due in part to the fact that the common external tariff has not yet been finally established and

also in part to the need of the associated countries to adjust themselves to the new situation. It is obvious that the system of association has not given them great advantages in the field of trade with the Community.

Investment aid, however, has been of far greater importance. The initiative for such investments rests with the governments of the associated states. They submit the projects selected by them for investment to the European Commission, which itself has no right of initiative. Investment aid in the associated states has been directed to a great variety of projects in education, training facilities, health services, irrigation projects, improvement of communications, road building, harbor improvement, the construction of hospitals, schools, and so on. The Community also grants scholarships for training in EEC member countries to students from the associated countries.

The \$581 million provided for investment aid under the treaty had been largely committed by the end of 1962.

The development of the association has been much more favorable than the negotiators of the treaty ever dared to hope. A relationship of close co-operation and reciprocal confidence between the governments of the associated countries and the European institutions in Brussels has developed over the first five-year period. The presence of the representatives of the associated governments in Brussels guarantees a close co-operation between the European institutions and the associated governments. Also, in view of the requirements of investment aid through the European Investment Fund, technical missions of the European Commission regularly visit the associated states for consultations on the spot. A drawback undoubtedly is that the European Commission has not, so far, been allowed to establish representations in

the associated countries. Members of the governments of those countries, however, regularly visit the headquarters of the European Commission for consultations with the Commission and its staff.

The Commission has also established a program through which several thousands of nationals of the associated countries, notably students, have been visiting the Brussels headquarters and the six member countries of the EEC for information courses. A scholarship program provides opportunities for study in institutions of technical training and higher education in the six member countries. Senior officials of the governments of the associated countries work for periods from four to nine months with members of the Commission staff in Brussels. The relationship thus established has greatly contributed to a better mutual understanding between the associated states and the Six.

PREPARATIONS FOR RENEWING THE ASSOCIATION

An important and interesting phenomenon in the development of European integration is the active role the European Parliament is playing as a dynamic element in the development toward European economic and political unity. It is not surprising, therefore, that already in early 1961 the European Parliament took an initiative concerning the renewal of the system of association. A working group of members of the European Parliament and of members of the parliaments of the associated states was convened in January 1961. Later in the year, a conference of European and African parliamentarians met in Strasbourg to discuss the principles of renewing the system of association in 1963. This conference adopted a number of resolutions, of

which the influence on the new convention of association has not been without importance. The conference also made it possible for members of African parliaments to become closely associated with their European colleagues and did establish, as it were, a counterpart to the already existing relationship between the associated governments of Africa and Madagascar on the one hand and the European institutions on the other hand. The working party mentioned before has continued to exist since the Strasbourg conference and has met on several occasions both in Africa and in Europe with the purpose of following closely and also influencing the developments on the level of governments.

In the summer of 1961, the Commission of the EEC submitted a memorandum to the Council of Ministers in which the Commission outlined the principles that, in its opinion, ought to apply in the negotiations among the associated states and the Six for renewing the association. The Commission suggested that the common external tariff of the Community on tropical commodities should be reduced so as to decrease discrimination against third countries producing the same type of commodities. It was further suggested that investment aid to the associated states should be considerably increased and that the new convention of association should be open to countries situated in the same regions as the associated states and which are of comparable economic structure. In making these suggestions, the Commission made clear its awareness of the criticism that the system of association, in being exclusive, did not sufficiently take into account the need for stimulating regional co-operation and development in Africa. The Commission also suggested that, under the new association convention, institutions should be established

which would enable the associated governments to participate with the six member states of the EEC in carrying out the provisions of the new convention. These institutions would also provide for a forum where consultations among the associated states and the Six could take place on all technical and economic problems involved in the association and in the development of the relationship between the Community and third countries.

In the autumn of 1961, negotiations began between the Six and the United Kingdom on the subject of membership for the latter in the EEC. The problem of the relationship between the European Economic Community and the developing countries of the Commonwealth was to play an important role in these negotiations.

From the outset of the negotiations, the United Kingdom government proposed that the system of association provided for by the Treaty of Rome should be extended to the developing countries of the Commonwealth in Africa and in the Caribbean area. The dependent countries of the Commonwealth were to be associated through the intermediary of the United Kingdom government, whereas the independent countries would have to decide for themselves whether they were to seek for association or whether they were to prefer other solutions to their relationship with EEC. In view of the importance of the trade relations between a considerable number of Commonwealth countries, particularly in Africa, and EEC countries, association appeared to be the most favorable solution. The United Kingdom view on this matter corresponded with the Commission's suggestion to open the renewed system of association and was favorably received by the member countries of the Six. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, the problems of

association never presented a major obstacle.

1962 NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations provided for by the 1960 decision of the Council of Ministers of EEC began in December 1961. A ministerial conference took place during which the ministers of the associated states as well as their colleagues of the Six stated their position on the new convention of association. Three working parties were established to deal with trade problems, financial and technical assistance, and institutional problems. These working parties, on which representatives of the associated governments and the governments of the Six sat together with representatives of the European Commission, started their work early in 1962 in Brussels. Their busiest time was the first six months of that year. Ministerial meetings of the Six and the eighteen associated African and Madagascar governments were held throughout the year according to the results of the deliberations of the aforementioned working parties.

Divergencies of opinion existed on both sides. As for the Six, the principal bone of contention was the problem of preferential treatment for the benefit of the associated countries. Two tendencies persisted among the Six: Germany and the Netherlands wanted to extend the preferential treatment to other countries of the same economic structure in Africa and would have liked to abolish preferential treatment in order to avoid discrimination among third countries as a whole. France attempted to maintain, in the first place, the relationship between the countries associated in 1958 and EEC. Belgium and Italy followed a middle course. The eighteen associated African and Madagascar states were not always

united in their view of the system of association to be established.

It should be remembered that political tendencies within the group of associated states range from a position of neutralism and nonalignment to a preference for working closely with the former mother country. The remarkable phenomenon of this negotiation has been that, in spite of differences and divergencies in the two groups, they always finally succeeded in presenting a common opinion in the negotiation. It has been proven possible to establish agreement between, on the one hand, eighteen young and developing nations and, on the other hand, six highly developed industrial nations of the Western world. This in itself would appear to be a phenomenon that offers great hope for the possibility of co-operation between developing countries and highly industrialized nations which among themselves are seeking to promote economic integration.

The new convention establishing association between the independent nations of Africa and Madagascar and the European Economic Community was initiated by the twenty-four negotiating governments during the fifth ministerial meeting of the interested governments in Brussels just before Christmas 1962.

The new convention would seem to be an improvement on the system that has existed so far. It has been concluded again for a period of five years and will, therefore, have to be renegotiated in 1967. The new system is based on the principles that had already been defined by the Strasbourg conference of 1961 and by the suggestions of the European Commission of that same year. The convention undertakes to reduce the common external tariff on tropical commodities by 25 to 40 per cent, thereby decreasing discrimination against third countries. The associated governments were disposed

to follow this line of policy because they felt that this would be in the interest of gradually promoting equal treatment in matters of trade and commerce toward nonassociated countries in geographical regions which are economically of the same structure. The logical consequence of this decision was to open the new convention to adhesion by such countries. Under the new system, it has become possible, for example, for Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the Caribbean area to adhere to the convention and thereby to obtain free entry for their commodities in the Common Market. The sacrifice made by the states associated under the 1958 to 1963 system should not be underestimated, because they are well aware of the advantages some of the African Commonwealth countries have by tradition enjoyed in some of the member countries of the European Economic Community. It is also important to note that the rupture in the negotiations with the United Kingdom does not affect the possibility of admitting Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the Caribbean area to the group of associated countries.

The European Economic Community also demonstrated its willingness to promote regional co-operation between associated and nonassociated countries by agreeing during the negotiations on an article in the new convention which allows establishing customs unions, free-trade areas, and other types of economic agreements between associated and non-associated countries in the same geographical areas.

The new convention restates the articles of the Treaty of Rome which allow associated states to establish tariffs against EEC for the purposes of protecting infant industries, for development, and for budgetary purposes. It again agrees to promote industrial development in the associated countries.

But it goes much further than the system that has existed so far.

The concession made by the associated countries in decreasing the common external tariff and thereby the preferential treatment they would finally have enjoyed in the Common Market has been compensated to a certain extent by the increase in investment aid for the period of duration of the new convention. This convention provides for a total of \$800 million for the 1963 to 1968 period. The method of extending such investment aid is more diversified than it had been during the first five-year period. The new convention provides for a whole range of methods of technical and financial assistance including long-term loans; previously, investment aid could only be directed toward infrastructural social and economic projects. It is very important also that aid can be given to associated countries for assisting them in adjusting the prices of their commodities to the world-market level. A timetable has been established in the new convention for this purpose. The convention also provides for joined institutions of the associated states and EEC member countries that will be responsible for carrying out the provisions of the convention. A ministerial council of association and a committee of association to assist it are the principal institutions established under the new convention. The latter institution will have to meet very regularly so as to deal with everyday problems; the ministerial council will meet at least once a year. The system of co-operation on the parliamentary level will be crystallized by means of a parliamentary committee composed jointly of members of the European Parliament and of members of the parliaments of the associated states. Conflicts of a juridical nature will have to be settled by a court of arbitration.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

As stated before, the new association convention was initialed just before Christmas 1962. Signature and ratification of the convention were at that time expected to take place, respectively, early in 1963 and during the first six months of this year. The convention would thus have come into force in the late summer or early autumn of 1963. The rupture in the negotiations between EEC and the United Kingdom, however, has upset these expectations. Italy and the Netherlands declared themselves unable to proceed to signature of the new convention. The associated governments in Africa and Madagascar reacted to the postponement of signature and expressed anxiety as to the future of the new convention. At the moment of the writing this article, it is hoped that the meeting of the ministerial council of EEC in early April will produce agreement on a date for signature. The Italian government has declared its willingness to sign the new convention after the general elections in Italy, and the government of the Netherlands has restated its willingness to accept the new convention *in toto* but is seeking some additional assurance that the new convention will remain open to adhesion by, for example, Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the Caribbean area in spite of the rupture in the United Kingdom negotiations. At the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in September 1962, however, certain independent Commonwealth countries in Africa made it clear that they would rather seek separate arrangements between themselves and EEC than adhere to the system established by the new convention. In March 1963, a ministerial delegation from Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar visited Brussels with the purpose of obtaining

information from the Commission as to the possibilities of their future relationship with EEC. It appears that the institutions established under the new convention are viewed by some of the English-speaking countries in Africa with a certain measure of suspicion. An explanation for this might be found in the fact that leaders of the former French dependencies in Africa, already during the colonial period, often were called to places of high responsibility as members of governments of the French Republic, of the French National Assembly, and even of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. They therefore consider institutions as established by the association convention as a guarantee for the manner in which the convention will be carried out. To the leaders of former British dependencies, who never were called to comparable functions in the United Kingdom government, there seems to be something sinister in such institutions. It cannot be sufficiently underlined that the institutions provided for in the new convention are responsible for dealing with the matters of technical, financial, and economic co-operation which are the essentials of the system of association. These institutions are not political institutions and have no responsibility whatsoever of a political nature. The system of association is a system of technical, financial, and economic co-operation and not of a political co-operation. The Community fully accepts the fact that the governments of the associated states do not want to align themselves politically with the Community.

It may well be that the EEC will be faced with a dilemma if Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean area would prefer to establish a type of association *sui generis* than adhere to the convention. It is difficult to see how an association *sui generis* could

offer the same advantages as the convention. The Commission, therefore, is inclined to stress the advantages of the new five-year convention and feels that negotiations on other types of association might well present difficulties. It is, however, too early to predict developments in the future.

OTHER COUNTRIES

The purpose of the present article is not to deal with the relations between the Community and other European countries or with the United States. Its purpose is, rather, to study the relations between EEC and developing countries. The memorandum of the European Commission on the action program of the Community, which was submitted in October 1962 to the Council of Ministers, states that the Commission (1) should be prepared to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of international commodity agreements; (2) should be prepared to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of broad trade agreements with developing countries of major importance, such as India and Pakistan; (3) should be prepared to undertake the extension of its system of association with certain African states to other states and territories in Africa and the West Indies.

A beginning for action on the third item is found in the new convention. The second item was discussed during the negotiations with the United Kingdom.

An association agreement with Greece has been concluded of which the general aim is, by means of a number of economic, commercial, and financial provisions, to aid Greek economic development and to enable Greece to become a member of the Community as rapidly as possible. An association agreement is also being negotiated with Turkey.

As far as Latin America is concerned, the Commission has submitted a memorandum in which it analyzes the situation and proposes a series of measures for assisting Latin America so that the Community can formulate a formal Latin-American policy and pursue it systematically.

Negotiations with Israel are proceeding, and negotiations with other countries in the Near East have been proposed to the Community. It is not unlikely that the countries of North

Africa either individually or jointly will demand the opening of negotiations for establishing a special relationship or a form of association between themselves and the Community. To what extent concrete results may be expected in the negotiations mentioned in this paragraph cannot be stated at this moment. It is to be hoped that the Community will be able to carry into the future the vitality of which it has been capable during the first five years of its existence.

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APPENDIX

COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OR RELATED TO THE ASSOCIATION SYSTEM

Independent Countries (Associated States)

Kingdom of Burundi
Federal Republic of Cameroon
Central African Republic
Republic of Chad
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)
Republic of the Congo, or Congolese Republic (Léopoldville)
Republic of Dahomey
Gabonese Republic
Republic of the Ivory Coast
Republic of Madagascar
Republic of Mali
Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Republic of Niger
Republic of Ruanda
Republic of Senegal
Republic of Togo
Republic of Upper Volta

Dependent Countries (Associated Territories)

St. Pierre and Miquelon
Comoro Archipelago
French Somali Coast
New Caledonia
Wallis and Futuna Islands
French Settlement in Oceania (French Polynesia)
Southern and Antarctic Territories
Surinam
Netherlands Antilles ¹

French Overseas Departments (Non-associated Territories, although related to the association system through the financial provisions and regulations relevant to the right of establishment services and payments)

Guiana
Martinique
Guadeloupe
Réunion

¹ The agreement has been concluded but is to be ratified by the parliaments of the six EEC states before it comes into force.

Cultural Pluralism in the United States and in the Projected European Union

By SAUL K. PADOVER

ABSTRACT: As political, perhaps cultural, and certainly economic forms of unity emerge in Western Europe, it becomes increasingly important for Europeans—and for Americans also—to examine sympathetically the American experience in cultural pluralism for areas of relevance to the European situation. Without some of the elements that have gone into the making of a successful United States, the Europeans may well succeed in creating material prosperity through their Common Market but fail in other areas, primarily in human relations and guaranteed freedoms. The leading strains of cultural pluralism in the United States which would be relevant to the European situation are embodied in the federal system, church-state separation, the absorption of immigration, democracy, and constitutionalism. Europe does not have a good record for democratic government, and the democratic processes will bear careful watching. The question of the relative positions of church and state is unresolved in many countries in Europe and will pose grave problems. Difficulties can be anticipated in Europe in the area of constitutionalism, because people need a guiding ideal to draw them together. European union to date has been based on reaction to the horrors of war and the fear of Soviet military domination. Without a central principle to hold them together, Europe may lapse from union as the war recedes into the past and the fear of Soviet domination is relaxed.—Ed.

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EUROPE—at least Western Europe—seems to be emerging into some form of unity. It seems to me to be of great importance for the Europeans, first, and, secondarily, for ourselves to have some critical awareness of what the American experience has been in a comparable area. The Europeans have not always been very friendly toward this idea, nor have they always been very well informed about the American experience. I remember, about fourteen years ago now, as a visiting professor at the Sorbonne, lecturing in American political theory and experience, that I found that just about none of my very sophisticated French students knew much of anything relevant about the United States. Very few of my colleagues did. As a matter of fact, in those days, so far as I know, there was not even a chair of American history in France, not even at the Sorbonne, although they did teach literature there, I believe. The situation in Britain was, of course, a little better, but Germany before World War II was not much better. I think it is necessary for Europeans to learn 'about the American experience and how applicable it might possibly be for them.

AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM

I will now isolate some of the strains of what is meant by cultural pluralism in the United States.

Federalism

One of the leading elements in the development of American cultural pluralism is that of the federal system, which I would consider as first in importance. The federal system has been a unique experiment. There have been

small federations in the past—some in antiquity, a few in the Middle Ages. But a federation on a large scale as it was founded and developed in the United States had never been tried before. As a matter of fact, the best critical and scholarly opinion at the time held that it would not work. It would not work, it was said, because mankind had never tried an experiment in self-government—or orderly and humane government, if you wish—on a vast scale. Never before had there been, in effect, a federal political system embracing a continent. Critics said that such an experiment could not possibly be successful.

The Americans, however, boldly undertook the experiment. The creation of federalism was systematic and conscious, based upon an acute realization of the needs of the time. The Americans were aware of the existence of numerous diverse, especially regional, elements in the society and that there was no sense of unity. There was no feeling of nationalism as such. A man from Georgia thought of himself as a Georgian; a man from Pennsylvania was a Pennsylvanian; a man from New York was a New Yorker. There were few conscious Americans in 1787–1789.

In order to achieve any sort of workable unity, it was necessary to grant each of the largely independent regions—the States—an enormous amount of autonomy and yet bind all of them with a certain central cement. Federalism, as it was hammered out in Philadelphia, was designed to satisfy the claims of diverse regional and other groups.

Church-state separation

Another factor in the development of American pluralism was one which may cause trouble for the Europeans in the future—namely, the religious question. Americans of the revolutionary and constitutional period—thinkers, scholars,

This article is the text of an address to the Annual Spring Meeting, Second Session, Friday afternoon, April 5. The question-and-answer session which followed the address is reproduced at the end of the article.

politicians, teachers—felt that the tragic and disastrous European example of a combined church-state relationship must not be duplicated here. The foremost Americans—including Benjamin Franklin, James Mason, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—felt deeply about it. They were convinced that a separation of church from state was an absolute necessity in the establishment of free government.

There was an additional reason for this in America. In the American colonies at the time, there existed numerous religious sects. It was, therefore, feared that, unless church and state were permanently separated, unless the society, in other words, was made absolutely secular, there would be continuous religious strife and hostility. American leaders were afraid that, in individual states where, for example, the Congregationalists were in the majority, they would dominate the society and make Congregationalism the official religion. The same might be done by a majority of Methodists or Presbyterians or Baptists or any other numerically superior religious body. This religious diversity would lead to the traditional religious conflicts. Political history showed that nothing disrupts a society as deeply and as dangerously as religious strife. America's Founding Fathers knew the history of the Middle Ages; they knew the history of the Reformation; they knew the history of the Hundred Years' War. They wished to avoid these tragedies in America. And the way to do it was to sever religion from politics, permanently.

In addition, it was felt that a separation of church and state would enable different and differing religions and sects to live in equality and in harmony with their neighbors, because no particular religious sect or persuasion would be legally permitted to use political power against the others. Nor

would they be in a position, constitutionally or legally, to use the power of government to compel their neighbors to worship, or not to worship, as they pleased.

Thus, the second most important element in the development of American cultural pluralism was the separation of church and state.

Incidentally, this conception of separation which had been put into the federal Constitution and into all the state constitutions has worked out remarkably well in practice. The United States since its inception, has been perhaps the only great society, in the Western world in any case, that has not permitted religious persecutions officially. There has been no religious brutality in this country. There may have been other types of violence, but religious persecution has been at a minimum in the United States. I do not mean that there was no religious prejudice, because that did exist and still does to an extent, but I am talking about political institutions and the agencies of power. The separation of religion from politics has been extraordinarily successful and has further guaranteed the pluralistic development of the American society.

Absorption of immigration

Another area of development which I think of very great importance was the role of immigration in the United States. Here, again, we see something unique. This is one of the few great nations in the world built in historic times totally out of immigrants.

In this we see an even clearer manifestation of diversity and of pluralism. Four main factors entered into the absorption of the mass of immigrants from every type of culture, from every type of ethnic group and religious persuasion and intellectual background. One factor was the federal system; an-

other, the church-state separation; a third, the idea of freedom; the fourth, the educational system. All of these add up to the general idea of what we call democracy.

In less than a century, between 1830 and 1921, when mass immigration stopped, there entered the United States nearly 40 million human beings, mostly from Europe. They were of enormous diversity. They brought with them every European language, different ways of eating, diverse ways of living, diversified ways of worshiping, dissimilar ways of working, assorted patterns of behavior of every type. These varied immigrants were not only permitted to function in freedom, but were encouraged to do so. Within one or two generations, they were absorbed into the totality of the society.

I submit that the absorption of immigrants into the United States has been one of the truly great experiments in human relations in the world. I can think of nothing comparable to it in any nation's history.

These immigrants, in turn, brought with them the only real wealth that counts in any society—the wealth of brains, the wealth of skills, the wealth of experience, the wealth of good will, the wealth of hopefulness. This is why they came. And this is why they created here, in a short historic period of time, perhaps the most powerful nation the world has ever known.

They were permitted to do so within the framework of what we call cultural pluralism.

Democracy

Let us now look at the role of democracy. As you know, democracy came fairly late in the American experience. The founders of the country, the early colonists, were not democrats in the sense of the term as it is used today. There were some exceptions even then:

I assume you could call William Penn a democrat. Certainly Roger Williams was one. The majority of the early settlers, however, were rather more theocratically than democratically inclined.

The struggle for democracy began with Roger Williams in Rhode Island and continued through the American Revolution and through the Constitutional period until about the 1820's when the last great victory for democracy was won, with the abolition of the last state restrictions on suffrage. With the establishment of universal manhood suffrage, at least for whites, political democracy became triumphant. Certainly you can equate it, if you wish, with the age of Andrew Jackson.

The idea of democracy, tied up with the ideas of freedom and equality, became almost a religious principle to the American people, to new and old settlers alike. It was particularly appealing to the vast numbers of immigrants who came not only to improve their positions materially—that was of primary importance—but also to better themselves socially and intellectually, to achieve opportunities for themselves, to educate their children, to worship freely, to act as they wished—all the things they could not do in the continental European society whence they came.

Very early in American history, the struggle for democracy began. Democratic aspirations found their strongest expressions among working people, especially on the ever-expanding frontiers, among the incoming farmers who did not want to be dominated either by landlords or by bankers or by a hereditary aristocracy. And that idea of democracy is perhaps the most crucial single thing that has kept the United States together and has given it the dynamism, the impetus, the strength, the virility which it has had to this day. Without it, I do not see

that the United States would have emerged the great power it is.

Constitutionalism

Closely connected with this idea of democracy and with its irresistible appeals to the common people to express themselves as fully and freely as they wished—culturally, politically, economically—was constitutionalism. Here, too, we have a key element in American pluralism. This is, of course, interlinked with democracy in general, because the Constitution of the United States is more than an instrument of government. It is not merely a legal charter. It is not merely a guide to the rules of the political game. All that is important. But I think that the Constitution transcends politics. The Constitution has served another national purpose. It has become the central element in the cohesion and integration of America's diverse ethnic and religious and regional groups.

The Constitution became, in the absence of a monarchy or a ruling aristocracy, a kind of sacred document around which American loyalties could build. Loyalties were awakened and attached with every wave of immigration. The Constitution has been, in fact, the main unifying force in the development of this vast and varied nation of nations, as Louis Adamic once described it. I do not see that the United States could have developed its strength and greatness without the Constitution, without the emotions which it has aroused and the loyalties which it has stirred up, without the attachments which it brought forth in the breasts of new and old Americans alike. It does, indeed, continue to do so.

The Constitution has been, then, the crucial principle in the development of the American society and a guarantee of American pluralism. Among other things, it has stood as a great charter

of rights, an umbrella under which diverse types of people could freely function and be legally protected as equals.

RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE

These experiences should be better known to Europeans, especially now. I am not sure that the Europeans are fully aware of what they can learn from the American experience. But I think that it would be well for them to learn. As they are now beginning to emerge into some form of political, perhaps cultural, and certainly economic unity, the Europeans could benefit from the American example. Without some of the elements that have gone into the making of a successful United States, the Europeans may well succeed in creating material prosperity through their Common Market, but they may fail in other areas, primarily in human relations and guaranteed freedom.

Democracy

The Europeans will confront problems perhaps more serious than those that Americans faced in 1787 and 1789. Take, for example, the question of democracy. For the moment, most West Europeans are democratically ruled, but the fact is that there is no deep tradition of democracy among many of the European nations. I am not now referring to democratic Great Britain or Scandinavia, you understand; my emphasis is mostly on the nations presently in the Common Market.

The nations of the Common Market, especially the three major ones, do not have a very good record in this field. I need not go into the details of the German experience—we all know about the horrors of Nazism and militarism—except to remark that, although Germany is, at the moment, a stable and orderly parliamentary democracy, there

are very deep authoritarian and fascistic strains still remaining there. They may be potentially dangerous to freedom.

Italy is a recent democracy developed and established only in the latter part of the nineteenth century, disrupted and destroyed soon after World War II, and I am not sure how deep the roots of freedom run there. In the case of the French, we have a special situation. They have tried democracy since 1789, and they have not managed to stabilize it yet. They work it intermittently, sometimes brilliantly and frequently through some form of authoritarianism, which is what they have now. In France, too, there are strong forces which are antidemocratic, both on the right and on the left.

Yet, a unity of Europe must stem from deeply rooted democratic elements if it is to inspire the common people and arouse their loyalties so as to make possible the permanent establishment of an orderly society. It is my thesis—which I am not going into now—that democracy, despite its shortcomings, has the supreme value of being one of the few types of government which provides stability without victimizing the citizens. James Fenimore Cooper explained it well in his book *The American Democrat*. To achieve stability and freedom, the kind that France, for example, has not had for nearly two centuries and that other European nations have rarely had, I think that they will have to watch the democratic processes very closely and give democratic values greater sympathy and study than they have given them to date. This is one area where the emerging European union may have difficulty in the future.

Church and state

Another factor is the question of church and state. That is still not resolved in many countries in Europe. It is certainly a grave problem in the

two countries that may someday join the European union; namely, the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. Neither Spain nor Portugal has a tradition of religious liberty or of church-state separation. There are religious issues in France, too, and the French have been struggling over the problem ever since the French Revolution. In Italy, there is an official church, and non-Catholic religions are barely tolerated. The Germans are half way in this picture. In sum, the Europeans will have to learn something from the American experience of church-state separation and to pay greater political and juristic attention to church-state problems.

Constitutionalism

Finally, one of the areas in which the Europeans will find grave difficulties is that of constitutionalism. We know from modern science—social science, psychology, sociology—that people need a basic ruling principle. People—individuals as well as societies—need a guiding ideal. In the United States, the central principle is provided by the Constitution. I do not see such a central motif in the Western European nations. They have organized, so far, economically. They did so first as a reaction to World War II, to the misery and poverty and horrors of that war. They organized, furthermore, out of fear of Soviet domination. One remembers the ancient French saying that people do not unite; they unite against. Europeans were moved to unite so long as Joseph Stalin was a threat, so long as there was the dread that the Soviets would invade and dominate West Europe. Now there is an increasing feeling in Western Europe—and I think that Dr. Lerner will probably comment on it, because he is a student of European public opinion—that the danger of Russian military domination is not

imminent. Therefore, the West Europeans may now have a feeling of relaxation leading to nonunion. They may now try to escape the great pressures upon them, and follow De Gaulle's illusion of assuming that a few weak European nations can really determine their individual destinies in the face of a powerful Communist coalition.

This is a real danger in the European picture. I do not know how many European thinkers and intellectuals are writing about it or how many statesmen are devoting attention to these problems, which are beyond economics. In a way, they are beyond ordinary

politics. When you begin to think about a central principle of cohesion, you turn to a different realm. And the basic question is: can the European countries develop a central principle of cohesion?

I am raising these questions for which I do not have answers. I would like to say, and I will conclude with this comment, that it would help the European peoples now working toward unity if they studied the American experience with greater sympathy than they have shown to date and with deeper understanding than they have been willing to give it until now.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: In view of the history of religious warfare in Europe, how can we hope for the essential separation of church and state?

A: First, I think that the ferocity of religious strife has abated in modern times. There is no religious conflict along the lines of the seventeenth century in Europe. The situation is reasonably mild. But, of course, wherever you have a dominant church using the powers of the state, you have potential areas of trouble. I think that European leadership is very much aware of it. You find a large literature on this among French and German liberal intellectuals—less among the Italians—an awareness of a potential danger in a continued state-church domination. You have a separation in a country like France, but it took a century and a half to achieve it, and there are still a great many undercurrents. However, I am fairly hopeful. The point I was making simply was that the Europeans should realize that their emerging uni-

fication must take these ideas into consideration and pay more serious attention to the meaning of separation of church and state. They must also allay the fears of religious people that are fairly prevalent—namely, that separation means antireligion, that it means godlessness, that it means atheism. That is not true. All these things require clarification. I stated simply a kind of theoretical observation where danger points might possibly lie.

Q: It seems to me that cultural pluralism is incidental to the American experience in unification, that the War of 1812 and the Spanish-American War were more germane. Might not the continuous threat of the Soviet Union be more effective toward European unification than some imitation of American pluralism?

A: I mentioned that one of the elements in the present movement toward European unity was the threat

of the Soviet Union, which caused the warring European nationalisms to attempt to combine, which they have done with some success—economically—so far. I also said that there is now an increased feeling—certainly on the part of De Gaulle—that there is no imminent threat of Soviet invasion. Whether this is realistic or not, I think such a feeling of relaxation may retard the pressures toward large-scale unification. That is one point I made, and the second point I made, which Dr. Lerner restated, is that you cannot have effective unification and successful unity without some central principle—spiritual, intellectual, ideological, or whatever. In the United States, you had some of those principles—the greatest of them being democracy. I do not see that the Europeans can escape this prerequisite for effective unification.

Q: It seems to me that Russia and her satellites are part of Europe, and I do not see that you can solve the problems of West European unification without simultaneously solving the problems of West European-Russian *rapprochement* and, also, United States-Russian *rapprochement*.

A: I just want to add a few brief remarks to what Dr. Lerner has said. The operational term in the question is "simultaneous." I do not think that there is a possibility of simultaneity here. In theory, of course, it would be very desirable to see not only a united Europe—you do not have to stop there—but a united world. I suppose it is a great ideal for mankind to achieve at some future time. The realities, however, are not such as to permit even speculation on this at this point. I think we have to take it as it comes along. The fact is that we have, at

this stage, two or three Europes—two increasingly strong Europes and maybe another one in the middle. One can only hope that these two major Europes—West Europe and East Europe—will someday join in some confederation. This is something which De Gaulle has talked about. It is certainly not out of the question, but it is not practical politics at this moment.

Q: What tests are there for the tensile strength of the social cement of American constitutionalism to which Professor Padover referred? In view of our General Walker, John Birch Society, Minute Men of America, labor-management conflicts, and so forth, might we not conclude that the cement of constitutionalism is as porous as it is sturdy? Has it been tested? Should it be tested? Can it stand the strain? Will it crack?

A: What you mean to say, I think, is that no society is perfect. I did not mean to imply that the United States, under its Constitution, has created a utopia, that we have an ideal society. Societies, including this one, have pressures and crackpots. The basic point about it is that pressures and crackpots and extremist expressions have been with us always. I would like to remind you of 1798. There have been continuous and numerous pressures, conflicts, demagoguery, and extremism in the United States from the very beginning, but, so far as I know, they have never managed to undermine the foundations of the society. If you find some cracks in the Constitution, they are not there because of these forms of anxiety and frustration, which I consider reasonably normal for a great society. When they become abnormal, you have a revolutionary situation in

which people take up arms and destroy the society or a segment of it. We have never had anything comparable in the United States. I did not mean to suggest that we have a perfect civilization. We have a practical system. I think it has worked very well. It began in an agricultural period with three million farmers and has gone through the strains and stresses of one and three-quarters centuries, and today, in an age of industrialism, urbanism, and automation, it still survives with as much order, stability, and strength as ever before.

Q: To what extent do you feel that the lessons of the American experience can be transferred to the European situation, taking into account the fundamental differences in the origins of the two societies? You explain that issues have come to the fore in Europe through overconfidence and underestimation of dangers, but is there not a deeper anxiety based on the realization that the mainstay of West European defense is operational only to the extent to which one nation is prepared to take awesome risks, anxiety based on doubts as to whether this deterrent functions?

A: The European situation today is certainly different from the American situation in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century. On the other hand,

the Europeans are facing problems that are comparable—problems of confederation, problems of treating diverse peoples for which one has a parallel in American immigration, problems of democracy, which is a basic moral value, problems of constitutionalism. I did not suggest that the situations are identical or that the Europeans should imitate or copy the American model. That is clearly out of the question. It would be the height of folly. What we have here in America is a great experiment which could provide guidance and inspiration for others. The Americans have had to face tremendous problems in comparable areas and were somehow able to solve them. This is all I meant to say, and not to compare the two situations.

If I understood the second question, you mean that the French are overconfident about Russian intentions. It is quite possible that they are overconfident, and nobody could say with certainty what Russian intentions are. But I am deeply convinced that the motivation of the French leadership at the moment is a feeling of *détente*, that there is a relaxed feeling, a conviction that the Russians are not going to invade, and, therefore, under the American military umbrella, which De Gaulle seems to reject, he is trying to build a little Europe as against a big Europe. He may well miscalculate, but this is, so far as I see, one of the motivations.

Will European Union Bring about Merged National Goals?

By DANIEL LERNER

ABSTRACT: Rapid unification of Europe is apparent in the economic sphere, but the European community lacks the necessary spiritual quality for unification which would be demonstrated in the merging of political or cultural national goals. Europe has undergone in one generation a transformation from which it has not altogether recovered. Formerly, Europe was at the center of world power. This was upset, and Europe became largely dependent on American policy and American power to take over the responsibilities it could no longer meet. The 1950 decade brought European leaders to the recognition that no European nation alone was able to guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. Only by accepting the difficult condition of dependency were European leaders able to move beyond nationalism toward new forms of transnational responsibility. This entailed the quest for merged national goals and for ways of expressing them in institutions and in practices. There has been a steady growth of commitment to the European idea and of readiness to sacrifice national interests and controls in order to maintain and strengthen the European community. There is a commitment to NATO and to United States leadership, but this is not as strong in France as elsewhere. De Gaulle's successes have influenced European elite opinion, and, for the period immediately ahead, the national goals of European leaders appear to be diverging rather than merging. The burden of European union obviously is on the European leaders, but it must be shared intellectually, morally, and politically by the United States.—Ed.

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MY topic was phrased as a question: Will European Union Bring about Merged National Goals? It is an interesting question, which has two answers. One is "yes," and the other is "no." Obviously "yes" because there is already visible the extraordinarily rapid unification—or apparent unification—in the economic sphere: the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market. These represent several kinds of merging of national goals which do not need to be stressed in detail.

One aspect of the merging, however, seems to me very much worth noting. The Europeans have managed this merging of national goals, paradoxically, by acquiring a new outlook which we can only call materialist. They have reached a common agreement that prosperity is better than poverty, that a reasonable distribution of wealth is better than the kind of economic distribution Europe had in the past. It is paradoxical because the one complaint that European intellectuals have always liked to reserve for America is that it is a materialist civilization. Now, the Europeans are "Americanizing" in this very dimension.

But what the European community tremendously lacks—and I suppose this is the "no" part of my answer to the original question—is any spiritual quality showing itself in a political or cultural merging of national goals. This is the sort of thing I suppose Professor Padover meant when he said that they could learn a lot by careful study and appreciation of the American experience. America became successfully "materialistic" long enough ago that it has been able to develop a tradition of concern about the spiritual effects of

affluence. Europe has yet to reach this stage.

THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

It is important for us to understand the recent European experience. I am not a historian, but I am struck by what has happened in my own lifetime, what has happened since 1918—in one generation—in Europe. It is important for us, to understand the dilemmas and problems that Europe faces today, to look briefly at what has happened to Europe in the course of our own lifetimes. Recall that the people who run Europe today—Adenauer, De Gaulle, Macmillan—were already grown men when this transforming process began in 1918.

The world of 1918 in Europe seems to be much closer to the world of 1818—or even 1718—than to the world of 1948. For, in this brief period, 1918 to 1948, there passed from Europe its own centuries-old traditions of human relations—both in the institutions of government and in the organization of ways of life. There has probably been a greater acceleration of history in this one European generation than at any other time in modern history. In 1918 the continent of Europe was still ruled by dynastic monarchies, and, through them, European imperialism governed most of the rest of the world. At that time, Europe was at the center of world power, governing itself and its dependencies throughout the world by means of the dynastic and imperial organization of political life.

This is brought home vividly by Edmund Taylor's excellent new book on *The Fall of the Dynasties*, which shows how rapidly this changed in the short years from 1918 to 1922. He reviews the disappearance of the great dynasties during that four-year period. It is interesting that these names, which were household words to most of us as

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youngsters, now sound like ancient history—the names of Romanov, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, the House of Savoy, and that extraordinary polity called the Ottoman Empire. All of these disappeared and, with them, a whole way of life, which was centuries old, disappeared as well.

These few short years initiated the end of European control over the world's affairs and effected a series of deep changes in the management of Europe's own affairs. The Europeans—and we Americans on the sidelines—cheered this process at first. We thought that the disappearance of the dynastic monarchies and empires must be good, because we were very sanguine about the mystique of “inevitable democratic progress.” Instead, we watched one after another of these newborn or still-swaddled democratic infants go to the wall—in Russia, in Italy, in Germany, in Spain. They disappeared during the interwar generation. In their place arose the series of new-style autocracies based not on dynasties but on ideologies. The new autocracies abandoned old-style legitimacy and “legitimized” themselves by naked power, using violence for the critical phases.

The new autocracies transformed the European world from what it had been only twenty years earlier. All of us remember what the 1930's felt like. People who had assumed that democracy was “inevitably” going to triumph suddenly were afraid. Remember the spurious dilemmas that so many people accepted at that time—for example, fascism *or* communism. People wrote books about the “wave of the future.” Everywhere in Europe people were riding this new wave. In every country there was a Quisling or an Oswald Moseley, a Jacques Doriot or a Pierre Laval. In the United States, there were Bundists and Silver Shirts.

Munich, I suppose, brought this

process to its culmination. But what had happened to Europe by the time of Munich apparently could no longer be settled without a war. World War II, to put the matter too simply, checked this terrifying transformation that had occurred in one generation of European life.

World War II did not settle everything. Far from it. I remember walking in the streets of Paris with Professor Padover, on the night Roosevelt died, until four o'clock in the morning, talking about which one of the wars that we were fighting at that time was going to be won. There were several different wars going on under the same sets of uniforms.

It is clear that, at least temporarily and we hope permanently, World War II checked the “wave of the future” in Western Europe. However, it was not checked at all in Eastern Europe. With the end of World War II, the remaining dynasties in Europe were swept from Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania. Instead, we got Communist autocracies there.

The one place where a king was not swept out and that the Communists did not move in was Greece. This, I suppose, must be attributed to what is known as the Truman Doctrine, an American expression of readiness to fight to keep the Communists out of Greece. This was a very symbolic event. The Truman Doctrine was the first official statement in the postwar sequence which certified that the old European-American relationship had been completely transformed. It was the first occasion when, officially, Europe—in this case, Britain—allowed that it was now dependent upon American policy and American power to take over responsibilities it could no longer meet.

DEPENDENT EUROPE

Now, this is a very difficult thing for a great nation or a great empire to

live with, and, yet, inevitably in those next few fateful years, this is what happened to all of Europe.

The Truman Doctrine in 1947 was followed by the Marshall Plan in 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Thus, in two short years, the historic relationship between Europe and America was transformed, indeed reversed. Europe was now, for the first time since the Holy Roman Empire, no longer the center of world power. The centers, in fact, were clearly outside Europe. And Europe was dependent upon them.

There arose, at that time, the beginnings of the recognition that no European nation by itself was able to guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. This is a point that the British ambassador made this morning. However it may be today, in 1963, my own studies indicate that the 1950 decade brought European leaders to the recognition that they were not, on a national basis, able to manage either their prosperity or their security.

The recognition of these brutal facts pushed the European leaders rather rapidly toward new concepts of collective responsibility. We are struck by the extraordinary magnitude of the changes they had to make in their own outlook in order to accommodate themselves to the historic new situation of Europe. It was only by swallowing the hard pill of dependency that they were able to move beyond nationalism toward new forms of transnational responsibility. This entailed the quest for merged national goals and the search for ways of expressing these goals in institutions and in practices.

EUROPEAN ELITE OPINION

It was in September 1954, just a fortnight after the European Defense Community (EDC) was rejected in the French Assembly, that my European colleagues and I began our study of

the attitudes of European elites—leaders in France, Britain, and Germany—toward the issues that they faced. The terms of our inquiry were these: How were responsible Europeans going to cope with the fact that they could no longer act on the only basis they had ever known in their personal lives and in their historic experience—that is, as nations? Since they could no longer operate effectively in the old way, how were they going to respond to the challenge of finding new ways?

Seen in these terms, one must acknowledge that the Europeans have come a long way. The British ambassador, in passing, chided us Americans a bit in dealing with the last question this morning. He indicated that, on this side of the water, we have shown much less willingness even to consider merging ourselves within a collectivity than the Europeans have, in fact, already *done*. It is obviously neither polite nor judicious for us to throw rocks at the Europeans, who have taken some remarkable steps forward and achieved some significant accomplishments.

Let me tell you a little about the elite panel surveys made by the Institute of European Studies. I will then summarize a few of the more relevant results.

In each of the three countries—Britain, France, and Germany—we had personal interviews with leading people in the major sectors of public life—government, politics, business, labor, military and intellectual life. We re-interviewed them periodically. We have made comparable interview surveys in these three countries in 1955, 1956, 1959, and 1961. I will not tell you about the techniques of such interviewing. They are perhaps less relevant to our present discussion than the findings that have emerged. These I would summarize as follows.

First, there is a very steady growth

of a strong commitment to the European idea—that is, the idea of a common supranational, or at least transnational, responsibility. This has entailed an increasing readiness to sacrifice strictly national interests—illustrated in Britain by the response to questions as to whether Britain should, in order to maintain strong links with the Continent, sacrifice its Commonwealth and Free Trade Area (EFTA) interests. By and large, an increasing number of British leaders have declared themselves willing to make these kinds of sacrifices. This has also been true, though a bit less so, in France, where the question was posed with respect to the Communauté. Again, many French leaders were prepared to sacrifice some national interests for what they regarded as the larger transnational European interest. In Germany, strikingly enough—and I have never seen this adequately reflected in the newspapers, but it is very clear in our material—there is even a willingness to sacrifice the goal of German reunification, if necessary, in order to maintain and strengthen the European community.

Along with this, as a second major finding, there is also an increasing readiness to sacrifice strictly national controls—that is, on key issues of sovereignty. There was majority support, when we gave them the choice in our questionnaire, for the “United States of Europe”—that is, they opted for stricter federal bonds over a looser confederation of nations.

This preference, of course, should be related to Professor Padover’s point that Europeans have much to learn from the American experience. The theoretical architect of the United States of Europe, Jean Monnet, whose major book on the subject has that title, bases his argument on the success of “the first common market,” namely, the United States of America. A United

States of Europe will need to benefit from the American experience not only economically but also politically, ideologically, culturally. The latter must include new ways of handling human relations—the element of cultural pluralism that has unified the diverse peoples of the United States.

These trends in European elite opinion had gone quite far by 1961, when we asked this question: “The key problem [for NATO] of *Polaris* control appears to force a choice between adopting the most effective system of collective defense now available, or maintaining intact the historic institutions of national sovereignty. Should Britain (France/Germany) in this situation give priority to collective defense or to national sovereignty?” Huge majorities in all three countries gave priority to collective defense. Only 7 per cent in Britain and 10 per cent in France gave priority to national sovereignty—and not a single German respondent did so.

Related to this steady growth in collective commitment to NATO—and, interestingly enough, to United States leadership—by 1959 there appeared to have formed among the European leaders a strong consensus on collective policy. This consensus included points which are major elements in what has recently been called the “Washington design” as compared with the “De Gaulle design.” Yet, in our 1961 survey, a number of variations appeared among the European leaders. I can perhaps summarize these variations as follows, speaking of the 1961 results: Although French support of all three elements—European community, NATO, United States leadership—remained about the same as in 1959, it conspicuously failed to grow. In Britain and Germany, on the contrary, elite support of this sequence of commitments grew significantly. Hence, there ap-

peared, for the first time since 1956, a serious disparity between the French elite and that of the British and Germans.

An additional finding is that French support of the European community increased strongly during this two-year period, while their commitment to NATO and the United States remained the same or even diminished a bit. The reverse happened in Britain and Germany. This meant that the French disparity took a specific turn. By 1961 France was clearly committed to the European community above all other commitments. The reverse was true in Britain, whose commitment was primarily to the Atlantic community and the "Anglo-American connection." Germany shared some characteristics of both, but, by and large, Germany stood closer to the British than the French point of view on these matters.

I will take a few minutes to read out some of the key questions that we asked in 1961 and then, in summary, see how one can interpret the meaning of the responses.

On the question of support for NATO, we asked: "Is NATO, as now constituted, strong enough to deter the Soviet Union over the next five years?" More than two out of three in both Britain and Germany said "yes"; fewer than half in France said "yes."

We asked: "Would you favor the integration of the national armed forces of this country into a permanent supranational army under NATO command?" Eighty per cent in Germany said "yes"; 60 per cent favored it in Britain; only 49 per cent favored it in France.

"Do you consider collective defense more important than national sovereignty?" This was given with specific examples. Ninety-five per cent in Germany, 84 per cent in Britain, and 55 per cent in France said "yes."

Here we see a widening gap between

France and the other two European countries. This recurs on questions concerning support for American policies in the past and present. We asked: "Do you believe the United States should have supported the Anglo-French military action at Suez?" In Germany, 88 per cent said "no"; in Britain, 56 per cent said "no"; in France, only 41 per cent said "no."

"Do you prefer the United States step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament as compared with the Soviet big-package approach?" Ninety-five per cent in both Britain and Germany, but only 73 per cent in France, preferred the United States approach.

"Do you prefer bilateral American-Soviet arms-control negotiations, or do you think these should be multilateral?" In effect, this question asked, "Should your country be in on it or not?" Sixty per cent in Germany and 45 per cent in Britain prefer the bilateral negotiations, but only 34 per cent in France prefer it. Again, these seem like questions of detail, but the issues they deal with are rather critical in terms of collective responsibility and European dependence.

"Do you agree with the American position on the necessity for measures against surprise attack?" Ninety per cent agree in Germany; 65 per cent agree in Britain; only 50 per cent agree in France.

"Do you agree with the American position on the indispensability of a system of mutual inspection for a satisfactory disarmament?" Ninety-six and 97 per cent in Britain and Germany, respectively, agree; 80 per cent in France agree.

These are not the most dramatic data we have, but I think they bear on the critical areas in which the desire to limit United States leadership is expressed. This has, in the last year or two, become a much stronger element

in France than it had been before, and it is much stronger in France now than it is in Britain or Germany.

What is the role of De Gaulle in all this? I must guess, because my questionnaires and my statistics do not automatically explain themselves. My own hunch, for whatever it is worth, is that De Gaulle has proved, once again, the truth of the old political maxim that "nothing succeeds like success."

By 1961 De Gaulle had scored some very major successes. He had defined an Algerian policy and imposed a "solution." He seemed to have broken the French military right wing and to have achieved the pacification of both the French and Algerian extremists. He had overridden the opposition of the National Assembly and obtained its endorsement for his idea of a national deterrent. This is important. In 1959 relatively few French leaders supported the idea of a French deterrent; by 1961 a substantial minority did so. An even larger minority did not know, could not say anything for or against it.

I think that the net effect of De Gaulle's first three years in office was that, by 1961, a significant portion of elite opinion in France had been brought to accept De Gaulle's general vision of the future. Another significant portion of elite opinion, previously oppositionist, had been "neutralized." This has given a fairly distinctive patterning to French elite opinion based on the Gaullist conception of a "French Europe." This is perhaps an impolite way to refer to the Gaullist vision, but I think that is what it really comes to. This Gaullist patterning is very different from the British-German patterning—which is shared with Washington, having been worked out jointly over the last fifteen years—based on an Atlantic community secured by the American guarantee through NATO.

The net result of this French re-

patterning, in the immediate period before us, is that the national goals of the European leaders now appear to be diverging rather than merging. This is the most audible "no!" now being widely heard in response to the original question put to me by The American Academy. But there may be more volume than tone in the strident outcries of current polemics.

De Gaulle's intentions may be far less grandiose than the design now being imputed to him. His design may, in any case, not be feasible.

EUROPEAN PROSPECT

Personally, I share the British ambassador's conviction that it is still the case that no European country on its own can guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. The idea of a Europe reaching "from the Atlantic to the Urals"—with the Western half based on French strength and leadership—does not seem to me to be a very realistic possibility. Nor do I see De Gaulle, an ingrained realist, basing any of his current operations on any such notion. Hence, I do not think that these are the crucial matters.

I think that the crucial matter is the absence of any spiritual or intellectual underpinning for the Gaullist conception of Europe. It is a highly materialistic conception, and it is animated by a highly traditional *realpolitik*. Its only operational "mystique" is De Gaulle's realistic effort to determine how far he may be able to push his allies in the direction of the national goals he has set for France. Its immediate effect has been to split French elite opinion within itself and to differentiate it from elite opinion in Britain, Germany, and the United States. Its longer-term effect may be more salutary. If De Gaulle does not drive hard enough to disrupt Europe—

which he is very unlikely to do—he will certainly have driven hard enough—probably he has already—to oblige European leaders to reconsider deeply the new needs that “merging national goals” imposes upon a durable European community.

All of this has rather serious implications for Europe and America in the years ahead. It is going to require a profound change of heart in both France and Britain—and a permanent conversion of political will throughout Europe—if past efforts to merge national goals through transnational institutions are to produce anything nearly as unified as a United States of Europe. The burden of this obviously is on the European leaders, and, perhaps, deeper

study of the American experience can be helpful to them.

But an ever bigger part of the burden is also on the United States. We are committed by our current economic, military, and political interests. We are committed, more profoundly, by everything America has represented—and would like to represent—in the world. If we counsel Europe to learn from our historic experience, it is because we treasure the best of our lifeways and wish them to prosper in the world. The Europeans have undertaken a great task—and they need our help as we need theirs. I hope that they and we shall prove intellectually, morally, and politically up to the common needs of this historic enterprise.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: In view of the history of religious warfare in Europe, how can we hope for the essential separation of church and state?

A: I think that the historic fear, when one talks about the situation in which church and state are not separated, is that the old reactionary church will “do in” the new democratic state. Today, the situation often is different. This week’s issue of *The New Leader* reports the following situation from France. A bishop in Lorraine declared himself in support of the coal miners, whereupon President de Gaulle had an emissary remind him that, as a bishop, he received from the state a salary equivalent to that of a lieutenant general and, moreover, that a lieutenant general was not supposed to oppose himself in public to the will of the state. So, sometimes the failure to

separate the two spheres may work the other way around.

Q: Do you believe that the present United States foreign policy as to the admittance of neutralist European countries to the European community will be detrimental to the political unification of Europe? Ought, perhaps, only European countries that are members of NATO to participate in the political unification of Europe?

A: The only way to handle a really tough question like that is to duck it. That is a very difficult question to give a single answer to. There are obvious dangers in tying political unification so strictly to the military alliance. At the same time, there are obvious dangers of weakening the military alliance by admitting people who

have no commitment to it. The device which has been worked out is that of associate-member status, which allows a country to commit itself to the economic agreements without assuming any responsibility for the political or military agreements. Whether this device can get between the horns of the dilemma effectively, I do not know. In some cases—such as Switzerland or Austria—I should think so. Whether it can do so in the case of Greece, I do not know. The problem is difficult, and I think that the answer we now have for it is probably as good as we can get at the present time.

Q: Do you see an analogy between the present-day situation in Europe and that of the 1920's, when a pro-European movement relapsed completely into nationalism. And, as to West Germany, can West Germany morally mortgage 17 million East Germans in order to achieve integration in Western Europe? If this is done, West Germans, contributing to West European defenses, will be setting themselves against Germans on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Might not the special mortgage lapse one day in a wave of German nationalism which would break Germany away from the European community?

A: On the first point, there is always a danger of relapse when you are dealing with feelings as strong as national feelings. I think that there is a great difference between the situation now and that in the 1920's, when a relatively few, idealistically inclined intellectuals out of power were mainly responsible for the pan-European idea. Today, responsible governments—probably less idealistic and less intellectual—have made firm institutional arrangements. Following from these arrange-

ments, the benefits of the Common Market are so obvious that nobody, including De Gaulle, is deliberately going to set out to wreck them in order to achieve an unqualified vision of his own. So, I think the present movement is more firmly based materially, but I do not discount altogether the dangers of relapse from, say, the new Gaullist conception, a national conception which seeks, in large measure, to use the Community for its own national purposes. I do not know how many propositions the Europeans will accept of the type recently proposed by France to the Common Market—that is, that its overseas development funds be allocated to fourteen African countries, twelve of which happen to be in the French Communauté. If France persists in playing this national-interest game, it will certainly knock the Common Market about quite a bit.

On the German side, I must confess that I start from a bias, and this probably somehow affects my answer. I do not think that it is any more criminal for Germans to fight Germans than for Germans to fight Frenchmen or Italians and so on. As a quality of feeling, the idea of Germans fighting Germans would not move me any more deeply than the idea of Germans fighting anybody else. How do the Germans themselves feel about it? Reunification has always been a highly charged slogan in Germany. That slogan has had a very deep reality in terms of separated families. My own impression—from my data, from living in Germany a part of each year—is that, realistically, the German leadership sees no necessary dichotomy or forced choice between working closely, honorably, intently with the West European community and maintaining the ultimate commitment to seek some accommodation for East Germany. I do not think that the two pose themselves as a

dilemma, in which you can choose either horn only at pain of being impaled on the other horn.

Q: It seems to me that Russia and her satellites are part of Europe, and I do not see that you can solve the problems of West European unification without simultaneously solving the problems of West European-Russian *rapprochement* and, also, United States-Russian *rapprochement*.

A: If a concert of Europe that included both Eastern and Western Europe were in the cards, I would certainly be for it. The conception we are working on today still is focused on a Western Europe which has to defend itself. It is a security arrangement as much as it is anything. This has to rest on your estimate of what Soviet intentions are, what Soviet policy would be if Western Europe were not competent to defend itself. I tend myself to figure that a rule of thumb in political life is that a strong and expansive power will expand wherever it can. Hence, it seems to me, for the immediate future, that we cannot escape the less desirable regional security arrangement by which Europe is divided and Western Europe can defend itself. I would be happy if one day it became possible to get the other kind of Europe that you have in mind.

Q: What tests are there for the tensile strength of the social cement of American constitutionalism to which Professor Padover referred? In view of our General Walker, John Birch Society, Minute Men of America, labor-management conflicts, and so forth, might we not conclude that the cement of constitutionalism is as porous as it is sturdy? Has it been tested? Should

it be tested? Can it stand the strain? Will it crack?

A: I just want to make a very brief comment on that. Almost a hundred years ago, somebody asked Fisher Ames, the nineteenth-century Will Rogers, essentially the same question that was asked here. He said: Well, democracy is like a raft. It hardly ever turns you over and drowns you, but your feet are always wet.

Q: Do you find an increasing or decreasing receptivity on the part of the Inner Six in the Common Market to continued and increasing American participation or investment? Is there likely to be any change as an effect of the temporary exclusion of the United Kingdom from the Common Market?

A: I think that the answer for the last few years is very clear: There has been an increasing receptivity, as you called it, or plain acceptance of United States participation in every form, including private investment. The only person who appears to have spoken out against this in public is De Gaulle and his immediate entourage, but I do not think that even De Gaulle is serious about this. I do not think that any economic adviser of De Gaulle would counsel him to believe that, if American private investment were withdrawn, the French rate of growth of the last three or four years could be maintained. I think the prospect for the future is that there may be a lot of political smoke but no economic fire.

Q: The Treaty of Rome provides that the European parliament should by now have been elected. Would Professor Lerner comment on the delay of this and how important it is?

A: I have not looked at the Treaty of Rome for about three years, and I do not recall whether it stipulated a date. I do not recall that it did. If it did, I would not take this nearly as seriously as some of the other matters we are discussing. Until there is something more like a European nation, I do not think a European parliament could function in any effective way—that is, a way which would not make a laughing-stock of it. A really good parliament is one of the crowning glories of a nation, and I do not see that a European parliament, given the present divided and dissentious state of Europe, would be very helpful. I hope they put it off until it can be something worth while.

Q: Do you feel that Great Britain and West Germany are as eager to unite as your data indicate, or is being for unification something like being for home and mother? Does not De Gaulle's action indicate reviving nationalism in Europe?

A: On the question of being for unification—yes, but! It is now like being for home and mother. But, is it not curious that such a hallowed symbol as national sovereignty—which was born among these nations of Europe and was treated as sacred until very recently—should so suddenly be stripped of its centuries-old sanctity? Is it not remarkable that, in Europe today, it is just as easy as being for home and mother to be for abolishing or limiting national sovereignty whenever it comes into conflict with the requirements of collective defense! I think that to put home, mother, and antisovereignty in the same pot is an interesting phenomenon. Also, there are rather important differences between the countries, so it is a little less like home-and-

mother in France than it is in other countries.

On the other point—again: yes, but! I think De Gaulle's activity is in some ways even healthy. I think he has raised the question for Europeans and for Americans of how serious they are when they say they are not nationalists anymore, when they say national considerations must take second place to collective responsibility. I think it is probably a salutary thing that De Gaulle has posed this question so sharply that people must really come to terms with it.

My hunch is, from the reading of my own materials, that the drive to collective responsibility for the West has taken on a fairly durable form. But these attitudinal matters are always subject to change. If De Gaulle should persist, and pile up apparent or even real successes, then I think he may succeed in redirecting the flow of political feeling among European political leaders very significantly. I do not think he is likely to do that, but he will at least have had the virtue of raising questions that are serious in a serious way.

If Europe is collectivizing—and with Europe, inevitably, the West must collectivize—then it is important that we should do this with our eyes open. De Gaulle may be—I hope he is—the last gasp of one-man rule in Western society. The West will be less passionately political when charismatic leaders—and violent extremists in opposition—no longer seem relevant to the problems of self-management of Western society. Without political passion, which De Gaulle perceives only (and, historically, rightly) as national passion, the West must decline—or rise anew and shine.

The only workable alternative to national passion is democratic passion. The West will either dynamize itself

in the service of the idea of "open society in a free world" or else it will decline as a congeries of self-seeking and "deterrent" nations. Although I am no utopian, I consider De Gaulle to be a brilliant realist of outdated wisdom. Because my wish that De Gaulle had been born an American is fantasy, I can realistically only hope that we will

accept the deep challenge that he has presented to us—"us" being the community of individuals who judge the increase of open society in a free world to be humanity's most worthy goal. If De Gaulle's stoic celebration of the past helps to clarify this pressing purpose of the future, we shall all be in his debt—Americans as well as Europeans.

Obstacles to European Unification

By THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI

ABSTRACT: The desire for unification is deeply rooted in European thought, and the concept has gained in importance and acceptance over the centuries. At the close of World War II, Europe lay in shambles which were the culmination of strife, misrepresentation, and hatred. Separated from its eastern portion and faced with the Communist menace, Western Europe had the choice of co-operation or going under. Co-operation was chosen. Obstacles to practical unification, some of them formidable, remain, but they can be overcome. The divisive forces which exist—and which Communist leaders hope to exploit in order to break Western solidarity—include geography, racial myths, language barriers, history, religion, cultural differences, psychological factors, nationalism, economic competition, problems of minorities, and divergent foreign-policy objectives. The split of Europe into East and West means that unification can be discussed in immediate terms only for Western Europe and, indeed, for only a part of that. Expecting too much too fast in Europe cannot but lead to disillusionment, yet the progress toward European community since World War II has been little short of phenomenal, and the obstacles which challenge unification are no cause for despair.—Ed.

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THE desire for European unification is deeply and historically rooted in European thinking. Over the centuries, the concept has grown in importance and acceptance until today it stands on the verge of realization. Creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) is but one powerful step forward. Time has been required to translate the idea into effective action, and it will also take time further to ripen the movement toward union. Formidable obstacles remain, but they can be overcome with time, dedication, sacrifice, vision, statesmanship, and a willingness to exchange ancient practices and prejudices for new and constructive co-operation.

BACKGROUND

Before modern times, Pierre du Bois, the medieval radical and adviser to Philip the Fair of France, proposed, in *On the Recovery of the Hold Land*, the establishment of a council of federated European powers whose duty it would be to adjudicate differences among the European states. Dante in the *De Monarchia*—written in the fourteenth century and published in 1559—urged the creation of a European emperor superior to princes and even to the Pope himself in order to bring about peace on the Continent. At the opening of the seventeenth century, the Duc de Sully, the great minister of Henry IV of France, urged in *The Great Design* that Henry and Elizabeth of England bring about a confederation of European states with a common grand council and senate with equality for all states. William Penn in 1694 published an *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet of Parliaments or Estates*. His ideas were given further vogue by John Bellero in 1710. Three years later appeared Abbé

de Saint-Pierre's *A Project for Settling Perpetual Peace in Europe*, and, in the latter half of the century, the writings of Rousseau, Kant, and Bentham were notable contributions to the idea of European unity.

Developments in European co-operation during the nineteenth century went on steadily. They can be seen in many alliances, among which were those of Chaumont (March 9, 1814), the Quadruple Alliance, and the Holy Alliance. The Concert of Europe grew in importance, although attention was focused largely on the ideas of liberty, freedom, constitutionalism, and the passion of nationalism.

When the Franco-Prussian War was over, the influence of Bismarck—who was first a Prussian, second a German, and only as the occasion required a European in outlook—triumphed over Napoleon III, who always sought to settle problems by European conferences. And when the First World War broke, Europe was divided into power blocs driven by intense nationalism. A European unification seemed more remote than ever but, in the eyes of some leaders, an imperative necessity.

During the interlude between the two wars, European confederation or union took on special urgency. It was advocated by statesmen, scholars, and public-spirited citizens in many countries. Sometimes the idea was merged with the broader one of world peace. Those who concentrated largely on Europe included such well-known figures as Aristide Briand, Gustave Stresemann, and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi to mention only three. Federation of Europe, Pan-Europe, and the Union of Europe were familiar terms in the lexicon of international affairs, and many publications carried the gospel. As nationalistic pressures continued to mount during the thirties, the concept of a united Europe drew

many advocates from Europeans and their descendants in all parts of the world.

When the Second World War came to an end, the Europe that had been the center of gravity for world affairs and the arbiter of the political destinies of the world for centuries lay in shambles. That heap of rubble which covered 4 per cent of the world's surface had accounted in prewar times for 36 to 39 per cent of world exports and 32 to 35 per cent of world imports. One half of the imports and 43 per cent of the exports had come from the outside world. The shambles were the culmination of strife, misrepresentation, and hatred, but they also were to mark a significant step toward European unity, especially in the economic and political fields. Recovery and the repelling of expansionist communism were stupendous challenges. Communism was more menacing to European security than any aggressive force had been since the sweep of the Mongols into the eastern part of Europe. Western Europe must co-operate or go under. And so it was that Western Europe, prostrate and separated from its eastern half that lay under the heel of the conqueror, faced its recovery and the rebirth of freedom and unification. This recovery marked a turning point in history. Through customs unions, the Benelux, the Marshall Plan, the Coal and Steel Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Parliament of Europe, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the European Economic Community, and other less significant efforts in many fields, Western Europe continued to give increased recognition to its common culture, institutions, and interests and, in the process, did so by breaking down time-honored barriers. That movement continues today.

DIVISIVE FORCES

The co-operation is not only new, it is, on the whole, partial, weak, and often stumbling. To speak of New Europe as a single entity is a broad generalization that not only disregards the power split between the East and West and economic groupings but is also oblivious to many forces that continue to divide Europe. Many of the old centripetal forces remain. It is through these forces that the Communist leaders hope eventually to break Western solidarity. Some of the divisive forces are geography, race, language, history, religion, cultures, psychological phenomena, nationalism, economic forces, minorities, and foreign-policy objectives of the individual states.

A brief look at some of these will help to give the unification movement of Western Europe its proper perspective.

Geography

Geography is a fundamental reality of all international relations, and it exerts an influence over all relations of the new Europe. There, the geographically artificial ideological and political split of the Continent in two arbitrarily divides peoples, separates East from West, leaves some Europeans captive and others free, and results in the Soviet bloc confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Out of this power split grow many geographic questions. What should be the relationship between the European and the American halves of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)? Is Britain a part of Europe? Should Germany continue to remain half free and half slave, or should NATO policy continue to be

to join the two parts into a geographically more logical political entity?

Water and distance are both important to the new Europe. The Frenchman and the Englishman on opposite sides of a narrow strip of water called the English Channel are no closer to one another even though technological improvements have virtually wiped out the significance of the water strip between them. The Pyrenees are a geographic demarcation between the Spanish and the French that coincides with political, social, and cultural differences. And then there are always boundaries—for example, the Oder-Neisse line. On all of these and many additional geographic phenomena, the policies, hopes, and ambitions of states divide.

Race

The feeling of race has not abated in the new Europe. Even though the idea that a nation represents a racial unit has been scientifically exploded, it still remains embedded in European thinking. Progress toward a European Economic Community in no way alters the British, French, German, Italian, or any other group's concept of itself as a distinct race with its own history, culture, literature, language, and institutions. To a very large extent, this concept is associated with a particular territory on which a people has lived for centuries, over which it has fought countless wars, and which has come to be associated with what it considers to be its racial characteristics. Motherland, fatherland, and *la patrie* remain strong emotional terms.

De Gaulle and Adenauer may have signed an agreement of co-operation and friendship, and this agreement may be a long step forward, but it does not make Frenchmen of Germans or vice versa. It will take a long time before the latent element of distrust between the two peoples disappears. How long

is anyone's guess. It will take as much as a generation at the shortest. To look at the matter in another way, the removal of trade barriers and blocks to the interchange of goods, services, and capital can be achieved by regulation that will speed up economic developments. But the changing of the attitudes of one people toward another is far more difficult.

Language

Multiplicity of languages in Western Europe is a great separator of peoples. No single language has been agreed upon as the language of the new Europe. Yet, if the new Europe is to attain a full measure of benefits from unity, some common means of expression will have to be developed. Different languages mean that it is impossible for people on one side of a political and linguistic frontier to understand the thoughts and views expressed on the other side via radio, television, newspapers, and publications. With the new freedom of investment and labor, when a new factory is erected in Germany and neither party understands the language of the other, instructions are impossible except by translation or sign language. Such a situation is scarcely conducive to the most efficient production. One of the greatest advantages the United States has enjoyed in its cultural, economic, and political growth is a common language spoken everywhere. It is true that Switzerland, India, Canada, and other countries have overcome multilingual problems, but their problems have not been comparable to those that confront the new Europe.

Furthermore, it is not without significance that language has been the most frequent refuge of those who have sought independence. Language uniformity has been most closely associated with irredentism and patriotism.

Language has been a powerful factor in the growth and advancement of nationalism. Indeed, language is deeply embedded in the like-mindedness on which the modern state is coming more and more to rest. Therefore, the multiplicity of European languages is one of the most powerful single roadblocks in the way toward European unification.

History

History, too, can bar the way toward mutual understanding. Textbooks written in all of the countries of Western Europe reflect national aspirations, achievements, heroes, and victories. No country needs special mention. It is a characteristic of all. National claims, arguments for special positions, perpetuation of hatreds, and the contemplation of past greatness tend to keep nations apart.

England's historic policy of maintaining a balance of power on the Continent and determining the destiny of Europe thereby cannot help but figure in the decision of whether or not she is to enter the Common Market. Both France and Germany cannot help but look back to two world wars. De Gaulle wishes to restore French greatness, and Germany wishes to overcome the discrediting she has suffered from Nazism. One element in the German and allied policy of German reunification is the fact that not only are the East Germans Germans but historically they have belonged to Germany for a very long time. Poland is concerned over the Oder-Neisse Line, which is fraught with historical considerations. Nor can the Dutch, the Belgians, and other formerly occupied countries erase from their thinking and attitudes the pages of the recent past.

Psychological obstacles

There are psychological obstacles to unification. Some are deeply lodged in

the past and often form a part of historical barriers. Probably none is greater than the distrust of Germany in many parts of Europe. It was relatively easy to rearouse this distrust during the Second World War because of the propaganda effects carried over from the First World War.

There is also the French distrust of Britain that has been revived under De Gaulle. De Gaulle is determined that his France shall not play a secondary role in the new Europe. He is strongly opposed to Anglo-Saxon domination, and he has made no secret of this fact. Similar psychological obstacles are to be found between Italy and France, Spain and France, Holland and Germany, and between other countries that space will not permit describing.

Nationalism

The biggest single divisive force is nationalism. It embodies all of the preceding elements and ties them into a single force or attitude.

Adenauer's aim is to restore Germany to full partnership and acceptability in Europe and the free world. Italy's aim is to continue its march toward national greatness. Franco seeks to establish a new and revitalized Spain. And every country is seeking to attain pre-eminence.

Nowhere is this more strongly manifested than in the case of De Gaulle and France. A Common Market and European Community on De Gaulle's terms is a *sine qua non* to his participation. He is the first European to object openly to United States leadership in Europe. He has made it clear that he wants to make Europe a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union. His exception to British participation in the Common Market is based on the concern he has that Britain will seek to direct the course of the European Community. His nego-

tiations with the Russians and *rap-prochement* with Adenauer are declarations that he intends to pursue an independent course of action. His determination to set up a separate French nuclear force is not only understandable; in the face of these objectives, it is logical. Whether this nationalism will be used to aid or to hinder Western European unity will depend upon the course of action De Gaulle decides to follow. Given the nature of the man, his course will be hard to predict.

With the passing of time, another imponderable is the course of German policy. To date, it has been acquiescent and co-operative with the French. But will it remain so as Germany gradually is restored to full and trusted membership in the European Community? Will Germany seek a new course of her own? Whose nationalism will it then be—that of France or of Germany? Or will the two be sublimated in a broader loyalty to the European Community? If the two giants come to loggerheads, what about the other partners? De Gaulle could not carry them with him when he blocked the British entrance into the EEC. Postwar Europe has been married to the North Atlantic community. What significance do the nationalisms of Canada and the United States have on Europe?

Economics

The strongest single force stimulating unification has been the economic, but it is not without its divisive elements. This can be discerned even within the Common Market. France is eager to develop a common agricultural policy so that its farming community may sell profitably within the Common Market. At the same time, the other five countries that are partners are concerned over the industrial exports on which their prosperity hinges. That both

parties desire a settlement augurs well for some kind of accommodation, but, for the moment at least, the French veto of British entrance into the European Economic Community has brought negotiations to a standstill. There is also an open question of how exactly the former French colonies, desiring associate membership in the Community, will act and be affected by that association. That all will be accommodation and co-operation is far from assured.

Although cuts in tariffs are running two years in advance of schedule and although, in the economic sense, unity is being speeded up at a gratifying pace, the main force behind co-operation is not economic but political. The OECD is an essential part of the North Atlantic alliance and, from the outset, European unification was considered imperative as a countermeasure to communism. It is the political aim that De Gaulle has challenged.

There are, in addition, other divisive economic forces. For generations, the British and the Germans have been competitors, and the emotionalism of prewar competition has continued into the postwar period, especially now that Britain is faced with monumental economic problems and West Germany is experiencing a new prosperity. What is more, as the empires have shrunk, the need for expanded trade has mounted.

Even the move for economic integration split the new Western Europe at the outset into two economic and trading blocs, namely the EEC and the Free Trade Area. So it will be seen that even in the area of greatest agreement and progress there are divisive forces underneath the surface.

Although the underlying purpose of unification has been political, there has not been any essential change in the foreign policies of the individual members of the new Europe. The smaller

countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, have always adjusted their policies to fit the cyclonic drift of European and world politics. It is, in the main, the policies of the major powers that tend to be divisive and which, unless modified to fit the objective of Western Europe unification, can block or delay the attainment of that objective.

Neither time nor space permit even a gesture toward a complete review. Two or three illustrations will suffice. First, there is Great Britain, which reluctantly finally decided to apply for membership in the European Economic Community. Up to that time, her eyes had turned toward the Commonwealth—that is, away from Europe. The Commonwealth dealt within itself in a series of preferences denied to non-Commonwealth peoples. Britain had led in modern industrialization, making Europe and the world its market, only to be overtaken by Germany, with which she engaged in strenuous competition.

From the days of Cardinal Wolsey, Britain, as a matter of policy, has sought to divide Europe into two armed camps which she has played off against each other. This made her the master of European destinies and earned for her from the French the sobriquet “Perfidious Albion” and gave rise during the First World War to the German cry of *Gott strafe England*. In competition and wars, not only were millions of French, German, and other continental lives lost, but so also were English, and eventually Canadian, American, and other lives lost. After the Second World War was over, some statesmen regarded the partnership of Britain and the United States in Europe as a redressing of the old British balance, with the United States playing the role of the balancing power on the Western side.

When Charles de Gaulle vetoed British entrance into the Common Market, he vetoed much more than membership in an economic partnership. He struck at the political, defense, and economic partnership that would have placed Western man in complete paramouncy throughout the world. He struck at the consolidation and institutionalization of NATO with the control of affairs in the hands of the United States and of Great Britain. Furthermore, the Kennedy-Macmillan *démarche* at Nassau lent substance to the De Gaulle fear that leadership on the continent of Europe would not rest with European states but with Britain and the United States.

De Gaulle had seen France twice invaded and twice occupied. He belonged to the heroic group who continued to fight to free France until it was finally accomplished. He witnessed the demise of the French empire, the bitter defeat at Dien Bien Phu, France's humiliating frustration during the Suez crisis at the hands of her ally, the United States, and he rescued his country from the chaos and agony of the Algerian separation. A fervent nationalistic lover of his country, steeped in its glorious past, ever mindful of its former greatness and present woes, his policy was not hard to discern from the outset. It was, has been, and is to restore France to its former position as the first power on the Continent. There could be no room for either Britain or the United States as the determiner of the destiny of Europe.

Engaged in another restoration, but of a different order, was Germany. Twice defeated and thoroughly discredited, its economy redeveloping, the former state split in two, one part behind the Iron Curtain, the other in the free world, Berlin divided, West Germany embarked upon a course of action calculated to restore her to the

good graces of the European Community. Germany's policies were rehabilitation and recovery. But speedy recovery economically did not solve the perplexing political questions of division, of Berlin, and the part to play on the European scene.

Reconciliation with France, erasing as far as possible the taint of former Nazism, co-operation with the former victors and with the United States particularly, and sharing in the unification of Europe were among the main planks of the new German foreign policy, which also sought eventual unification, liberation of Berlin, and continued close relations with the free world. For the moment, lead in the new European Community did not seem essential. Germany is apparently more interested in not offending and in developing her recovery than in seeking a return to continental leadership.

Time does not permit reference to Italian policies nor to those of Spain or the other countries, each with its own set of aims and objectives. It should be noted that omission here by no means indicates that these last policies were not significant.

When De Gaulle vetoed British entrance into the Common Market he was confronted by the opposition of the other five members: Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. Resentment against the French was pronounced, and the spectacular advance of the European Economic

Community was braked to a speedy halt.

Other obstacles

There are several other obstacles to the unification of the new Europe. For example, there is the split of Europe into East and West. The Iron Curtain is a political instrument, and New Europe still remains Europe on both sides of that barrier. When we speak of unification, we speak only of the Western part and of only a part of that. There are minorities, such as the emigres from Algeria in France and the German group in northern Italy. Religious differences, too, are enmeshed in the racial, linguistic, and cultural differences. Lack of space militates against considering others.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be noted that, although this article is devoted to the obstacles to unification, its principal role is that of correcting perspective on the development of European unification, especially for those who expect too much too fast from the movement. There are many obstacles that challenge the new Europe, but they are no cause for despair. The introductory paragraphs of this article seek to provide a setting against which to measure what is to come in this progress toward a European community since World War II, which progress has been little short of phenomenal.

The Strength of the Projected Union vis-à-vis Russia

By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

ABSTRACT: Soviet concern over the European Economic Community is recent. The Soviet critique reflects a mixture of dogma and realism. The doctrinal position is that the Common Market will not succeed because collaboration, integration, and unity on economic, political, and cultural levels are contrary to the nature of capitalism. Thus, the Soviet Union professes optimism about the long-range future but expresses concern about the present and visible future. The Soviet Union regards the Common Market as an attack against the standard of living of the European working class, as the basis of a new kind of colonialism, and as a force destructive of the sovereignties of the individual member states. A likely inference from Soviet statements is that Moscow fears that the Common Market will inhibit further Communist growth and social unrest in Western Europe. Further, there is apprehension that a common European consciousness will be generated. Also, the Soviets fear for their relations with the underdeveloped world, notably Africa, which has become increasingly disposed to form associations of its own to deal both with the Soviet bloc and with the Common Market and the United States. The Soviets continue to believe in contradictions, general crisis, and inevitable depression in the capitalist world, but they take cognizance of objective developments in the West. Thus, if the Western unification movements succeed, although their immediate effect may be to heighten tension, the long-run impact will probably be toward stability and rationality.—Ed.

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ONE is always involved, in interpreting Soviet statements, in a kind of process of divination, because everything which appears in Soviet publications is fitted very carefully into a doctrinal framework, whether or not the official "Marxist-Leninist" doctrine is logically compatible with this or that policy statement. One must read between the lines and try to determine how literally to take a particular statement.

It appears that Soviet concern over the European Common Market, or, to use its official designation, the European Economic Community, is rather recent, at least in terms of important policy statements and of significant actions. Before interpreting significant documents and speeches, it would be useful to sketch a background regarding the topic in general and to relate recent Soviet positions to earlier developments.

BACKGROUND

It is not necessary to supply much general information on the concept and history of the European Common Market. It represents the culmination of a whole series of integrating measures which could be traced to the immediate post-World War II situation, to the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to various other political, economic, and military measures, particularly the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, and the Rome Treaty of 1957. It entered its operational stage about 1959. It is not surprising that the Soviets did not react voluminously and energetically until fairly recently.¹

This article is the text of an address to the Annual Spring Meeting, Third Session, Friday evening, April 5. The question-and-answer session which followed the address is reproduced at the end of the article.

¹A balanced account of the development and significance of the Common Market is

One of the first significant indications of Soviet concern was a statement made by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in May 1962, during a reception for the president of Mali, Mr. Modibo Keita. Khrushchev went out of his way to assert that the European Common Market was a menace to the underdeveloped countries. This statement by Khrushchev, and particularly the degree of asperity with which it was made, probably reflected the fact that some of the new African states, which had at first been inclined to listen sympathetically to Soviet propaganda, were by then beginning to show some evidence of disillusionment. It was possible to observe, even on such a short trip as the one I just completed to Russia, evidence of disillusionment with Soviet policy among African students and, to a certain extent, also among representatives of other underdeveloped countries. Of course, we have had recent dramatic evidence of that from Bulgaria. I suspect at least some indirect connection between this trend and Khrushchev's statement to the president of Mali.

In June 1962 the Soviets called a conference of the Comecon, or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, to consider problems posed for the Communist states by the Common Market. By that time, it appeared that Britain's entry into the Common Market was imminent, and the United States had embarked upon President Kennedy's policy of seeking to bring about a mutual reduction of tariffs, and other kinds of economic co-operation, between the United States, the Common Market, and the other countries of Europe organized in the British-led trade grouping, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), or Outer Seven.

contained in U. W. Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962).

The above Comecon conference was followed shortly by a call by Mr. Khrushchev for a general international trade conference. This appeal for an international trade conference, to put an end to what the Soviets were beginning to call discrimination on the part of the Common Market in international trade against the Soviet bloc countries, was repeated in September. Khrushchev demanded the establishment of an international trade organization in which all countries would receive "equal treatment." This propaganda gesture appears thus far to have had little impact. It probably reflects a fear on the part of the East European countries—Poland especially and Czechoslovakia and also Yugoslavia, which, though not organizationally associated with the Soviet bloc, nevertheless has similar institutions and, in many ways, similar problems—that, with the reduction of tariff barriers inside the European Common Market, the agricultural exports of the eastern countries, especially in Germany, would be diminished. This apparently is one of the major problems which the development of the Common Market has already posed and may pose increasingly for Eastern Europe and also for some West European and non-European countries. Indirectly and even directly, this puts pressure on the Soviet Union itself, as the principal country of this grouping. There appears to be some basis for speculation that the resulting actual or potential economic pressure on Yugoslavia has tended to push Belgrade toward a measure of *rapprochement* with Moscow.

The next major Soviet step vis-à-vis the Common Market was the issuance of a series of theses by the top economists and political scientists of the Soviet Union, organized in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

publics. This institute has always played an important part in Soviet foreign policy, particularly in elaborating high-level rationalizations for Soviet policy. The above-mentioned theses apparently were intended to serve as guidelines for interpretation by Communist commentators and publicists throughout the world, especially for the governments of the East European Communist states, for propaganda against the Common Market. More immediately, the theses issued by the Institute were intended to set a stage and to provide a framework for a conference of Communist economists which was held in late August and early September 1962. This was not exclusively a Soviet or Soviet-bloc conference; it was attended also by Communist leaders and Communist scholars from most parts of the world. This conference seems to have ended in a high degree of frustration. The Communist economists were unable to reach agreement either on the nature of the problems posed by the Common Market or on policies to be adopted to deal with these problems.

There was a conspicuously high degree of difference between the Italian Communists, representing the most flexible interpreters of communism in the world today, and the French, who still adhere to a very hard, orthodox line. Such differences between the Italians and the French and, of course, between the Italians and the Soviets have been manifested at many international Communist gatherings; this was simply another example.

Probably the attitude of the Italians reflects the fact that, of all the Communist parties of the West, they are the most similar to an ordinary political party, a very large mass party. As the recent elections indicate, they have achieved conspicuous success in maintaining a large following, but they are now confronted with serious problems,

which reflect, I believe, some of the problems of the Common Market development for the entire Communist world. There has been a high level of prosperity in Italy over the last few years. Fearing the possibility that prosperity might have a disruptive effect upon the morale of their rank-and-file members and electoral supporters, the Italian Communists have begun to take measures to deal with it by adopting a more flexible policy, including a less rigidly negative attitude toward the Common Market than that of most other Communist parties, and this in turn reflects back on their attitude toward the whole international Communist propaganda line. This in itself is a very interesting question. Suffice it to say that the situation between the Italian Communists and the Soviet and other Communists and the general position of the international Communist movement reflects some of the problems which the Common Market is beginning to pose for the whole Soviet bloc. It reflects the appeal which the Common Market and other trends, other movements in Western Europe have for at least some elements of labor and for the mass of the population generally.

I have suggested a few of the Soviet policy moves and propaganda positions which have been taken by the Soviet Union toward the Common Market during the last year or two. I should add that a new stage seems to have been reached, with the rejection, in January 1963, under the leadership of President de Gaulle, of the British application for entry into the Common Market and, particularly, with the adoption of the Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation. On the one hand, these developments must be quite satisfying to the Soviets in some ways, because they represent at least a temporary setback, of serious proportions, to the entire integration movement. On the

other hand, the Franco-German treaty has been the subject of a rather violent Soviet reaction. Earlier this year, the Soviet press emphasized the dangers of what they described as a "Paris-Bonn axis." That, of course, gets us beyond the purely economic aspects of the Common Market. However, the Common Market is not merely an economic agreement but also, and perhaps mainly, a political one and even, too, a cultural movement. It symbolizes and to some extent embodies and fosters an all-around regeneration of the entire European social system on an international scale and, for this reason, presents fundamental challenges to the Soviet bloc, particularly in the sphere of ideology.

SOVIET CRITIQUE

Generally speaking, the Soviet critique of the European Economic Community, or Common Market, reflects the mixture of dogma and realism which one normally finds in the Soviet approach toward political affairs, both domestic and foreign. Very briefly, and in an oversimplified form, the Soviet attitude is: "This is bound to fail and yet it is a big problem for us while it lasts." Moscow seems to be saying that the Common Market is not going to succeed because capitalism does not work that way. That is the dogmatic, obligatory conclusion one would expect from Soviet authorities. The most important single statement which the Soviet government has issued on the Common Market is the theses mentioned above, and the theses are prefaced and set in a framework by a quotation from Lenin. This is still the standard operating procedure in the Soviet Union on all major policy matters—to begin with an appropriate quotation from Lenin—and, because Lenin had a great deal to say on almost

every conceivable problem, an appropriate quotation can usually be found.

The particular quotation from Lenin's writings that is used in the theses first appeared in print in 1915 in a famous article entitled "Concerning the Slogan of the United States of Europe."² Lenin says that, of course, the European "capitalists" can co-operate with one another, but only temporarily, on the basis of agreements among particular monopolies and trusts and also on the basis of agreements among governments. This is the rather convenient general formula within which the Soviets have been attempting to present their interpretation of the Common Market movement. Lenin went on to say that there could be some sort of "United States of Europe," but, he asked, what would it amount to? And here the selected quotation seems to furnish a clue to the meaning of Soviet propaganda regarding the Common Market and, I think, also to some of the anxiety it has aroused in the Kremlin. Lenin asserts that the purpose of such co-operation—which, it should again be emphasized, he said could only be temporary—would be (1) to prevent the advance of socialism, and to quell, frustrate, and hold back the forces of socialism in Europe and (2) to facilitate the retention of the colonial domination, the colonial position, of European powers—in sum, to stop socialism in Europe and to hold on to colonies in Asia and Africa.

The Soviet doctrinal position seems to be that collaboration, integration, and unity on the economic, political, and cultural levels are contrary to the nature of "capitalism" and are against

the laws of history. At the same time, as will become apparent, there is also a great deal of concern about the present and about the emerging trends in the foreseeable future. So we are left with a mixture of professed Soviet optimism about the very long-term future and considerable concern about the present and the emerging and visible future.

Perhaps we should amplify somewhat the Soviet interpretation of the present economic situation of Europe. One of the main points of this propaganda, which of course fits into the Leninist framework, is that the Common Market represents an onslaught against the standard of living of the European working class and, indeed, constitutes an international collaborative movement, albeit a transitory one, of the imperialists—the upper classes in general and the big monopolists and trusts in particular—to depress the standard of living of the European workers, to destroy the trade unions, or at least to weaken them, and in every possible way to intensify exploitation. There is a great deal of supporting elaboration of this position in Soviet publications. It is argued, for example, that the productivity of labor is increasing more rapidly than wages and that this fact reflects intensified exploitation, and many subarguments are presented in support of this position.

There is a considerable body of argumentation to the effect that the Common Market represents, a new kind of colonialism, or at least represents the basis for a new kind of colonialism. During the last two or three years, the Soviets have been saying a great deal about so-called "collective colonialism," or "collective imperialism." By this, they profess to mean a kind of extension of the allegedly exploitative nature of the Common Market in Europe outward to the underdeveloped countries.

² Lenin's statement regarding the impossibility of long-term economic co-operation among "capitalists" is quoted in the "theses," in *Pravda* for August 26, 1962, from Vol. 21 of the 4th edition of his *Works* published (in Russian) in Moscow, 1948.

The Soviet argument is that the imperialists are pursuing their old policies of exploitation but under new conditions, conditions which, in many ways, are less favorable to them than the old conditions, and with new techniques, of which the principal one is the so-called collective colonialism or collective imperialism. This, of course, ties in with what has been a major Soviet proposition in the whole postwar period, one which has assumed increasing importance and intensity since the death of Stalin and especially since the rise of Khrushchev to power, namely, that we are living in the era of the "collapse of imperialism," under the pressure of the example set by the "Socialist camp." Perhaps this is a less effective line of propaganda now than it was in, say, 1960, because there seems to be increasing evidence that this line of propaganda, at least temporarily, has met with a less favorable reception, particularly in Africa, than in 1960 or 1961. But it is certainly still a major thesis and one which figures prominently in the Soviet case against the European Economic Community.

Another aspect of the Soviet critique of the Common Market is that the Common Market destroys the sovereignties of the individual states which belong to it. This argument was very heavily emphasized in Soviet propaganda to Britain when the British were making up their minds to apply for membership. Like so much Soviet propaganda it fits in not only with general policy positions, particularly general doctrinal positions, but also is designed and tailored to what the Soviets feel are the needs, the predispositions, and the susceptibilities of particular audiences. Knowing that there were powerful forces in Britain which were worried about possible consequences of British entry into the Common Market,

the Soviets proceeded to couch their arguments for these people in the terms outlined above.

SOVIET CONCERNS

One inference that can be drawn from Soviet statements regarding the Common Market is that Moscow fears that the Common Market and everything connected with it—including political integration and cultural and educational implications—constitutes a barrier to the further growth of Communist influence and of social unrest generally in Western Europe. Soviet sources, of course, do not openly admit to such concerns, but, interpreting statements made by the Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev himself, and by the major organs of the press, one can easily conclude that such an inference is well founded.

Prosperity

Inferences of such character attain a certain plausibility in the light of the fact that Europe has, for some ten years now, been enjoying probably the greatest prosperity in its history. At the same time, the forces of extreme radicalism have, almost everywhere, been on the decline. Communist parties still poll great votes in some countries, such as France or Italy, but the morale of the parties has undoubtedly declined considerably, and the number of card-carrying, dues-paying members certainly has declined, as has the circulation of Communist newspapers. That is just one of the numerous aspects of the context in which the Common Market has developed and in which Soviet attacks on the Common Market probably should be understood.

It is very important, also, to bear in mind that the Soviets say almost nothing about the increase in the stand-

ard of living, in the range of goods and services, and in all kinds of leisure-time activities available to the peoples of the West European countries. They do admit that the economic growth rate of Western Europe has been high, although they claim that, in recent years, it has slowed down drastically.

However, even in this area of living standards, the Soviets have displayed increasing realism and, also, a sense of concern by publishing, recently, statements which, to an attentive reader of the Soviet press, must reveal that Western Europe has been enjoying exceptional prosperity, and they now have begun to take the line that the mass availability of television sets and other types of consumer goods is not a very great benefit in itself because these are merely "material" things! There is a kind of reversion in some of this propaganda to the idea that what is really important are moral and spiritual values, not merely material ones.

It is a bit paradoxical for the Communists to take this position, although it is not entirely unique; at times in their earlier propaganda, they took a somewhat similar line. What is interesting is that they are finally admitting, although on a very limited scale, that Western Europe is prosperous. They, of course, deny that the European Economic Community should be given major credit for this. They point out that Europe has enjoyed certain advantages. There was, first of all, the rebuilding, the reconstruction, which stimulated economic demand. There is certainly some truth in this, although one might ask why the reconstruction has produced such burgeoning prosperity in Italy or Germany, for example, and so much less of the same in Eastern Europe. To deal with that question would be to get involved in all kinds of complicated problems. In any case, that is one of their explanations. An-

other point made in Soviet sources is that the technological revolution now going on throughout the world, in both East and West, creates new demands and stimulates economic growth. This is a somewhat odd argument for the Communists to be using, but the fact remains that they do use it. There are a number of other explanations which they have tried to give. Indirectly, through these various analyses and the reporting associated with them, at least a section of the Soviet public has learned a great deal about what is happening in Western Europe, as well as in the United States.

Holy Alliance

A second major inference that can be drawn from the Soviet critique of the European Economic Community is that its development is fostering a kind of revival of the reactionary Holy Alliance of the nineteenth century. This is a somewhat strange line of argument, but I think it, perhaps, could be interpreted as reflecting a fear on the part of the Communist leaders that there is developing in Europe a common consciousness, a European spirit. It is certainly true that some of the champions of the Common Market openly admit that they are trying to create a "European nation." When the Soviets criticize the Common Market movement as a modern-day Holy Alliance, they are indirectly expressing their concern that, for good or ill, the integration movement is achieving at least a measure of success, on the levels of ideology, education, and culture. Moscow and the West European Communists assert that the reactionaries are now in control in Europe, at least for the time being. For that reason, they use a term such as "the Holy Alliance," and they make a great play of what they call the "clerical, reactionary" regimes of De Gaulle and Adenauer.

Franco-German co-operation is of concern to the Soviet Union for many reasons. One of the main points which Soviet propagandists emphasize in connection with it is that the power of West Germany has greatly increased. They argue that the West German economy is vastly stronger than that of France or any other country in Europe, including Britain, and that integration creates favorable conditions for the strong to overcome the weak. This is an important ingredient of the Soviet analysis of the situation, and they apply it, of course, to Franco-German collaboration, which they view as opening the way to German domination of Europe economically and, ultimately, politically.

Underdeveloped areas

Let us return now to the problem of European relations with the underdeveloped countries. The increasingly sharp criticism of the policies of African countries, which has been a notable feature of the Soviet press for several years, indicates a fear that the Common Market has a considerable appeal to the countries of Africa. The Soviets indirectly express their concern by advancing the thesis that what the Common Market is trying to do is to keep the underdeveloped African countries permanently in a state of weakness and to make certain that the African countries will remain permanently hewers of wood and drawers of water.

A year or two ago, or perhaps three years ago, the Soviets were able to find a great deal of confirmation of this position in statements by African leaders, but this has now become more difficult. As a result partly of this and partly of other tendencies, the Soviet attitude toward the African states has become more reserved, less effusively cordial, and is tinged by concern. This change is certainly related to the Common

Market, but there are many other factors. One of the principal contentions in the Soviet criticism of the relations between the Common Market and the African countries is that the European Common Market economy is trying to get imports at low prices from the Africans, that they are really trapping the Africans into what is for the Africans a disadvantageous relationship, that they hold out the allure of association with Europe, but that this has only a symbolic value and that all the economic value goes to the European countries.

An associated development is that the Africans themselves are increasingly conscious of the necessity for forming associations of their own to deal both with the Soviet bloc and with the Common Market and the United States. In other words, as a result of increasing integration in the West and of the pressures from the East, the Africans are beginning to develop their own kind of association and integration. The two major groups of African states are now negotiating the possibility of forming a single larger group which might be to the advantage of all of them. That tendency points up something that is quite important in connection with this whole development; that is, when you have integration in any major part of the world, it tends to stimulate integration in other parts. This presents a very difficult problem, because the more integrated the various groupings become, the more powerful they become and the more they tend, while feeling homogeneity and unity within, to set up barriers to other groups and to create problems for other groups.

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS

The data presented thus far has consisted largely of evidence of Soviet concern or inferences which were drawn from Soviet statements which indicate

concern and which could be interpreted as reflecting the success and the strength of the European Economic Community and related developments. This should be counterbalanced by referring to indications or professions on the Soviet side of belief that, in the long run, the Common Market will not succeed.

There is, first of all, the continued belief—which is really a basic dogma—that the whole capitalist world is today living in a deepening “general crisis.” The doctrine of the general crisis of capitalism was proclaimed a good many years ago, and it is a very involved dogma. We are now supposed to be in its third stage. This doctrine cannot be dismissed as merely a kind of secular theology. It is important because it sets the framework within which, at least to some degree, Moscow perceives the world. It tends to insulate the Communists from any aspect of reality which challenges these doctrines. One may say that this is contrary to empirical observation, that this is a dogmatic rather than empirical way of perceiving reality. Perhaps that is true. Nevertheless, this doctrine is important. Perhaps someday it will be overcome if the trends that we are talking about continue to develop. But it is still a major part of the framework of perceptions in terms of which the Soviet intellectuals and policy-makers view the world.

A corollary of this, which is also an aspect of continuing importance in Soviet doctrine, is that there will be, sooner or later, a major depression in the West. The Soviets have for many years been looking for signs of this. They maintain that the prosperity that now exists in Western Europe, for example, is somehow unnatural, that it has gone on too long, that it cannot last forever, because, after all, that is the way of the capitalist world. There is also a certain amount of satisfaction

in the Communist world with strikes and all kinds of unrest, although I think that some of the shrewder observers among the Communists must realize that strikes in many ways are evidences of prosperity because they take place when workers are in a position to present demands. But they continue to play them up as indicators of decay in the Western capitalist system.

Finally, the Soviets are happy about the “contradictions,” as they call them, within the Western capitalist world. They have always laid great stress on the so-called contradictions of capitalism. Lenin had a great deal to say on this and so did Stalin. Right now, the principal contradiction is between the Franco-German bloc on the European continent and the Anglo-American grouping. And, of course, they can quite easily divide the British and the Americans into subelements in the Anglo-Saxon part of the imperialist world. They can also point to Japan as a country which is pursuing, in their version of things, an independent policy and is in a high degree of contention and rivalry with all of the other so-called imperialist powers. The most recent developments have, naturally, given Soviet propaganda a good deal of material to work with along these lines. So, while there is much evidence of concern in what the Soviets have to say about the European Economic Community and European integration and various integrating tendencies generally in the free world, there is also a stubborn belief that all these evidences of strength which inspire the concern are only temporary and that, somehow, the whole movement will inevitably collapse and that, ultimately, the social revolution will sweep it all away.

On balance, however, the evidences of strength reflected in these implicit admissions that something big is going on

here are much more impressive than the evidences of weakness.

SUMMARY

To sum all this up, it seems to be clear that, both explicitly and implicitly, the Soviets have admitted that the European community and the other integrating tendencies really do present something very significant and something in a sense qualitatively new. It is also clear that they do not know quite what to do about it. In some ways, their position, while dogmatic and hostile, has elements of flexibility and accommodation. There is at least some indication of this. Khrushchev, although he has denounced the Common Market and also the American attempt to achieve some sort of association with it, has pointed out that it is the policy of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc to take cognizance—and this is significant in Communist terminology—of “objective” developments in the capitalist world. By that kind of statement, he is suggesting that he realizes that it is necessary for the Soviet Union to do business with these new forces. I have already suggested other aspects of this realism by pointing out that the Soviets have learned a good deal about these developments indirectly through what appears in their press. Probably they have learned a good deal also by the increasing contacts that have taken place between Europeans and Americans on the one hand and their own people on the other in the last five or six years, particularly on the level of scholars and journalists and intellectuals of various kinds. In that connection, it is interesting and significant that, while the propaganda in the daily press is hackneyed and cliché-ridden, discussions of this sub-

ject among Soviet experts and economists are on a much more realistic and sensible level. So, on balance, there is a recognition that a powerful force has come into existence here.

What will be the long-term significance of all of this? The answer to that question seems to depend upon one's assumption of the validity of the two general points of view which are in contention. If the Soviet Marxist-Leninist dogmas are correct, the Common Market will go the way of all other attempts to organize the capitalist economy and to achieve political and cultural integration in what is, by Soviet definition, a warring congeries of forces which can only co-operate with one another temporarily, selfishly, and for purposes of immediate profit. On the other hand, if this movement does succeed and if its success proves that the Communist dogmas are not valid, it may, in the long run, be a very powerful force toward strengthening the elements of rationality and common sense—you might say the anti-ideological elements—within the Soviet Union and the Communist world generally. This element is, to a certain extent, inherent in Marxist thinking anyway. It is strongest among people who are concerned with certain aspects of administration, with economic theory, with science, and so on. In other words, while the future is still more or less indecipherable, we can postulate certain trends and compare their future outcome along the lines above suggested. If it works out in this way, if these movements are successful, then, although the immediate effect is perhaps to heighten tension, because it inspires anxiety, the long-run impact will probably be in the direction of stability and rationality.

QUESTION AND ANSWER

Q: I am concerned about the countries of Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain. How can you prevent billions of dollars going from the West to those countries from falling into Communist hands to be used against the free world?

A: The question concerns sums of money—billions of dollars—going to countries of Eastern Europe. I suppose the question has in mind trade or commodities which result from trade. So far as economic aid is concerned, it is my understanding that the United States economic aid to the countries of Eastern Europe is limited to a very small amount and kept within a very restricted range. It is almost entirely confined to Poland, as I understand it, and is on a very small scale.

Questions of economic exchange go in many ways beyond my scope, because I think they get into military areas with which I am not familiar.

If, however, you are talking about ordinary commercial trade, as long as it is not in strategic materials, it certainly has both positive and negative aspects. But I do not believe you can cut off all trade between the entire Soviet bloc and the United States or between the Soviet bloc and Western Europe. It seems to me that the governments and the private business concerns engaged in trade must be regarded as having sufficient consciousness of their own interests and of the national interests to conduct the trade in a manner that probably does more good than harm.

The Effect on NATO of the Projected European Union

By WILLIAM R. TYLER

ABSTRACT: As Europe moves toward unity and is increasingly able to speak with clarity, precision, and authority on given issues, European relationships with the United States and NATO will change. In the long run, this change will be constructive and will provide an additional unifying factor in NATO. The interests, needs, and ambitions of the fifteen member states of NATO are not the same, but, if harmony can be achieved within the European Economic Community, this can further unify the NATO alliance, certainly in non-military affairs. If member nations of NATO pursue common ideals and follow common policies, the development of different concepts of military strategy will not occur. Unity is not only a goal of the United States foreign policy but also an abiding necessity recognized by the peoples of Europe. An atmosphere and feeling of security, essential to the growth of co-operative ventures by NATO and the European Community, must rest upon economic strength and prosperity, for only prosperous nations can afford the military program upon which security depends. Attitudes of responsibility are also crucial. Each country must realize that responsibility to its own people is closely related to responsibility in holding together and strengthening the Atlantic community. As attention is directed in the immediate future toward domestic politics in many of the Atlantic countries, less attention may be devoted to NATO. We must, nevertheless, push forward if disarmament, stability, and peace are to be achieved.—Ed.

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I HAVE been asked to speak to you tonight on a subject which requires prophecy—always a risky device. Before we attempt to foresee what the effect of the projected European union will be on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), let us examine the present situation and its background.

You are all familiar with the post-war history of our bipartisan support for European efforts toward unification. We have been quite pragmatic about this. We have adjusted our views on several occasions as the Europeans themselves have modified theirs as to what seemed the best way to move forward toward their objectives. For we have always been clear that the inspiration and drive for the creation of a new Europe must come from the Europeans themselves and have widespread popular European support if it were ever to succeed.

SPHERES OF UNION

I stress this because the popular notion of a united Europe clearly centers on the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Although these institutions have large political implications and, indeed, make many basic political decisions, they are generally considered to be economic in character. But economic unification can only be a partial step toward the creation of a new Europe. We have from the beginning accepted the obvious fact that, to be successful, a united Europe would have to be a complete Europe; that is, it would have to be

united not only in the economic sphere but in the political and military spheres as well.

Our support for European unity has always taken into account this basic consideration. Let me recall for you that in the early 1950's this country gave its encouragement and support to the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) and European Political Community. It was only after the collapse of the EDC proposal in 1954 that steps were taken toward the European Economic Community. These were essentially an economic approach toward the political goal of European unity.

In recent years, the issues of European political and defense co-operation have come to the fore again. In the summer of 1961, the Bonn Declaration proposed a Union of the European Peoples designed to take first steps forward in the political and defense fields. Europe has since then been in ferment, discussing the problems and possibilities of such a step. The one thing which stands out in this intra-European dialogue is that Europe itself is not agreed within itself upon how it shall proceed. The philosophic differences between federalism and confederalism, nationalism and supranationalism, integration and co-operation are well known to all of you. They are being debated now, and no clear-cut view is likely to emerge in the near future.

There is also the question of which countries shall make up this projected European union, and, again, no ready answers are in sight. We are keenly aware of these differences, for much hangs on the outcome. For over a decade in NATO, the United States has been in a position which it does not find congenial. We have a massive nuclear deterrent. We possess almost 60 per cent of the economic production and resources

This article is the text of an address to the Annual Spring Meeting, Third Session, Friday evening, April 5. The question-and-answer session which followed the address is reproduced at the end of this article.

of the NATO alliance; the remainder is unevenly distributed among a number of larger or smaller nations. So, like it or not, the needs and responsibility of leadership have, up to now, fallen to the United States. Political consultation—the problems of reaching accord and consensus with all of our partners in NATO—is an extremely difficult one. There was and is no one spokesman for Europe. There are spokesmen for fifteen individual countries who represent a significant diversity of opinion.

I think this is why the European Economic Community has captured the imagination of so many Americans. As the voice of six countries, the institutions of the EEC for the first time afforded a real possibility that the United States could negotiate or consult with the representative of a single European view. Where the European Economic Community finds it possible to speak with a single voice, as in the tariff field, for example, we have already found that many more things are possible between us and that we can and must set our sights higher than has ever been possible in the past.

So, as Europe itself is prepared to speak with clarity, precision, and authority on a given issue, the nature of the relationship between us must change. This change need not be adverse; on the contrary, we expect that it will be a constructive change, that it will enable us to do more and greater things together not only among ourselves but in the interests of our common leadership position in the free world.

We can also expect, for the same reasons, that there will be constructive changes in the relationships of the countries of this new Europe vis-à-vis the other countries in NATO. This relationship will be slow to develop, perhaps, but it is inevitable that countries

with common economic policies will have to harmonize their political and military policies. In the long run, this circumstance is bound to provide an additional unifying factor in NATO.

I say “additional” because we already have many unifying factors in NATO, and we have the machinery provided for us to develop additional unifying factors. I say this with awareness that the public press is replete with stories pointing out that the alliance is in disarray, that the allies cannot agree on basic issues. But we have agreed on the basic issues. Not only have we agreed on them, we are convinced that these basic issues are right and are important. What we have not always agreed on is how we should develop the machinery to support these issues, these aims and ideals. The part of the machinery that is constantly being overhauled, and rightly so, is the defense side of NATO. From the public point of view, it is the side of NATO which receives the greater attention. There are many complicated questions involved which I will not attempt to go into this evening—questions of what type of nuclear force, what type of control and what type of command, how many fingers on the trigger, and so on. They are important questions and the countries of NATO are grappling with these questions. How these questions are answered will have a great deal to do with the development of NATO in other fields, will condition the attitude of this projected European union within and towards NATO. But these complicated problems must be, and will be, solved. The future of the Atlantic community may well be at stake. But the Atlantic community has confronted and surmounted other problems in the past. The Atlantic alliance has demonstrated its strength in the past.

IDEALS AND GOALS

The strength of any alliance rests not on its forms, procedures, or structure, but on the commitment, the integrity, and dedication of its members and on the ideals and goals of its members.

While the goals of NATO are as valid today as when the alliance was created, there is nothing sacrosanct about the way in which the alliance is organized. Indeed, the relationship between the military and political aspects of the alliance has undergone a progressive change since the early days. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed just fourteen years ago, there was no plan to organize an integrated military command such as we now have, with combined headquarters, with common supply lines, and with closely co-ordinated defense plans. Its functions were those of a traditional alliance. The treaty itself is one of the most succinct and straightforward and unhedged international documents. Its ninety-nine-word preamble proclaims the determination of the member governments "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

The functions of the alliance were to ensure maximum, pooled strength in the event of war and to deter a potential enemy by putting him on notice that, if he upset the balance, he would have to face not one enemy but the combined strength of all the members of the alliance. But, at its inception, NATO had little that could be termed a military strategy. Today, it has a fully developed strategy. This strategy has evolved over the years to meet changing conditions and varying threats. The relationships between and among the partners have changed. As European countries have increased in prosperity, in strength, and in con-

fidence, they have increased their potential, they have strengthened their role as partners. They are no longer dependents of the United States. The alliance must reflect this change and meet the interests, needs, and ambitions of its members. The form the alliance takes should be that which provides the best possible way of meeting these interests, needs, and ambitions.

The interests, needs, and ambitions of the fifteen member countries of NATO are not, of course, the same. But, if the interests, needs, and ambitions of the countries of the European Economic Community are harmonized, this can only have the effect of further unifying the alliance. This is extremely important from another point of view. That is the effect this new European union will have on the nonmilitary aspects of NATO.

There has been a great deal written about the origins of NATO and how these origins have supposedly conditioned the development of NATO. NATO was organized to meet the threat of Soviet encroachment. It was, and is, successful in that the Soviets have not advanced further in Europe. The implication here could be that, if the threat disappears, there is no need for NATO. There is the further implication that the NATO countries hang together in the face of this threat and that the countries will go their separate ways if the threat diminishes or is made to appear to diminish. These things may have been true several years ago. They are not true today.

NATO no longer has to depend on the imminence of the Soviet threat to hold together. Over the years, a climate of confidence has developed. This climate of confidence is due in great part to the political consultation which takes place within NATO. I realize that this term "political consultation" is a much-abused one, but

I think that is because it is misunderstood. Many take it to mean that one member of NATO should get the concurrence of the other fourteen countries before embarking on any political or military action affecting one or more of the member countries or the interests of those countries. This, we all realize, is virtually impossible. No parliament or congress would ever allow this in any event.

There are two types of political consultation which take place within NATO. One is the more or less formal action of one government informing its fourteen NATO allies that a decision has been taken. This is merely a little more than exchange of information. It does have some virtue in that the countries—and this is true in most cases—have been informed in advance. There is also the slight possibility that particularly weighty arguments may cause the country planning the action to change its course somewhat.

The second form of political consultation involves an intergovernmental exchange of views prior to any decision, that is, during the policy-making stage. Naturally, there are difficulties here in that parliaments' rights cannot be encroached upon. But there is more of this type of consultation in NATO today than there was five and ten years ago. This method of political consultation is more likely to open the way to truly co-ordinated policies. The development of a European union with its co-ordinated policies can only improve this type of consultation. Looked at purely from a mathematical viewpoint, it automatically reduces the number of parties involved—and therefore the potential number of points of view—by the number of countries in the union.

This political consultation is an important piece of machinery which the countries can utilize in fields other than

military and political. The existing structure of NATO provides the framework for this. Article Two of the NATO treaty states:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

This Article Two of the Charter provides another means through which ideals and policies can be harmonized. If the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization pursue common ideals and follow common policies, the development of different concepts of military strategy will not occur. There will naturally be problems and difficulties of a technical nature, but they should not present in themselves a serious threat to allied unity.

This unity is not only a goal of United States foreign policy but also an abiding necessity.

This unity is a goal shared by the peoples of Europe—they recognize that it is vital to their interests as well as to ours, that it is an immutable fact of life.

There is movement, and forward movement, toward unity in these important regional organizations. There is a growing consciousness of unity.

This unity can continue to flourish in the co-operative ventures of NATO and of the European Community. But, in order for the growth to continue, we must have an atmosphere and feeling of security. We are bending every effort to strengthen that security. And, because our security today is so dependent on nuclear weapons with their astronomical costs, we must have na-

tions which are economically strong and prosperous.

This prosperity in turn requires a greater degree of co-ordination of economic policy, a policy in which the considerations of security and unity will be overriding. Today, in nearly all sectors of the economy in Western Europe and in North America, business is prospering in this climate of security and unity. It will prosper further if the climate of security and unity is improved.

To these three necessary factors—of unity, security, and prosperity, we need to add a fourth: Responsibility. All the member nations of the North Atlantic alliance recognize their responsibilities to their own peoples. The conduct of these countries makes this fact self-evident. When all of these countries arrive at a greater realization that responsibility to their own people is closely related to responsibility in holding together and in strengthening the Atlantic community, we will attain progress at a greater rate.

PROSPECTS

The rate of progress will vary from time to time. There was a slowing down when the United Kingdom was refused entry into the European Community. The word "projected" in the title of this address—the title assigned to me by your Academy—represented the hope that the United Kingdom would be a member soon. Although we continue to consider that the accession of Great Britain to the Treaty of Rome is an objective to be encouraged, we recognize that this accession may not come about for some time. So there is some slowing down in the movement toward European unity as a result of the rupture in January, as the six members of the Common Market countries sort out their relationship with one

another, and as the British government determines how best to establish its *bona fides* as a "good European" to the extent required better to qualify for entry on the Continent. Furthermore, this pace of European unity will be affected by domestic political activities in a number of countries. The Fanfani government in Italy faces an election test this month, the Dutch go to the polls next month, and Germany will be absorbed with the question of Chancellor Adenauer's succession for many months to come. The British also face the prospect of elections some time in 1964. With the intensification of domestic political activity in these countries, the attention of their leaders is likely to be directed more toward national considerations than toward broader questions of European unification.

But, with all this, we remain convinced that the momentum toward European integration will continue to increase. It is, therefore, important that the American public and the Congress do not become so disenchanted or impatient with recent developments as to diminish American support for the European unity movement. We should not react impetuously by moving toward a political or military "Fortress America" position. Recent events have slowed but they have not stopped the European drive toward integration, nor have they seriously impaired the degree of integration thus far achieved through the EEC. For these reasons, we intend to reiterate our support for European integration so long as the European unity movement is neither subverted as an instrument for the hegemony of a single nation nor directed at the establishment of an autarchic Europe which would work against the political and economic interests of the United States and other free-world countries.

If we push forward in this movement, if we achieve a greater harmonization

of our policies within our regional economic and military organizations, if we develop this sense and feeling of unity, security, prosperity, and responsibility, we will have an advantage that can-

not be overcome. At some point, the Communists will recognize this. This recognition may make possible progress toward disarmament, stability, and peace.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Why did the Administration advance again along the military line at Nassau, ignoring the opportunity of consulting in an Atlantic convention such as is proposed by Mr. Herter, which would provide a chance of advancing on a larger front than the purely military?

A: I am sure that I do not have the full answer to this question. But I would say that, in moving forward in the the military and political and economic fields, we cannot possibly hope to present a front that is moving forward in a horizontal line. We are not entirely masters of the events which require of us decisions and the application of policies in one or the other field. So, I would only say that I would not regard the decision, say, at Nassau, to which you referred, as being at the expense of moving forward in consultation or economic development. It is not a matter of choosing the military field rather than the other fields. For a combination of factors that I know you are familiar with, there was the necessity at Nassau to take decisions in the military field, but the process of consultation and moving forward so as to create an Atlantic partnership remains in the forefront of our efforts and of our priorities.

Q: To what extent do you believe that the forgotten deterrent power—political, economic, and even military

—which is the power of the captive nations at the beck and call of the enemy could be used by NATO when the time or the necessity comes? Ought this power to be encouraged and preserved?

A: I would like to say very briefly in answer to your question that the United States government, as a matter of principle and policy, does not accept or recognize Soviet domination over the peoples of Eastern Europe. As to the deterrent which you mentioned, I would only quarrel with you on one point: It is not a forgotten deterrent. It is a living and powerful deterrent as long as liberty exists on Earth and the spirit of freedom in the human breast. We are confident that that power will not only continue to operate but that it will survive and that ultimately it will triumph.

Q: In view of your comments on the need for co-ordinated policies in NATO, would you comment on the problem of the delivery of pipe to the Soviet Union? The Atlantic Council asked the German government to discontinue contracts that had already been signed. Germany complied, but controversy was provoked because the Germans felt sure that Britain or some other NATO country would undoubtedly supply the pipe. Is co-ordination important on such an issue? Is it possible?

A: I was almost afraid that somebody would bring up the wide-diameter pipe! I think you are aware of the complexity of the problem and of its possible ramifications. It is true that the United States government believes that wide-diameter pipe contributes to the military strength of the Soviet bloc and, therefore, that exports of wide-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union do not serve the best interests of the West. It is because of this position which we have taken that we attach great importance to wide-diameter pipe not being exported. However, there are differing views within the alliance. Imperfection is inherent in the nature of human effort. There are differing views, and it is no secret that the government of the United Kingdom has, on the whole, a different perspective on East-West trade from what we have and different estimates, different criteria from those we have as to what constitutes and does not constitute strategic commodities in some respects. I say that these differences are within a very narrow range because we are both agreed that commodities of strategic importance should not be sent to

the Soviet Union. The only trouble comes when we try to define what each of us means by the word "strategic." In this particular respect, there is a difference of opinion which has been publicly aired. I believe that it is in the best interest of the West to hold off from exporting wide-diameter pipe. The resolution in the North Atlantic Council was limited in range, because it was a resolution which everybody agreed to carry out "to the extent possible." Obviously, it was not a firm resolution in the sense of a united opinion that this should not be done, but only that it should not be done to the extent possible. For my part, I hope that the line will be held. The German government, although contracts for several hundred thousand tons had already been fulfilled, has taken a very courageous decision against considerable domestic pressures to hold the line. What would we do if other members of the alliance were to sell wide-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union? I would take refuge in the position that, since it has not happened yet, I would rather not try to prophesy what we will do if it does.

The Projected European Union and the Question of German Unity

By K. HEINRICH KNAPPSTEIN

ABSTRACT: The political union of Europe and the question of German unity are interrelated as political realities and visions. The political union is still something of the future—despite the integration which has been developed in so many fields. The profile of the projected union is undetermined in a number of essential elements, such as membership, outside relationships, and the like. The union is, however, a matter of serious political concern for many governments, political parties, and the public since World War II. The functional integration of the Six has been brought about without the preponderance of any one nation over the others. Although national entity has become something less of a problem, the question of German unity is an essential problem in terms of policy, peace, and security and of the future of Europe. The question has national, international and distinctively European implications. The future union is not limited to any particular area in Europe. Except for the Soviet Union, there are no potential nonmembers by definition. The division of Germany is part of the division of Europe and, in this sense, is a concern of all. A Europe which would limit itself to preserving the liberties of the free people and would surrender hope for those who are not free would not be a Europe minus something nonessential; it would not be European at all, but, rather, an association of selfish purpose separating and dividing nations, not uniting them.

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DISCUSSING the interrelationship of the projected political union of Europe and the pending question of German unity means analyzing at the same time the interdependence of two political realities—their affinities, their dilemmas, and their prospects—and means also discussing two visions—two objectives which are in fact at this time lacking some elements of reality, such as shape and concreteness and effectiveness. Whether these trends in Europe can go hand in hand, whether they exclude each other, whether they will separate in the course of history, or whether these questions, after a longer or shorter period on separate ways, will merge harmoniously is subject to a great deal of speculation among divergent viewpoints. In any event, the development of both questions will largely affect the future of Europe. The prospects for these two issues partly depend upon the platform from which nations in Europe approach these problems—it depends upon the objectives the nations are aiming at and upon the strength of will with which nations and people collectively and individually are pursuing them. The realization of both these visions will depend upon the way in which their determination will be manifesting itself when the hour of decision comes.

We can discuss many ways in which both these issues can develop in the future—on a theoretical basis. We can, however, also discuss, and I propose to do that here, the inherent elements and their strengths in both these issues and the views which the German government and the German public take in this respect.

THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION

Let me first identify the major elements which seem to constitute the driving forces toward the political union of Europe.

The political union of Europe—whether conceived of as a federation of European states or as a “United States” of Europe, but compounding all the essential factors and institutions of modern statehood in the sense of Western democracy—is not in existence. This union is deeply longed for in large parts of Europe. It also may be subconsciously looked upon with some anxiety and preoccupation. Such a union would definitely change the loyalties of the past and present which were and are those of a nation as developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The union is still something of the future, the pending but inevitable arrival of which is felt as a necessity. But the union has not yet taken shape and nobody yet knows what it will look like and what his own position toward it will be. What would be its composition in membership? Would it be the so-called Inner Six? Would it necessarily terminate at the Iron Curtain? Would that Iron Curtain continue to exist and to divide Europe? Would it include the British Isles, all or most of the border states of the Baltic Sea, of the Mediterranean? Would it continue to maintain links of association with African states? What would be the relationship, the interdependence with the United States in an Atlantic partnership or even community? Would it be having a hostile Soviet Union as its neighboring country? All these questions concern, with variable emphasis, nations and individuals in Europe, and, of course, these questions are discussed in depth outside the European continent.

Many persons have attempted in the past to design the structure of the United States of Europe—in literature and in political philosophy: Maximilien Duc de Sully, friend and advisor of King Henry IV of France; the English Quaker William Penn; the French

politician Claude Henri de Saint-Simon; the Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau; the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, Giuseppe Mazzini, the hero of the Italian liberation and unification movement; the political theorist Konstantin Frantz; the French poet Victor Hugo; the French statesman and philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville; and many others more—in recent decades, in particular, the idealist Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Many attempts have been made in the past to bring about a united Europe by means of aggression, that is "civil war," through hegemony, through dynastical policy, through supremacy of one over the others.

However, only after World War II did political necessity as well as disillusionment about the objectives of national self-sufficiency, self-containment, and supremacy render it possible to work practically on the basis of another, a new concept. The concept of functional integration without political or military preponderance of any one nation in Europe over the others would—if implemented—actually develop a Europe the concept of which is not identified with any one nation in particular. This concept would also preserve the character of nations in the sense that they will not be subjected to the rule of any other nation or national system. This concept actually is being realized step by step. The economic interdependence and integration as well as the common defense system constitute the groundwork for the "projected union." The different circle of nations involved in each of these fields indicates to us that this process has not yet consolidated to the extent necessary for a next decisive step toward political union.

Within the circle of the countries of the European Economic Community—which in the very sense of the term

"European union" are the most advanced ones—we also see a diversity of specific interests and problems. One of these countries—Germany—brought into this undertaking the burden and the responsibilities of a defeated and divided country, but it also brought the dynamics of a people determined to construct anew its homes, its future, and its reputation. Another country—France—and some others to lesser degree—brought into this undertaking the responsibilities and burdens of nations with outgoing colonial ties to many a part of the rest of the world which had to be severed and then reshaped in new forms of economic association through a process of national independence for the peoples overseas. With this troublesome task performed, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—and also Italy—returned home to Europe to build with the one nation in the center of the small continent a lasting and sound structure for a far-reaching political project. Is the extension to these six countries the ultimate with regard to membership? Will the British Isles stand apart? Do they have to be outside? Would the membership for others be blocked pending the definite decision concerning Great Britain? There is probably no easy, no quick, even no general answer. Each of the nations, each of the regions has a particular, a specific profile which ultimately may allow this or that form of membership or association, but, in the end, their participation will contribute in shaping the profile of the projected union, which will definitely be different from each of the member nations' profiles at this time. It will also not be a mere addition of national individualities. In our view, the structure of this Europe now comprising the six countries is open to any nation in Europe under the one condition that the basic principles of the projected

union as envisaged at the beginning of the European Economic Community—in particular, the element of integration and the determination to commit the future of the nation to the course of this Community—will not be jeopardized. The legitimacy—political as well as historical—of the European Economic Community's identifying and defining itself as "European" and prejudicing the use of this name, rich in tradition, rich in prospects, is to be seen in the commonly accepted rule that this community is open for membership to other nations in Europe.

Let us—for a while—stay with this predominant political objective and analyze the provisions which were elaborated—in the framework of the Six—with regard to membership and participation of other nations in Europe.

Article 237 of the Rome Treaty which established the European Economic Community says: "Each European country can apply for membership in the community. . . ." The same treaty says in its preamble that the contracting parties to this treaty are determined to safeguard and consolidate peace and freedom, by way of this community of their economic resources, and that they urge the other nations in Europe who share these concerns and pursue the same objectives to join these endeavors. The treaty also opens the possibility for association of third countries, not necessarily in Europe, and of other state-confederations or international organizations.

The conceptional design which has been worked out and agreed upon for the establishment of the European union since World War II—the way from the grass roots to the top—has its handicaps. It is not merely a proclamation of which the implementation is left to future generations. It is, in a sense, not responsive to many feelings and sentiments for demonstra-

tive steps forward. It is the design of cautious and determined people who are not prepared to follow a mere slogan just for a nice holiday rally. It is the determination of people who want to build the future on sound pillars and to enlarge step by step the vested interest in terms of economics, of opportunities, and of challenges. It is also the precautionous course of those who carefully pause after having achieved one further advance and try to consolidate the new basis before advancing anew, thus leaving room also to retreat from errors and stalemates in order to start again on more promising terms. This should be understandable in view of the abuse which has been done to the idea of European union in many ways in the past. The need for reassessment, for instance, came when the project of an integrated European army had failed in 1954. This was also the case with the early attempt in 1955 to draw up a master plan for the political union before the economic grounds had been paved. This course also allows pauses either when circumstances do not permit the opening of membership to other countries or when political circumstances in any of the member states do not allow a next step in the advancement of the integration. Could any of the countries, any of the governments that conceive of the political union as a matter of necessity and not just as a pleasant subject for a Sunday speech be that careful, if not for the reason that confidence and insight were so strong that Europe will and has to be growing toward unity and that too speedy a progress could do tremendous damage and then distinctly weaken the implementation of the basic concept? There are, indeed, many avenues along which the next step can be taken. These are the opportunities, the challenges, but also the hazards of this process.

GERMAN UNITY

How do we now conceive—at the same time that nationhood becomes apparently less a problem in Europe—the question of German unity as a vital, as an essential problem in terms of policy, in terms of peace and security, in terms of the future of Europe. The question of German unity, in our view, has a number of aspects and implications, of which some are of a national nature, some of an international character, and some distinctively European. I think it is worthwhile to identify these different elements.

The division of Germany describes primarily an unsettled international problem.

To the extent that it is considered to be a problem of the German people itself, it could be solved in a couple of days, for the nation—although divided as West Germans and East Germans and West Berliners and East Berliners—continues to feel and act wherever feasible as a cohesive nation in terms of common history and common future. It is interlinked, in spite of walls and iron curtains, nowadays as before, by close family bonds and by manifold relations in as many fields of human activities as possible. In the face of the continued international stalemate on the question of the division of the country, the most pressing point for the German government and for private organizations as well as for the individual citizen is, of course, the humanitarian aspect and the determination of the people to alleviate and mitigate these hardships as much as possible. However, vis-à-vis overriding international factors, such attempts can bring about only very limited results, and the tragedy of many a family remains in the dark, untold and uncured.

On the other hand, the division of

Germany as an international problem concerns primarily the major former occupation powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The German question did not constitute the source for the postwar East-West conflict, but it was influenced by this conflict to a very large degree and, of course, influences the course of East-West relationships.

Also, the division of the country has a number of further implications, namely those related to World War II itself. The mere fact that this war had been initiated by Nazi Germany must have had consequences on the policies, preoccupations, and sentiments of neighboring countries and of everybody to whom the maintenance of peace in central Europe and in the world as a whole constituted the major concern in international relations.

The geography, the location of Germany in the central part of Europe, and its economic and human potential, of course, represent essential factors that tend to influence if not to dominate any lasting political settlement. Such a settlement has been postponed time and again. It will probably be suspended as long as the Soviet Union has not developed a more reasonable understanding of the future implications and dangers of a continued division of Germany. The East-West conflict has—as of now—not outgrown its life and death implications in the sense that the Soviet leadership dissociates itself clearly from a policy of Communist expansion in the sense of the Khrushchev statement: "We will bury capitalism."

Apart from the immediate relationship of the German question to the responsibilities of the four major powers and their divergent views on the future of that country in the center of Europe and apart from the meaning which the continuing division of the country has

to the nation which is thus divided, the question of the unity or division of Germany carries also a considerable weight for the projected union in Europe and the concept of a Europe ever more closely integrated. This might not be visible on first glance to an outside observer.

As I explained in the first part of this statement, the projected union of Europe is not limited to any specific area of Europe. It is not true that the "United States of Europe," the "Federation of European States," or the "United Europe," whatever may ultimately be the structure and name for the union, has any natural frontiers within Europe—except in the case of the Soviet Union. At present, it is correct to say that the projected union is primarily related to the six member-states of the Common Market and to those who indicated their serious interest in membership in this community—as Great Britain did and a number of other European countries did who are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But—and I am rather specific about this point—there seems to be no major voice inside Europe that indicates a readiness to accept the political, ideological, and somewhat artificial division of Europe in a free part and in a Soviet-controlled one as a natural line of division of the continent. Thus, the division of Germany represents a major concern to all of the European states, because it symbolizes the division of Europe as a whole. The free part of Europe will not be a self-contained union of interest but a union which offers its freedom and opportunities to any part of Europe. This, of course, is, for the government and the public in Germany, a very reassuring element. It is our view that the unity of Germany, in a genuine sense, cannot be brought about by a policy of isolation and separation

from the rest of Europe, from their concerns and their culture, but only within the framework of the predominant trends of political, economic, and social integration within the whole of Europe. In this sense, we discern a tendency toward closer ties and identical views also in terms of our specific problem—the question of German unity—among the nations which associated themselves and their future in the community.

German unification is not an objective in any scheme of constructing foundations for another attempt at German hegemony over Europe. German unification would, rather, accelerate the integration of that people in the center of Europe and the common course of European unity. After a long period of expansion into other parts of the world, other European nations—such as France, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands—return home to themselves, to Europe. These energies—and this also seems to be one of the principles for the union of Europe and for the unity of the German nation—will not be used for the advancement of national objectives but for the betterment of the commonwealth of the nations in Europe, not for the establishment of the hegemony of any one nation over Europe but for the development of a commonly shared and supported European society. In order freely to choose this course toward Europe, a nation should, however, enjoy freedom of action and freedom of conscience and thought. A nation which would have to take such a decision under duress from outside or in a state of domestic turmoil would, perhaps, not be prepared to sacrifice self-interests in a given situation for the sake of the commonwealth of nations united in a political union. When discussing such items and trends, it sometimes appears that one should fear "a

return to Europe movement" leading to some form of isolationist policy of Europe itself vis-à-vis the world outside Europe. This, of course, is not so—on the contrary. When Europe has found itself and has alleviated the pressure from the Soviet Union—an element which keeps European nations so much preoccupied with themselves and European affairs—it will, among other things, be more free to look outward to other parts of the world and to share more effectively with the United States, in a genuine Atlantic partnership, the burdens and responsibilities of industrialized countries to restore the distorted economic balance between the various regions on our globe. There is, as far as I can see, no sizable trend in Europe that would favor and see durable advantages from a course of action which would preclude and exclude Europe from the rest of the world. This might have been the case in former centuries and in former decades when the question of union in Europe was conceived mainly in terms of hegemony of one of the nations over others, when a check and balance could not be found or even be tolerated with regard to the genuine interests of the different members of the European community.

EUROPEAN UNION AND GERMAN UNITY IN PERSPECTIVE

In our view, the question of the political union of Europe is not a matter of political wishful thinking but a matter of political necessity, a matter of political challenge which people in our country will not only assess on the basis of present-day implications but also—and perhaps in a much deeper sense than outside observers can perceive—in view of the challenges and opportunities offered to the younger generation whom they want to be brought up in a society of broader

interests than those of a narrow nationalistic framework. Thus, support for and policies toward greater European unity are not a matter of *strohfeuer*, of easy success, of easy but quickly fading enthusiasm, but of hard work, of patience, and of constant effort. This attitude will affect each decision which is still to be taken in the national framework and on the background of a national constituency. Disappointments about failures and setbacks do not become easier under such circumstances, but they cannot any longer change the determination of governments and people to pursue this course of action.

As a matter of realistic approach, however, we must recognize that the state of mind in various parts of Europe shows quite substantial shades and even differences of attitude in this matter—which is only an additional reason to proceed with patience and by careful action. Under such prevailing circumstances, the available course of action lies in fact in the field of functional co-operation and progressive integration. In addition, the mutual dependability in matters of defense and economic development between Europe and the North American continent as well as engagement in the rest of the world at the same time demand the development of a balanced interrelationship between these two continents as the major political gravitation fields and as main centers of industry in the free world. This interrelationship has been changing over the years and will continue to change. In this area of co-operation with the United States, which is an essential consideration in all policy matters in Europe, not so much the determination to grow into one integrated union but, rather, the determination and the need for developing mutually beneficial, mutually acceptable, and mutually satisfactory

arrangements in all matters of defense and economics and related activities are the immediate targets. The difficulty in this area is that, as of now, it is not one European voice to which the United States is listening, which it is consulting, but, rather, a series of European national voices. This is what sometimes makes it so difficult to arrive at a balanced and perceptive decision. Taking into this picture, in addition, the power relationship of the United States to the Soviet Union, one must realize time and again that it is a burdensome undertaking to meet at one and the same time a number of purposes. It appears very often that a matter under discussion turns into a great psychological problem because both sides of the Atlantic are seeking agreement and understanding on the background of different knowledge and judgment, which can perhaps be overcome through more intense sharing in knowledge, in research, and in intimate considerations which are pertinent for any foreign-policy decision. This, of course, breaks the traditional "sound barriers" of diplomatic intercourse in which one of the essential ingredients used to be the belief that one cannot allow partners, even in a very close alliance, to have a look into the "shop of policy-making."

I am optimistic about the prospects of the European political union—without being able to identify in advance the exact nature of this community or union and without being able to express firm views as to the membership of such a union, hoping, however, that it would be open to any nation in Europe, even a nation or parts of nations which are under Communist rule at present or which are under the pressure of foreign domination, as is the population in East Germany. In the same sense, I am convinced that the question of German unity with its various implica-

tions—those of a national character, those of the East-West conflict among the major allied powers of World War II, and those implications which develop in the context of the projected European union—will continue to be with us until the very day that a satisfactory solution can be found which would not be contrary to European and, thus, to German interests. The German people do not view this question as a problem of national prestige or as a prerequisite for a re-emergence of nationalistic, self-contained, and even expansionist policy. For Germany, this problem includes, among other elements, humanitarian fairness to their countrymen. It is also deeply affective of the future shape of Europe. Foremost, however, it is of direct relevance to the objectives for which the free world is standing through challenges, dangers, and daring hours in solidarity—as the free world did in the defense of freedom for Berlin and in the maintenance of hope for the return of freedom for the Cuban people. Such hours of courage symbolize these ideals and objectives in the same way as the years of efforts by the free world to enable newly emerging nations to gain their independence and to develop the technical and other skills and tools to maintain their freedom against subversive political gamblers—troublemakers who wander around the globe in search of profitable grounds for political exploitation.

The nations of the free world, and, particularly, the United States, have a tremendous capital of good will behind the Berlin wall, behind the Iron Curtain which cuts apart one section from the other in Europe, a capital of good will and expectation which has resisted and survived the ups and down of Communist rule over a long period of time. This attitude and this expectation on the part of the population in East Europe await an alternative to Com-

munist rule which is not merely an endless quarrel of nationalistic designs but an alternative of progress in a greater society.

In this sense, the postwar period of World War II is definitely different from that of the postwar period after 1918. It would be a great mistake to overlook these differences. This is something of which the leaders in the Kremlin are very well aware, and they are trying everything to dilute these trends and forces by hammering into the population the themes of revanchism and expansionism. But this kind of maneuvering can be taken in some degree of seriousness only by those who do not live with the generation of this age, not by the common man in the new society in Germany or elsewhere in Europe.

The people of the generation of tomorrow in postwar Germany want their nation to be integrated with other nations in a united Europe. They want this with all their hearts and emotions. They want this for all of their nation in the same sense that they want to keep open this new design for any other nation in Europe. A Europe which would limit itself to preserving the liberties of those who are free and would surrender hope for the freedom of those who are not free at this time would not be a free and united Europe simply lacking something nonessential. It would be a society of selfish purpose. The Europe of the Six is and will be a good and honorable community because it stands by its objective to unite the nations of Europe, not to divide them.

The Impact of the Franco-German Entente

By HAROLD C. DEUTSCH

ABSTRACT: The Franco-German entente has a broad scope, treating of cultural, economic, and military matters. Its impact was initially encouraging, for a reconciliation between France and Germany appeared to be a symbol of the victory of the present era over history. Subsequent events have contributed to a view of it as an effort to turn back history and to play an old game of power politics with a new alignment. De Gaulle has cast himself and France in the role of federator for Europe and tends to regard as intolerable any combination which includes close association with the United States. Adenauer is desirous of assuring his place in history by effecting a Franco-German reconciliation, and many of his views correspond to a little-Europe policy. There are some indications that the Germans might be reluctant allies of the French. German opinion was disturbed by the French veto of British membership in the Common Market and De Gaulle's apparent repulse of the United States. Differences may arise over a German contribution to the development of a French nuclear force independent of NATO. De Gaulle is unenthusiastic about German reunification. The success of Caesaristic, directed democracy in France may adversely influence the development of democratic institutions in Germany. The role of the individual in international politics seems to have been reasserted through the Franco-German association, yet the urgency of international problems occasioned by nuclear armaments makes it vital to rise above purely individual considerations in the broader arena of world politics.—Ed.

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IN dealing with the problem of the impact of the Franco-German entente, we are today asking ourselves questions that we never dreamed of raising a few months ago. Not that the Franco-German pact was a surprise in itself. Many of us have been watching closely how this association has been developing. But there are some elements about it which had something of a bombshell character.

First, it has a most extraordinary scope. It has a character never seen in a traditional alliance in that it covers almost every conceivable aspect of relations between two countries. The treaty deals in an amazing way with cultural, economic, and military relations, involving what seems at some points almost a fusion of the two peoples.

The second aspect that surprised and also upset us was the timing of the whole affair. It came exactly a week after President de Gaulle's famous press conference of January 14, and the whole focus of the combination seemed, therefore, to be part of the effort De Gaulle was making to exclude Britain and the United States in very large measure from the decisions affecting the Continent. This is the more disconcerting because the Franco-German reconciliation was a dream shared not only by French and Germans but by all the Western world throughout the late 1940's and the 1950's. It seemed to us to be the *sine qua non* of any real progress in Western unification. The dream, as we now know, has gone sour in many ways for people both inside and outside the combination. In Washington and in London, it has assumed some of the aspects of a nightmare.

One of the things that was so espe-

cially encouraging at the start was that the notion of a Franco-German reconciliation appeared to be the very symbol of the victory of our age over history. If France and Germany could forget the rivalries of centuries, why would it not be possible to deal with any other difficult problem which history had created and with which we were confronted in trying to deal with the great issues of the present time? Against this shining vision of conquering history, we now have conjured up before us the vision of two old men conspiring to turn back the clock and to play an old game in a somewhat new fashion, with a new alignment—essentially a game that many of us feel has been outdated in the international sphere.

FRANCE AND DE GAULLE

On examining this problem, it is necessary to review some of the fundamental concepts which are associated with the roles of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. Many of us certainly felt that we had arrived at a point in history where the personal element was least expected to play a major role. It looked to most of us as if never before had the dictates of economics, politics, defense, and the like so inexorably determined the course of affairs. One wonders whether we will not have to revise our view, whether the role of the hero or the villain in history is not going to be assessed more highly in the next generation and in the rest of this generation than was the case before. In the last weeks, as you know, libraries have been written about the role of Charles de Gaulle in particular. No one, certainly, has shaken the dry bones of the world so much since Adolf Hitler.

In De Gaulle we have a man who is capable of large thinking but also of thinking, at times, of a dreadful simplicity, who never seems to let go once

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he gets his mental teeth into something. He is accused by many of having his mind either in the remote past or in the distant future, with most of us suspecting that it is more of the former than the latter. We shall not go very far into De Gaulle's ideas concerning the problems of France in the present world and Europe. Here we certainly have a man who recognizes some but not all aspects of the changed world, who continues to envision international relations essentially in terms of the old power game, though he is by no means entirely deaf to the appeal of "Europe."

Apropos of that, I should like to tell a story related to me in 1958 by one of the most distinguished citizens of Switzerland, the great historian Carl Burckhardt. We were in his home on Lake Geneva, and it was just a week or so after De Gaulle had come to power. I expressed my own anxiety as to what this meant for the European unity movement. He said, "I understand perfectly how you feel. I have my anxieties, too. On the other hand, De Gaulle is not completely averse to furthering European unity. And there I might tell you a tale. Twice during the war, I was in London. On each occasion, I saw De Gaulle, whom I knew well. On the second occasion, we were walking in the garden of the villa where he was quartered, and somehow into our conversation came the problem of the future of Europe. De Gaulle said, 'You know, in history, there have been three Frenchmen who have been destined by Providence to assist in the unification of Europe. The first of these was Charlemagne. The second was Napoleon.' And then he stopped and looked thoughtful and shoved the gravel with his foot and said, 'We won't go on to the third.'"

Perhaps, if he had gone on, De Gaulle might have been tempted to predict the coming of another Charles the Great,

a Charlemagne II. You observe here the notion of the "man of destiny" and, secondly, of France as the proper federator—a word that De Gaulle uses quite frequently. Apparently he feels that Europe, if it is to be associated, must have a particular federator. He has several times said emphatically that the federator must not come from the outside—in other words, must not be the United States. By implication, he may also include Britain, because whether or not Britain belongs to his Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" is very much a question.

In connection with this problem of a federator, De Gaulle obviously would like to have France act as the honest broker. He does not conceive of the possibility of the European states automatically coming together, just agreeing among themselves to some form of union. Somebody, if not necessarily holding a whip, must use a prod. And this honest broker ought to reap some kind of political commission, a commission he would like to claim for France.

European union, therefore, for De Gaulle, whatever he may have said to Professor Burckhardt in London, seems to mean essentially a means to an end, not an end in itself. The real end that interests him is the world political role of France. For him, then, the European idea is not, as it has been to most of its advocates in the last forty years, a repudiation of nationalism or of the concept of the balance of power. It is, rather, an expanded framework in which these principles, these interests, find new applications. He knows, of course, that France, by itself, is not going to be able to play that kind of role. That much he will reluctantly concede to realism, but not very much more. He realizes, also, that the role of France would not be a very great one in an Atlantic combination or in a Europe in

which Britain is a full partner. Therefore, if France is to play the great role of which he dreams, it means that Western continental Europe must represent a third force, an autonomous decision-making factor in the affairs of the Western world.

FRANCE AND GERMANY

Given De Gaulle's appreciation that France, if alone, can only sulk in a corner, the key to the problem obviously is a close association with Germany. That is the more clear when you examine any alternative. For example, Britain and France have been frequently associated during our century, but that is a combination which is today unthinkable except in that close association with the United States which De Gaulle regards as intolerable. France and Italy? Obviously ridiculous! Therefore, it can only be France and Germany. There is no other choice.

Naturally, this all depends very much on the German response. This is the current great interest, the big question mark before us. Few of us have many doubts about De Gaulle and his policies. We think that they are very definitely fixed. But still we have hopes that, through this one avenue, we can bring some influence to bear.

We have not the time today to look at Germany's development of outlook and policy since the late 1940's. She has been able to see a secure future for herself only as part of an integrated Europe, as a partner in the movements for unity in the European and in the Atlantic spheres. The Germans are sick of adventures, and, beyond that, they are in a situation, especially economic, where international operation on an individual basis is unthinkable. They are completely dependent on outside association.

The most vital part of the big problem of reconciliation with France has

been the obvious fact that, for the Germans, the road to Europe has to be over Paris. Without that association, any connection between Germany and the West would be of a most tenuous character.

ADENAUER AND GERMANY

This brings in, also, the role of Konrad Adenauer. Where is he concerned in this whole problem? Is he dupe or is he accomplice? Or is he reluctantly being dragged along a road on which he has once embarked?

Certainly, Adenauer, who is no more without personal vanity than the rest of us, is deeply concerned with his place in history. He already has many claims to fame. But, if he could be the architect of Franco-German reconciliation, then he will have a unique place. For generations, there have been Germans who have dreamed of playing that role. Even William II at times had that dream, and we often wish that he had had it more fully than he actually did. If Adenauer can achieve what the statesmen before 1914 and Stresemann in the 1920's and others were not able to do, then, clearly, he has this absolutely unimpeachable claim to everlasting historic fame not only in his country but in the Western world generally. Here is undoubtedly a major motivation and one most worthy of respect.

What needs more emphasis, what is frequently forgotten, though easy enough to perceive if you look back over his policy of the last ten or twelve years, are the "little Europe" inclinations of Konrad Adenauer—the ones which were opposed so bitterly by the Social Democratic party in Germany in the early 1950's. This involves a tendency to operate in the framework of what we now call the "Inner Six," the Common Market states, a combination essentially dominated by Catholic

elements in the various countries concerned, obviously a major consideration from his standpoint. Again and again, Adenauer shows that it is his inclination to push the little Europe as against the larger one, even though I do not feel that he can be accused of having no larger vision of the greater Europe.

If you look, for example, at a press conference which was on German television in August 1962, you will find him there saying things—a week before De Gaulle made his famous trip to Germany—in which he indicates agreement with some of the lines of policy that De Gaulle has embarked upon this year. He said then that it is not necessary that, in joining the Common Market, Britain also must be associated with a larger European political union within the same combination. Here there is evidence of an inclination on the part of Adenauer to go along with a good deal of what De Gaulle has favored.

GERMAN OPINION AND THE ENTENTE

The full impact of the German-French entente will only become clear to us when we know more about two points. First, will the Germans ratify—as I am almost sure they will—and in what form are they going to do it? Are they going to make political reservations of some kind? Will there, as has been proposed in the Bundesrat, be a preamble in which it is made clear that this does not in any sense imply a weakening of the bonds that Germany has elsewhere. Second, can Germany exact some kind of price from De Gaulle, perhaps concessions along the line of a more liberal attitude toward the early association of Britain with the Common Market.

As said above, it appears quite sure that the Germans will ratify. This was very clear to me when, a week or so after the veto at Brussels, I read an

editorial in a German newspaper in which the writer criticized De Gaulle severely and then, in the last paragraph, said, "But, after all, my fellow citizens, indignation is a poor political counselor." In other words, whether we like it or not, we have to continue along the line that we have adopted!

De Gaulle ought to keep in mind here that reluctant allies are of very doubtful value. We certainly do find a great change in the attitude of Germany. The great enthusiasm for a reconciliation with France along the lines indicated has ebbed in many respects. The Brussels veto was a shock to German opinion. Many who had previously been all for the road over Paris now are wondering whether this is any longer the true road to Europe.

For the Germans, this also threatens infinite complications for their relations with their other associates in the Common Market and with other neighbors in Europe, for their relations with Britain, and, especially, most sensitive of all, for their relations with the United States. Remember that the basic German policy of rehabilitation since the last war has been based on the unity movements for Europe and the Atlantic. If the road over Paris is not going to lead there, or is going to involve a very serious detour, then there are obviously grave doubts about the whole proposition. Yet I do not believe that the Germans really can refuse to ratify, and the problem essentially is one of to what degree they may associate that ratification with clauses which, by defining and perhaps making reservations, will influence the character of the combination. Or, can they actually exact something in the way of concessions from De Gaulle?

Certainly, a tremendous impression has been made in Germany by a speech made the end of March by Dr. Hallstein, the president of the Common

Market Commission, at Strasbourg at a Council of Europe meeting, where he pleaded that the ratification of France and Germany should "interpret and apply the pact in such a way as not to injure the character, functions, and dynamic of our union." The response to that appeal in Germany has been almost universally a positive one.

Hallstein did not have to take the lead alone, as is indicated, too, by a conference that took place in Bonn on the 14th of February—under the chairmanship of the former foreign minister, the present head of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) delegation in the Bundestag, Von Brentano. This included all the Eurocrats, the ones from Brussels, also those in the Bonn government, including Erhard, the economic minister. The final resolution which was voted by that group was that Germany should make every effort to induce France to agree to a program in which, first of all, Britain would immediately be associated with the Common Market and by 1966 would be a full member. Probably by 1968, there would be a political union including Britain, and, apparently around 1970 or so, an Atlantic community treaty with the United States. It is interesting that the most influential man there, and more or less the successor-designate of Adenauer, Minister Erhard, said most emphatically for publication that this would have to be a package deal, that De Gaulle should not be allowed to pick and choose, that, thus, step one must inevitably lead to steps two, three, and four of this program.

It is hard to know to what degree we can take this entirely seriously. Is this meant to be a serious effort to get concessions from France? Or was this essentially meant to be face-saving for the Christian Democratic Union of Adenauer? There is a good deal of the latter to it.

Adenauer and his party are much embarrassed by these developments which have raised a storm in Germany. The pressures on Adenauer are indeed great. Here, again, one wonders to what degree Adenauer was dupe or accomplice concerning the timing. It seems that he probably did not realize that De Gaulle was going to have that press conference. The date of the treaty had been set weeks in advance, but the press conference was probably engineered by De Gaulle in between. One might say that the old fox, Adenauer, was outfoxed by De Gaulle. I should say, however, that whatever indignation Adenauer may have, if any, is—as with so many Europeans—aroused more by the way in which De Gaulle did this than by what he did. What bothers Adenauer most is not so much the slamming of the door on Britain as the insults and the repulse directed against the United States. Adenauer assuredly is much more sensitive about that than about the problem of Britain.

We are all aware that the only way we can get to De Gaulle is via Germany. Some of you no doubt have read the article in the April 6 *Saturday Evening Post* by Mr. Stewart Alsop in which he points out how, in Washington, people are at their wits' end, how nobody has anything remotely like a formula for dealing with the situation, how all the suggestions which are made for putting pressure on De Gaulle have already been recognized as being either self-defeating or more painful to us than they can possibly be to De Gaulle. So, the only way we can hope to get to the French president is via Germany, because she is obviously so absolutely vital to his program.

Here it may well be that, at some point, De Gaulle will be influenced by the fact mentioned, that, even though Germany will no doubt ratify whether she can get concessions or not, having

a reluctant ally will be of questionable value to him, especially after Adenauer disappears from the scene. The successor to Adenauer, especially if, as most people suppose, it is Erhard, will think very differently about these things. Just to have Germany's signature and ratification is going to be of somewhat questionable value if her heart is not in the association.

THE COMMON MARKET

As to the problems of the impact, we can deal with only the most significant, because the influence of this Franco-German association, assuming it continues as now outlined, can well prove world-shaking in various respects.

First of all, let us look at the picture with respect to the Common Market. Will it inhibit the political development of the Common Market? We know that De Gaulle has tried repeatedly in the last years to extract the political life from the association. The speech of Hallstein to which I referred is one long protest against this effort by De Gaulle to limit it to economic association, to an assembly of economic bureaucrats who have nothing to do with political decisions concerning Europe. Hallstein, speaking at Strasbourg, said expressly, "I am speaking not for myself but for the entire Commission." He said most emphatically that the demand that the political organization of the Common Market proceed must not be forgotten for a single moment. Obviously, there will be a tendency on the part of De Gaulle to dilute that as much as possible.

THE NATO ALLIANCE

In relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we certainly can anticipate many consequences. We are all aware of the basic tripod on which the NATO policy of De Gaulle rested when he came to

power. First of all, France was to have her own nuclear force. Second, there were to be strict limits to Western military integration. Third, he demanded a three-power directorate.

Taking these in reverse order, he has quit talking about a three-power directorate, which, of course, makes no sense at all in terms of the present Franco-German constellation. There has been some restriction, after an initial very disturbing set of measures, in the way in which France has prevented the military integration of NATO. The fact that the French general staff and the officer corps on the whole are pro-NATO has made this rather difficult for De Gaulle.

De Gaulle continues to stand absolutely solid on the issue of an independent nuclear force for France or, conceivably, for Western Europe. The implications of this nuclear factor are extremely significant and carry into many areas.

We all appreciate how the threat of massive retaliation, the basic policy of the United States in the days of Secretary of State Dulles, has lost more and more in credibility, especially as the Soviet strength in this area has paralleled ours and as Russian rocketry has obviously exceeded ours. The basic thesis now is that we must deal with the problem of restraining the Soviet Union, if it ever must come to the use of force, by an escalation system in which we start with the mildest possible means and work up, as far as is necessary, toward the more drastic ones.

Given this picture, Europe has recovered considerably in potential influence within the Western association. The theory of escalation, as the emphasis of the Kennedy Administration has shown so clearly, has led to a situation in which the conventional means of warfare are again more significant and where, therefore, those who could, in

that area, contribute something substantial gain weight in Western councils. Conceivably, Western Europe could do all and more than what the present NATO forces, including the Americans, are doing. So, the weight of Europe, relatively speaking, increases in that kind of situation.

Also, we have had the problem for some ten or twelve years now of convincing the Europeans that we were ready to act for them, to take a chance, for example, on sacrificing New York in order to save Paris or London. On that point, there are more doubts today than ever before. Many people in Europe also are saying, yes, the Americans would be willing to act, but escalation implies that they will act rather slowly. At what point would they act in the major sense, with the ultimate weapon? As the allied forces falter at the Elbe? As they collapse completely on the Rhine? As the Russians reach the Channel? At what points are the Americans going to move? Should not we have this decision in our own hands?

Here, De Gaulle has made an impression—especially in France—with his claim that the existence of an independent nuclear force, no matter how small, means at least one more finger on the trigger, that Europe can make the decision which will launch ultimate weapons and force the Americans, really, to go along. So, the influence of Europe in connection with any negotiation with the Soviets in the councils of the West would proportionately increase because she would now be in a position to act by herself and to make decisions by herself in the event of crises in the European area.

It is very interesting, vis-à-vis the whole problem of the future of NATO, to contemplate just what De Gaulle has in mind about the fusion of the Franco-German forces as such. When he made

that visit last September to Germany, he spoke of an organic co-operation between the forces of the two countries. He spoke of joining financial and technical resources. And many people assumed that he was asking the Germans to assist the French with the scientific problems of building the nuclear weapons on which the British were apparently unwilling to give help. The treaty of last January has a whole section of military clauses, all extremely vague. They imply that the door is wide open and that the two countries can go just as far as they wish or circumstances permit.

THE GERMAN PROBLEMS

Let us deal with the question of how all this affects Germany, her role and her place in the world. Will, for example, the development of the Franco-German entente be useful in promoting German unification? Many Germans would like to believe this, but most of them must have their doubts. They are all thoroughly aware that De Gaulle is the only Western statesman who, before Mr. Harold Wilson spoke out in March, had openly said that we should definitely resign ourselves to the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line. By inference, we may assume that De Gaulle is unenthusiastic about the reunion of the western part with the eastern part, or the Soviet zone, of Germany. Certainly, De Gaulle, in dealing with the problem of relative weight in the Franco-German combination, would be appalled at the notion of dealing with a Germany of 70 million plus population as against the present one of a little over 50 million. Many Germans must be doubtful, then, that De Gaulle is eager to promote unification.

One of the amazing features of the whole story is De Gaulle's optimistic confidence that, even in a relatively

equal situation with respect to population, the two countries are going to be able to carry on with France effectively in the driver's seat. It offers a remarkable contrast to the French viewpoint of just six or seven years ago. It must be remembered that the European Defense Community (EDC) failed in the mid-fifties largely because the British refused to go into it and the French were afraid to be left alone with Germany. If the French had any reasons in 1954 and 1955 to be worried about being left alone with Germany, how many more reasons they have in 1963! There has been an unbelievable rush of Germany to the forefront from the economic standpoint, from the military standpoint, from every standpoint that counts in giving weight to a nation in international councils! The German position has obviously greatly improved. There is ample reason to wonder whether De Gaulle will long be able to control the genie he is calling upon at this particular time. It would be interesting, but also tragic, if the way back for France to a course of broader Western co-operation would be the result of developments in Germany—which would not only signify that France was no longer able to handle Germany but that the West in general would have a similar problem.

The De Gaulle influence on German internal politics is a problem by itself. We should see it unfolding in the next months. More interesting from a long-run standpoint to me is the effect of this upon German public opinion and attitudes concerning the future form of society and political orientation of the country.

German liberals were dismayed in the fifties by the way in which the Fourth Republic was floundering before De Gaulle took over in 1958. They are now even more dismayed by the example that Germany now sees of a

Caesaristic, "directed" kind of democracy as it has developed in France. There is cause, I fear, for real anxiety about the effect on German democratic trends—up to now, on the whole, encouraging—of the association with France, where very different methods are achieving success. Nothing does succeed like success. One must remember the changes in German attitudes that resulted from the victories of Bismarck in the mid-nineteenth century. One can only hope, from this standpoint, that the effect will not be too serious for German democracy.

Another aspect of the problem is the degree to which the developments in Germany and France are going to enhance the "fear" of the Soviet Union about Germany. The Franco-German association has been called another way station to full German rearmament and even nuclear armament. If the association continues, it is almost inevitable that Germany will share much more fully in whatever development France further undertakes along this line than she would ever have been likely to in a larger Atlantic community led by the United States. Here is some reason, then, for Soviet anxiety. I submit, however, that this so-called "fear" of Germany is largely a myth, that Russian talk about a "Bonn-Paris axis" is merely the new edition of a very effective propaganda line that the Soviets have pursued ever since Germany began to make something of a comeback. In fact, the general alibi for Soviet policy put forward by their apologists all over the world in the last eighteen years has been that the Soviets are afraid of some aspect of Western developments. Some apologists make the point that this fear may be unreasonable but, if we only could allay it, we would not have any serious trouble with the Soviet Union. The main edition to that particular fable in recent years is

that the Soviets are afraid of Germany. There is a very large and complicated problem here, but it is more than questionable whether they really regard Germany as a serious aggressive factor, even though they may be disturbed by developments which change power relationships in a number of ways.

Let us say a word or two about Eastern Europe. De Gaulle has many times said that Europe—and how right he is here!—is not merely Europe west of the Elbe, that it involves a much broader area. He likes the term “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” That does not, in itself, have very much meaning. There is more reality to the idea of an association of the states of the present Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe with Western Europe. The supporters of the De Gaulle program have repeatedly emphasized recently that here was one of the great hopes of the West and, especially in connection with the Franco-German association, that, if Europe emerges in the West as an autonomous force, it will exert infinitely more attraction for Eastern Europe than a larger community in which American domination looms in the distance. There may well be some logic in this assumption, and, from the standpoint not only of the Franco-German association but also of the Common Market, this development will bear watching.

LONG-RANGE EFFECTS

The hardest thing to gauge in any situation is always the long-range effect, what we can expect if the present situation—disturbing as it is—continues. We come back again to the problem of the role of the individual. Bismarck once spoke a reassuring word on this. He said that the individual cannot do very much by himself, that all he can

do is listen for the footsteps of God through history and seize a corner of His mantle as He passes by.

I submit that Charles de Gaulle has a less acute ear in this sense than John F. Kennedy, that the latter is giving us a better interpretation of the basic needs of our age, that the idea of an Atlantic community is the only hope that we have to make real progress, not only in Western defense, which is obviously vital, but also for the long-range goal of finding more real security for the world.

Who would dare hope that we can go on as we are doing for another ten or twenty or thirty years, allowing individual nations to dispose of the kinds of weapons they now have and the more terrible ones of tomorrow and to depend upon no accident occurring sooner or later. If we are not able, within the next generation, to solve this problem and to find the way to an international authority which can prevent any individual nation making such decisions, then the outlook is grim indeed. I personally do not share with my friends of the United World Federalists the view that we can make much progress along that line in a world organization in which we have both the Communist world and the free world. For reasons which we cannot go into but that most of you would probably find cogent enough, it is inconceivable to me that we can make much progress along that line, and we shall be doing very well if we can simply hold present positions with respect to the United Nations.

That does not mean, in my view, that we have to sit back resignedly and wait, that nothing can be done. There is an area in which the Soviets cannot interfere and influence our decisions, and that is the Western family of the Atlantic world. If, within that area, we cannot make progress, we must not

blame the Soviets. Then, we must admit the Communist claim that the capitalist world is so full of inner contradictions that it cannot, in the long run, settle its problems.

Here is the great challenge to the West. If we can in the Western world within the next years develop a means of unity capable of transfer onto a larger world plane—if we ever arrive at that fortunate day when there will be no East-West clash—then we will have made real progress within an area which is realistic. It fits very well what has been described as the “grand design” of

President Kennedy—the notion of tightening the bonds between continental Europe and Britain and gradually creating a true Atlantic community. That seems the only way to a more secure future.

It must be, in my view, a fairly rapid development. Yesterday, in the question period, one person said perhaps we would not be able to accomplish it for a thousand years. I submit that, if we do not succeed before then, it may well be that for 970 years of that time the world will have been a radioactive waste.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Comment by Professor Deutsch: In concluding, I did apparently leave the impression that I was paying tribute not only to the basic design of American policy but also to the way in which we were pursuing that design. I agree thoroughly with Professor Kohn, however, that we have not always sought to implement that design in an effective way. Undoubtedly the United States has been dealt a basic lesson through the events about which we have spoken. There was a certain mood of arrogance in high American quarters during the last part of December 1962 and the early part of January 1963. There appeared frequent comments by prominent American observers to the effect that the Administration, in its exuberance over the success in Cuba, was now going to show Europe a thing or two. And the President made a number of remarks in Miami in a supposedly off-the-record press conference in which he said, in effect, that America would have to take much more of a lead, that we were not after all in a popularity contest, and that, if some of our European

friends did not like everything we did, we could only regret it. The experience we have had since with De Gaulle has shown that our mood then was out of order, and, as you know, it has been very much more chastened since it was made plain that Europe was obviously going to insist on a greater degree of codetermination with respect to its fate. I would say that we have been put on our good behavior and that we had better heed the warning.

Q: What hope does the Atlantic community offer as compared with the planning of President de Gaulle concerning the subjugated nations of Central and Eastern Europe?

A: I believe that De Gaulle here has stolen a march on us. I think that he has done something which leaders of the West have sadly neglected over the years. All through the late 1940's, all through the 1950's, and now in the 1960's, the leaders of the West should have reiterated more emphatically that

our idea of Europe is not a Europe which stops at the Elbe. That line is accepted temporarily by harsh necessity; we should not for a minute forget those in Eastern and Central Europe with whom we have a common heritage. Our ideal at all times is that united Europe must eventually include them and that the Atlantic community must include them. I do not feel this can be emphasized too much, and I only hope that Western leadership, in the years lying ahead, will be both more clearly mindful of this and more eloquent in response to this necessity.

Q: How might we possibly arouse fear in the Soviet Union?

A: The problem of how to arouse fear in or, to use a more common term, to exert pressure on the Soviet Union has been one which has troubled Western statesmen for eighteen years. We are all aware that we have not once been able to make a gain anywhere in the world in areas once penetrated by Soviet or Red Chinese influence. It has always been a matter of riposte, response on our part, to Soviet actions.

As to arousing fear, we obviously cannot arouse much fear along the lines of threatening to commit suicide.

In most situations in the world, we cannot repeat the stand we took in connection with Cuba. In Cuba, our position was unique in that we had all the trumps, militarily speaking. The only response the Soviets had was to launch the big bombs. We controlled locally everything that was vital in the way of military, naval, and air force. Under those circumstances, the Soviets had to make that painful and virtually inevitable choice between retreating or launching World War III, and this is perhaps the only place in the world—in other words, the Western Hemisphere

—where we can exert that kind of pressure.

Elsewhere, we can, of course, create fear by means of measures which are not associated with war or threat of war. This lies in the way of building up resources in the West which represent not only a strengthening of the West but also a strong appeal to the people behind the Iron Curtain.

I feel that the greatest apprehension in the Soviet Union in recent years has been aroused by the fantastic leap forward in Europe. Europe, in four years, has perhaps made the greatest economic advance the world has yet seen in a corresponding period, and this, as I see it, has been the greatest blow that the Communist world revolution has suffered at any time since it was victorious in the Soviet Union in 1917. It is such a blow because it has demonstrated that, if capitalism can master its contradictions, if it can exercise a certain self-discipline, it is still capable of dealing with the problems of a changing world in a way that even its most enthusiastic adherents hardly deemed possible ten years ago.

If the West can continue on this road, we can arouse apprehension on the other side with reference to the specific gage of battle which Khrushchev threw down to us when he said, "We will bury you." The threat was that the Soviet Union would outproduce us and that, therefore, by 1970 or so, the rest of the world, yielding to logic, would accept communism as an obviously more efficient and better form of society. If that is going to be the area of contest, then plainly the way to proceed is to develop further the bonds of union in the West, such as are represented by the Common Market.

Q: Why have we not produced an alternative at least as plausible as

De Gaulle's? Do we envision the future reunification of Europe entirely in terms of a Soviet mellowing? Or might we be secretly afraid—in spite of all our lip service to European unity—of the eventual power of a united Europe?

A: With reference to my remark that De Gaulle stole a march on us, I meant only psychologically. De Gaulle has many times said that Europe does not stop at the Elbe, and he has very expressly addressed the appeal for a united Europe to the Soviet-dominated areas of the East. As I said before, there we have missed a good trick and have also been very negligent in our conception of the morality of this entire problem.

As to whether we have any lingering fears of Europe, of course there exist in America not so much fears as apprehensions, some of them completely legitimate. What has happened now could not have happened if we had not gone so far in re-establishing Europe, including France, economically and otherwise, if we had not encouraged the Common Market itself to proceed to the point that it has. We realized from the start, all of us who were not naive about the matter, that this involved certain calculated risks. It involved the possibility of the kind of thing that De Gaulle has actually done. It involved the danger economically—as emphasized in some of the remarks yesterday—that this would not be an open-ended kind of development, that

continental Europe could become a closed community where the nationalistic economic policies of France and Italy would take over as against the more liberal ones of Germany and the Benelux countries. It involved the possibility of economic tensions and difficulties not only as between Europe and America but between Europe on the one hand and Japan, Latin America, Africa, and various South Asian states on the other. So, there are reasons for anxiety that things might go wrong.

Yet, I am convinced that the American people and their leaders have understood that there really is no other policy. If we pursue one dominated by anxiety about what Europe can do by itself, about the economic rivalries and competition which she can create for us and others, if we are fearful of what Europe can do in the way of making her own decisions along the line of neutralization programs or separate negotiations with the Soviet Union and so on, if we allow these fears, which are real fears and have some basis, to dominate our policy, then we will simply accept the pattern of affairs proposed by De Gaulle. We will look upon the Western family as being in the same state that it has been for centuries with a continuance of the power game, with a use of new devices and slogans only to pursue stale ends, in short, not to bind Europe and the West together but merely to advance, as De Gaulle is trying to do, the narrowly conceived interests of one particular country.

The Future of Political Unity in Western Europe

By HANS KOHN

ABSTRACT: The Franco-German treaty does not represent a move toward genuine European unity; it is a mistake in terms of promoting unification in that it is an exclusive treaty. An adequate defense of Western democratic values requires a multinational treaty that includes all the North Atlantic countries, one which repudiates authoritarianism, dogmatism, and exclusive nationalism and provides for mutual consultation and close co-operation on all levels. World War II was followed by a period of political and economic weakness in Europe during which old-style nationalism appeared to wane. Recovery, which Western Europe owes to the United States, led, at least in France, to the resurgence of old nationalism, which turned against the United States, and to the revival of hegemonic aspirations. NATO, conceived not solely to defeat the Soviets but also to strengthen democracy, freedom, and welfare within Western civilization, was weakened as Europeans came to lose much of their fear of Soviet military aggression. It is principally President de Gaulle of France who does not believe in a united Europe or in an Atlantic community or in the United Nations. He is unable to understand that neither the United States nor Great Britain is as passionately nationalistic as he is. He is anxious to assure primacy for France in Western Europe and to make of continental Europe a third force in world affairs. In view of this, the United States should not attempt to exercise its hegemony as such but should, rather, set an example of true co-operation and consultation.—Ed.

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I WISH to supply a short outline of the historical background to what Professor Deutsch, with whom I completely agree, said about the events of the year 1963, the consequences of the Franco-German treaty, and, above all, President de Gaulle's rather outspoken declaration at his press conference of January 14. There are only two very minor points, on which I do not disagree, but about which I would stress somewhat differently the points which Professor Deutsch made so excellently here.

He spoke of the need of a "federator of Europe." I do not know enough about Charlemagne, because it is long ago and I am not a student of medieval history, as President de Gaulle is. De Gaulle knows everything about France from Charlemagne to Charles de Gaulle. But I know something of Napoleon I; he is a part of "my" modern history. I would not call him a federator. What Napoleon tried to do was to establish a unity of Europe by hegemonic means—a French hegemony. President de Gaulle obviously is trying to do the very same thing, though in a much more civilized and less revolutionary way. Napoleon tried it at a time when France was still, relatively, the strongest single power in Europe and hoped to retain and to strengthen this position. Under today's changed circumstances, President de Gaulle comes to Germany to participate in a Franco-German hegemony in Europe, a hegemony of which most Germans at present do not really wish to have any part.

The second point at which I want to add one note to the excellent remarks of Professor Deutsch is the Franco-German pact. This was signed by

Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle on January 22. That it is certain to be ratified, I thoroughly agree, because there is no other way in which the federal parliament can express or try to institutionalize what the large majority of Germans agree to—namely, that there should no longer be, along the Rhine, as there has been for 200 years, a barrier of hostility. Most Germans wish and expect Franco-German co-operation. A long chapter of Europe's modern history seems definitely closed—and this would be true with or without a specific treaty.

But there is one point: Is there to be an exclusive co-operation, a very special tie, aiming at establishing a hegemony in Europe in a revival of the nationalisms and hostilities of the past, or is there to be an inclusive, broad co-operation of friendship, of mutual confidence, of mutual aspirations—between Bonn and Paris as well as between Bonn and London, Bonn and Washington, Bonn and Ottawa, Bonn and the Hague. I think that the majority of the German people, and the French people, too, wish to go ahead with some kind of Western co-operation without any exclusive ties. To go a step farther, while I recognize the personal greatness and achievement of De Gaulle and Adenauer, I believe that they do not represent in every of their steps and plans either the French people or the German people.

I wish to take up the warning Professor Deutsch expressed, namely that there is one thing in particular to be worried about. The visit of General de Gaulle last year did not have a good effect on the German mind, and in June, De Gaulle is coming again to Germany. Does the way in which he appeals to German greatness and flatters the Germans really help the new Germany? The last twelve or fourteen years gave us, in Germany, the Federal Republic

This article is the text of an address to the Annual Spring Meeting, Fourth Session, Saturday morning, April 6. The question-and-answer session which followed the address is reproduced at the end of the article.

of Germany, an unexpected democratic development. As a student of German history, I know very well that it is the most democratic regime, the most Western regime that Germany has ever had in her long history. And now General de Gaulle appears as a man on horseback, as a strong authoritarian personality, filled with the burning fire of nationalism and dedicated to rebuilding French military grandeur. Professor Deutsch mentioned Bismarck as a similar leader in Germany and the impression on the German mind produced by his success. I fear that a close exclusive alliance with France, where democracy is not a very secure plant and authoritarianism is accepted, will not be healthy for German democracy. From 1789 until today, France has not known the secure democratic development which Switzerland, Britain, Scandinavia, and the United States know. There have been the Bourbons and the Napoleons and Marshal Pétain and now General de Gaulle. I would prefer the Germans much more to look to Britain, to Scandinavia, to the Low Countries, to Switzerland for the growth of their democracy, rather than to a country like France where, in spite of the immense genius of the people and their innate love of liberty, which so far finally has always succeeded in overthrowing the authoritarian regimes, the democratic regime has always been unstable, vacillating, and not deeply honored.

NATIONALISM AND NATO

After these brief comments on Professor Deutsch's analysis of the present events, I wish to turn to a brief sketch of the historical background.

What I am afraid of in Europe today is a rebirth of an old-fashioned hegemonical and self-centered nationalism. World War II was followed by a time of political and economic weakness in

Europe, when you could believe that the old type of nationalism was waning, and I have the impression that it did wane among many of the younger generation. It is very interesting for me that one of the leading German historians, Ludwig Dehio, recognized that, with World War II, the chapter of hegemonical wars and aspirations in Europe had come to an end. But, as early as ten years ago, in 1953, in the June issue of the German periodical *Aussenpolitik*, he warned that "The recovery of Western Europe, which it owed to America, led to the resurgence of all our old nationalisms." And he went on to make two points: (1) that this newly revived nationalism will turn against the United States and (2) that it will revive the hegemonical aspirations among "the two continental powers with a long military tradition and old hegemony aspirations: France and Germany." He was not right about Germany, fortunately. Although there are aspirations like that, they are unofficial today. He was, unfortunately, right about France.

Professor Deutsch spoke about apparent weakness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Every one of us knows how NATO was weakened in the last years for many reasons, not only, but above all, for French reasons. The fear of Soviet aggression in Europe has, I believe, waned. Most Europeans believe that Soviet military aggression in Europe is most improbable, or they believe it does not actually exist. And that, of course, has led to a weakening of their enthusiasm or interest for NATO. They overlook, in my opinion, the fact that the Soviet has not become pacifist, and they overlook the fact that, if Europe is secure today from Soviet aggression, and I believe she is, that is not due to a change of heart in the Kremlin. It is due to American

armament and to American protection of Europe. But, more important to me, and again I think I am there in complete agreement with Professor Deutsch, NATO, in my eyes, was never a purely defensive military alliance based on fear. Nothing that is a purely military alliance endures. Lester Pearson, the Canadian minister, wrote in 1955: "NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being. . . ." It is my deep conviction that what we need is not so much a European union, though in a broad sense it is welcome, as an Atlantic unity, not so much for the sake of the defeat of the Soviets but to strengthen democracy, freedom, and welfare within Western civilization, and I believe that, unfortunately for the future of the West, and of French democracy, General de Gaulle does not share these hopes and aspirations.

FRENCH OPINION

General de Gaulle in his rather brusque rejection of Britain as a European country, treated Britain almost as if she were—and I do not imply any offense to Togoland—Togoland, forgetting that, whatever political liberty and rights of man exist in Europe or anywhere else have their source in seventeenth-century England, and not in France under Louis XIV. But, in his anti-British attitude, President de Gaulle could count for support on a strong anti-British tradition in France.

It is not the only tradition. There was a strong pro-British tradition in the eighteenth century which continued in the nineteenth century with men like Saint-Simon, Renan, Taine, Clemenceau, Jaurès. But there was a strong anti-British tradition in the French Revolution, under Napoleon I, in the Action

Française group, and quite recently under Marshal Pétain. A deep distrust of perfidious Albion was quite widespread on the Continent and not only in France. De Gaulle could appeal to that.

But what I wish to do now is to show that, though De Gaulle's strong stand in his declaration of January 14 came as a surprise to many Americans, it was surprising only because they did not take the time to read General de Gaulle's writings. General de Gaulle is a supreme tactician; in fact, in many ways, I regard him as the greatest living statesman of the West—a supreme tactician, a supreme politician who does not wish to appear to be a politician. As regards his strategic goals, he has followed them with complete consistency—which is one indication of the greatness of his great character—from the very beginning.

When I spoke about Germany in this country in the 1930's, people had not read Hitler, which is understandable, because Hitler, who was a faceless man, wrote an abominable German and spoke an abominable German. President de Gaulle—who is a man with a noble face, a face in many ways formed by the great aristocratic tradition of the Europe of the past—writes brilliantly, better than any other living statesman, including Mr. Churchill, who is the only one coming out of a similar aristocratic tradition—yet one which for two centuries respected liberty in a way unknown to continental aristocracy—who writes brilliantly, too. Yet De Gaulle writes in a more monumental and more self-centered way.

DE GAULLE'S DESIGN

What I wish to do now is to read you a passage from De Gaulle's war memoirs, from the third volume, called *Salvation*, published here in 1960 and in France in 1959. What De Gaulle

writes here, though written a little before, was approved by him for publication in 1959 and 1960. I think it is very important to understand why he does not believe either in a united Europe or in the Atlantic community or in the United Nations; he accepts them *pro forma*, but he does not believe in them. He believes in France, to use a famous word, in "France d'abord," France above all other things, France first.

He writes: "No sooner had the sound of gunfire faded than the world's appearance changed. The strengthened spirits of the people, mobilized for the war, suddenly lost their unified object. The ambition of states reappeared in all its virulence." He speaks of 1944 and 1945. "The allies [Britain and the United States] revoked those considerations and concessions that they had granted each other in time of danger when confronting a common enemy. Yesterday was a time for battle. The hour for settling accounts had come." De Gaulle saw, as he writes, with dismay France's weakness in relation to her own goals and the partisan calculations of other states, meaning the United States—above all, the United States.

General de Gaulle makes the same mistake we all naturally do; he sees everyone motivated by the same forces motivating him, and he cannot see that the United States or Britain may not be so passionately nationalistic as he is. That they are nationalistic, but not so passionately nationalistic, that they are more pragmatic than doctrinaire, is difficult for him to understand.

They will take advantage of the situation to try to force our hand on issues still undecided and to relegate us to a secondary place among the nations responsible for constructing the peace. But I had no intention of letting this happen. Considering the fact that Germany's col-

lapse, Europe's laceration, and Anglo-American friction offered a miraculously saved France exceptional opportunities for action, I decided to wait, because it seemed likely that the new period would permit me to achieve the great plan I had conceived for my country.

General de Gaulle uses here one strange expression, "a miraculously saved France." He does not add what the miracle was. The miracle was the perseverance, heroism, and greatness of the British people, who stood for one year alone facing the frightening might of Hitler, before Hitler's attacks forced Russia and us to be on Britain's side. That was a miraculous turning, by which France was saved, but not only France was saved, the liberty of the world at large was saved. What is now the General's great plan? Every word he wrote he has since tried to realize, knowing when to be silent and knowing when to speak, knowing when the time was not ripe and knowing when the time seemed to be ripe—undoubtedly a statesman of great stature, comparable, it may be, to a man like Bismarck, and, yet, I would say, of a nobler mind in many ways than the irascible chancellor ever was.

I intended to assure France primacy in Western Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten its safety; to co-operate *with East and West*, and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances, *on one side or the other*, without ever accepting any kind of dependency; to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees [the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, Spain] to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc [with France] and to press forward this organization as one of the three world powers, and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and the Anglo-American camps. Since 1940, my every word and act have been dedicated to establishing these possibilities.

I read the memoirs twice. I was immensely impressed by the person behind them, but I was deeply hurt in a certain way by the strong anti-British feeling which goes through all of the three volumes and by the revival of old struggles and bitternesses between Britain and France—the last one about the Middle East—a revival which, to say the least, is today superfluous. De Gaulle suspected Britain even in publishing his book of wishing to dominate the Middle East. His hostility on this point was entirely past-dominated. Today neither France nor Great Britain will dominate the Middle East, and, let us add, neither will Washington or Moscow. But the long bygone times of colonial rivalries are still alive, unfortunately, in some European minds.

THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP

I wish to add, as Professor Deutsch did, and inspired by his example, a word about the United States. And there I shall not be as complimentary as Professor Deutsch was. I agree with everything he said about De Gaulle, Germany, Adenauer, and so on. His very last words, however, I think, demand a brief remark on my part. Namely, we—by that I mean the United States government and the United States people—tend sometimes not to take sufficiently into consideration the feelings and susceptibilities of our associates and fellow Atlantic nations. I have the feeling that the present Administration has not improved this grave deficiency. Professor

Deutsch said there was a need for an Atlantic community, but we have not exercised sufficient leadership for the formation of an Atlantic community. There has not come out of Washington an inspiring message. And sometimes we try to decide questions concerning the whole community by ourselves. That may have been possible in 1949 when Europe was still laying in ruins. That is impossible today. I think that our insistence on control by us alone of atomic forces and our secrecy vis-à-vis our allies concerning atomic science do not inspire confidence in the co-operative spirit of the United States itself.

Though we do not aspire to hegemony, hegemony was thrust upon us, and we are to accept it, willingly or not. We should not try to exercise it, but we should, rather, set an example of a true co-operative spirit, of a method of continuous consultation.

To return in the last words to the Franco-German treaty, the real mistake of the treaty is that it is an exclusive treaty. Let us write something, rather, that is a multinational treaty of all the North Atlantic countries—Canada, Europeans, us—for mutual consultation, for close co-operation on all levels. I think that this unfortunate treaty might set the example for something better in which authoritarianism, dogmatism, and the exclusive nationalism of the past are repudiated. The whole West, then—France and Germany, we and Canada, and the rest of Europe—will share in a common defense not only of our military positions but, above all, of our democratic values.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Would you comment on the fact that, while we have urged England to join the Common Market, we have

shown remarkably little interest in accepting the merchandises of England and Canada, to say nothing of cheap

heating oil from Venezuela or cheap sugar from Santa Domingo, which are trying to be democratic?

A: I entirely agree with what I regard to be the implications of your remarks. We are very great in urging other nations to be nice, but we are not always as nice as we wish other nations to be. That was, after all, the burden of my last remarks, and I was so happy that Professor Deutsch completely agreed with them. We must show a much more liberal attitude. But it is not always the Administration alone. We have a Congress—Senate and House of Representatives. They follow, as far as I can understand it—and I am not an expert on domestic American policy—sometimes a policy which can hardly be called truly enlightened with regard to our co-operation with our allies and friends.

Q: How does one explain that a country such as the United States which was the beneficiary of an ideological revolution, having waged war to gain its independence, has been poised in an attitude of surprise for the last forty years that ideological revolutions have accomplished what they said they were going to do—from Lenin, from Hitler, to Stalin, to Khrushchev, to De Gaulle. How is it that we cannot comprehend that with which we started?

A: I am again in the fortunate position of being able to agree with the question and the questioner. If

the people in the world rise today with a claim to national independence or to social reform or for social mobility or against obsolete caste systems, they carry out our traditions. They are inspired by the Declaration of Independence, by the spirit of 1776. But we forget that sometimes. We have not succeeded in integrating our own tradition, our own revolution in what is going on, a world revolution. Yet, as you say rightly, people today are motivated not so much by economic greed but, above all, by ideological reasons, and we do not always understand that. This is true not only of the State Department but even more of the nation as a whole. I think that our future very much depends on our sympathy, empathy, understanding of what is going on today and what motivates people, on our capacity to understand that people everywhere are much more moved by spiritual motives—whatever the spirit. It may be an evil spirit. Hitler was an evil spirit, but the German youth of 1933 was almost unanimous for Hitler, was inspired by ideas—evil ideas, but ideas. As long as you do not understand that, you cannot understand what is going on today. It is ideas, and we should not abandon our ideological leadership in the world which is changing as a result of our history, as a result of what happened here, as a result of the social mobility here. And, above all, we should not forget Latin America, because what is needed in Latin America is that social mobility, that breaking of the rule of oligarchies which will come either with our help or against us.

Residual Nationalism: A Rising Threat to Projected European Union

By BLAIR BOLLES

ABSTRACT: Nationalism both within the European Economic Community and in nations outside the EEC framework is diluting the effectiveness of European unity movement in stimulating international co-operation. Isolation tendencies in the EEC, residual in the political parties that opposed European union, threaten to disintegrate the Community. At the same time, the rising wall of tariff exclusiveness and plans for a Europe-Africa preferential trade zone manifest a nationalism that infuses the entire EEC. Nationalism on both the nation-state and the Community-wide bases makes the EEC a divisive force in the world. Persistence of nationalism is largely related to the small number of members in EEC. The establishment of the Community was a miscalculation which calls for new policies by countries which are not EEC members.

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NOT long ago, the unity movement in Europe appeared to optimistic observers to be a splendid means for bringing all right-thinking nations into a happy-family relationship, with nationalism gone the way of feudalism. Certainly, confidence that the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, would be the basis for a broad venture in international co-operation ran through the presentation which the Kennedy Administration made to Congress in 1962 for the new Trade Agreements Act. Congress approved the act on the assumption that membership in the EEC would be expanded and that the enlarged Community would establish close-knit trading relations with the American side of the Atlantic Ocean. But that is not the trend of the European Economic Community, which is the nexus of the movement toward unity among nations.

The gulf between the hopes of 1962 and the facts of 1963 is the result of the impact of nationalism, which has survived as a powerful force in the countries of the EEC and in the neighboring countries. The latter's nationalism has diluted internationalism within the EEC, where nationalism of the type that leads to trade wars survived the signing of the Treaty of Rome and is embedded. Unless its form is changed, the EEC is not going to contribute to the spread of international harmony either within Europe itself or within the larger "Atlantic world." It simply establishes a new division in Europe and marks the end of the Atlantic dream.

This residual nationalism can shatter the Community as an economic organism, prevent its membership from expanding, and keep it from its founders' goal of evolution into a political union, or it can foment a relationship of rivalry between the entire Community and the remainder of the now friendly Western world.

The unity of a few states—and the EEC consists only of six: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—is no more a signal of the birth of general internationalism in the twentieth century than the unification of Germany was in the nineteenth. The subordination of the German states in one German Empire helped to tidy up the European map, but it also gave nationalistic Prussia an opportunity to infuse the whole roster of empire membership with its nationalism, particularly with regard to economic nationalism. Unity is good for the unified, and insofar as unity within the EEC invigorates the economic life and elevates the standard of living of the Six, the existence of this limited-area unity stands for a stability which is to the whole world's advantage. But, for the outsiders, it carries with it the menace of certain well-known types of nationalism.

Pertinent forms of nationalism

Nationalism can take many forms and is adaptable to changing conditions. The forms relevant to this discussion can be categorized as outgoing and inward-directed: (1) outgoing politico-military nationalism, which erupts into conquest and control of neighboring powers by one strong power; (2) outgoing economic nationalism, which takes the form of preferential or closed trading areas; (3) inward-directed political nationalism, which is isolation from unity movements; (4) inward-directed economic nationalism, which takes the form of protectionist trade barriers around one country or a single continuous bloc of countries and of preferential trade arrangements among distinct and exclusive groups of countries.

MENACE AND PROMISE

The manifestation listed first, which wars and conquests have taught the

world to fear in the twentieth century, is something of a wicked fairy god-mother to present-day internationalism in Europe: Out of the menace comes the promise.

When the German armies had been driven from Russia and World War II ended with Soviet troops in Berlin, Vienna, Prague, and Warsaw, Premier Stalin spoke of it as a great national triumph—Mother Russia rides again!—and voiced minimum expressions of gratitude for the help he had received from his allies in prelude to victory. When the disclosure of this point of view was followed by the establishment of Soviet domination over the countries of East Europe and by the attempt to isolate Berlin from the West, it slowly became obvious that the repression of the aggressive conquering nationalism of Hitler's Germany had invigorated an aggressive nationalism in Moscow.

The memory of Nazi nationalism and the fact of Soviet nationalism stimulated European countries toward partial continental union. As a practical ideal in its own right, international union was advocated by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, and he gained respect but not results. For results, the world needed a prod, and the Soviets obliged by providing it.

Against the background of two world wars and the new nationalistic vigor of Russian policy, it was plainly desirable for the West to have a "system evolve that will help to end the danger of further intra-European struggle."¹ The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1951 provided one system to minimize the danger of further struggle, but it did not fulfill all needs. It was necessary to develop basic strength within Western

society as well as within Western military organization, and the turn toward EEC became inevitable.

But, having erected buffers to conquest-oriented nationalism, the unity movement poses nationalism problems of its own. Within the EEC can be found an isolationism capable of shattering the organization before it is fully formed, a clear-cut tendency toward bloc protectionism, and a plan to set up a preferential trading area in twelve countries of Africa. These facets of nationalism arouse doubt, on the one hand, whether the EEC will survive, and, on the other hand, whether the EEC will make a lasting contribution to world stability if it does survive.

Residual isolationism

Having made its contribution to the establishment of the EEC, the Soviet Union can also encourage its disintegration by carrying forward the trend toward international friendliness which Chairman Nikita Khrushchev first displayed in 1962. As the imminence of the Soviet menace recedes, the faith in national self-sufficiency intensifies wherever it exists, and it exists in the France of President Charles de Gaulle, which is a cornerstone member of the EEC. "General de Gaulle tends to relate greatness to isolation. . . . No doubt he advocates a plan of 'vast confederation' for Europe, but it is a confederation of independent states."² The stated goal of the EEC in the Treaty of Rome is a political union that would eventually leave no room for independence, and the program for economic integration itself is already an invasion of independence. The EEC was not supported by the Gaullists before the treaty ratification, and they will not have to support it indefinitely if events in

¹ Paper by Reginald Maudling, M. P., in *Economic Unity in Europe: Programs and Problems* (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1960).

² Chapter by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, in *In Search of France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 353, 354.

Europe, including eastern Europe, raise doubts of its worth to a large number of voting citizens.

Vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the EEC is weakened by uncertainty about the future. As it is presently organized, the capacity of the EEC to stabilize Europe and the world depends on continuation of a situation that makes for instability. That is the division of Germany into the democratic West and the Soviet-dominated East. Benign or menacing, the Soviet Union can be counted on to press the West for a resolution of the problem of German division through a new agreement on the German microcosm of Berlin. A benign Soviet Union may in time arouse a serious response to this pressure. A new definition of the status of Berlin would necessarily provoke a re-examination of the status of each of the Germanys, West and East, and the status of West Germany involves its membership in the EEC.

Germany after Adenauer

There is a residual isolationist nationalism in West Germany that has cropped out at all critical occasions since the establishment of the federal government in Bonn in 1949. Isolationism has been prominent among the Free Democrats, and it has not been totally absent from Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union. During the Messina Conference in March 1957, which was the first act in the preparation of the Treaty of Rome, Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer's Minister of Economics, sneered at the proposal for a European common market: "European incest. Economic nonsense."³ Erhard was not for high tariffs, and he objected to the prospect that the EEC would set an elevated schedule of duties for the Community as a bloc. The prospect is becoming reality, and Erhard retains a

position of power and influence in West Germany. Since the EEC came into existence, Erhard has supported it, but the relative vigor of German opinion for Western unity and opinion for isolation from the unity movement will be measured in a new setting as soon as Dr. Adenauer retires, supposedly this year, from the chancellorship and the leadership of his party. The passion of his concern for profound German involvement in multinational Western institutions is unmatched in any other German political personalities who might control German policy after his withdrawal.

Irrespective of Soviet ploys, there is another latent condition which can strengthen political elements leaning toward nationalistic isolation from the EEC: the level of economic activity. The EEC must be admitted to have made a great impact on the member countries, because Europe has enjoyed a boom since the birth of EEC on January 1, 1958. The EEC has not been subjected to the strain of disenchantment that comes with hard times, but the curves of economic activity traditionally go from boom to recession and back again, and, in prudence, one should look forward to the onset of recession.

Most countries of the world made a nationalistic isolationist response to the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 and 1930. The United States enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. The Germans accepted Adolf Hitler as Chancellor. The British instituted Empire Preference in trade, through the Ottawa Agreements. There was a general withdrawal to policies of national self-reliance in the search for the means of economic recovery. They showed their sentiments clearly at the London economic conference in 1934; the conference failed to evoke a unified approach to the common problem.

Concern over the response that the EEC members will make to a decline

³ Blair Bolles, *Big Change in Europe* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958), p. 147.

in their economic activity must persist, because European unity is a partisan political issue in most of the countries that make up the Community. It is like the protective tariff in the United States up to 1934, when the first reciprocal trade bill was enacted. In France, the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and the Guy Mollet Socialists were for European unity and the Gaullists against—long before 1958 when De Gaulle resumed the presidency. In Germany, unity was opposed by most Free Democrats. In Italy, the number of Communist voters remains strong, and West European unity is not a plank in the Communist platform. The argument for sovereign self-sufficiency gains force from the fact that, although the EEC has indeed advanced the economic welfare of its members, each of those six countries had already achieved a remarkably high level of economic activity and standard of living before they entered the EEC. The parties—or new groupings drawn from the old parties—which lost in the vote on ratification of the Treaty of Rome can conceivably become the parties of victory when consumption drops and exports lag.

PROTECTION AND PREFERENCE

Meanwhile, Community-wide nationalism is a fact, embedded in the treaty itself. It is manifest in the provision for establishment of a common external tariff around the six countries as a bloc and in the protectionist point of view by which the Community exploits that provision. One "must realistically face the probability that, as the Common Market comes into being, exports to the Common Market countries will be subject to tariffs that may be substantially higher than tariffs now in effect."⁴ The EEC members have

speeded the program for reducing trade barriers as between themselves. As a result, they will, all the earlier, be in a position to erect their high common wall. Trade with the EEC by countries that are not members has increased since 1958, but can we foresee aught but a fall in that curve of trade, particularly with Germany and the Benelux countries, after the Community is fully integrated as an economic unit?

The inward-directed nationalism of trade protection is re-enforced by tendencies toward the limitation of investment from overseas in the EEC. The government of France, in February of this year, announced decrees giving a favored position to the French state-owned oil companies over foreign companies. The attitude of exclusion or limitation extends to other areas besides oil, although official policy does not presently reflect this attitude. An example is the recommendation by the Small and Medium Business Association of France that foreign investment in distribution be restricted.⁵ Another shading of this trend toward nationalistic anticompetitive self-reliance is seen in the energy policies of Italy, where the government-controlled ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) dominates the business of distributing oil products. It is the opposite of internationalism—first to fend off competition from abroad by a tariff barrier and then to limit the opportunities for foreign competitors to function within the tariff wall as distributors or manufacturers.

Africa trade preference

The protectionism within the EEC bloc can be projected, by authorization of the treaty, beyond Europe into Africa. There, twelve new countries potentially have the status of "as-

⁴ Paper by George Ball, in *Economic Unity in Europe*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵ Waverly Root, "Yankees in France May Soon Be Packing Bags," *Washington Post*, March 24, 1963, p. 23.

sociated countries." These include all the former French territories in Africa (except Guinea and the one-time protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia), Somalia, and former Belgian Congo. The former French territories enjoy already a preferential status with France, through the absence of tariffs and the existence of franc-based currency. These conditions limit the commercial opportunities for all countries except France. This semiexclusive preference will be shared with all EEC countries when the five members besides France formally extend the role of association to the Africa areas. The "overseas territories will have free access to the Common Market as a whole, but they are allowed to retain certain import duties to protect their infant industries."⁶ Such an arrangement will make of a large segment of Africa an even more exclusive preserve for particular countries than it was in the days of African colonialism, and it will, thus, limit the area of trade in the world for non-members of the EEC. Also, it threatens to cause a further dislocation in world economic relationships because producers of primary mineral and tropical agricultural products in other underdeveloped parts of the world, particularly Latin America, will not be able to compete for sales in the EEC market with the African states.

Thus, the kind of economic nationalism which harassed world relationships in the 1930's is beginning to exert itself in the 1960's under the guise of a unity which is actually a divisive force. The power of residual nationalism within the EEC is obviously very strong.

SACRIFICE AND VISION

This persistence of nationalism is directly related to the character of the European unity movement itself. The

number of countries participating is too small to bury nationalism. Those countries, indeed, have a population almost as great as the United States, and together they outproduce and out-employ all the rest of Europe on this side of the Soviet Union. But the EEC occupies only a portion of the continent. It is surrounded by vigorous countries, some of which are industrially far advanced. A group of countries bound together by a policy of progressive integration becomes not simply a Common Market but a Common Competitor of the countries which are neighbors but not participants. Thus, the establishment and functioning of a limited grouping like the EEC stimulates national rivalries.

In entering the EEC, the six countries made a sacrifice—or revealed a great vision—not made or revealed by those who stayed out of it. They sacrificed a portion of their individual sovereignty. This fact alone is enough to provide a sense of distinction for the Six that generates a Community-wide nationalistic feeling.

The Six had certain things in common. They had been defeated and occupied in World War—either by the German forces or, in the case of West Germany itself, by Western allied forces. Other European countries had also been defeated and occupied, but there was an added distinction to the three most important of the Six. France, Italy, and West Germany all were impelled toward the unity movement, first through the Coal and Steel Community established in 1952 and then through the EEC, by Catholic-based governments—the Popular Republican Movement in France, the Christian Democratic Union in West Germany, and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy. The prominence of political Catholicism in the movement was considered as one deterrent by the British foreign office, I

⁶ Jean-Claude Petit, in *Economic Unity in Europe*, op. cit., p. 39.

was informed privately at the foreign office in 1954, when the unity move was young.

An important opportunity to encourage the Six to expand farther over Western Europe was lost by the United States even before the EEC came into existence, when the question of the European army was at issue, in 1953 and 1954. This proposed pooling of sovereignty for military purposes was pressed upon the very six who had set up the Coal and Steel pool and not upon their neighbors. In the debate leading up to the French rejection of the European army treaty in 1954, the nonadherence of Great Britain was cited with some resentment by outspoken French opponents in the National Assembly and in the army. One suspects that they would have opposed it in any event, but they were able to exploit the nationalistic opinion that France should not be asked to make a sovereign sacrifice from which the British were excused. The issue of the European army is today lost to memory among the many dead issues of the past, but the United States stress on the Six at that point helped set the framework of European unity as the unity of six.

Others stay out

When the EEC itself came into existence on January 1, 1958, the British showed no interest in joining it, and the continental neighbors of the Six were not in a position to join it. The Six invited all the members of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation (OEEC) to join both the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community. But only the Six "were willing and able to make the necessary commitments. . . . The reasons generally accepted for Britain's decision to stay out of the Community were related to questions of parlia-

mentary sovereignty and Commonwealth responsibility. In the case of Switzerland and Sweden, policies of traditional neutrality played a role."⁷ When Britain sought admission in 1962 and 1963, it asked for a waiver of membership requirements so that it could assure protection of agriculture in the Commonwealth. President de Gaulle of France made himself internationally unpopular by blocking the British admission, but the basic concept of the EEC as a pooling of sovereignties and of national interests would be destroyed if the rules were broken for the admission of any one state. The United States, not dissimilarly, sets standards for admission to statehood. Furthermore, the recent British push toward membership had a partisan political overtone. The EEC was favored by the party in power, the Conservatives, but the Labour party voiced objection. The unity of Europe will be impossible without partisan political agreement within the nations united.

In retrospect, one inclines toward the conclusion that the establishment of the EEC was a miscalculation. The idea had a validity at one time which it subsequently lost. Such an integration of nations was urgently needed immediately after World War II, when a pooling of the inherent strength of the major European powers in the West was an obvious requirement as a shield of continuing peace. But many international institutions subsequently came into being which themselves served to bring together at different levels of interest most of the West European nations. The most important of them were NATO and the OEEC. When they were developed in the 1950's, the case of the 1940's for a formal unity became much less urgent. The mo-

⁷ Leonard Tennyson, chapter on "Economic and Political Integration," in *Economic Unity in Europe*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

mentum from the 1940's, however, accelerated by the existence of the Coal and Steel pool of the Six, carried a part of Europe forward toward the EEC. Only the few were willing to pay the sovereignty price of entering the EEC. Many were ready to co-operate in NATO and the OEEC. The latter two institutions provide international forums

and set international responsibilities in which nationalism is diluted and the concept of the "Atlantic community" is nourished. The EEC, however, confronts the world with a new and unexpected set of nationalistic realities which inevitably will set in train new policies or variations in existing policies outside the Community.

Western Europe and the American Balance of Payments

By G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

ABSTRACT: American political, military, economic, and financial relationships with Europe are reflected in our balance of payments. Surpluses were created after World War II when we gave and lent heavily for European recovery, but these have been replaced with deficits which, though they attract attention because they involve gold sales, are in a declining trend. Now that Western Europe is a potent economic force, it can be expected increasingly to share the costs of defending and strengthening the free world, thus relieving some of the burden on the United States. The paradox of the situation in which the United States dollar is a "key" currency is that confidence in the dollar increases as we eliminate our deficits but the disappearance of our deficits will reduce the growth of international liquidity and could impair growth of trade and flow of capital. The present adjustment process for surpluses and deficits works slowly. To compensate, a more flexible international monetary system is required, toward which the United States has taken the initiative, chiefly with West European countries, in developing new techniques of co-operation and co-ordination. The United States welcomes European integration in the long view but anticipates mixed economic consequences in the short run because American sellers will be placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to insiders and possibly threatened competitively in third countries as well.—Ed.

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THE subject of Western Europe and the American balance of payments brings together the whole complex of our political and military as well as economic and financial relationships. As the leader of the free-world alliance, the United States pays a disproportionate share of the costs of its defense; as the provider of the major key currency, it is concerned with maintaining the soundness of the dollar and the proper functioning of the international monetary system. Western Europe and the United States are the two major pillars of the free world. Consequently, our relationships with them and the roles which they and we play are crucial factors in the strength of the free world. A proper sharing of the burdens of our common interest is a vital need for our time, and it is one for which we are working.

This complex range of political, military, economic, and financial interrelationships is all reflected in the neat—and somewhat mysterious—accounting tables which record our balance of payments. I propose first to review briefly the change in the international position of the dollar after World War II, then to consider the strategic position of Western Europe in relation to the United States balance of payments and the international monetary system, to describe some new techniques being used to strengthen the international payments system, and finally to comment on some of the implications of regional integration in Europe.

THE DOLLAR: FROM SCARCITY TO ABUNDANCE

In the early years after the war, it seemed that the dollar would be forever

scarce in the world. Europe, ravaged by war, was in great need of the goods for which the United States was a main supplier. In those days, we gave and lent enormous sums and, at the same time, ran substantial surpluses in our balance of payments. Between 1946 and 1949, the United States gave and lent to Europe more than \$15 billion and concurrently had surpluses totaling \$7 billion financed in large part by the depletion of European gold reserves.

Many respectable and eminent economists were predicting a perpetual dollar shortage. As they saw it, our leadership in technology and industrial efficiency would always provide a surplus. Yet, at a time when the volume of such predictions was at its height, the situation was already changing. Our balance-of-payments surpluses actually disappeared in 1949 and were replaced by deficits which continued in every subsequent year with the sole exception of 1957, during the Suez crisis. This experience supports the conclusion of George Schwartz that “most economic forecasts of coming scarcity have generally been the signal for a glut,” in his article “Economics Isn’t Funny, but Economists Are.”

This financial change is graphically illustrated by the shifts in the distribution of international reserves during the postwar period. At the end of 1945, West European international reserves were little more than \$8 billion, while American reserves exceeded \$20 billion. By the end of 1962, West European international reserves totaled nearly \$28 billion, while American reserves had declined to about \$16 billion. Of the European increase of nearly \$20 billion, roughly 40 per cent took the form of gold, and 60 per cent was in the form of foreign exchange, mostly dollars.

Most of this increase came from our deficits. From 1950 through 1957, the average deficit was around \$1.5 billion.

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In the three years 1958 through 1960, however, the annual deficits jumped sharply to levels exceeding \$3.5 billion. Private net investment outflows increased sharply and have since continued at a high level. Our over-all balance-of-payments deficits have been in a declining trend since the disturbingly large deficit of \$3.9 billion in 1960, but these deficits have continued to attract widespread attention, in part because they have involved large sales of gold. From 1950 through 1957, only 17 per cent of our deficits took the form of gold losses, but from 1958 through 1962 the corresponding percentage was 40.

The dramatic change in the financial position of Western Europe cannot, however, be understood unless we see it in the perspective of the Cold War and the burden it has put on the United States. From 1945 to 1962, our combined grants and credits for foreign military and economic assistance have amounted to over \$140 billion—nearly 50 per cent to Western Europe. Deducting grants and sales of military equipment and aid-financed exports of goods and services, the net excess of payments to foreigners is estimated to amount to over \$60 billion. Against this, the cumulative deficit in our balance of payments for the same period was \$22 billion. Although one cannot apply a one-to-one relationship to our spending and our deficit, the lesson is clear: had it not been for the exigencies of the Cold War—at times hot—our balance-of-payments position would be vastly different.

Now that Western Europe is once more a potent economic force, stronger economically than it has ever been, it can be expected to assume—and to some extent is beginning to assume—an increasing share of the costs of defending and strengthening the free world.

We expect that this burden-sharing will continue until an appropriate allocation of these costs has been made. This will ease the burden on our balance of payments.

FINANCIAL ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Our financial links with Western Europe are more important than the large volume of trade between us might indicate. At the end of 1962, Western Europe held 50 per cent of the \$20 billion of short-term dollar claims held by foreigners, official and private. This is exclusive of another \$5 billion held by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and similar international organizations.

The accumulation of such large dollar holdings by foreigners is a measure of the great importance of the United States dollar as a "key" or "reserve" currency. It has long been recognized that the supply of gold cannot increase rapidly enough to provide the foreign-exchange reserves the world needs to support an expanding volume of trade and finance. The growing use of dollars as international reserves in the postwar period increased world liquidity and promoted a large increase in the movement of goods and capital, which otherwise would not have taken place.

It should be noted that foreigners are able to earn interest on their key-currency holdings but not on gold. These holdings are normally invested in short-term securities. In 1962 the United States paid about a half billion dollars of interest on the dollar reserves of other countries.

The willingness of foreign countries to hold income-yielding dollar claims has enabled the United States to finance a large part of its deficits without

depleting its gold stock. But the dollars thus used remain liabilities of the United States and could become a claim against its gold stock. The stability of the international monetary system rests, however, on the confidence of foreign dollar holders that their dollars can be directly or indirectly converted into gold. One important factor influencing this confidence is the relationship between total foreign dollar holdings and the United States gold stock. Other factors include the size and persistence of United States deficits and their causes.

So long as United States liquid liabilities to foreigners remained comfortably below our gold reserves, even sizable balance-of-payments deficits could occur without appreciably diminishing confidence in the dollar. But, because of these deficits, the United States gold stock has been declining since it reached a peak level in 1949, while liquid liabilities to foreigners have increased substantially. This trend in our gold stock and the size of our foreign dollar liabilities has caused some concern about our continuing deficits.

This constitutes the essence of the dilemma pointed out by a number of observers—perhaps most notably by Professor Triffin. The world's gold supply has not increased as rapidly as international trade, and the expansion of world liquidity has depended to an increasing degree on the accumulation by other countries of dollar balances which they hold as international reserves. But, because dollars held by foreigners constitute potential claims against our gold stock, the growth of such dollar holdings has resulted in some quarters in some impairment of confidence in the dollar and the stability of the entire international monetary system.

This confronts the world with a paradox. Confidence in the dollar will increase as we continue to make progress toward the elimination of our deficits. But the disappearance of our deficits will reduce the growth of international liquidity and could, thus, impair the growth of trade and the flow of capital.

The international monetary system in the seventeen years since World War II has worked remarkably well in view of the persistence of the Cold War, the periodic war crises, and the difficult problems of reconstruction. There have been, from time to time, financial crises for some countries, but these have been surmounted without basic impairment of the international monetary system. The free world is stronger and wealthier than ever before. Contrast this with the period between the two world wars when liquidity crises were frequent, trade languished, and mass unemployment was the rule everywhere.

We do not want to see a repetition of those liquidity crises that ravaged and impoverished the world some thirty to thirty-five years ago. As the United States moves to equilibrium, other methods will have to be found to provide the growth in liquidity that is now supplied by the dollars generated by United States deficits. This will be a matter of primary concern in our future dealings with Europe.

Western Europe's accumulation of dollars has substantially exceeded its earnings in bilateral transactions with the United States. This excess is indicative of surpluses in the European balance of payments with the rest of the world, which finances these deficits with dollars acquired from the United States, partly as a result of our military expenditures and economic aid programs. In the decade 1953 through

1962, Europe gained gold from the United States and dollars from all sources totaling nearly \$15 billion, while European earnings in bilateral transactions with the United States fell short of this amount by more than \$8 billion. Thus, Europe's short-term creditor status vis-à-vis the United States and its resulting financial importance to the United States has been swelled by its propensity to accumulate surpluses within the free world's multilateral payments system in which the dollar is universally used as a medium of exchange. And again I repeat that an essential element in this accumulation has been the free-world security programs, the cost of which has been borne by the United States.

Europe is critical to our balance of payments also because of its decisive role in shaping the future direction of world commercial policy. From the beginning of the Trade Agreements Program to the signing of the Rome Treaty, American initiative provided the impetus to world-wide trade liberalization. The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and, to a lesser degree, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has greatly increased the bargaining power of these groups in negotiations on trade matters in general and tariff matters in particular. Future progress in freeing world trade from governmental restrictions will depend to a large extent on decisions by these groups. The outcome is of major importance for our balance of payments.

THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS

While the international monetary system has shown great strength and flexibility, the adjustment process whereby a country's surpluses or deficits are eliminated has not demonstrated

the same kind of resiliency. According to classical theory, the accumulation of surpluses by some countries corresponding to continuing deficits by other countries was a self-limiting process. The adjustment mechanism operated through income, price, and interest-rate changes. A country's deficits were supposed to contract its income level and money supply, thus reducing its demand for imports, lowering its prices and costs and hence increasing its exports, and raising its interest rates, thus attracting capital from abroad. A reverse process was supposed to work in the country accumulating surpluses. This mechanism appears to have worked fairly well in the nineteenth century, but at the price of a decline in employment in the deficit countries.

Most modern societies are not willing to pay this price. On the contrary, all of the Western industrial countries are pledged to the objectives of full employment and reasonable rates of growth. They quite naturally resist forces leading in the contrary direction and direct their policies toward offsetting, as far as possible, the domestic consequences of deficits or surpluses if they appear to threaten internal stability.

This does not mean that the market forces described by the classical mechanism are no longer operative. It does mean, however, that they now work more slowly and that the adjustment process takes much longer to produce results. It is difficult for countries to neutralize fully the consequences of surpluses and deficits. Although monetary policy may succeed in preventing surpluses from increasing the money supply, such surpluses tend to increase the velocity with which money circulates, and this tends to operate in an equilibrating direction. Moreover, the favorable effects on national income

of surpluses are difficult to neutralize completely, and there is, consequently, a tendency for such surpluses to stimulate higher levels of imports.

The rapid growth rates of the European countries, their high levels of demand, the developing shortages of labor, and significant rates of price increases undoubtedly reflect, to some extent, the consequences of balance-of-payments surpluses and the operation of the classical adjustment process.

Price increases in Europe and price stability in the United States are, in fact, helping to make American products more competitive in world markets. What is important to emphasize is that the present-day adjustment process is much slower now than the classical mechanism was. Because deflation is no longer permitted in modern-day society as a cure for deficits, and where devaluation is ruled out by the deficit country for compelling reasons, the necessary adjustments occur largely through inflation in the surplus countries relative to the deficit countries. This raises imports of the surplus country and reduces its competitiveness in world markets.

NEW STRENGTHENING MEASURES

A slower operating adjustment mechanism requires a more flexible international monetary system than an adjustment mechanism which works promptly. Otherwise, the international system of trade and capital flows would be subject to periodic major crises and would collapse.

To increase the liquidity and stability of the international monetary system, the United States and other countries have evolved new techniques, which involve the deliberate co-ordination of policies among nations and co-operation among governments and

central banks. In no way have countries been freed from the requirement that they balance their international accounts, but, as a result of these efforts, the international monetary system has become more flexible and more immune to sudden disturbance. It consequently provides a more stable and secure environment in which fundamental adjustments can take place.

The United States has taken the initiative in exploring and developing new techniques in international monetary co-operation, chiefly with the West European countries which now hold around 45 per cent of the world's international reserves. This is a natural development considering that the dollar is a reserve currency, that the United States acts as world banker, and that there has been widespread concern about the stability of the present system in which an increase in international liquidity implies an increase in the ratio of American liquid liabilities to American gold reserves.

The United States began its role of co-operative innovation with other countries as several developments toward the end of the decade of the 1950's indicated that such action could be important in maintaining the confidence on which the smooth functioning of the system depended. The European countries were, for a time, pleased to accept dollars in settlement of the United States deficits which began in 1950, but, after they had rebuilt their international working capital to desired levels, they increasingly took gold in settlement for additional American deficits. Large sales of United States gold after 1957 were influential in focusing attention on the underlying changes which, largely unheralded even by professionals, were taking place in the international monetary system. Moreover, it became ap-

parent that our large foreign-aid and military expenditures were not temporary, as had once been widely supposed, but could not be substantially reduced because of our world-wide commitments.

When the West European countries made their currencies convertible at the end of 1959, it again became possible for foreigners to send their short-term funds abroad in search of higher interest earnings than they might be able to obtain at home. In addition, they could translate fears or doubts about currency stability into international shifts of liquid funds—to engage in speculative capital flight of the sort which had wrought havoc with the international monetary system in the interwar period. The urgency of achieving a high degree of international co-operation in the monetary field became still more apparent late in 1960, when the constellation of these and other influences resulted in a flurry of speculation against the dollar on the London gold market, which provoked widespread concern regarding the stability of the dollar and the international payments system.

The treasuries and central banks of the United States and other countries, chiefly the Europeans, have worked closely, both multilaterally and bilaterally, to promote international balance and to enhance the stability of the payments system by increasing the resources available for coping with emergencies. Co-ordination of policies has become a major tool for avoiding serious balance-of-payments disturbances. In 1961 the United States joined with Canada and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) countries in forming the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a new international organization—successor to the OEEC—for the study and co-

ordination of policies on a wide range of economic matters of interest to the Atlantic community. The OECD's Economic Policy Committee and its Working Party 3 on Policies for the Promotion of Better Payments Equilibrium both provide forums for the exchange of information, opinions, and advice. The United States joined with seven European countries, Canada, and Japan to provide the IMF with up to \$6 billion of supplementary resources to increase the funds available for defending the international monetary system.

In addition to these efforts in multilateral settings, the United States has actively sought bilateral co-operative arrangements with a number of the European countries. To help reduce short-term capital outflows which adversely affect the balance of payments, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have begun to operate in foreign-exchange markets so as to make such outflows less attractive. In conducting these operations, currencies are obtained through swap and borrowing transactions, as well as through outright purchase when conditions are favorable.

Swap arrangements negotiated with foreign central banks serve not only the immediate purpose of providing resources for intervention in the foreign-exchange market but also establish new channels for mobilizing international resources in the event of emergencies. With the techniques of creating and using swaps worked out, the bulk of the arrangements are now on a stand-by basis and need not involve the actual exchange of foreign currencies for dollars. At the present time, the Federal Reserve System has swap arrangements totaling \$1.1 billion, of which \$850 million is with European countries and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).

Bilaterally negotiated arrangements with some European countries have helped the United States directly to reduce its deficits. The European countries have made substantial repayments in advance of schedule on our earlier loans to them. Large prepayments were received in 1959, 1961, and 1962, totaling around \$1,750 million, principally from Germany, France, and Italy. Within the past year, the Treasury has negotiated the sale to foreign authorities of intermediate-term, nonmarketable obligations payable in foreign currencies. At the end of February 1963, such intermediate-term borrowing from Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and Canada totaled more than one half of a billion dollars.

The United States has also sought relief for the balance of payments in ways that directly impinge on payments flows. Fully aware that our military expenditures abroad and aid programs contribute to our continuing deficits, we have called on our European allies to shoulder a more equitable share of the costs of mutual defense. We have also urged on them the desirability of providing more and untied assistance to the less-developed countries. We have negotiated agreements with Germany and Italy, under which these countries undertook to increase their expenditures in the United States for military supplies so as to offset our military expenditures in their territories. We have urged the European countries to improve their capital markets so as to lessen their dependence on borrowings in the United States and increase their capacities to lend to the less-developed countries. We have negotiated with the European countries for the dismantling of nontariff barriers to trade, for liberalization of controls on capital movements, and have bargained for lower tariffs. Of course, the United

States has also adopted a number of domestic policies, such as promoting exports, improving export credit facilities, tying aid, increasing military procurement in the United States, and maintaining interest rates at internationally attractive levels—all of which help in the transition to equilibrium.

IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

At the same time that we have been making notable progress in co-operative monetary arrangements with Europe, the Europeans have embarked on a venture which has far-reaching consequences for international trading relationships and the United States balance of payments. In the early postwar period, the United States encouraged the development of regional organization in Europe, hoping thereby to promote economic recovery and contribute to political stability. The Europeans themselves saw in growing unity not only tangible economic advantages but also steps toward reducing and finally eliminating the internal strife that had provoked two world wars in less than half a century. The story of our own participation in these wars bears no repeating. It is enough to say that we have warmly supported policies and actions which would contribute to eliminating their causes.

The European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, represents the high point to date of the postwar thrust for European integration which began so auspiciously with a proposal of the French government, the Schuman plan, in 1950 for a Coal and Steel Community. The customs union, for which the EEC, or Common Market, is perhaps best known, is only one aspect of a far-reaching blueprint for integration. The

Rome Treaty envisages, after a transitional period of from twelve to fifteen years, free movement of capital and labor in the Community, common policies for agriculture and transportation, and common rules affecting many aspects of economic activity within the area and between the area and the world. Implicit in this treaty is agreement by its signatories that even these goals are by no means final, for the treaty, in fact, envisages steps toward a form of political as well as economic union.

Although welcoming integration in Europe as in our long-term national interest, we have anticipated the economic consequences with mixed feelings, for, by their very nature, customs unions and free-trade areas extend to their members more favorable tariff treatment than they extend to outsiders and thus place American sellers at a competitive disadvantage relative to insiders. This disadvantage could be offset by generally higher demands for foreign products within the regional groups arising from more rapid rates of economic growth stimulated by internal tariff reductions. At the same time, increased efficiency and productivity within the tariff areas pose a potential competitive threat to American sellers in third-country markets. The growth of a powerful economic entity in Europe thus presents us with both new challenges and new opportunities.

The heights of the external tariffs of both the EEC and EFTA, the seven-nation European Free Trade Association, will, of course, be major determinants of America's ability to compete in those markets with internal producers. The United States intends to use the authority provided the President in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to bargain effectively for reductions in these external tariffs so as to

reduce both barriers to trade and, where possible, special preferences. We do not delude ourselves into thinking that the negotiations pursuant to the act will not be arduous and protracted, particularly with respect to agricultural products where trade is encumbered by quantitative restrictions as well as by tariffs. All parties concerned will have a great deal at stake. We have clearly announced our intentions and objectives, which we intend to pursue to the limits of our capability and the willingness of others to join with us. It remains to be seen what fork in the road the European Community will choose to follow.

Aside from its commercial implications, which are enormous, economic integration in Europe also has important consequences for the United States balance of payments through the capital flows to Europe which it has encouraged. There is, of course, no way of determining to what extent American investments in Europe were higher because of the regional developments than they would otherwise have been. We must suppose that the desire to establish productive facilities with duty-free access to important markets was an important consideration and that regional integration, by stimulating growth, made profit opportunities within the area appear more attractive. What is clear is that the formation of the Common Market coincided with an accelerated flow of investment funds from the United States to Europe. These movements of long-term capital have intensified the pressures on our balance of payments. To be sure, some of these investments directly led to exports of United States goods and services, and, over time, most investments generate a return flow of dividends and profit remittances. But it takes many years for the returns to

the United States from a foreign investment to cumulate to the initial amount invested, particularly since earnings re-invested abroad are exempt from the United States corporate income tax. Moreover, not all investment outflows cause offsetting increases in exports. Thus, the short-term impact on our balance of payments of investments in Europe has probably been adverse.

The United States has a deep interest in seeing the EEC develop commercial and agricultural policies that are liberal and outward looking, rather than restrictive and inward looking. The EEC has now reached a critical stage in its evolution, where decisions must be made that will influence decisively the future course of its relations with the rest of the world. The drama that has attended the recent failure of negotiations for Britain's entry into the EEC has made the world realize that Europe now stands at the crossroads. Our interest in the outcome is obvious. The pace and form of the Atlantic partnership, of which President Kennedy spoke last July 4, will depend in large degree on what decisions are made in Europe in the period ahead.

In this connection, it is again worth noting that, in the financial field, the European governments have, on the whole, played an important and co-operative role in promoting better international balance through the co-ordination of national policies, in developing measures to increase the resources and stability of the international monetary system, and in direct financial arrangements with us. This has helped to provide the United States with more time to move toward balance without requiring the use of hasty and restrictive measures which would be incompatible with our long-run interests—and theirs as well.

At the same time that we recognize

the changes which must be made, we must also keep in mind that our international position is strong. In 1962 we had a surplus of nearly \$5 billion in our trade in goods and services. American investments abroad have grown so rapidly that our international net worth has actually increased by around \$30 billion since the end of the war. Our definition of the balance-of-payments deficit considers only the change in our net liquidity position and does not offset gains in long-term assets against increases in liquid liabilities. We have, therefore, recorded deficits when, in fact, our over-all foreign net asset position has improved.

In the words of the President, when he addressed the IMF's Board of Governors last September, "... our balance of payments deficit is not the result of any monetary or economic mismanagement, but the result of expenditures our people have made on behalf of the people of the free world." Yet despite our large and continuing financial commitments for the security of the free world, we are progressing towards balance-of-payments equilibrium. In the 1930's the world attempted to cope with international imbalance by resorting to competitive devaluations and trade restrictions which greatly disrupted international commercial and financial relationships. Our progress since that time has been nothing short of remarkable. In co-operation with other countries, we established liberal ground rules for the conduct of international trade and finance and built international financial institutions to facilitate the efficient and orderly growth of the international economy. Trade and financial restrictions have gone down, not up, and this process continues. International co-operation and co-ordination on matters of trade and finance have reached

higher levels than ever before. Of course, we will never run out of problems, but we have reason to hope that the urgent ones of the day can be worked out within the framework of good will, co-operation, and liberalism which we have done so much to construct.

* * *

QUESTION AND ANSWER

Q: Was the removal of United States rockets from Turkey part of a package deal involving removal of Russian offensive weapons from Cuba, and, if it was, has not Russia actually achieved something of a victory through its adventure into Cuba, contrary to popular opinion?

A: The only point I would like to make on this—and this is a little out of my field—is that a move such as the one involved in shifting the material out of Turkey is not the sort of thing that is done overnight. The plans for this were developed and were under way before the Cuban crisis came along. This was not a project that was developed as late as the Cuban crisis.

The Projected European Union and American Military Responsibilities

By WILLIAM R. KINTNER

ABSTRACT: At present, NATO is at an impasse. The problem is not so much differences between De Gaulle's and Kennedy's designs for projected unions as differences over military strategy and armaments. Europe, because of policies we are advocating and pursuing there, could turn inward militarily as well as economically. The United States, until recently, provided European security and also maintained world-wide commitments. Now, European countries have developed their own nuclear weapons, and we have not been able to design an operational strategic concept that will permit centralized control of their use. We should now enlist European co-operation not only to strengthen their own defensive ability but also to make greater contributions to the total security of the free world. American policy inconsistency, however, is perplexing to the Europeans. The Europeans do not believe that a primarily conventional strategy will provide deterrence in Europe. They do not believe American policy offers sufficient options between defeat and thermonuclear war so long as NATO conventional forces confront nuclear-armed Soviet forces. They suspect the United States of being more interested in *détente* with the Soviet Union than in maintaining Western security. The United States failure to share nuclear assets could, in time, divide the Atlantic. Nuclear-sharing could be the key to cross-Atlantic co-operation in the technological sphere, stimulating economic growth and political harmony, frustrating Soviet exploitation of their military power.—Ed.

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THE question really facing us is whether, because of the policies that we are pursuing and the policies being advocated in Europe, Europe will turn inward militarily as well as economically or whether the broader vision of an Atlantic community can be created. We have just heard of the interrelationship between our political and military and fiscal policies. At the present moment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is at an impasse. The fundamental debate as to the meaning of strategy in the thermodynamic age is at the root of many of NATO's political and economic problems. These, you have been told by many speakers at this conference, are integrally related. And yet we are also told that between us and some of our European partners is a different view of what the world should be and the way we should organize our affairs.

Raymond Aron, the famous French political scientist, in a recent article that appeared in *Figaro*, said that there was a distinct difference—in fact, almost an antagonism—between President Kennedy's design and President de Gaulle's design for Europe. I personally do not believe that these designs are necessarily incompatible. As I understand the President's view, which is a view shared by his predecessors in the White House, we Americans look forward to the creation one day of a genuine Atlantic community, a unity of partners in which Western Europe will become a force strong and powerful on its own but identified and associated with our own policies. President de Gaulle's contribution to the construction of this Europe has been a momentous one. The fact that he has participated in

the healing of the German-French dispute which had been at the root of so many of Europe's difficulties over the past hundred years has probably been one of the greatest acts of statesmanship that we have seen in this century. And so, with all the problem that President de Gaulle is currently creating for us, I think we can not overlook the fact that this grand old man and the other grand old European men born in the nineteenth century have proved to be forward and imaginative statesmen in the best sense of that word.

SECURITY PROBLEMS

Let us now briefly look at the security problem facing Europe. I should point out that they are also the security problems facing us, because we are tied with Europe in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the very fundamental principal of which is that an attack on one is an attack on all.

Europe seen from the vantage point of Moscow looks somewhat different than it does from the vantage point of Washington, D. C., or even from the perspective of Paris or London or Bonn or Berlin. From the East, Europe is faced by a tremendously powerful, well-organized, and militarized state. The Soviet Union, from its beginning, has emphasized the development of powerful military forces. This emphasis has not changed, despite changes in leadership inside the Kremlin.

Western Europe today is faced by a strong land force. It is also faced by something else—fourteen hundred or so surface-to-surface missiles located in the satellite region, in the captive areas of Eastern Europe, and in the western regions of the Soviet Union. These missiles have as their potential targets most of the major urban centers of Europe. In other words, Europe stands against the Soviet Union in very much

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the same situation as the United States would have stood with respect to Cuba if the Soviet missiles had not been removed from there.

The Soviet Union, from its beginning, has carried on a comprehensive strategy, a political, a psychological strategy underwritten and supported by growing military power. The Soviets, however, are very conscious and conservative in the use of their military power. They are a conservative revolutionary force. They have been very reluctant to take upon themselves extreme and undue risk. Furthermore, unlike many people in this country, the Soviets do not believe in accidental war. They do not believe that a war starts like an automobile accident in the street. They follow Clausewitz's thesis that wars are a continuation of policy by other means. If there is to be a war in Europe, consequently, it will occur only if the Western defenses are shattered by overwhelming Soviet power or if we create for the Soviet leaders an opportunity which they would find too tempting to resist.

The Soviets are interested in seeing that NATO becomes weak rather than becomes strong. They are interested in removing the nuclear forces which have been the shield that has permitted the European economic developments. It seems unfortunate that there is somewhat of a coincidence between Soviet aspiration and views expressed in certain Western quarters as to what should be the nature of European defense.

THE SOVIET POSITION

Looking at the world at the present time, it seems evident to me that the Soviets fear thermonuclear war and that their present policy is compatible with our own—namely, to render thermonuclear war improbable. This Soviet fear, though rarely expressed, runs deep. A demonstration of the fear

was the Soviet action in the Cuban missile crisis. You may recall that the most operational statement made by President Kennedy was to this effect: that, if a Soviet nuclear warhead would explode anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, the United States would respond by attacking targets in the Soviet Union itself. Recognizing that these were no idle words, the Soviet Union did back down. I would like to point out that their fear of war, of a nuclear war in particular, is supported by the fact that the Soviet Union is the leading colonial empire in the world today. It controls over several hundred million resentful people who once belonged to the European community—the captive nations of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states. Inside the Soviet Union, also, society is controlled by a totalitarian political party. In short, we are not dealing with a society of consent such as we have in the United States or in most of the countries in Western Europe. Therefore, in the event of a war, the suppressed peoples of the satellite regions—and perhaps even some of the suppressed nationalities inside the Soviet Union—would be released from their bondage. This, to my mind, is one of the greatest deterrents to Soviet initiation of war.

Looking at it toward the future, however, it is fair to say that the Soviet Union has not quite given up its ambitions toward Western Europe. Western Europe is, from their point of view, the decisive area of the world. If the Soviets could gain control of the industrial and human potential that exists in Western Europe, they would have the means to displace the United States as the strongest power and the greatest defender of the free world.

What are their prime means of achieving this goal? It seems to me that they are trying to seek, over time,

technological dominance over the West. You remember the reports a few years ago about Soviet technological training. They are graduating, reportedly, three times as many scientists and engineers as the United States. They are looking forward to gaining, perhaps in fifteen or twenty years, a technological supremacy. From their point of view, this makes very good sense. Because they are Marxists, they believe that he who gains control and dominates the means of production—which now means technological mastery—in the long run dominates the political order. We have seen evidence of their achievements in the Soviet advances in space, in nuclear warheads, in their missile defense problem, and in other scientific advances.

Because of the Soviet technological advances, because of their general strategy, and because of developments that have taken place in Europe, United States policy regarding Europe has undergone numerous modifications.

UNITED STATES POLICY CHANGES

Proliferation has taken place in nuclear weapons since the first nuclear device was exploded underneath the Chicago stadium in the early forties. There have been many expressions of why nations want them. Put facetiously, the American slogan was "More bangs per buck"; The Soviet, "More rubble per ruble"; the British, perhaps, "More pop per pound." And now we are told the French want them in order to gain "More frappe per franc." Whatever the reason is, it seems evident that nuclear weapons are regarded as a *sine qua non* for effective influence and national power in the major sense of the word.

With the spread of nuclear weapons, United States policy has changed. The changes, however, have not been altogether acceptable to the Europeans. This is the root of the dilemmas we

are facing. If we look back, until recently, the European countries were in a state of dependency on the United States. Consequently, what we said and what we asked them to do, they did.

Consider the evolution of NATO policy. When we first organized NATO, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean war, we advocated a conventional strategy. The Europeans agreed to it, in principle at least, in Lisbon in 1952. But the forces agreed upon at Lisbon were never developed. In 1954 we advocated a new look—primary reliance on nuclear weapons. Remember Mr. Dulles' expression: We would respond at times and places of our own choosing against Soviet aggression. This was reflected in Europe by the trip-wire concept: If the Soviets crossed the frontier and ran through the thin line of NATO troops, they would then be retaliated against not at the point of contact but inside the Soviet Union itself.

With the sputnik in 1957, with the Soviet acquisition of long-range aircraft, and the intercontinental ballistic missile, we moved on to the sword-and-shield concept—requiring some strengthening of European conventional forces, the shield, so that it would not be necessary to respond immediately with nuclear weapons.

With the Kennedy Administration coming into power, there was another major change in American policy. There was a 20 per cent increase in the United States military budget, a greater emphasis on conventional forces, an emphasis on a secure striking force—which meant that we would concentrate it primarily in continental United States in hardened Minuteman sites and the Polaris submarines operating under the oceans. But perhaps the greatest fear and the greatest concern of the Kennedy Administration is that any employment of force carries with it, to

some unknown degree, the chance of escalation into a thermonuclear war. So there has been considerable emphasis on arrangements for the command and control of forces to make sure they are always responsive to the political will. There has been concern over "permissive links"—mechanical devices to be placed on nuclear warheads so that they can not be fired without the expressed authority of the highest political level.

These changes are, in many cases, desirable—particularly the concept that, in a thermonuclear war—and I believe in and heartily subscribe to the Administration's effort to take measures to make sure that it does not take place—if it should take place, the forces employed must be under some centralized direction. The question that has arisen between ourselves and our European friends is how central control of nuclear war is to be effected under the existing political arrangements. We have sought to insure it by trying to hang on to the monopoly of nuclear weapons. We have not been able to design an operational strategic concept that will permit centralized control even if other countries possess their own nuclear weapons. This latter is the situation that we are facing today.

Another new factor in our relations with Europe, as has been brought out by previous speakers, is that we have tremendous security obligations around the world. Our actual defense effort is three times—in dollars and cents—all the rest of the NATO countries combined. Up to the present time, we have provided their security in Europe. Our NATO allies have contributed almost nothing to the world-wide commitments the United States faces in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. This is a situation which the United States should try to do something about. We should try to enlist European co-operation not only

to strengthen their own ability to defend themselves but also to make greater contributions to the total security of the free world.

EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCE

The foregoing is a too brief summary of the defense philosophy which President Kennedy has been trying for the past several years to sell to the Europeans. He has argued, for example, that the European members of NATO should build up their conventional forces so as to reduce their reliance on atomic response, arrest proliferation of national atomic capabilities, withdraw atomic weapons from forward areas, lock them so that local commanders can never use them unless given the authority to do so, rely on Strategic Air Command (SAC) and sea-based forces outside the possible war area as the primary nuclear force, and plan on maximum political consultation before authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. The last idea is basic to the famous pause concept that the Europeans describe as the pause that refreshes. Under this concept, if a Soviet attack takes place, NATO does not consider the use of nuclear weapons until after the Soviets are, perhaps fifty miles inside German territory. Then the NATO council meets and flips a coin to decide whether atomic weapons will or will not be used. Many Europeans believe that this concept undercuts the credibility of the NATO atomic deterrents. This is, again, one of the matters at issue between us.

The Europeans in general have rejected much of the Administration's defense philosophy. They have continued with the development of their nuclear weapons. They have resisted our encouragement to emphasize conventional forces. They have resented, if not resisted, some of the efforts to take land-based missile systems from the European

continent. Yet the way that the discussion has been reported in the American press and magazines, it seems almost as if these issues arose in a personal argument between President de Gaulle and President Kennedy. The points of view which De Gaulle has been advocating have their power because they are shared by other Europeans. In a speech in March 1963 to Parliament defending the British defense budget—which is largely oriented toward nuclear weapons—Lord Hume said: "If we do not have the will to defend ourselves with the most modern weapons, we ought not to claim the right to be a great power."

The rejection of much of the United States Administration's military concepts that has taken place in Europe has not, in my opinion, been properly covered in this country. If you read most of the statements made—I just cite Mr. Alsop's article in the recent *Saturday Evening Post*—it seems as if the side of the angels is over here and the side of *le diabolos* is on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. I believe that some of our policies may be a fault. Yet I do not perceive in all official United States statements quite the degree of humility in these matters that one would like to see a genuine discussion over strategic alternatives.

Mr. Acheson recently gave a speech in San Francisco. Mr. Acheson is one of our great men and one of the staunchest supporters of the Atlantic concept. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was as much his creation as that of anyone. Yet he had this to say: "Our present European defense policy is right and should be continued. This consists in constant pressure toward developing a conventional position." Mr. Acheson is associated with a group of people who have felt that we take greater risks by maintaining a nuclear capability in Europe than we

would if we shifted and went back to some pre-Korean type of forces over there.

There are many people—in this country and in Europe—who do not share this point of view, although it is one that is persuasively and repetitiously stated in many circles. About this phenomenon, Dr. Henry Kissinger stated: "that American military policy conceals certain ambiguities has been obscured by the fact that most responsibility for developing it belonged to a single school of thought, and people after many years of association, have come to take for granted some assumptions that are not really so self-evident as they try to make them appear." Uncontested assumptions relate with particular significance to the nuclear question.

Yet we and our European allies are not arguing solely about basic and fixed military policy. The shifts and gyrations that have taken place in American military policy are also at issue. In the same month, January 1963, we chastised our Canadian neighbors for not taking nuclear warheads and condemned the French for wanting to have them. Likewise, last December we argued with the British that they must take the Polaris missile submarine. Three months later, we came along and offered them a merchant-marine nuclear package. At no time did we ever discuss, either in December or on the merchant-marine mission, the possibility that they might acquire land-based mobile missile systems. The Soviet Union deploys some fourteen hundred such weapons in Eastern Europe. Land-based missile systems are about one-fifth as expensive as either the Polaris or the merchant-marine missile systems and can perform the same military job, often more effectively. Furthermore, we have argued that the Europeans should build up their conventional

forces, but we are also asking them to invest in the merchant-marine nuclear force, costing in the neighborhood of some three or four billion dollars. This price would take away the funds that they would need if they were, in fact, to increase their conventional forces.

In the face of this type of inconsistency, it is not completely surprising to me that the Europeans occasionally scratch their heads and ask what is going on.

EUROPEAN CRITICISMS

If one follows the European press, in general, the Europeans have these three fundamental criticisms to make:

First, they do not believe that a primarily conventional strategy will provide deterrence in Europe. They believe, as the Soviets themselves say, that any war in Europe will turn itself into a nuclear war; that, therefore, the best way to prevent it is to convince the Soviets that this is the case—by having the weapons that make this outcome inevitable. There is validity in increasing the land forces in Europe. There are certain situations which they can help support—Berlin being an obvious example. But, if these forces are not at the same time supported with a tactical nuclear backup, which has been the situation for the last ten years, they will not be effective. This is the major criticism that is directed against us by the Europeans. It deserves a hearing, because they have been in the military business for several hundred years and know something about it.

There is less European criticism about the assumption that conventional forces will increase military flexibility. President Kennedy has stated that he wishes to have options between defeat and thermonuclear war. Yet the only alternative that we offer in each case is the Polaris submarine. We offer nothing in between. What it would

come down to, if our policy were put into effect, would be NATO conventional forces fighting against nuclear-armed Soviet forces. After the conventional forces were defeated, as they would be because of the very logic of technology, we would have the choice of either quitting, thus inducing the collapse of NATO and the collapse of Western civilization, or launching the thermonuclear war. We are not providing the flexibility in between continental troops on the one hand and strategic nuclear forces on the other.

The third factor that the Europeans are worried about is that the United States is paying less attention to maintaining the security position of the Western world than it is to find some form of *détente* with a Soviet leader who now proclaims peaceful coexistence and who appears to be having a little difficulty with his ally in Peiping. I do not think that this is the actual goal now being sought by the Administration, but there are some spokesmen who advocate that, if only we could arrive at some nuclear disengagement, then we might have a *détente*, here and now, with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the rapidity with which United States missiles were taken out of Turkey and Italy, whether their removal was part of a package arrangement or not, did give that impression to many people in Europe.

Furthermore, in our shifting policies on these issues, we have sometimes strayed into strange and contradictory positions. We would all like, I hope, to see some form of unified forces in Europe, particularly in the nuclear area. Yet, in our Nassau arrangements, while advocating a European nuclear force, we actually helped to create a continuation of the British national force. As Mr. Kennedy himself stated at Palm Beach on January 1, the forces given to the British could be withdrawn

in moments of great national peril, which, he added, would be "the only time you consider using nuclear weapons anyway." There was a contradiction in what he said next, that "our whole policy has been against the diversion of resources toward independent nuclear deterrents. We think that it does not make strategic sense. And we think that it would really cost the Europeans a great deal of money."

If you agree that nuclear deterrent forces have become in fact the major deterrent of war, if the history of this period could be written five hundred years from now, the nuclear bomb may turn out to be the prince of peace. Going back to Churchill's statement, the balance of terror may be the means of preventing the human race from blowing itself up and destroying its political institutions. If there is a validity to these assertions, a deterrent strategy which does not wholeheartedly incorporate nuclear weapons is a deceptive hoax.

As of now, NATO has not incorporated modern weapons systems into its forces. European forces are not designed to fight the Soviet forces on a basis of equality. Presumably there are thirty Soviet divisions lined up in Eastern Germany and Poland. Against those, only the United States divisions in the Seventh Army are modern ground forces.

Furthermore, the inconsistency of trying to deter with inadequate military forces is recognized by many Europeans. I quote now from a statement made by John Strachey, who was previously War Minister for the Labor government: "Once the Russians have possessed themselves of such weapons, it is manifestly impossible to ask NATO troops to face them with conventional weapons alone. One might as well ask them to throw away their automatic rifles and resume the pike."

TASKS FOR THE WEST

Fortunately, I believe, there has been a recognition, a belated recognition, that we have to deal with the problem of nuclear sharing more forthrightly. If you will take the statements made over the past two years on this issue, you will find a begrudging but, fortunately, continuing concession to facts. Within the last week, Walt Rostow, counselor of the State Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff in State, had this to say:

We must move into nuclear partnership with our Atlantic allies. To do this, we must work toward a solution which would maintain the unity of the alliance with a unified nuclear deterrent at its core. We must devise and agree on general guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in the face of Soviet attack. We must take active steps to bring our European partners more deeply and directly into the nuclear business with respect to problems of targeting, control, and strategic relationships. . . . This must relate to the tactical and strategic forces at our command.

If the United States is to do this job, what specific actions might it take? It is my opinion that, if we would pledge the creation of a European nuclear force, under the aegis of an existing body, namely, the Western European union, operating within the framework of NATO, we could overcome the doctrinal and strategic gap that exists. The Western European union is composed of the Six in the Common Market and Great Britain. This particular union could be the instrument to do the job. This would require changes in the United States—among them, revision of the United States atomic legislation, reorganization of strengthened ground forces for atomic as well as conventional conflict, development of a NATO intermediate-

range missile force, development of a NATO-wide defense against ballistic missiles and manned aircraft, and, finally, the establishment of an effective system of political direction and military command for the control of NATO forces.

What matters today is not necessarily whether the Soviet Union has this or that many nuclear missiles. What we must make certain is that there never arises a strategic imbalance where the Soviet Union can dictate the political fate of the Western world. This means that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must become a viable political and economic partnership. We have helped prevent that by our attitude on the development of modern weapons in Europe. It should also be mentioned that the European interest in nuclear weapons, space developments, electronics, and so forth has a fundamental economic basis. We and the Soviet Union are at the forefront of technology because of the efforts that we made in this field. Europe, which was the center and source of modern technology, does not want to be in a second-rate position—where we explore the frontiers of science and technology and they make Volkswagens and champagne. The French are investing a billion dollars a year in nuclear developments, because they want to make sure that they will have the ability to stay in the very forefront of future technology.

This brings up one other issue, the question of burden-sharing, which we have already discussed. The Europeans, I believe, can be induced to share more in their defense, more in the defense of the free world, if we together work out with them a policy and a strategy which they can understand. In essential terms, the defense of Europe is more their direct concern

than ours. If we were not living in today's kind of world, we could say, let the Europeans go on their own way, let them, if they wish, detach themselves from our nuclear umbrella. But the calamitous consequences of that action upon ourselves and upon Europe would be too disastrous to contemplate.

A French journalist had this to say:

General de Gaulle wants France and other nations to regain their independence in matters of war and peace, through their own efforts, and at their own expense. This is impossible. President Kennedy wants the European nations to have complete confidence in the United States in those matters and to rely on Washington for their defense and their destiny. This is impossible. Out of the clash of these two policies comes the crisis.

How can the crisis be resolved? It can be resolved, I believe, by fundamental discussion of the political, economic, and military issues involved. It is encouraging to note that this view is becoming dominant in Washington. I again quote from Dr. Rostow:

The debates and explorations that accompany this transition [that is, the new role of Europe toward the United States] should not be viewed as petty squabbles or as evidence of disarray. These are part of a living constitutional debate of the first order of magnitude, a debate that must take place if inescapable problems are to be solved and Europe move from dependence to global partnership within the free world.

Until recently, the United States has been following a monopolistic policy toward Europe, running diametrically counter to the demands for a more perfect Atlantic union. Partnership requires the responsible sharing of power. Over the long run, Americans have recognized that monopoly, whether political or economic, generally manages to defeat the purposes for which

it is created. The American monopoly of nuclear power, if it continues, bids fair to defeat the purposes of the United States and, for good measure, to wreck the Atlantic community. It is time that we abandoned this policy—I have suggested some evidence that we are on the road to abandoning it—and recognize the sharing of nuclear power to be the essential to creation of a powerful Atlantic community.

We must recognize that the Atlantic world and NATO have made a tremendous contribution to world peace and to the security of the Atlantic area. If there are schisms in the Sino-Soviet bloc, they directly reflect the growing power, confidence, and integration of the West. But we cannot stand still.

The failure of the United States to share its nuclear assets could, in time, divide the alliance. Nuclear sharing, on the other hand, could be the key to opening cross-Atlantic co-operation in the technological sphere, spurring the economic prosperity and political harmony of the West, while frustrating indefinitely Soviet political exploitation of their military power. President Truman laid the foundations for the North Atlantic union. President Eisenhower carried them on. President Kennedy could be the foremost architect of the Atlantic community of the future if he finds the wisdom of Solomon to solve the question of nuclear co-operation between the United States and its European allies.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Why does the responsible leadership of our country fail to move in the direction of coping with the existing dangerous weaponry and to outlaw war so that we could have national security?

A: President Kennedy has demonstrated time and time again—like President Eisenhower and President Truman before him—that, if there were a way to eliminate these weapons and still carry out his fundamental responsibility for the security of the United States and freedom against the totalitarian aggressor, he would have done so. We have many instruments for doing this. We have an arms control agency in Washington. We have carried on countless discussions with the Soviet Union in all kinds of forms. To the present time, we have not found a device, although we are constantly seeking it, by means of which we can at the same time procure the protection

of our society and avoid the consequences of the possible employment of war as an instrument of national policy.

Q: Was the removal of United States rockets from Turkey part of a package deal involving the removal of Russian offensive weapons from Cuba, and, if it was, has not Russia actually achieved something of a victory through its adventure into Cuba, contrary to popular opinion?

A: I do not know whether it was a package deal or not. I do know that there has been a great deal of press speculation on it. The confidential newspaper reports of *The London Economist*—I believe on November 6th—stated categorically that this was in fact the case and reported conversations between high United States of-

ficials to this effect. The possibility that it might have been a package deal has been vigorously denied by the Administration. The only point that I would care to make is that I think the coincidence on timing was unfortunate in the fact that it fortified the belief that there had been a package deal. There was no great pressure on the part of any of our allies to take the missiles out. They were first-generation liquid-fuel missiles. They could have been taken out this month—April 1963—rather than when they were and would not have fed the speculation. I do think, in these matters, that timing is very important, and I think that, had the removal of the missiles been postponed, the Administration probably would not have been subjected to such speculation.

Q: What do you think is our ratio of security when we have only thirteen Polaris submarines against an estimate of Russian submarines at 575? How can we sell ourselves to the European countries if we remove our whole first ring, Nike-Zeus periphery of security from them and, at the same time, say that the Jupiter is not operational?

A: As far as the Soviet submarine fleet is concerned, its number is large; whether that is the exact number, I do not know. But most of the Soviet submarines are conventional; most of them are for the purpose of interdicting overseas transport, like the Nazi subs in World War II. I believe that the Soviets are just getting into the missile-submarine field along the lines of the Polaris, and that, of course, has a different function. I think that we are concerned that the Soviets will eventually have an equivalent to the Polaris

roaming up and down the Atlantic making our own cities hostage. There are some ways, however, of dealing with those weapons. The Polaris-type missile has a more vertical trajectory than an intercontinental-type missile and is, according to technical experts, easier to knock down on the terminal end of its trajectory than an intercontinental ballistic missile.

This gets to your second point: Why are we not doing more in antimissile defense? That is a very good question. This has been a hot topic for a number of years. There is evidence that the Soviets are putting something in the vicinity of 20 per cent of their total research and development into antimissile defense. If they should achieve it and we do not, there will be a strategic imbalance of almost the same character as we enjoyed in the nuclear monopoly. This is a hot debate in Washington. I personally am on the side of going into production with the only engineered antimissile we have rather than shooting it down with paper decoys, which has been going on down there. But there are many reasons for a negative attitude toward the antimissile missile. There is a strategic theory which some people accept called "finite deterrence" according to which each side has perhaps fifty or a hundred missiles or bombs or such and neither creates any defense. In other words, you sign a mutual suicide pact. If he shoots you, you shoot him, and it is all over. The people who believe that say that, if you build up a defense system and pursue an active civil-defense program against fallout and so forth, you are provocative because you convince the enemy that you are preparing for a first strike. I personally do not agree with that thesis, but it is pervasive in certain quarters.

WHEN on January 29, 1963 France rejected Britain's admission to the Common Market, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan said: "It is bad, bad for us, bad for Europe, bad for the whole free world." President Kennedy had said on January 24:

We have strongly supported Britain's admission to the Common Market—because we think that it helps build a United Europe which, working in equal partnership with the United States, would provide security for Europe, for United States, and together Europe and United States—we can concern ourselves with the very pressing problems which affect so much of the world.

In President de Gaulle's view, European union is for some time going to be confined to the Six—France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—although he intimates that Great Britain is free to make trading agreements with the Common Market and may, after a period of "indispensable evolution," be ready to identify itself fully with Europe.¹ It also seems possible that integration of all sixteen members of the Council of Europe and the five West European states not now in that body—Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Finland—may eventually be possible. Furthermore, if one takes seriously his statement that Europe extends to the Urals, the eight members of "The Commonwealth of Socialist States," parties to the Warsaw Pact, making a total of twenty-nine countries, all except the two Germanys and Switzerland members of the United Nations, may in the long run be regarded as "European."

It is clear, however, that, for a time,

¹ Press conference, President de Gaulle, January 14, 1963, reprinted with statements by Prime Minister Macmillan, President Kennedy, and others in *Current*, March 1963, p. 6 ff. See also press releases by Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador to the United States, February 3 and March 12 and 15, 1963.

any close economic or political union of Europe will be confined to the six countries united by the Treaty of Rome and strengthened by the Treaty of Paris signed on January 22, 1963 by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer "to end 400 years of war and disputes" between France and Germany. Its area roughly corresponds to that of Charlemagne's Holy Empire and has a population, economic resources, and military potential approaching those of the Soviet Union or the United States. President de Gaulle has not made it clear whether this union will eventually be a "third force" in international politics, but he insists that it is to have an independent defensive capability even though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will remain indispensable as long as the Soviet threat continues.²

What will be the effect of European union, thus defined, on American international prestige?

This prestige might be adversely affected by the following facts: (1) The United States publicly but unsuccessfully advocated Britain's entry into the Common Market and (2) has employed methods to forward its views of European union and European defense, which have been resented in a number of quarters. (3) Furthermore, some think European union may not be in the national interest of the United States, and (4) others think it may hamper the development of the United Nations, collective security, and world peace. If either of these opinions proved true, American prestige might be adversely affected.

These possibilities indicate considerable variation in the concept of prestige. Does a great state lose prestige if its capabilities prove inadequate to fulfill its commitments or pronouncements; if its meddling in affairs that

² *Ibid.*

other people regard as domestic arouses their susceptibilities and resentments; if it fails properly to calculate and implement its own interests; if it permits immediate interests or limited horizons to dominate over wider interests and responsibilities? Let us consider these four possible adverse effects of European union on American prestige.

CAPABILITY AND COMMITMENT

After the United States had publicly committed itself to the policy of admitting Britain to the Common Market, as described by the British Conservative Government under Macmillan, President de Gaulle terminated the negotiations and, for the time being, frustrated the policy. In popular thinking, the prestige of both the United States and Britain have doubtless suffered. In the game of international politics, they have failed to achieve announced ends, and great powers are supposed to be able to achieve their goals. However, all states actually suffer occasional frustrations, none are really "sovereign," and the setback may prove to be temporary. Furthermore, the goal may eventually prove to be less desirable than alternatives which may emerge.³

The Customs Union of the Six has greatly increased productivity in this area, and it is not certain that a broader union would be equally effective. The French, according to Raymond Aron, support De Gaulle in believing that their national interests, both economic

and political, are best served by strengthening the union of the Six.⁴ British opinion was divided on the issue, and it may be that Britain can prosper as much by developing trade with the European free-trade area, the Commonwealth, the United States, and the Common Market itself, perhaps in general negotiations through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as it could by membership in the Common Market. The British may continue to believe, as they have for centuries, that Britain's national interests are best served by contributing to a balance of power on the Continent, while developing commercial, political, and cultural ties overseas.⁵ The United States has many opportunities to negotiate improved trade relations under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, even if Britain is not in the Common Market. From the security point of view, it may be that De Gaulle is right in minimizing the danger of Soviet aggression in Europe and in perceiving the possibility of further relaxation of tensions through emancipation of West Europe from the

⁴ "Placing General de Gaulle," *The New Republic*, Vol. 148 (March 16, 1963), p. 8. For history and progress of the Common Market, see U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Doc. 132, September 14, 1962, p. 1 ff.

⁵ Lionel Gelber, recently Special Assistant to the Canadian Prime Minister, writes: "If Britain cannot retain an independent status—if it is converted into a mere outer island province of a European Union—the Commonwealth will dissolve automatically, and so will an Anglo-American factor that has been another overseas source of British strength. Britain in the Twentieth Century has been like a tripod with a leg for Europe, a leg for fellowship of the Commonwealth, a leg for ties with the United States. Conditions may alter. It is on the three legs of its tripod, and not on any one or two, that Britain must still stand." "A Marriage of Convenience," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41 (January 1963), p. 321.

³ Jacob Viner criticizes the United States for its "commitment to bestow blessings on any preferential tariff arrangements provided they could present claims, even of doubtful legitimacy, to the labels of 'custom union,' 'Common Market,' or 'free trade area'—labels which in the best of circumstances designate mixtures of trade liberalization and of aggravated protectionism in uncertain and unascertainable proportions." "Economic Foreign Policy on the New Frontier," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39 (July 1961), p. 560.

excessive United States influence which has alarmed Russia and may have encouraged Germany to pursue aggressive policies.

With these possibilities in mind, it would seem that any lost prestige from the present failure of Britain to enter the Common Market should not be taken too seriously. Although maintenance of a close relationship between commitments, declarations, and goals on the one hand and capabilities, probabilities, and possibilities on the other is desirable, and a mark of intelligence in decision-making, whether by large or small states, it would be unfortunate, especially in the nuclear age of rapid change, if the prestige of states, especially nuclear powers, required such unvarying success in realizing goals that international politics, where there is certain to be occasional conflict of goals, becomes a game of one-up-manship, brinkmanship, and standing firm whatever the consequences. Rather than crying over false ideas of prestige, this experience should be a stimulus to further thought about the values, advantages, and disadvantages of European union of varying scope, form, and function and of American relations to such a union.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

One reason for De Gaulle's refusal to admit Great Britain to the Common Market appears to have been the fear that Britain would be a Trojan horse within which was concealed the United States. President de Gaulle, many Frenchmen, and some Britishers, as indicated in the controversy over American insistence that Polaris be substituted for Skybolt, and even some Canadians, as indicated by Prime Minister Diefenbaker's refusal to co-operate in United States defense proposals, seem to feel that the United States has been assuming too much responsibility for

running the world since World War II.

Immediately after that war, with the prestige of victory, the atomic monopoly, a huge army and navy, little damage from the war itself, over half of the world's total production, and the reputation of being the main champion of the United Nations, human rights, and economic restoration and development, the United States had an unparalleled opportunity for leadership. It soon became clear, however, that the Soviet Union, although it had lost 25 million of its citizens and had suffered unparalleled economic disaster from the war, was not going to follow this leadership but was going to maintain its huge land army, expand on its periphery where feasible, develop its vast economic potential, and propagandize its ideologies among the relatively receptive peoples of the poor and devastated areas of the world. As a consequence, West Europeans, a majority of whom refused to subordinate national independence and human freedom to the possibility of economic development under the severe discipline of communism directed by the Kremlin, saw in the United States not only their leader but also their defender against Soviet armies and Communist infiltration.

The fear of Soviet might was enhanced as Stalin took over one European satellite after another, ending with Czechoslovakia in 1948, as the Soviet Union acquired China as an ally in 1949, as it developed the atomic bomb and then the hydrogen bomb, and, with the assistance of China and local Communists, as it waged successful war in Korea, drove France out of Southeast Asia, and created Communist states in North Korea and North Viet Nam. The United States atomic threat, as Churchill suggested, was the only obstacle to a Soviet march to the English Channel.

The Marshall Plan, the creation of West European union and NATO at American initiative and with American financial and military support, economic aid to underdeveloped countries, and the formation of various alliances surrounding the Soviet Union were the response of the West to the Soviet challenge. This response stimulated Soviet counter measures, rising tensions, the arms race, and other manifestations of Cold War unfavorable to international security. Both conditions and policies were, however, changing on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Much American opinion seems unaware of these changes. Stalin died in 1953 and his "cult of personality" was repudiated by Khrushchev. Soviet military expansion ended, though not military maintenance of the existing situation, as illustrated in Hungary. Khrushchev, aware of the intolerable devastation of nuclear war, denied that Communist doctrine requires war with capitalist-imperialist states, engaged in disarmament negotiations, announced a policy of peaceful coexistence, and directed Soviet goals to economic development and Russian security more than to the realization of Communist ideals.⁶ Yugoslavia, Albania, and China repudiated Soviet leadership, the last two because it was not tough enough, and European members of the Warsaw alliance manifested varying degrees of restiveness at that leadership.

At the same time, West Europe staged a remarkable economic recovery, established a considerable degree of political stability, and improved its defenses. Britain and France acquired

nuclear potential, and France relieved itself of the burden of colonial war in Indo-China and Algeria. Communist parties in the West declined in influence. Europe, especially the Six, moved toward economic, political, and military co-operation, and achieved a degree of confidence in its own capabilities and future.

Europeans have been more aware of these changes than Americans. Although they recognize the great power of the Soviet Union, they do not anticipate its march to the west. They recognize that Khrushchev is inhibited by a developing economy which he has built up since the war and which he wants to conserve, by a population that wants no more war but an improved standard of living, by the unreliability of his allies in both Asia and Europe, and by the expectation of Communist advance without war. Such advance seems to have become for Khrushchev a long-run policy to be achieved by propaganda of peace, by programs of aid in developing countries, and by making the Soviet Union such a model that all will eventually wish to imitate it. Because he believes that communism is the "wave of the future," he sees no need to take risks to hurry history on its course.

Aware of these changes, De Gaulle can easily believe that the Cold War is obsolete, especially if he can bury the hatchet with Germany, gradually build a defensive force in West Europe, and negotiate successfully with a Soviet Union less fearful of aggression from the West and more fearful of aggression from the East. "Little Europe" may, he thinks, eventually be extended to the Urals, thus restoring the ancient grandeur of European civilization with France at its center.

Along with Western Europe's diminished fear of Russia has grown increased opposition to American interference, if

⁶ Chester Bowles, former Undersecretary of State, believes that "Communist ideology is declining in relevance to the tasks of the modern world and that the Communists themselves are finding it of declining value as a political tool, an economic panacea, and an instrument of diplomacy." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40 (July 1962), p. 565.

not domination. General de Gaulle recalls the defeat and occupation of France, the snubs he endured from Western statesmen while in exile, and the contribution which French Communists gave to the resistance during the war. He also never fails to think of the ancient glories of France, and he remembers that France had at times been an ally of Russia, whose interests as a state, he thinks, are more and more superseding the ideology of communism as the guide to the policy of the Soviet government. Although both Russia and Britain are potentially part of Europe, America is not. Centering in France, Germany, and Italy, the modern Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne must, thinks De Gaulle, be itself, settle its own relations with Britain and Russia, and maintain friendly, but not subordinate, relations with America.⁷

If De Gaulle succeeds in convincing the Six and then other Europeans of his ideas, which is by no means certain, American prestige might gain by accommodating itself to these opinions, rather than by attempting to assert a leadership no longer considered necessary by the Europeans and resented as intervention in the regional problems of their continent.

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

A form of European union which proved adverse to the interests of the

⁷ Though advocating a stronger European federation than De Gaulle's *l'Europe des patries*, Altiero Spinelli, an Italian leader in the European Movement, concurs in many of these ideas. NATO, he thinks, manifests American "hegemony" and the "*pax Americana*." He wants European friendship with the United States, but Europe should, he thinks, be primarily responsible for its own defense and cannot be "as long as it remains an irresponsible military and political dependency of the United States." "Atlantic Pact or European Unity," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40 (July 1962), p. 552.

United States would doubtless be criticized in this country, and the prestige of the United States government abroad might suffer, if it were thought that that government was incapable of perceiving and defending its national interests. It does not seem likely, however, that the kind of European union projected by De Gaulle would have an adverse effect on American interests. It may, on the contrary, by contributing to general security, increase American security. An independent European defense force may relieve anxieties in West Europe, which have arisen from European dependence, either upon the United States which many Europeans fear may in an emergency act precipitately or not at all, or upon a NATO nuclear force subject to the veto of several or all NATO powers.⁸ With diminished fear of Soviet attack, a more limited and controllable defense force may seem safer. De Gaulle's concept may also relieve widespread fear in East Europe that a powerful NATO, led by an imperialistic United States and a revenge-seeking West Germany, may launch an attack in the East under the slogans of liberation and irredentism. "Little Europe," while good for defense, will long be incapable of aggression. If it should reduce tensions and create an atmosphere favorable to disarmament, this would not be contrary to American interests, though there might be protests from elements of the "military-industrial complex," against which President

⁸ Americans who favor a NATO deterrent recognize the difficulty of reconciling the desire of each ally "to possess both a trigger and a safety catch." Malcolm W. Hoag of the Rand Corporation, "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41 (January 1963), p. 295. See also former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "The Practice of Partnership," *ibid.*, p. 258, and Henry A. Kissinger, "Unsolved Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40 (July 1962), p. 536.

Eisenhower warned in his farewell address on January 17, 1961.⁹

From the point of view of the economic interests of the United States, the effect of an increasingly strong Customs Union among the Six is problematic.¹⁰ Customs unions among many states tend to increase the tariff wall around the whole because of the disposition of each member to wish a protected market for its own products. Each finds itself obliged to support higher tariffs for others in order to obtain their votes for its own. Such a process built up the United States protective tariff from the Civil War to the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. However, in the United States, this process was moderated in 1934 by congressional delegation to the executive of power to make reciprocal trade agreements, and it may be that the Common Market will develop such a procedure making possible reduction of its general tariff by negotiations under the auspices of GATT and the enlarged powers of the President under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It is generally true that the larger the group within a custom union, the more difficult it is for other states to negotiate successfully with it. For this reason, the Common Market, restricted to the Six, may prove more favorable to trade expansion than a larger Common Market.

Britain and the other members of the European Free Trade Association, as well as the United States, will undoubtedly seek by negotiation to keep the Common Market tariff wall from getting too high. The Common Market may, therefore, make for freer trade in the non-Communist world, and there is even the possibility that, with its extensive bargaining power, satisfactory

agreements can be made to increase trade with the Communist world. The United States has had political objections to such increase because of its anti-Communist obsessions. Extensions of international trade, however, if effected by reciprocal agreements, provide hostages for peace, reduce tension, and increase prosperity. It is difficult to perceive any serious repercussions on American national interests by the current success of De Gaulle's Common Market policy.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The United States took a major part in establishing the United Nations, and American presidents have repeatedly said it is the major hope of international peace and security and the cornerstone of American policy. Nevertheless, for a decade, the United States has centered its security policy on NATO and other alliances. Its enthusiasm for the United Nations has diminished as its "automatic majority" in the General Assembly has become less certain, owing to an increase in the number of uncommitted states and a decline in the willingness of European and Latin-American states to follow United States leadership.¹¹ As the Soviet charge that the United Nations was a branch of the United States State Department has become less realistic, the United States has been less willing to use the United Nations as an instrument of its policy, much less to guide its policy by the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Regional and collective defense arrangements are permitted by the Charter, but a study made of them in 1953 concluded that, although they may be useful:

⁹ Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), chap. 1.

¹⁰ *Supra*, note 1.

¹¹ See former Secretary of State Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41 (January 1963), p. 303.

[Those that] become very large and powerful tend to withdraw the interest of their members from the United Nations, to reduce the confidence of others in the United Nations, to escape the control of the United Nations, to be looked upon by neighboring non-members as dangerous, to divide the world into hostile poles of power, and thus to reduce international security and prospects of peace generally.¹²

Subsequent history seems to confirm this judgment.

There are many people in the United States, in Europe, and, particularly, in the uncommitted countries, who see little hope for peace and security in a shrinking and rapidly changing world, vulnerable to destruction by nuclear weapons, except through the United Nations. They think a military balance of power between two major centers—maintained by competition in nuclear weapons, jet planes, satellites, and missiles and supported by espionage, subversion, and continual technological break-throughs—can not be stable. In such a “balance of terror,” each side seeks to prevent its opponent from gradually undermining its interests by nibbling aggression, subversive intervention, or propaganda. For this purpose, it seeks to sustain the credibility of nuclear threat as an instrument of policy and, at the same time, to prevent nuclear war by making a first strike with nuclear weapons incredible because of the deterrent influence of second strike capability by both sides. Such a system invites accident, assures provocations, augments tensions, puts pre-emptive strikes at a premium, and makes extremely likely the escalation to general nuclear war of border hostilities which begin with conventional arms and proceed with tactical nuclear weapons. Under such conditions, it is

improbable that agreements on nuclear testing or disarmament will be reached but highly probable that nuclear arms will spread to governments less responsible than those that now have them.

Since a military balance of power is, under present conditions, certain to be unstable and undesirable, some think a centralization of power in a world federation, world government, or universal empire is the solution. Sentiments of national independence, state sovereignty, and ideological rivalry, however, stand in the way. Abundant communication and diffusion of technologies may tend toward cultural and ideological convergence, as suggested by observers of developments in the Soviet Union and the United States,¹³ but the process is certain to be slow because of the political obstructions which each group offers to diffusion and convergence. Furthermore, a uniform society of the entire human population seems unlikely, in view of the geographic and historic variety of the world, and undesirable, in view of the importance for human progress of competition among diverse systems of government, economy, and culture. More common values and institutions will emerge as communication becomes more continuous and abundant, but much diversity will remain.

The conclusion may be that the only feasible, viable, and desirable system of security is that contemplated by the United Nations Charter—a system of peaceful coexistence of states whose sovereignty is defined by international law and sustained by international organization.

With that assumption, one may ask

¹² United Nations, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 8th Report, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations*, 1953, p. 33.

¹³ Pitirim O. Sorokin, *Mutual Convergence of the United States and the USSR to the Mixed Socio-Cultural Style* (Mexico, D. F., 1961); Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962).

what is the relation of European union to such a system. The Charter itself recognizes the propriety of both regional arrangements and collective defense arrangements, but under severe limitations. Regional arrangements can take "enforcement measures" only with the authorization of the Security Council, and collective defense arrangements can act only in case of "armed attack," must immediately report any action to the Security Council, and must terminate such action if so ordered by the Security Council. It has been noted that collective defense arrangements tend to become large, to escape these limitations, and to undermine collective security under the United Nations. The NATO and Warsaw alliances have actually done so as tensions have risen and the security of all declined.

It appears, therefore, that, if regional arrangements are to serve rather than to destroy mankind, those intended for defense should be kept from getting too large and should be kept under close control and supervision by the United Nations itself, perhaps transferring the function of supervision to the General Assembly, because of the dangerous possibilities of the great-power veto in the Security Council.

From this point of view, the simultaneous decentralization of NATO, by establishment of an independent West European deterrent, and of the Communist bloc, by the breach between the Soviet Union and China, may manifest a tendency toward conditions in which

collective security under the United Nations can work, even in relations between the great powers, as it did in achieving cease-fires in Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, and Suez, where the great power blocs did not directly confront each other. In Korea, Hungary, and the Congo, where the confrontation was more direct, the United Nations has been less successful. If such decentralization should be the tendency of DeGaulle's "Little Europe," it presents an opportunity for the United States to increase its prestige as a supporter of the United Nations. Neither DeGaulle, who refuses to pay assessments, nor Mao Tse-Tung, who continually frustrates efforts of India and other states to gain representation for mainland China, are friends of the United Nations, but their simultaneous assaults on world bipolarity may actually benefit it.

By accommodating itself to the gradual disintegration of exaggerated defense arrangements and by bringing all regional and defense arrangements under control of the United Nations, the United States can contribute to the movement away from the unstable, bipolar balance of terror and toward collective security, international peace, and co-operation for human welfare as designed by the Charter. It, therefore, does not appear that the results of the projected European union will necessarily adversely affect either the interests or the prestige of the United States.

The New Europe and the Cold War

By D. F. FLEMING

ABSTRACT: The recent challenges by Mao of Kremlin leadership in the Soviet bloc and by De Gaulle of American leadership in the Western bloc have made the foundations of the Cold War unstable. China defied all the rules of the nuclear club, until she could get into it; France accepted the new principle that national sovereignty now resides in oblitative capacity and that prestige depends upon it. De Gaulle's design for Europe calls for forbidding all peace-making until the Americans no longer need their land bases in Europe and leave and until the new Europe is strong enough to deal with a Soviet Union which, eventually weakened by conflict with China, will have no choice but to join the great Gaullist European family. The prospect of a European power independent of the United States and unchecked by Great Britain drew protest from Moscow. In view of these circumstances, making peace in co-operation with Russia is not out of the question. The United States and the Soviet Union, the two great powers, have been drifting toward a common ground. Peace with Russia has gained in credibility, but peace with China has not in the public mind, although the requirements for the continuation of civilized life may demand it. In the interest of survival, the game of playing power politics as if the nuclear missile had not been invented must be discontinued by all. National security which rests on the stock-piling of ultimate weapons is an illusion. Mutual trust is the only adequate basis for true and solid peace among nations.—Ed.

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DURING the winter of 1962-1963, there were massive explosions inside each of the two Cold War alliances. In both cases, the number-two man challenged and defied the leader so completely that the very foundations of the Cold War were made unstable.

In the East, Mao brought a long-fought struggle with the Soviet Union to a bitter crisis. This dispute had mounted since 1956 when Khrushchev overruled the Communist dogma that war is an inevitable development of capitalism. It had led to wholesale withdrawal of economic aid by the Soviets to China and to a world-wide struggle for leadership of the ninety Communist parties. Finally, when Khrushchev moved for a conference to abate the conflict, he was met by massive published catalogues of his sins and by demands that he be purged and that he come to Peking for the proposed meeting. A call to Canossa, a leading editor termed it, and there were even warnings of unsettled Sino-Soviet border problems. Mao wants "the leadership of the Communist bloc as a whole and undisputed hegemony in all parts of Asia," said a West Coast observer, a judgment underlined by China's humiliating military thrust into India, Khrushchev's unaligned friend.¹

THE "ANGLO-SAXONS" DEFIED

In the West, President de Gaulle's rejection of American leadership was almost as complete. After five years of requests to be admitted to the top nuclear directorate, and of withdrawal from NATO, he held a press conference on January 14, 1963 in which he rejected Britain's application for admission into the Common Market until such time as she might divest herself of her insular, oceanic, and American

connections. He made it totally clear that the "system of the Six" was to be inward looking, especially in agricultural matters. If Britain and her European friends were admitted, the Market's cohesion "would not hold for long and in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community."²

This brutal rebuff to the Anglo-Saxons preceded by eight days the signing at Paris of the long-negotiated treaty with West Germany which bound them "to consult each other, prior to any decision, on all important questions of foreign policy," with a view to arriving at "a similar position." The list of things to be consulted about was inclusive; no field was omitted.

In the area of defense, they would harmonize both their strategy and tactics, creating institutes for the purpose; increase the exchange of armed-forces personnel, particularly from the general-staff schools; organize a joint program of drafting "appropriate armament projects" and financing them; create joint committees to consider research and submit proposals to quarterly meetings of the ministers, including civil defense. In addition, the teaching and use of each other's languages, the interchange of students, and co-operation in scientific research would be pushed. And, last but not least, West Berlin would be regarded as a Land (state) of the Federal Republic, unless Bonn declared to the contrary within three months. This is a status never accorded to West Berlin by the United States.

De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Market, which was finalized in a formal French veto at Brussels on January 29, was contrary to West Ger-

¹ Arnold A. Rogow, Stanford University, *Council for Correspondence Newsletter*, February, 1963, p. 31.

² French Press and Information Service, No. 185.

many's wishes and interests, because her trade outside the Market of the Six is already greater than within it. His timing was also an insult to Adenauer, who, ready to leave for Paris, was to be confronted with a *fait accompli*.

A NEW AUTHORITARIAN EUROPE?

In a closed "system of the Six," West Germany could look forward to eventual dominance, on the basis of her economic power being much greater than that of France. She could expect to achieve eventually something like the economic sway in West Europe which she sought in the two world wars. However, while her political self-confidence has not recovered from Hitler's catastrophe, De Gaulle would have his chance to create an authoritarian bloc under French leadership consisting of West Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, and an Italy turned back toward a new form of fascism.

This dread word and prospect have already alarmed people throughout the Six. In Europe, Lippmann found deep and wide fear of coming German and Italian De Gaulles—and of a worse French one after the General goes. Being "locked up inside a Gaullist Europe was frightening" to many people. In Rome, Anthony Sampson found a new fascism talked about "quite freely"; in London, Robert H. Estabrook sensed keenly De Gaulle's "atrophy of the French sense of political responsibility," which abetted the latent forces of fascism. In Paris, Claude Bourdet pointed to the danger of a coalition of German-French military bureaucracies and technocracies committed to support West Germany's claim to lost lands in the East.³

³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 29, 1963; *The London Observer*, February 3, 1963; *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1963.

This specter of a new authoritarianism in Europe might seem a little unreal to distant Americans, long absorbed in fighting the Cold War; it was not strange to readers of De Gaulle's memoirs, who noted that since 1940 his "every deed and act" had been designed, among other things, "to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. . . ." ⁴

Neither Hitler nor Mussolini excelled De Gaulle in strength of will and tenacity of purpose, or equalled him in the length of their vision. Few would question, either, that Spain and Portugal could strengthen the authoritarian caste of his projected Europe. Some Italian industrialists have already rallied to him, and, in Germany, former Defense Minister Strauss waits in the wings, a "strong" man backed by powerful forces and by his belief in nuclear weapons for a rearmed Germany. Could she be long denied them in the intimate embrace of De Gaulle's Europe? And could anyone doubt that this would bring a strong reaction from Moscow? The Soviet Union, said *Izvestia* on February 17, "will never remain passive in the face of atomic weapons supplied to former Hitler generals."

Crying out in alarm, Bourdet recalled the long insistence of American business, church, and government groups that West Europe should be united, above all for the Cold War aim of making West Germany "the spearhead of the Western Alliance, killing forever any hope of a reunited, neutral Germany." Now the United States had obtained the wrong Europe, "a monster-

⁴ Murrey Marder, *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1963.

child" which "can jeopardize all hopes of an East-West settlement."⁵

DE GAULLE'S IMPACT ON OUR POLICY

The impact of Gaullist Europe on American policy was paralyzing. He had undermined "the whole basis of existing policy in Europe." Washington was "stunned and dazed," said the *Washington Post* on February 21, by the shattering blow which De Gaulle had struck "at the foundations of American post-war policy." It was clear that Western Europe would no longer accept "American leadership and dominance in European affairs."

All agreed that De Gaulle's object was to exclude us from any important role in Europe.⁶ The terms of the Franco-German treaty pointed strongly that way. The military paragraphs indicated French control and French arms sales to Germany. Yet Germany was buying \$750 million of military hardware from us yearly.⁷ Without this sale, we could hardly keep our 400,000 troops in Germany. Already, too, the Six had raised their tariffs on American poultry from 4.5 cents a pound to 13, virtually cutting off a \$50 million market in West Germany alone. This foreshadowed a determined move to establish support prices for wheat somewhere between the French \$2.15 a bushel and the German \$3.00, closing a half billion dollar market to us and enabling the French to plow up another 6,000,000 acres for wheat.⁸

Simultaneously, De Gaulle's officials moved, in France and in the Market,

to check American investments. Our colossal General Motors was especially feared. The General was "convinced that the American purpose is to colonize Europe." He saw British entry into the Market as the thin edge of the American wedge to further the American domination of Europe.⁹ It did not matter that Market investments in the United States were some \$15 billion and our investments in the Market about \$12 billion; they were growing and must be forestalled, especially since the objection to them was as much political as economic.

Nor was this the last of the non-fraternal revelations which awaited us, for European industry, thanks to our great economic aid, was now newly built, as sophisticated as our own and based on a great mass market like ours. "We shall be challenged in all the world markets," Lippmann warned, "and we shall need the kind of discipline which human beings submit to only when they know that they are challenged."¹⁰

At first, the resentment against France was so strong among the negotiators of the other members of the Six and their peoples that there were hopes of organizing resistance in Europe against De Gaulle, but, as the weeks passed, they subsided. All of the other five valued the prosperity which the Market had brought. Having asserted his resounding veto, De Gaulle ordered

⁹ William Millinship, Paris, *The Observer*, January 20, 1963. See Waverley Root, *The Washington Post*, March 24, 1963, p. A23, for an account of the restrictive French decrees.

¹⁰ Lippmann, "The Unravelling Alliances," *Newsweek*, March 18, 1963, p. 21. The world-wide range of De Gaulle's ambitions was revealed in his toast to the visiting president of Mexico in which he recalled the "territorial amputations" inflicted on Mexico in the past and offered her \$150 million credits, as the first step in an aid program designed to draw together "all nations of Latin traditions." *Newsweek*, April 8, 1963, p. 40.

⁵ Claude Bourdet, Editor of *France-Observateur*, "The Wrong Europe," *The Nation*, March 9, 1963, pp. 191-195.

⁶ Anthony Sampson, *The Observer*, January 27, 1963; Roscoe Drummond, *The Washington Post*, February 3, 1963.

⁷ Joseph Alsop, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 11, 1963.

⁸ Lippmann, *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1963.

all his officials to keep quiet, though they could not conceal their triumph.

Realization spread everywhere, also, that De Gaulle spoke for much sentiment in Europe. The brute fact was that great numbers of Europeans backed him, said one reporter, mainly "the hard young men of the new generation." In the Ruhr and Northern Italy, "there is a swelling rebellion against American leadership." The younger generation is not Atlantic-minded. Its loyalty is to Europe as a whole. It knows that the new Europe already outproduces us in steel and coal and that its gold reserve, like its growth rate, is double ours. It no longer believes in the credibility of our deterrent and wants its continent to cease being the object of other people's policies. "De Gaulle is capitalizing on a broad-based and probably irreversible European revolt against American ascendancy."¹¹

Behind Macmillan's evident misery on his visit to Rome, one of his fellow countrymen sensed that there was a core of sense in De Gaulle's leadership—"that Europe is becoming impatient of purely American leadership and that General de Gaulle represents, not only in France, but beyond, a symbol of European pride." No European country would see America in quite the same light again.¹² Recognizing that De Gaulle's pride had often been hurt by the special relationship of Britain to the United States, culminating in its blunt assertion in the Nassau Pact, the publisher of the *Washington Post* concluded that De Gaulle "would not allow Europe to be distorted by a half European Britain intent on creating an American-British superiority over Eu-

rope."¹³ The diplomatic correspondent of the *Observer* agreed that "In distrusting future American policy, de Gaulle is in tune with a widespread mood of European nationalism. . . ." Another British analyst asked who doubted "that if the declaration of independence from America had been made by the British Prime Minister it would have won him the next election."¹⁴ Other Europeans noted that, in opposing the admission of the neutrals—Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland—to the Market, the United States was seeking to preserve it as an instrument of the Cold War.¹⁵

A MULTILATERAL DETERRENT?

In its frustration, Washington sought to get around De Gaulle by sending Ambassador Livingston Merchant on a mission in February to enlist support for a multilateral deterrent. It seemed to be advanced in a "tentative and tepid spirit." Almost no one in the Administration thought it "either politically urgent or militarily essential,"¹⁶ but this was "the season when Defense Ministers scurry from capital to capital, their briefcases stuffed with plans and charts. Bigwigs and brass hats emerge from their winter hibernation crying

¹³ Philip L. Graham, *The Washington Post*, February 15, 1963.

¹⁴ *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1963. Marquis Childs learned that many Europeans resented American behind-the-scenes direction of the terms for enlarging the European Community, and, in London, Max Freedman found much blame ascribed to the United States for Britain's Market failure. Critics said our policy fell in between remaining neutral or working with all our power. The result was European suspicion and the absence of our support in the most critical periods. (This criticism was not from governmental quarters.) *The Washington Post*, February 22, March 12, 1963.

¹⁵ I. F. Stone's *Bi-Weekly*, February 4, 1963.

¹⁶ Emmet John Hughes, *Newsweek*, March 25, 1963.

¹¹ Eldon Griffiths, *The Washington Post*, February 9, 1963.

¹² Anthony Sampson, *The Observer*, February 10, 1963.

doom like Cassandra, and humbler folk dip deep in their pockets to pay the price of liberty."¹⁷ In Europe, Merchant found the British lukewarm and the Germans co-operative, with reservations. They appeared willing to accept one third of the \$5 billion cost and a veto for each member of the control group temporarily. De Gaulle's nuclear adviser termed the multilateral-force idea "a multilateral farce."¹⁸ The smaller countries hesitated to contribute without a share of control, and no American government was thought "likely to accept a situation in which nearly half a million American lives could be jeopardized by European action."¹⁹

The problem of permitting several governments to have their fingers on both the nuclear triggers and safety catches appeared to be so insoluble that one editor thought the Merchant mission might turn out to be "chiefly that of so plainly confronting both Europe and the United States with the insurmountable obstacles to accord, under the old structure, that the minds of statesmen will be prepared for a bolder alternative policy."²⁰

In the absence of such a move toward global control of nuclear weapons, it developed that our allies rejected the hopeful McNamara policy of trying to pull nuclear weapons back from the front in Germany, substituting increased conventional strength. The British might raise their troops in Germany slightly to 55,000 men, but not

to the 75,000 requested by NATO. The French would move a division farther forward, but, as Dean Acheson explained on March 14, the French Army hardly existed after its long series of humiliations, ending in Algeria. He thought it would take a decade to rebuild it from the bottom. Thus, the thirty NATO divisions which we had been demanding since 1957, after asking for ninety in 1952, were still unprovided. Only the American and German contingents were large.

Instead of increasing them, both the Germans and the British wanted to revert to the strategy of using atomic weapons at the very start of any Soviet advance. The Germans were emphatic that the nuclear deterrent must be gapless. For his part, De Gaulle would cut French armed forces this year by 250,000 men.²¹ If we wanted West Europe defended against the always-imminent deluge of Soviet hordes, without the immediate necessity of starting a nuclear war, we would have to increase our wall of men in Germany.

At the same time, it became clear that the Europeans were determined to have nuclear technology, because that was the going thing. British Lord Hailsham, good friend of the United States, made this unmistakably plain in an address at New York in which he asked us to pause and reflect about an alliance in which "all the advanced and sophisticated technologies were left to one of the partners, and the rest relegated to supply a complement of conventional arms in war, and in commerce a modest contribution of Scotch whisky and compact cars." Others want to "produce and share jointly in the manufacture of a supersonic air-

¹⁷ *Newsweek*, "The Merchant Mission," March 4, 1963, p. 33.

¹⁸ *The Washington Post*, March 11, 22, 1963.

¹⁹ Alastair Buchan, "NATO Divided," *The New Republic*, December 20, 1962, p. 15.

²⁰ *The Washington Post*, February 28, 1962. On March 2 *The Economist* termed the search for controls for a multilateral nuclear force a case of "multibafflement."

²¹ Dispatches from London and Bonn, *The Washington Post*, February 21, 1963; Sulzberger, *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 29, 1963.

craft, a rocket, a reactor . . . yes, and a war head too. . . ." ²²

WHAT IS REALITY?

With the evidence becoming mountainous that the Europeans do not believe in the danger of a Soviet invasion, what becomes of our sacred mission to stand in the middle of Europe in great force, ready to throw back the Red flood? In the place of the intoxicating certainty of power which prevailed in Washington in mid-winter, after the expulsion of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Cuba, there was "a new sober search for the hard core of reality." ²³

Where indeed is reality? With his customary common sense, Senator Wayne Morse declared that he was "emphatically opposed to keeping American forces in Europe if they are not wanted, not needed, and not matched." Above all, he was "not interested in any American policy of trying to outbid France for the leadership of Europe," and President Kennedy himself repeatedly said that, if the Europeans wanted us to leave, we would. ²⁴

The thought of bringing our permanent German garrison home was almost

²² *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 31, 1963.

²³ Marquis Childs, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 20, 1963.

²⁴ *The Washington Post*, February 15, 1963. Stewart Alsop quoted one Kennedy adviser as saying about troop strength, "either the Europeans go up or we come down," and another said: "The ground defense of Europe is primarily a job for the Europeans." *The Saturday Evening Post*, April 6, 1963, p. 81.

The West Germans would doubtless contribute more troops to induce us to remain, but apparently no one else would.

Alsop stated also that, at their Vienna meeting in 1961, "Khrushchev stated flatly that he would regard it as a *casus belli* if the Germans were permitted their own nuclear weapons." *Ibid.*, p. 80.

incredible. Even if West Europe were not at once overrun, what might happen to West Berlin? Have we not stood embattled for a decade in its defense? Have we not repeatedly pledged our sacred honor, our lives, and all the lives in the West for these people? Do we not believe deeply that, if the status of the city is changed an iota, West Germany will promptly "go," then West Europe, and soon the world, in one thunderous crash of national dominoes falling into a sea of world communism?

These are unthinkable questions, but the rebellion against us in West Europe forces us to think them. Recording his consistent advocacy of defending Berlin, Louis J. Halle, a former State Department official, now concludes that we ought to prefer not to have this Berlin obligation at all. It has been "an unspeakable burden for us." For fifteen years, "it has hung over us like a sword of Damocles and we have seen no prospect of getting out from under." But "the defense of Europe is the concern of Europeans primarily." Now, if they develop their own nuclear arms, "we shall be relieved of the commitment to retaliate on the Soviet Union for any strokes at Paris" or Berlin or elsewhere in Europe. He thinks it likely that, if we face them with withdrawal, the Europeans will decide that "they cannot all have push buttons of their own with which to set our deterrent off." Still believing that "the future of mankind depends on a drawing together of our nations"—*all* nations?—he is sure that "nothing would be more counterproductive of this than for us to insist that others accept our embrace." ²⁵

This would seem to be common sense, but what would become of the chief purpose of our national life, and of many million individual lives, if we

²⁵ Louis J. Halle, "Reconsidering our Foreign Policy," *The New Republic*, March 23, 1963, pp. 13-15.

cease to fight the Cold War in its main theater? Halle faces the issue squarely, acknowledging that "we, more than any other nation, have a way of becoming psychologically committed to undertakings for which there are no rational grounds."

PERMANENT FIXATION

Our fixation about a Soviet invasion of West Europe is the prime example of this principle. After Roosevelt's death in 1945, we quickly closed our minds to the consequences of both the Munich Conference of 1938 and World War II, which together brought the Russians into Central Europe. Then, because they did not return East Europe to Western control, and exploitation, it was assumed that the Yalta Conference was to blame and that, like Hitler, the Soviets were out to conquer the world. They would begin with West Germany and Europe. The Communist seizure of control in Czechoslovakia in 1948, followed at once by the Berlin Blockade—both defensive actions after the promulgation of the Churchill-Truman Doctrine in March 1946 and a year later—made us certain that West Europe was in mortal danger. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed to defend it.

Doubtless we had to do this, just to make sure, since West Europe is an essential part of our living room in the world. It is undeniable, also, that the Russians would like to have Germany, and all other countries, Communist. But where is the objective evidence that the cautious Stalin ever intended to advance into West Europe, against our atomic monopoly before 1949 and superiority after it? Nevertheless, playing the game of defending West Europe has absorbed a large share of our time, resources, and energies for

fifteen years, to our increasing debilitation. This is the core of the reasons for the constant drain on our gold reserves, until we have been reduced to borrowing \$350 million from our European clients to bolster the dollar, repayable over the next five years in their currencies, not ours.²⁶

When the grand game of defending the West Europeans against the poised Red avalanche began in 1948, they had 15 per cent of the free world's gold and we had 71 per cent. Now they have 44 per cent and we have 40 per cent. Excepting Britain, which also has a sluggish economy, they have spent a much smaller part of their national income for arms, and prospered mightily, while we "defended" them at the cost of hundreds of billions. Parenthetically, it might be noted that France received the largest sum of foreign aid from us.

DE GAULLE'S SETTLEMENT PLAN

If our long period of standing in the center of Europe in binding nuclear armor is obviously drawing to a close, what kind of peace will De Gaulle make, after adamantly blocking, with Adenauer, all of our tentative efforts in that direction? By now, the outlines of his vision are well known. He begins by rejecting the division of Europe "at Yalta" into Soviet and American occupied zones. He just would not have done it. He, too, does not believe that either Munich or World War II happened. But unlike us, he has never believed in the danger of Russia coming further west or in the need for NATO. As James Reston put it on February 4: "The General is not worried about Russian soldiers taking over Europe, but about British statesmen and Amer-

²⁶ Gaston Coblenz, Paris, *The Washington Post*, February 18, 1963.

ican salesmen, generals and politicians taking it over." He began to dismantle NATO as soon as he came to power in 1958, withdrawing French troops, ships, and planes, and driving our nuclear armed planes out of France.

NATO itself has always been at its mercy. Its headquarters is in Paris. The great bulk of its infrastructure—ports, pipelines, airfields, communications networks, depots—is in France. Without France, there would be no room to maneuver. She sits in the center of West Europe, and neither NATO nor the Common Market can function without her.

De Gaulle's design calls for forbidding all peace-making until the Americans no longer need their land bases in Europe and go home, and until his new Europe has grown strong enough to deal with a Soviet Union evolving constantly in the direction of Gaullist-planned economy and weakened by conflict with China, which colossus will eventually take over Siberia and leave Russia behind the Urals no choice but to join the great Gaullist European family.²⁷

De Gaulle's faith in the moving stream of evolution is partly justified. But it collides with the law of retardation, which decrees that the traumatically wounded Russians would shun him as an arbiter and father because of his alliance with Adenauer and West Germany. The prospect of "a European power independent of America and unchecked by British restraint" stirred no applause in Moscow. Continued United States presence seemed safer. The Kremlin promptly sent protest notes to both ends of the new "Paris-

Bonn axis," twenty typed pages long and strongly worded.²⁸

IS PEACE WITH RUSSIA OVERDUE?

In these circumstances, what do we do next? Could the thought be entertained that finally we are free to move toward making peace in co-operation with the Soviet Union? Every Cold War reflex forbids the idea. Yet it does not seem feasible to drift much longer, refusing to join in a German settlement or, at least, an adjustment at Berlin. Shall we yield the play to De Gaulle by default? Or shall we try to wait him out?

There is a natural inclination in the Administration to think that at least Kennedy can outlast the seventy-two-year-old De Gaulle, but the Gaullists do not reason that way. They are confident that they can decide when to negotiate with the Soviets. A convenient time would be in 1969, when the NATO treaty expires. When De Gaulle's term ends in 1965, they count upon his re-election for seven years—or the election of a hand-picked successor. That would carry Gaullism up to 1972. Who will be the American President then, the Gaullists ask?

On the other hand, De Gaulle's failure to bring the French coal miners to heel and the powerful support given them by French labor and public opinion may presage a revulsion against him. There are already protests against the great costs of nuclear grandeur and many internal opponents of his inward-looking little Europe. It may well be that De Gaulle has killed the spirit that built the Common Market and that this will work to disintegrate his hegemony.

While events develop, it would be highly irresponsible for us to throw in

²⁷ Among other statements of his blueprint, see William Millinship, Paris, *The Observer*, January 20 and February 10, 1963. See also the very revealing text of an interview between one of his ministers and Joseph Alsop in *The Washington Post*, March 29, 1963.

²⁸ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 6, 1963.

the sponge and retreat into a neo-isolation. Nor could that be done. After all, the two greatest powers carried the main burden of winning World War II and the responsibility is still upon them to make a peace in Europe that will have some reasonable chance of preventing a third and final world war. It is still quite possible that an internal upsurge in France or a broad revulsion in West Europe will forestall the new authoritarian Europe that our Cold War policies have fostered, but, even then, the obligation remains on us to help make a German settlement that all concerned can live with.

De Gaulle has long since recognized the Oder-Niese boundary. Aside from Adenauer, what prevents us from doing so? It is highly unlikely that Russia would concede a very loose federation of East and West Germany to De Gaulle's Europe, but she might to us, with strong guarantees. The two super-powers do still retain the power to guarantee a German settlement, and only they can do so. Shall we leave it to a new chauvinist Europe to bring about a dangerous and unstable disengagement in Germany, one that would permit her great dynamism to build up for a third European explosion in this century? Is it beyond our wit and wisdom, also, to achieve a world control of nuclear weapons, just before it is forever too late?

These questions may seem incredible to those in the Kennedy Administration who have intended to amass such overwhelming nuclear power as to overawe the Soviets and still "win" the Cold War. They would make uncomfortable the larger number who have conceived of a new West Europe working in harness with us, either abreast or in tandem, to win the race against communism in all the world. But China and the De Gaulle-Adenauer team

have made this dream obsolete. They proclaim from the house tops that hereafter the politics of the world will be played by the Four, not the Two. How much time do we have left to stabilize the world in the highly unstable nuclear age?

Ever since Stalin's death in 1953, his successors have been working for such a stabilization with us. Khrushchev staked his future on it but was defeated by our cold warriors before the abortive summit conference of 1960 met. Since then, he has been increasingly beset by mounting internal problems and rising Chinese anger at his "weakness" and his failure to back China. In his defense, he warned Peking, from East Berlin on January 17, that the United States could loose a storm of 40,000 atomic and nuclear warheads, capable of obliterating whole nations and of killing some 800 million people. On the other hand, he said, Soviet 100 megaton bombs were so powerful that they could only be used on overseas targets, lest they lash back.

Would anyone deny the accuracy of his evaluation in either case? Must we wait to make peace until he is no longer in power?

Watching the drift of the two great powers toward common ground, a thoughtful observer noted that "Western and Soviet dogma are becoming blurred under the intense but still supportable heat of a necessarily dynamic coexistence. We are close enough to hear each other."²⁹ So, incredibly, again, we appear to be. The President has said publicly that "We would be far worse off—the world would be—if the Chinese dominated the Communist movement"; a Gallup poll has reported that 47 per cent of us now think that

²⁹ David Felix, "The Sense of Coexistence," *The American Scholar*, Winter 1962-1963, p. 89.

China will be the greater threat to peace in 1970 and only 34 per cent still believe Russia will be. Two years ago, these percentages were almost exactly reversed. Today, 63 per cent think it possible "to reach a peaceful settlement of differences between Russia and the West."³⁰

IS PEACE WITH CHINA IMPOSSIBLE?

But, if peace with Russia is now credible, nearly all agree that accommodation with the Chinese is unthinkable. We must apparently wait to move strongly toward a real world community until the Chinese have the power to shape or destroy the world. Yet we might reflect, with David Felix, that they are an enormously able people, apart from their vast bulk, with an ancient civilization. "They were," he continues, "sophisticated philosophers and administrators when we were barbarians." Now aroused, they can easily master our science. With a young and powerful revolutionary *élan*, they can be expected to survive disasters, as the Russians did and as they have already, and to "develop a unitary national strength of presently unimaginable magnitude."³¹

Perhaps we can presently accept the Soviets as allies against the Chinese, changing only the main focus of the emotions and emoluments of the Cold War. But must we again endure all the costs and wastes and perilous brinks of another cold war, lasting maybe fifty years?

It may truly be that it is already too late to bring China into the world community without very great convulsions, but it is certainly not too early to try to conceive the conditions which

might reduce her deeply injured pride and lead her to come to terms with our precarious nuclear civilization.

Are ostracism and encirclement really the correct treatment for the world's largest people, and one of its ablest? When China has "sophisticated" families of nuclear weapons, will we be able to maintain our toe holds around her eastern rim? And, when she moves to expel us from these areas, will we really choose to convert local wars into nuclear holocausts? Is it true that she would not accept any kind of autonomy for a united Korea and Viet Nam, ideological or otherwise? Both are strongly nationalistic. Is it too late to attain any kind of agreed neutralization for Formosa? Must we continue to try to frustrate China's trade with other peoples and reject its ameliorating influence upon ourselves? She is now determined never to be dependent on any one nation again.

It will not do to equate her desire to expel us from her own harbors and doorsteps as one more world conquest mania on the march, on the Nazi model. After all, the Chinese are people. If they are cut, they will bleed. We need something better to deal with them than a new myth that they can be dealt with only by gigantic military power.

SHATTERED MYTH

In striving to avoid coannihilation with China, it will be essential to remember that another of the great myths on which the Cold War flourished has been shattered, the myth of a monolithic world communism, moving as one vast co-ordinated organism in all parts of the earth. The bitter Sino-Soviet rift has revealed the triumph of national interest over Red brotherhood, at a time when Soviet communism was moving far away from old Marxist landmarks—so far that Edward Crankshaw,

³⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 27; *The Washington Post*, March 25, 1963; *The Progressive*, April, 1963, p. 3.

³¹ David Felix, *loc. cit.*, p. 87.

one of the most perceptive students of Soviet affairs, could say: "What happens next we cannot tell. All that we can tell is that Communism as hitherto understood is not on the agenda. The Soviet Union is no longer primarily the headquarters of an international conspiracy. . . . Movement towards some kind of liberal society gathers momentum." Surveying the great variety of Communist parties in the world today, he found it best described as a spectrum.³² The Red dynamism of the Chinese may be strong for a long time, but it, too, is not eternal.

COMMON INTERESTS

Recognition that the Cold War is disintegrating also begins to spread. "There is no doubt," says one Washington observer, "that the Kennedy Administration has been exploring ways for better relations with the Soviet Union."³³ "American policy makers are currently reviewing every front of the cold war," said Marquis Childs on February 18, "as the premises of only yesterday no longer seem valid." "I am convinced," added Roscoe Drummond, "that the last thing the Kremlin would want is to see Europe organized without the positive participation of the United States." In Moscow, Eldon Griffiths saw that "the dominant themes among Soviet and American leaders are frequently undistinguishable. . . . Their policies and frustrations are often undistinguishable." For example, only two men, Kennedy and Khrushchev, had stared annihilation in the face. Khrushchev had, for a long time, studded his letters to Washington with suggestions of common interests.³⁴ Others added that, for the sake of a

dialogue with President Kennedy, he had split the world Communist movement, and they asked if we should now force him back into tight alliance with China?

COLD WAR COSTS

Before we quickly answer in the affirmative we ought to consider the costs of the Cold War to date. Some of them are:

(1) *The warfare state.*³⁵ Since 1947 we have built the Pentagon into the most gigantic employing and planning agency in the world. Its power exceeds that of all our great corporations combined. Yearly about 80 per cent of our huge budget—now topping \$100 billion—goes for war purposes of one kind or another. Yearly, the marriage of the military-industrial complex, about which President Eisenhower so solemnly warned in his Farewell Address, grows tighter. Cities, states, regions even, rise to plush prosperity or sink toward idle despair as the lush cost-plus contracts are handed out. A \$5 billion award can shake the Congress itself, as in the TFX controversy.

Increasingly, too, the war contracts go into seven states which are establishing hammer locks on the essential research brains, technical facilities, and going concerns. In 1962 the seven got 57 per cent of 25 billion in military contracts. It is wonderful for these few but an increasing drain on all the other states.³⁶

(2) *A stagnant economy.* This flows directly from our vast military socialism. While the military money is being passed out, it employs many people and yields huge profits for a relative few. But then the products become unpro-

³² *The Observer*, January 27; *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1963.

³³ Bascomb Timmons, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 1, 1963.

³⁴ *The Washington Post*, March 9, 1963.

³⁵ This is the title of an arresting book by Fred J. Cook (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

³⁶ Fred J. Cook, "The Coming Politics of Disarmament," *The Nation*, January 16, 1963, pp. 133-135.

ductive. The giant missile sinks deep into its silo, to remain there until doomsday—man-made or divinely determined. It does nothing to create wealth or services. Each year, a great part of our national product dies for all economic purposes. Much of our economic lifeblood cannot circulate, but the juggernaut grinds on.

In the West, Great Britain is also in the big defense business. She, too, has a stagnant economy. Elsewhere—in Italy, Germany, France, Japan—military expenditures have been low and prosperity is booming.

(3) *A stunted future.* This also is inherent in the warfare state. Our government finances about 65 per cent of research, mostly for the military and space. In England, the same figure is 60 per cent. In Germany and Japan, some 85 per cent of research money is private, and their economies are automated, modernized, and equipped with all the latest improvements.

(4) *Foreign-aid waste.* Much of the \$140 billion we have spent in foreign aid has been for truly economic, life-giving purposes, but the larger half has been in military aid. For years, we traveled throughout the world pressing arms on backward peoples, burdening their primitive economies all around the Soviet Union and China. Even in South America we supplied the arms which the burgeoning military dictatorships now use to frustrate our belatedly enlightened Alliance for Progress.

(5) *A steadily weakening dollar.* The perpetual drain of equipping and supplying hundreds of our bases and posts abroad, along with a million men and their families in the great ring around the Communist states, has steadily worked to bring the dollar down from its supreme eminence in 1945 to its present limping, hat-in-hand position. Other causes have contributed to the

decline, but the military drains, including military aid, head the list.

(6) *Stock-pile scandals.* In the nuclear age, when there would be no time to prepare for war after it began, and only minutes to get ready to die, we decided to establish great stock piles of military materials. Then minerals were bought to support prices and help industries. "The melancholy chronicle of dubious contracts and questionable intercessions by Cabinet officials lengthened" until we now have a \$9 billion accumulation of secretly acquired materials, including \$800 million worth of deteriorating rubber. The true scandal involved, concluded the *Washington Post* on February 4, "is that so much was spent on so many superfluous things with the public knowing so little."³⁷

Nor is this a full measure of our stock-pile malaise. Secretary McNamara has testified that there are "more than \$12 billion of excess and long-supply military items in our inventories, excluding the billions of dollars of surplus and obsolete" items which have to be disposed of every year. We are fortunate that McNamara "is convinced that time is not on our side in the arms race, and that we should slow down and concentrate on getting both solvency and security."³⁸

(7) *The neglect of our human resources at home.* During these Cold War years, the hearts of many of our cities have been dying as slums festered with unemployed people, many of them school dropouts who can never be really

³⁷ We now have stock-pile reserves of ninety-six materials, everything from hog bristles to opium, hanging over our markets. We are overstocked in sixty-five of seventy-six items for which maximum objectives had been fixed. Editorial, *The Nation*, December 8, 1962.

³⁸ James Reston, *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 31, 1963, and *The New York Times*, April 1, 1963.

employed. Education has limped for lack of resources and partly for lack of talent. Railroads and commuter services have steadily declined. Rural conservation has lagged. Health services have become strained. Appropriations for all these things have been rejected annually or severely cut, while fifty billions for defense went through almost unanimously.

HOW MUCH OVERKILL?

Seymour Melman, of Columbia University, has calculated that we can now deliver explosive power equal to 21.97 billion tons of TNT. Allowing for a 50 per cent failure to deliver, this is enough to kill all the Soviet cities of 100,000 people or more 1,250 times.³⁹ How many times more would we need to kill them?

The reply is crushing and simple. If we had not waged the Cold War to this inconceivable degree, the Soviet peoples would have risen from the deep abyss of death and destruction in which they stood in 1945 and rapidly conquered the world. This is the faith by which we live. Yet we still have to try to understand why Soviet agriculture is starved for capital, why the rising demands of the people for more consumer goods lead to current riots, and why Soviet foreign aid rapidly diminishes.

OUR FINAL WAR GAME

In 1947, hard on the heels of the world's bloodiest war, we enlisted in the Cold War. Aside from World War II itself, it has been the most stupendous game ever played on this planet. In it, we have used nearly a trillion dollars worth of wealth, amassed an unimaginable arsenal, and scattered our resources over the world to all who would call

themselves anti-Communist. We have also largely stagnated our own national life, brought ourselves near to international bankruptcy and squandered much of our moral capital.

Then, after sixteen years, China and Gaullist France rudely seized hands for themselves in the global Cold War game. China defied all the rules of the nuclear club, until she could get into it; France accepted the new principle that national sovereignty now resides in oblitative capacity and that prestige depends upon it.

In a recent article, Henry A. Kissinger argued ably for getting behind a joint Franco-British nuclear force and trying to expand it into a European one, for co-ordinating its policy with ours and thus maintaining the unity of the West against the Soviet Union, including the targeting of the engines of annihilation.⁴⁰

By such means the integrity of the Cold War might conceivably be restored, but our salvation depends on moving beyond it, and on freeing ourselves from the daily menace of nuclear weapons, not in marshaling them in new formations.

WHAT FUTURE?

"The power is already given to two nations," said Chief Justice Earl Warren, "to destroy all life." Extending this power further will not save us. "Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when it may no longer be habitable," said President Kennedy, adding that the nuclear sword hangs over us "by the slenderest of threads."

In a remarkable letter to the *Washington Post* on March 25, Henry W. Edgerton, highly respected judge of the

³⁹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 26, 1963.

⁴⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *The Reporter*, March 28, 1963, pp. 22-27.

United States Court of Appeals in Washington, added the comment that "A sword hanging by the slenderest of threads will fall. We shall not survive unless the thread is strengthened or the sword removed." It was, he said, unlikely to hang for ten years. "The alternative to peace is annihilation."

This is the only way out. The game of playing power politics as if the nuclear missile had never been invented cannot go on much longer. The illusion that "national security" can still be made to exist if enough ultimate weapons are piled up, and buried in the bowels of the earth, promises to be our last. Seeking an escape from reliance on "the myth of national security," Judge Edgerton ventured to suggest some steps that we could take toward peace. We might simply stop bomb testing, dismantle our bases near Russia, "cease to make war in support of dictatorship in South Viet Nam," and even reduce our military budget.

With the foundations of the Cold War audibly cracking beneath us, are we capable of breaking out of the rigid patterns of thinking which it fastened upon us? If we are, can we see beyond the age-old kind of enmities which can only destroy us in the nuclear age? "If we escape a nuclear holocaust," said Justice William O. Douglas, on February 24, "it will be because we have found common ground with men of all colors, of all races, of all creeds, and of all ideologies."

The need to move in this direction was painfully clear after World War I and tragically plain after World War II, as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt both told us. Now the recent

developments appear to give us one more chance to make peace and to organize it adequately.

Today, there is no future for man except in organizing the world community before it is too late. In his great Easter encyclical, issued on April 10, Pope John XXIII declared that "A public authority, having worldwide power . . . must be set up by common accord and not imposed by force." He made it clear that nothing less will do, for, no matter how much the governments "multiply their meetings or sharpen their wits," they are "no longer capable" of "finding an adequate solution."⁴¹

In calling for a world authority strong enough to keep the peace, the pope also pleaded for the banning of nuclear tests and weapons, for "complete and thorough" disarmament and for "a true and solid peace of nations," which "consists in mutual trust alone." In his message three newspaper pages long, there is no suggestion that either of the Communist giants should be left out or that the Cold War should be revived, much less continued until it destroys humanity.

⁴¹ *The New York Times*, April 11, 1963. On the same day, Max Frankel wrote from Washington that the hectic effort to bind the Western alliance militarily had produced proposals for multilateral, multinational and other multifarious projects." The capital was "swimming in plans for allied and inter-allied forces that would be variously assigned, committed, earmarked, contributed and subscribed from national contingents and controlled, managed, directed and manned by all, some or one of the members." *The New York Times*, April 12, 1963.

In other words, we cannot quit playing the nuclear war game. No other national purpose seems worth our devotion.

American Government and Administration: Recent Developments

By WILLIAM H. YOUNG

I BELIEVE," announced the President of the United States to the Congress assembled on May 25, 1961, "that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth." The delicate and complex question of presidential disability would certainly have been explored on the front pages of the nation's press and in the drawing room of the Vice President had any such pronouncement been made even as recently as 1957. Ambulances with strait jackets would have been rushed to Capitol Hill had such a statement been made by any important statesman prior to 1950. We are now, however, prepared to spend, at the very least, \$10 billion—more than the entire national budget of twenty-five years ago—to achieve this goal.

Behind this announcement, we all now realize, lay the Russian sputnik of October 1957, the civilization-destroying nuclear warheads of the new rockets, the sluggish American economy, the enormous political prestige of

science, the guilt feelings aroused by destruction-oriented scientific activity, the desire of the "new frontiersmen" to find a new frontier equal to their vaulting ambitions, and, perhaps most significant of all, the determination of most national leaders that the American democracy become the scientific leader of the world.

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

With perhaps one major exception—the distribution of the national domain—every other major public effort materially to enrich the lives of the American people has been undertaken only after bitter controversy and at the expense, real or apparent, of the vested interest of a considerable number of people. Increasing the public domain of knowledge of our natural environment and of the techniques by which it can be controlled—for good or ill—threatens no material interest. Viewed from this angle, it may be surprising that government science has been so long in coming rather than that it has grown so rapidly in the last half-

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decade. And, yet, only forty years ago the nation was rocked with controversy over the question of teaching biological science in Tennessee. Material interests are not the sole concern of our people, and, ideologically, we were, until quite recently, unprepared to support the idea that sizable pressure on the frontiers of knowledge is governmental responsibility.

With a combination of hope and misgiving, we have, nevertheless, arrived in 1963 at a position in which more than two-thirds of all the avowed research taking place in our land today is directed and paid for by the government of the United States. The nation is now spending approximately \$12.5 billion a year on this effort. Of course, this is not all going into the moon race. Much of it, perhaps the largest part, is going to perfect our ability completely to destroy life on this planet, but much is going into the fight against cancer, arthritis, heart disease, and into environmental sanitation and better power generators and improved communication with Europe and better weather forecasting and a whole range of life-giving, toil-reducing, and leisure-enhancing efforts.

Knowledge, however, is a peculiar thing. It cannot always be torn from the infinite as coal from a seam, wheedled from the test tube as votes from the voters, threatened with exposure as unorthodox opinions, adjudicated as railroad rates, or ordered to appear on schedule as an army private. Certain and benevolent results cannot be guaranteed from any finite expenditure, statute, or decree. Most of the traditional procedures of the United States government are wholly unsuited to the extraction of knowledge. Only the procedure of dipping the hand into the treasury and giving the money to the scientist seems at all relevant.

Almost no one is entirely satisfied with progress to date. Many are certain that vast sums are being wasted, that projects are selected with one eye on the congressional district to be "helped," that universities are being bribed to forget their students, bury the humanities, and ignore the social studies, and that research not directly associated with the production line is impractical. Others fear the stifling effects of governmental secrecy, the interest-killing forms and reports of the bureaucracy, the quick and unwarranted release of new "break-throughs" to further administrative or political ambitions, the crushing experience of testifying before a congressional committee, and the subservience of all developments to the "necessities" of the Cold War. All of these concerns are real and important and disturb scientists and statesmen. Nevertheless, agricultural production, longevity, the atom bomb, and the Russian spacecraft have already shown what public science can do. Congress has supported and will probably continue to support it. On several occasions, the Congress has, in fact, been more generous than the executive branch. Therefore, we must find ways of mitigating the evil possibilities while facilitating the best hopes.

THE PRESIDENCY

The most striking fact about the presidency of the 1960's is that it is occupied by a Roman Catholic. The well-established usage of American politics that only a Protestant Christian could be elected has thus been discarded. The narrowness of the victory, however, allows speculation to continue as to whether this particular religious affiliation is an asset or a liability. Almost any group—religious, fraternal,

racial, economic, ethnic, or national—that can muster 150,000 members and can show that they all voted for Kennedy can claim to have been decisive in the election of 1960 and can, presumably, claim to have their interests considered in the next election. Several studies of voter behavior, however, suggest that the incumbent's religion probably attracted more voters than were repelled and, therefore, was not detrimental to his aspirations.

The other new feature of presidential politics is the introduction in 1960 of televised debates between the leading candidates under carefully controlled conditions and on time provided free by the networks. One effort of this type cannot be considered a precedent, yet it does point up the necessity that future candidates must televise well. The increased use of this particular medium for campaigning has also tended to place less emphasis on the long, hortatory speech in which a candidate attempted to develop his views about one major aspect of public affairs and to increase the emphasis on slogans, catch phrases, and "personality." It has also made campaigns much more costly. This in itself provides much stimulus to the free debate. The debate system, however, makes any careful development of attitude on a complex issue of public policy impossible. It remains to be seen whether the traditional campaign usage that an incumbent should never share his following with a challenger will also be discarded in view of President Kennedy's promise to debate in 1964.

The fall of Senator McCarthy and the self-denying practice of the Congress with regard to televising investigation hearings have restored a monopoly of television publicity to the presidency. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy sought to use this broadcasting medium much

as Franklin Roosevelt used radio to place themselves and their programs before the American people. While each, by so doing, retained a large popular following, neither successfully pushed Congress very far by this practice.

Despite the setbacks to presidential prestige of the steel-seizure decision of 1952, the McCarthy era of investigations, and the Cuba invasion fiasco, the presidency continues to develop as the major power center of American government along the lines laid out by the Roosevelts, Wilson, and Truman. The present incumbent announced early in his campaign his views of presidential power in a speech before the National Press Club. "The President," he said, "must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office—all that are specified and some that are not."

Eisenhower repeatedly sought to identify Congress with decisions which carried grave risks of military action, such as the crises in the Formosa Straits and in the eastern Mediterranean. The resulting congressional resolutions, however, left wide latitude to the President and were criticized by the Democratic leadership as unnecessary. Kennedy, on his own responsibility, has sent military personnel to Laos and Thailand, blockaded Cuba, and has taken a firm position in Berlin without formal congressional participation—in keeping with the broad view of presidential power. Both Kennedy and Eisenhower intervened with military force in desegregation controversies in the South without congressional approval and without state co-operation. The enormous costs of our present foreign policy have, on the other hand, strengthened the position of Congress in policy-making.

In aiding the President to discharge the awesome and growing responsibili-

ties of this office, the White House staff continues to grow in size and influence and now undoubtedly overshadows the Cabinet as the major co-ordinating device of the executive branch. Eisenhower attempted, largely without success, to re-establish the Cabinet as an organ of collective decision and co-ordination. He even provided it with a secretariat. Little of this effort has proved enduring; in the final analysis, he relied most heavily on his own entourage of assistants and chiefs of staff. Kennedy, too, relies on his own "team," and department heads are probably given less freedom from White House staff direction—some would say interference—than under his predecessor. It has been suggested recently that even the National Security Council, a major Cabinet committee, is less important in decision-making than it used to be.

The importance of the modern research efforts of the national government has led to the expansion of the Executive Office of the President to embrace a new office of Science and Technology through which the President seeks to reconcile ongoing scientific activities with his economic, educational, military, and space-conquering aims.

Another presidential staff mechanism, the Council of Economic Advisors, established in 1946, appears at last to be emerging as the major executive depression-fighting instrumentality envisaged by the sponsors of the Full Employment Act. This appearance may, however, be largely an incident to the conflicting theories of how to deal with economic slowdowns espoused by the Republicans and Democrats. The Eisenhower Administration preferred manipulation of interest and credit through the Federal Reserve Board as a stimulus. The present chief executive

prefers to increase purchasing power by a reduction in national taxes. The leadership of the Council, however, in fashioning the tax-cut policy has dramatized the importance of the President's staff in developing programs of action. Neither the Treasury nor the public works, welfare, labor, or the business agencies have had a comparable role. The present efforts also point up the clear acceptance by the President of the responsibility for the nation's economic health.

Perhaps, as long as foreign affairs and national defense continue to be the predominant concerns of the government in Washington, the President will continue to hold the spotlight in the center of the stage. In these areas, his legal and traditional responsibilities are and have been greater than in most other areas of public concern.

THE CONGRESS

The Congress has not supinely accepted the continued rise of presidential power and prestige and has sought in numerous ways to gain a larger voice in policy formulation and central decision-making. The major device of congressional aggressiveness continues to be the investigation—usually of executive-agency conduct. The television and newsreel cameras no longer carry the drama of the investigation into the homes of America, and headlines are somewhat harder to come by nowadays, but the number and scope of investigating activities has been increasing steadily. The Eighty-seventh Congress (1961–1963), for example, authorized more than \$15 million for these purposes compared with about \$6 million spent in 1951–1952. The Eighty-eighth Congress is likely to continue investigating at about the rate of the Eighty-seventh.

A few of the attention-capturing inquiries have centered on real or alleged problems of our society, such as the costs, profits, and distributing methods of the drug industry. Most, however, have focused on executive-branch policies and procedures—for example, those dealing with the Federal Communications Commission, the conduct of Sherman Adams, Chief of the White House Staff for President Eisenhower, the handling of the Cuban “invasion,” speech censorship and airplane-contract decisions in the Department of Defense. All of these have raised doubts in some minds about the skill, wisdom, or honesty of executive agents, and several have led to some new type of legislation restricting executive-branch behavior. In general, the investigating process has benefited from the storm of criticism aroused against it in the McCarthy era. Most of the investigators are now operating under more carefully assigned mandates. Rules Committee authorization is now required in the House, and more careful attention is being given to standards of fairness for witnesses. The wise decision of the leadership to forbid televising the hearings has eliminated some of the worst features of this activity.

For years, the members of Congress have been urged—mainly by scholars—to tighten up their party apparatus and try to resemble responsible, disciplined, party members somewhat like those in the British House of Commons. The friends of “responsible” party leadership in the legislature appeared to have won a consequential victory in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 with its provisions for party policy committees in the two houses. Since that time, however, little seems to have gone well for this viewpoint; Congress has continued to behave, politically at least, much as it did in the past, with

its members accepting White House, Speaker, or floor-leader direction when, and if, it seemed desirable. The past half-decade has, therefore, witnessed many new efforts in this direction. Some kind of life, for example, has been breathed into the policy committees of the House. The Republicans, who had agreed only in 1949 that there was such a committee, finally gave it some more vigorous leadership in 1959 and even a little working staff. The Democrats, who have steadfastly refused to create such a committee, nevertheless did in 1962 revitalize their old steering committee to “co-operate and consult with the Democratic leadership” on legislation. In both cases, these efforts stemmed from dissatisfaction with the existing leaders which was not strong enough or widely enough held to unseat them. These moves were hailed as giving the rank and file more voice in the development of the party—leaders—attitudes on legislative policy. In the Senate, the Democrats have been forced by similar rumblings to hold party caucuses on legislative matters somewhat more often and to seek somewhat more voice for the dissidents on the policy committees. Meanwhile, the congressional party has stoutly resisted efforts by the national party organization to create policy committees among influential leaders to state policy for the party in nonpresidential years. During Eisenhower’s second term, Democrats tried to develop a policy position for the benefit of the voters as an alternative to White House position announcements; the congressional party members resisted. The Republicans tried the same thing in 1962 and again met strong congressional obstruction.

One other effort to counter presidential leadership and assert the prerogatives of the legislature deserves

mention. A struggle between the Commander-in-Chief and the Armed Services and Appropriations Committee on the character of the defense effort has been going on for several years. On numerous occasions, these committees have proposed and Congress has endorsed spending for more planes or more submarines or some different types of weapons systems than the President has, for various reasons, recommended in his budget. The President has then used his long-asserted power to withhold spending authority from executive agencies to halt some or all of these congressionally endorsed expenditures. The committees have protested vigorously. They have argued about the legality of this conduct and have sought valid procedures for halting it but have never issued a statutory ultimatum. In the most recent test, in 1962, however, the House Armed Services Committee was dissuaded from writing mandatory language into the armed-services procurement bill and thus directly precipitating a constitutional challenge only by a long conference between the President and the chairman in which the President promised in writing to give "full consideration to the views of Congress."

A summary of recent developments in the legislative process must include, finally, a string of negatives. Thus far, the Senate has not agreed to adopt the rules anew at the beginning of each new Congress, and the cloture rule, in consequence, remains about as it was. The power of the Rules Committee has not been weakened appreciably in the House of Representatives; the Committee has, instead, been enlarged from twelve to fifteen members. The size of the House has not been increased despite the most vigorous attempt in thirty years to do so. The seniority system has not been modified, and the

lobby-registration statute has not been clarified.

THE COURTS

If anyone had supposed that the Supreme Court of the United States, having undertaken the most difficult enterprise of its entire history in attempting to halt racial segregation in our public schools, would relax for a spell, he was mistaken. The Court recently decided to take some responsibility for the "fairness" of our state legislative-apportionment systems. In 1962 in *Baker v. Carr* (369 U.S. 186), the Supreme Court decided that federal courts had jurisdiction to determine whether existing schemes of state legislative apportionment were compatible with the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts had previously shied away from the issue of unequal legislative districts in considerable part because of the difficulty of enforcing a decision on a recalcitrant legislature. Accompanied by a sort of veiled threat to force at-large election for all members of the legislature or to draw an equitable district map by some judicial process, the high court ordered the district courts to handle the matter. Within a year of this epoch-making decision, suits against extant apportionment systems had been entered in thirty-six states. The courts have found the district system for one or both houses of the legislature unconstitutional in nineteen states; final decisions are pending in thirty-one states, including some of those where the system for one house has been held invalid. New reapportionment schemes have been passed in fifteen states and are under close consideration in eleven other states. This is really an amazing result considering the sharp break with

tradition represented by the decision and the determined opposition to the Court's efforts in school desegregation.

The determined thrust of the modern Supreme Court into social and political questions of the most complex and delicate kind has, however, invited sharp attack by states' rights advocates. A concerted effort to alter the high court's jurisdiction by placing outside the scope of its appellate authority certain types of cases was narrowly defeated in the Senate in 1958. The Sixteenth General Assembly of the States in 1962 made up of representatives of the state legislatures went on record—in a close vote—in favor of a constitutional amendment which would create a Court of the Union comprised of the fifty chief justices of the highest state courts. This court would have final authority to hear cases involving the reserved powers of the states, and its jurisdiction could be invoked by the legislatures of five states calling for a review of a decision of the Supreme Court.

Apart from the criticism aroused by the modern decisions on racial discrimination and on unequal legislative apportionment, the modern court's doctrine of pre-emption to justify striking down certain state efforts to rid the country of "subversives" has attracted the greatest fire. This doctrine, which awards exclusive jurisdiction over matters on which Congress has validly acted to the national government on the basis of court determination of the necessity for such exclusiveness, has been a sore point in the field of labor relations for many years. Its use in internal-security matters has aggravated the discomfort. Many members of Congress have argued that exclusive federal jurisdiction should be based on unequivocal statutory language indicating that Congress intends to exclude state actions.

Thus far, however, efforts to curb the court have not been successful.

CIVIL RIGHTS

One of the most active domestic policy fronts in American government continues to be that of civil rights. The effort to secure more equal legislative representation by judicial procedure has already been described. Two other major developments of the last half-decade deserve notice: the first is the national effort backed by legislation to increase Negro voting in the South; the second is the addition of freedom of association to the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The first civil rights acts since the Reconstruction era were pushed through the Congress in 1957 and 1960 and were mainly aimed at helping the disfranchised southern Negro. The first authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief in a national court to prevent threatened coercion or intimidation designed to prevent any person from voting for national officials. The second authorized, under carefully circumscribed conditions, the appointment by a national court of a referee who might hear and decide requests from persons who had been forbidden to register to vote in national elections. Both of these enactments have resulted in national intervention in several districts in the South, and some increase in Negro registrants has been achieved. Legal and social resistance to increased Negro participation in elections, however, continues, and the gains thus far have been small. The southern Negroes are pressing energetically on established electoral practices and seeking by every means to force recognition of their demands. For the first time since Reconstruction, a Negro was elected in 1962 to the Georgia legislature.

As an incident to the controversy over

the educational, employment, and property rights of Negroes, several southern states and cities have sought to regulate the militant National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In dealing with cases arising from Alabama and Little Rock, Arkansas, where the association was charged with failure to comply with regulations requiring the submission of membership

lists, the Supreme Court emphatically announced that freedom of association is a right included in the due-process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment (*N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama*, 357 U.S. 449, 1958). Although earlier decisions had foreshadowed the recognition of this cherished freedom, no pronouncement heretofore had been quite so unequivocal.

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ECONOMICS

JOAN ROBINSON. *Economic Philosophy*. Pp. 150. Chicago: Aldine, 1962. \$3.50.

The main purpose of this book is to sort out the mixture of ideology and science in economics, without prejudice to either ingredient. Ideology, defined as a set of metaphysical propositions, which differ from scientific propositions in that they are not capable of being falsified, plays for society the important role of justifying the rules necessary for the operation of an economic system, and performs for economists the indispensable service of giving direction to their inquiries and providing hypotheses on which to practice their professional analytical skills. One direction is given when the ideology is designed to "justify the ways of Mammon to man" (p. 21); quite another direction is given when the ideology purports to show that capitalism is a transient stage in economic history doomed by inherent flaws to ultimate collapse, or that capitalism can be patched up and preserved by measures assuring "full employment," or better still that capitalism can be made to grow and develop indefinitely, carrying with it in its train the hitherto undeveloped regions of the world.

To be sure, the technical features of the operation of an economic system or model can be described in a perfectly objective way, but the type of model selected for analysis among all imaginable models depends, willy-nilly, upon ethical preconceptions "that have soaked into our own view of life and are somehow imprinted on our brains." Mrs. Robinson's "somehow" remains mysterious, and where (p. 14) she admits of "absolutes," they make a startling appearance, looking very much like categorical imperatives. However that may be, the central question remains whether it is possible to separate economics from political economy. Mrs. Robinson argues that it is not possible. Her position is exactly opposite to that of Milton Friedman who supposes that one can formulate a "positive economics," independent, as he puts it, "of any particular ethical position or normative judgments."

Mrs. Robinson's argument is illustrated in a trenchant survey of the literature, impressive in scope. She alludes to philosophers from Mandeville to Popper, and unmasks economists from Adam Smith to Harrod. Adam Smith's concept of value turns out, on her interpretation, to be derived from moral preconceptions and devoid of analytical significance or histori-

cal content. Ricardo's labor-unit as a measure of value, though originally conceived in an ill-fated attempt to do nothing more than serve as an invariable standard for measuring national income and its component parts at different dates, suggested to his followers ideological overtones casting doubts on the moral legitimacy of profits. Karl Marx's law of value, though shown to be empirically false when transformed into a scientific hypothesis, gained all the more force as an ideological dogma simply because it lent itself to reformulation as a scientific, that is, falsifiable, proposition.

The neoclassical utility concept fares no better in Mrs. Robinson's hands. For all its modern refinements, utility remains "a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity" (p. 47). And the neoclassical laissez-faire theory resting on foundations of utility is revealed as an "ideology to end ideologies" (p. 53), for it abolishes the moral problem by portraying the market economy as an impersonal mechanism destined automatically to turn out the best of all possible worlds—maximum utility for society within the bounds of available resources and technology—with nothing for the members of the society to do other than to act egoistically. Then let the Keynesian revolution overthrow neoclassical doctrine, and what are we left with? Again an ideologically motivated model, since "full employment," the central feature of Keynes's model, is so friable that it crumbles at the slightest touch when probed for empirical precision. The thickets of algebra that cover the growth model of Harrod *et al.* deflect attention from the central problems of the motivation of accumulation and of the effects of arbitrary distributions of wealth. Implicitly, these models subscribe to the sacrosanct political slogan that capitalist institutions are the bulwark of liberty.

What are the rules of the game? What basic ideas ought to be regarded as acceptable as a guide to policy—the rules of prevailing beggar-my-neighbor nationalism? the profit-maximizing rules that beg the question of maximum satisfaction for all by identifying market purchasing with

consumption proper? the national-income accounting rules that are vitiated by the same confusion and are biased, in consequence, against public goods and services for the uses of which it is not easy to collect payment? Mrs. Robinson has no final answer. She is perplexed, but her perplexity is not without meaning. It is the perplexity of Hardy's Chorus of the Pities:

Still thus? Still thus?
Ever unconscious!
An automatic sense
Unweeting why or whence?
Be, then, the inevitable, as of old,
Although that SO it be we dare not hold!

Mrs. Robinson does not hold it as inevitable either. She closes with an appeal to economists "to combat, not foster, the ideology which pretends that values which can be measured in terms of money are the only ones that ought to count."

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HANS A. SCHMITT. *The Path to European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market*. Pp. xii, 272. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. \$6.50.

Any author who tries in 250 pages to review the complex events after World War II leading to the Common Market must confine himself to a bare chronology of the events or analyze it from a very particular point of view. Professor Hans Schmitt of Tulane University has chosen the former attack, but at the same time has given special emphasis to the workings of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) down to the formation of the Common Market. Given the numerous articles and books already published on the various aspects of the European union, the reviewer wonders if a superficial chronology makes any contribution to an understanding of the problem.

In the first twelve pages, the author dismisses the various pioneers of European union from the united Christian Europe of the early Middle Ages to Hitler. He

also hastily passes over the early post-World War II international organs such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Brussels Treaty, because he feels that they provided for only intergovernmental action and that their "great lack was effective policy coordination" (p. 38). Professor Schmitt ignores what these earlier organs did in setting the stage for the development of a supranational authority. The OEEC's experience in allocating resources and bringing together bureaucrats of various levels into co-operative arrangements was both successful and an important prelude to later developments.

It is perhaps the very scope of the problem which makes it necessary for the author to make glib conclusions. He rejects, for example, Ernst B. Haas's thesis on the uniting of Europe with one statement: "The political scientist's [Haas] hope that there would emanate from this first experiment an overflow of integrative energy into their other economic sectors was both too narrow and unwarranted" (p. 205). But he never says why or in any way makes an attempt to prove his refutation of Haas. Similarly the book abounds in such meaningless conclusions as: "The results of these provisions [on promoting research] were mixed. Some ventures were surprisingly successful, others were disappointing, still others brought results that were just about on a par with expectations." No further explanation is given.

In order to truncate his study the author is likewise forced to leave out large segments of the story which might have helped him analyze the whys of integration. For example, he quickly passes over the months of working out the detailed provisions of the ECSC and omits entirely the negotiations on the Common Market Agreement. Yet these deliberations more than anything else brought out the problems, the anxieties and the whys concerning European union. The author is at his best when he gives an account of the actual operation of the ECSC. His description is well organized and careful,

and his conclusions are fair. Although his own bias is in the direction of European integration, he is highly critical of the results thus far. These chapters, which really form the heart of the book, are well worth reading. The author should have concentrated his energies on this phase of the study and left the general history to a more detailed and careful analysis.

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R. S. SAYERS (Ed.). *Banking in Western Europe*. Pp. xii, 403. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. \$6.75.

This important book consists of studies of the banking systems of eleven western European countries—France, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain and Portugal—that were written by a number of English and other financial specialists under the direction of Professor R. S. Sayers, of the London School of Economics.

In addition to serving as editor of the volume, Sayers also is responsible for the surveys of the banking structures of Switzerland—in collaboration with W. Linder—and Norway, and is coauthor with Mrs. Sylvia M. Johnson of the chapter on Belgium. The chapter on French banking is the contribution of Professor J. S. G. Wilson, of the University of Leeds, while Mr. R. G. Opie, Fellow of New College, Oxford, discusses banking in West Germany. Mr. G. Clayton, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Liverpool, describes the banking systems of Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal. However, the survey of Italy's banking structure is the contribution of two authors: Mr. L. Ceriani, Director of Studies, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Rome, deals with the "commercial banks and financial institutions," while Mrs. Vera Lutz discusses "the central bank and the system of credit control." Though mainly academicians, the contributing authors are well qualified to describe the financial sys-

tems of the countries with which they deal; they not only have had close "contacts with practical bankers over a long period," but they have carried out most of their research in the countries concerned. Some of them also have been associated with the work of "comparative studies in financial institutions" in the London School of Economics.

In general, "to secure some uniformity of scope," each chapter covers the structure and practices of ordinary commercial banks and other financial institutions providing banking services, the position of the central bank, and the techniques of monetary control, but the methods of treating these subjects vary with the authors. The chapters devoted to France, West Germany, and Italy cover almost half of the book. The space allotted to each of the other countries varies with the complexity and importance of its banking institutions. Thus, Portugal, whose "financial system is at a relatively early stage in its growth in that the banking habit has not developed among all sections of the community," receives sixteen pages, while Switzerland, whose position in the financial world is "out of all proportions" to its size and is "among the leading financial centers of Europe," gets twenty-three pages. Thirty-seven pages are devoted to the Netherlands which has "one of the oldest banking systems in the world" and "a tradition going back at least to the early seventeenth century." The individual contributions are conscientious and of high merit. The volume is excellently edited, and Sayers and his collaborators have performed a most valuable service in providing such a clear, comprehensive and up-to-date work on "banking in Western Europe."

It is therefore with regret that I point out what, in my opinion, at least, is a weakness of the book. As the countries covered range from highly developed to relatively underdeveloped economies that have evolved financial structures and policies appropriate to their needs, their banking systems may have little or no resemblance to one another. It is a great pity that Sayers has not prefaced the

series of studies by a comparative discussion looking at the countries together. Such analysis would have pointed up the differences and similarities among the various banking structures, the nature of governmental controls and regulations, the relationship of commercial banks to the central banks, and the differences in the techniques of monetary controls. This would have tied together and given proper perspective to the discussions in the individual contributions and thereby enriched this valuable book.

Despite this criticism, however, *Banking in Western Europe* is a basic reference work for every financier, industrialist, and economist concerned with western Europe, as well as a first-class text for university courses in comparative banking.

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NAUM JASNY. *Essays on the Soviet Economy*. Pp. xiv, 297. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, for the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1962. \$6.00.

So the Grand Old Enfant Terrible of Sovietology rides again. With all his customary faults, of course: the book is repetitious and ill written, the level of statistical sophistication is very low, and there is no grounding at all in general economic theory. Many obiter dicta imply a belief that there is one and only one correct answer laid up in heaven: as if, for instance, the equally legitimate Paasche and Laspeyres formulae yielded the same answer—which they almost never do. It is very difficult to see exactly how the figures were arrived at. At times, the imagination runs riot: "The introduction of doubtful 'new' commodities, indeed the fabrication of 'new commodities' for the index of industrial production, *may* have depended on the varying urgency of the need for 'improving' the rates of growth. In periods favorable for the Soviets, when the rates of growth were anyway satisfactory, the introduction of new statistical commodities *may* have corresponded fairly closely to the real appearance of new

goods. But when the actual rates of growth were unsatisfactory, models of commodities *must* have been designated 'new' which were not really so, and this *must* have been done on a large scale. . . . Thus by artificially varying the rate of access of 'new' commodities with new 'unchangeable 1926-27 prices' from favorable to unfavorable periods, a certain levelling off of the ups and downs in economic development *was* attained" (pp. 30-31, reviewer's italics). Indeed the whole treatment of industrial production is inferior, and neglects too much of others' recent work.

Moreover, the vendetta against Professor Bergson is pursued, with accusations almost entirely unjustified. Thus, Bergson did not in fact "give Soviet statistics the green light by proclaiming them trustworthy" (p. 23) in the *Journal of Political Economy*, April 1942. He most specifically and several times over confined his endorsement to the wage statistics he was using. Nor did he "fall for the falsification" when the Soviet authorities published postcollectivization crop data "on the root" in direct continuity with previous data "in the barn"—THE ANNALS, May 1949—as Jasny implies (p. 35). He fell, if at all, into a more trivial error: that of supposing harvest wastage—which is what separates the two kinds of estimate—to be constant year by year. This, by the way, is far from implying that your present reviewer is a warm admirer of Bergson's early work. It is merely that those who attack falsification must themselves be like Caesar's wife, and that even scholarly hatchets merit eventual burial.

Yet how can this not be a favorable review? Essay IV is a brilliant and indispensable collection of statistical traps. It amply justifies using the word "falsification" of many Soviet statistical practices, in the Central Statistical Office, let alone at enterprise level, and that not only under Stalin. The difference between Jasny and others is, I think, semantic. Some scholars mean by "they do not falsify" only "they do not invent figures," writing 2 for 4, for example. Jasny calls it "falsification" if current prices are de-

scribed as comparable prices—as in the recent construction index—or harvests on the root are directly compared, without footnote, to harvests in the barn. It is surely clear that he is using the dictionary definition of the word. His opponents are also right in saying you can use Soviet statistics if you know what they actually mean and how they were compiled—a point Jasny would certainly not deny, and which does not exclude "falsification" as the man in the street understands the term.

The profusion of detail and confusion of layout make it a major research effort to read Essay V, on peasant incomes, let alone check it. Suffice it to say that here at any rate is a good beginning to this intricate subject. Those who assume that the results are as shaky as the methodology should remember the fate of Jasny's last hostile reviewer, whose attack on his methods looked fine in the journals, but when the basic results were confirmed who laughed last? Even so, I dare to say that in all his work Jasny much underestimates the harvest of 1940 (cf. pp. 85-87, 106, 134-135), which is no small fault since 1940 is now a base-year for nearly all Soviet statistics. He presents no reason to disbelieve the official claim that 1940 was an excellent harvest year.

Essay VI, on "Perspective Planning," is more instructive and readable. Space precludes our saying here more than that it is the best of the three big essays; Essay VII is a mere addendum, and Essays I to III were published earlier. Essay VI is a hitherto-never-attempted Kremlinology of the Five Year Plans and the senior economic officials—an invaluable contribution to Soviet economic history.

Naum Jasny is the real corrective to a type of modern American economist whom we all know: solely interested in his advanced techniques, never asking whether the data will bear so heavy a superstructure, blind to the personal foibles and political passions which underlie them, making always just those assumptions, however implausible, which will enable him to describe yet further theoretical arabesques upon the thin ice of what he

actually knows. Yet common sense can be combined with technique; moreover rigor and clarity are also virtues, to which our author is frankly a stranger. We are all immensely indebted to this lonely and courageous scholar, but as the bishop said to the actress: "Madam, I accept your intuition, but you must let me find the reasons for it."

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DAVID C. MCCLELLAND. *The Achieving Society*. Pp. xv, 512. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962. \$7.95

Thus far, the problems of economic development have mostly been discussed by economists in terms of per capita income, capital coefficients, and population increase ratios. Professor McClelland undertakes to discuss it in terms of the motive forces which foster economic development. The key concept which he uses in this endeavor is *n Achievement*—need for achievement. His method is empirical testing of hypothesis with quantitative formulation of the results. The strength of man's concern with achievement cannot be inferred from some particular type of behavior; it must be measured. For the purposes of a development theory this must be done in internationally and historically comparable ways. This intention is carried out through three types of research: "the first deals with *group* measures of *n Achievement* and other psychological variables in relation to over-all rates of economic development, the second, with *individual* measures of motives, interests, values and performance of both mothers and their sons in various countries, the third with the motives and other behaviors of actual business entrepreneurs" (p. 57).

The first of these researches was done through content analysis of folk tales and children's readers from various cultures in order to see whether they contained much achievement imagery. The second was designed to trace the origins of *n Achievement* in certain parental values and

attitudes, and the effects of *n Achievement* in adolescent boys on their occupational interests and performance under certain conditions, especially in relation to entrepreneurial behavior. In the third study, business men themselves were tested after they were already established in their careers to see whether they had high *n Achievement*. All this was supplemented by specialized studies on the relationship of ethnicity and social class to *n Achievement* and self-reliance training in the United States, and on the relationship of *n Achievement* and attitudes toward time.

Those societies which are developing economically in a rapid way are referred to as "achieving societies." The hypothesis that *n Achievement* translates itself into economic growth through an entrepreneurial class is tested. It is found that *n Achievement* promotes behavior particularly suited to the entrepreneurial role and that it leads young men to aspire to a business career if they are of a middle- or lower-class background, but not if they are of an upper-class background. Other psychological factors in economic development, such as *n Affiliation*—that is, need for positive affective relationship to other persons—and *n Power* are tested in a comparable way with more negative results, while other-directedness is related to economic development but not to *n Achievement*.

There follows a discussion of the sources of *n Achievement* the most important of which is child-rearing toward self-reliance. This is related to the value systems of various religious groups. Finally, the question is raised how the psychological forces making for economic development can be encouraged through public action in the countries which want to produce fast development. What matters is to increase other-directedness and market morality, and to break resistance to modernization. "The psychologist's priorities are for investments that improve communication, take women out of the home, make use of psychological tests on performance criteria to evaluate executives, and reorient school teachers to a new kind of education that stresses group participation and

achievement" (p. 427). In the last analysis, however, "ideological conversion" of a suitable type is the decisive influence in development.

A brief review cannot do justice to the wealth of comparative materials from many countries, the ingenuity of testing procedures, and the suggestive nature of the analysis in this book. Yet it leaves one with an uneasy feeling. It goes to the author's credit that he himself points repeatedly to the thinness of the empirical materials and the limitations of their conclusiveness. However, many additional questions suggest themselves. In the first place, is Achievement as the basic concept of development theory arouses the suspicion of containing a strong tautological element. What the author is really proving with an enormous, if not always convincing, apparatus of intercultural and historical testing is that no nation ever developed economically which was not very anxious to develop. Moreover, psychological considerations certainly are very important in explaining history, but it is another question whether the experimental designs of contemporary psychology are really applicable to past societies and cultures and whether quantification of folk tales and children's stories makes much sense in such cases. Is it assumed that everything is quantifiable, in the past as in the present, or that things which are not are *eo ipso* unimportant? The application of concepts and measurement methods derived from the contemporary American culture and academic terminology to very different societies of the past and present also raises a serious question whether ethnocentric delusion has always been avoided.

Having said all this, it remains a merit of this book to attempt a systematic analysis of the psychological roots of economic development and to formulate a general development theory in terms of motivational, cultural, economic, political, and artistic independence, a process in which McClelland, in a way, tries to set aright Marx's inverted world. It is for reason of this global view that this book will occupy an important role in the con-

stantly growing literature on economic development for several years to come.

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ROBERT L. HEILBRONER. *The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time*. Pp. 189. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. \$4.00.

In this latest book, Professor Heilbroner turns his attention to the problem of development of underdeveloped countries. In it he demonstrates the literary skill and solid scholarship we have come to expect from him through his earlier books. The result is a highly readable and essentially accurate book, ideal for spurring the "intelligent layman" or the beginning student to further reading in the field. Not that this work is a distillation of the literature; on the contrary, Professor Heilbroner has some telling points of his own which add interest to the volume. The author has little doubt about the importance of development of underdeveloped countries. Indeed he describes the co-operative effort in this field "as the first real act of world history" (p. 17), which "towers over any previous enterprise of man." In his opening chapter he presents five propositions which set the tone for the whole book: economic development is not primarily an economic but a political and social process; the political and social changes required for economic development are apt to be revolutionary in nature; economic development is not a process which breeds social contentment; the Great Ascent is not assured of success; and the price of development is apt to be political and economic authoritarianism.

Heilbroner stresses—in the reviewer's opinion overstates—the problem of social attitudes as a deterrent to change in underdeveloped countries. He is properly appalled at the scarcity of technical, scientific, managerial, and labor skills, and rightly points out that the scale of technical assistance programs is hopelessly inadequate for filling this gap. He makes the point, often presented by the reviewer,

that in many underdeveloped countries future comparative advantage is likely to lie in industry rather than in agriculture. Thus their development presents problems to countries like the United States, where comparative advantage is most clear-cut in the field of agriculture, but where there are articulate vested interests in many fields of industry which may find it difficult to compete in the industrialized world of the future. We point to the collapse of private investment as a means of transferring capital from richer to poorer countries. He suggests that the limits to "crash programs" of foreign aid may be absorptive capacity in the recipient countries rather than the willingness to provide aid in the donor countries. He also makes a point which is too frequently neglected in the literature: that economic development, in the simple sense of raising per capita income, is no guarantee of higher levels of welfare for the masses of the people. He cites Mexico as a case in point; a still better example in Latin America would be Venezuela, with the highest level of per capita income and one of the highest recent rates of economic growth, where, nonetheless, half the population is underfed and levels of literacy, education, public health, and the like are appallingly low. Consequently, he argues, "economic development is not a process which commands the uncomplicated allegiance of our humanitarian impulses" (p. 167).

While foreign-aid policy is no simple affair, Professor Heilbroner has no doubt that aid must be continued. Curtailment of aid, he says, "would make things incalculably worse for the West" (p. 170). He shares with the reviewer a preference for multilateral over bilateral aid and recognizes that it is not a question of "either/or," but one of expanding the United Nations program while continuing the United States program at least on its present scale. He closes on the very important point that success of Western policy in underdeveloped countries is not a matter of international programs for stabilization and development alone. Even more important is that Western nations

"regain their historic identification with freedom." For this purpose, events at home are at least as important as events abroad. "Thus," he says, "the price of leadership in world economic development comes home to us as a domestic political challenge—perhaps in the end as the supreme domestic political challenge" (p. 182).

There are minor inaccuracies in the volume. I do not believe that the expression "profound torpor" is an accurate description of what was occurring in underdeveloped countries "until recent decades." Most of these societies had their own internal dynamics. Heilbroner seems to accept the Prebisch thesis regarding terms of trade. This theory has by now been largely discredited, and Professor Heilbroner seems to confuse deteriorating terms of trade with instability of export markets and unfavorable long-run trends resulting from changes in taste and technology. The author is unnecessarily pessimistic about the possibility of allocating foreign aid according to the gaps between absorptive capacity and a maximum domestic effort and providing technical assistance to raise both absorptive capacity and maximum domestic effort where large-scale capital assistance cannot yet be effectively used. However, these flaws are unimportant in comparison to the high qualities of the book, and the volume is a welcome addition to the literature in the field.

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RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH. *The National Wealth of the United States in the Postwar Period*. Pp. xxix, 434. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. \$12.50.

This valuable work presents estimates of the stock of tangible assets of different types in the main sectors of the economy during the years 1945–1948, which continue similar series published in the author's "A Study of Saving in the United States." The tables are carefully annotated, and while the short text stresses the methodological and statistical limita-

tions of the statistics, no economist could fail to appreciate the years of painstaking research required to produce a first set of detailed balance sheets for the nation. Eventually the estimation of the national wealth will come into the province of some large organization of specialists in economic statistics, but until such time, the Goldsmith series will be used extensively in quantitative studies of economic growth and change.

The estimates for reproducible tangible wealth were derived by the "perpetual inventory" method, which cumulates the gross expenditures for each type of asset over a number of years equal to the assumed length of useful life. The expected useful life of durable goods compiled from various sources, including the Internal Revenue Service, varied from around 5 years—aircraft, motor vehicles used by producers, cutlery and hand tools, ophthalmic products, books and maps—to 28 years for railroad equipment and 30 years for ships, boats, and electrical machinery. The assumed average life of various types of structures varied from 40 to 80 years. The cumulated gross expenditures adjusted for depreciation and deflated by appropriate price indexes provided the estimates of net capital stock at constant cost—with 1947–1949 as base—and at replacement cost. No standard procedure could be used to determine the approximate value of nonreproducible tangible wealth. The value placed on land, forests, and subsoil assets depended on skillful use of fragmentary and inadequate information, and it is here that future investigations will probably make the most significant revisions in the estimates.

In a chapter on the reliability of the estimates, the measurements from the perpetual inventory method are compared with the corresponding totals for certain assets based on such sources as the Censuses of Housing and Government and the publications of the Internal Revenue Service. The comparisons with benchmark calculations indicate that estimation method yields aggregates of the correct order of magnitude and that the magnitude of the differences varies with the procedures used in determining the benchmarks. These

results tend to assure the analyst that the data can serve the purposes of quantitative studies. As the statistical tables include the expenditure data and the price indexes in addition to the estimates of wealth, this volume offers a mine of material already compiled for the scholar.

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National Bureau of Economic Research.
Aspects of Labor Economics. Pp. xi, 349. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. \$7.50.

This volume consists of the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. The contents are a miscellany of studies; consequently, there is unity neither of theme nor of subject matter. The scope of the deliberations and commentaries is indicated by the several papers: "The Economics of Occupational Licensing," by Simon Rottenberg; "Method and Substance in Theorizing About Worker Protest," by Abraham J. Siegel; "Labor Force Participation of Married Women," by Joseph Mincer; "A Nonunion Market for White Collar Labor," by George P. Shultz; "Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain," by Armen A. Alchian and Reuben A. Kessel; "The Economics of American Negro Slavery," by Robert Evans, Jr.; "Wage Structure Theory and Measurement," by Melvin W. Reder; and "The Effects of Unions on Industrial Wage Differentials," by H. Gregg Lewis.

Occupational licensing is presented as an old protective device supported by a persuasive rationale. The intricate pattern of causes and effects of labor unrest is woven around the central concept in the minds of workers as to *what is*, in contrast to *what ought to be*. To the Marxian and Veblenian analyses Rottenberg adds his own. The study of married women's participation in the labor force breaks little new ground, but presents clearly the causes and the consequences. Examination of the nonunion market for white-collar labor is confined to banks and insurance companies in Boston, but Shultz plans a much more

comprehensive inquiry. In a predominantly nonunion labor market, competitive forces obviously have considerable significance.

Central in the discussion of competition, monopoly, and pursuit of pecuniary gain is the effect of the search for maximization of utility upon consistency of choice. The importance of psychic-economic factors is perceptively recognized in this analysis.

The study of the economics of American slavery from 1830 to 1860 is a comparative analysis of rates of return on slave capital and other forms of investment. The slave system is clearly portrayed here as a viable economy. The analysis of wage differentials and measurement reveals the influence of changing tastes, techniques, and resources upon the short-run and long-run effects of competitive forces. One gathers that disequilibrium rather than static equilibrium prevails in both situations.

The interest of economists and laymen in the impact of unionism upon wages, efficiency, costs, profits, and gross national product is perennial. In this paper, competitive capability in domestic and international markets is clearly identified with union behavior, policies, and practices. Unionism as a cause in wage dispersion among industries appears to be less significant than other conditions and factors.

A conference of economists under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research always yields rich additions to economic knowledge and research techniques. The conference reported here is no exception.

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SOCIOLOGY

The Eighth Art: Twenty-three Views of Television Today. Pp. xiv, 269. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962. \$5.00.

This volume publishes "twenty-three views of television today" commissioned

by the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for a planned quarterly of opinion. When the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences began *TV Quarterly* in 1961, the project appeared redundant. The titular editor, the superlative television critic and writer-producer, Robert Lewis Shayon, seems to have experienced some difficulty in performing his role as introducer, as the articles constitute in his judgment neither an anthology nor a "symposium, aspiring to be an organized or comprehensive collection of opinion on the subject of television. They are an authoritative miscellany of information, inside revelation, technique analysis, reportage, evaluation, and opinion"—a mixed bag, indeed. Nor should Mr. Shayon be blamed for the pretentious title: why not, with equal justification, "The Eighth Wonder of the World," or perhaps, "The Eighth Capital Sin"? Nor is the book-jacket blurb—"like the medium it dissects, entertaining, eye-opening, and endlessly exciting"—any more helpful in describing either the medium or the book.

Perhaps it is graceless to be severe on the remains of so nobly conceived an enterprise, for should we not encourage a commercial network when it "disinterestedly" provides a format for criticism of itself? We should, but only if we are fully aware that such generous gestures are seriously affected by their conception as public-relations gestures. Like the Ben Shahn brochures sent to mailing lists of "opinion leaders" on the eve of important telecasts, the form of the announcements is usually better than the content of the programs. Similarly, I have found to my growing consternation that the hundreds of copies of Joseph Klapper's excellent *The Effects of Mass Communication* distributed gratis by CBS are either unread or used chiefly as an "intellectually respectable" way of countering serious criticism of the medium by invoking Klapper's meticulously responsible exegesis of multiple causation. Still, the CBS tradition of honest thought, started long ago by its social psychologist, Ph.D. president, is too important to dismiss because it can be abused. In fact, even the weaknesses of this book are so

symptomatic of the parochial ideology of television's creators that a careful consideration of it should be a prolegomenon to any future metaphysics of the medium.

Cawston's "Television—A World Picture" immediately destroys the provincial American notion that our system of broadcasting is the way God had it planned on His Drawing Board. It might also make us worry about the ultimate effects of our entertainment programming exports in underdeveloped areas that cannot afford to be as frivolous as we think we can. Rosten's reworking of his *Daedalus* piece on why not to expect too much from the audience clears the air in a useful way; one wishes he would now finally move on to use his lucid intelligence on the medium of television, in the way that he has, for example, brilliantly developed a new style of art criticism for *Look*.

Stravinsky's comments ought to be required reading for Leonard Bernstein: "Other than the possible development of a new musico-dramatic form, musical life on television does not interest me. A televised concert is a bore. One sees the timpani and the trombone and the oboe individually as these instruments are played. One watches the players breathe and moisten their embouchures. But seeing a musician play, in this way, distracts from listening to the whole ensemble." And CBS ought to ask itself why it stretched Stravinsky's half-hour composition, "Noah and the Flood," into an hour-long "saleable" musical disaster. And A. E. Hotchner's embarrassingly "inside Hemingway" piece on adaptations makes one, reluctantly, prefer originals—even if from the film factories of Warner Brothers.

Walter Cronkite's anecdote about the live cameras covering Gromyko's "dramatic exit" from the Japanese Peace Treaty Meetings in 1951—into the men's room—should end for a time the esthetically vacuous myths of live television as the truth and reality medium. Its vaunted coverage of history in the making—coronations, Olympics, presidential debates, space shoots—is not helping the people understand events. It is turning the world's changes into spectacles. What television needs, and what these articles signally fail

to provide, is systematic analysis of the unfinished business of the country and an equally detailed examination of television's formal qualities to facilitate our meeting this agenda. Lawrence Laurent's analysis of what a television critic needs to know and do is a good example of the former; Gilbert Seldes' tantalizingly undeveloped sketch of how television first tried to create its own esthetic is a beginning of the latter. What we definitely do not need more of is the free-floating moral anxiety represented by Mannes, Hadas, Siepmann, and Montagu. Let the head-wingers address themselves to a specific problem of content or a specific question of form. Big Thinking leads nowhere—but to an unearned sense of moral superiority on the part of the critics. Revere's excellent piece on "Television in Courts and Legislatures" also reminds us that sensible policy talk on the medium need not come from paid box-watchers at all. The most ironic omission is an almost total lack of discussion of the commercial dilemmas of the medium. Culture, after all, is safer. That is basically the misgiving with which this reviewer began.

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FRIEDRICH FÜRSTENBERG. *Das Aufstiegsproblem in der modernen Gesellschaft*. Pp. viii, 179. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1962. DM 27.50.

The impact of this study is somewhat reduced by its very conciseness, above all, by its scarcity of illustrations. The reason may be the author's drive to develop a conceptual scheme—rather than a theory, although this is not a distinction he makes—designed to map out considerations and conceptualizations that are required if we would do justice to the topic, the problem of upward social mobility in modern society; it invites us to appreciate relevant circumstances and thus to avoid misconceptions. The study of the topic is important because it leads to the "central problems of social structure" (p. 151), such as the question of the "possibility of a reciprocal adaptation of the structure of conscious-

ness and the structure of social relations" (p. 163). For Fürstenberg, sociology has the classical task of enlightening men about the actual nature of society; it must avoid two dangerous tendencies that have characterized it for some time: on the one hand, to undertake "point-like 'snapshots' and global 'cross-sectional analyses' of social phenomena which for the purpose of measurability are reduced to a few variables," and, on the other, to indulge in "culture-critical aphorisms" (p. v). In an effort to steer clear of both—or, as he misleadingly says, to "supplement" them—Fürstenberg tries to do "exact and detailed research which is oriented, however, toward problems of society as a whole" and catches structure and function—a structural-functional approach is taken for granted—"of the topic of investigation—in this case, the phenomenon of upward social mobility—in all relevant social spheres, and thus in its complexity."

The author proceeds in eight chapters, followed by a recapitulation, and, in my judgment, he succeeds to an impressive degree. The objective study of upward social mobility has been handicapped both by its Marxian reduction to a class phenomenon and by liberal apologetics of inequality. The increasing objectification of research reflects the increasing differentiation of society. The analysis of the "consciousness of upward social mobility and of factors influencing it" (p. 12) is followed by analyses of mobility process—initial social position, social distance traversed, indices of mobility achieved, social sector or group in which it takes place; of subjective expectations and motives, objective claims on the mobile individual, and criteria of selection; of social determinants of the chances of upward mobility—relative to personality, to the relevant social system, and to society at large; and of social consequences of upward mobility—consequences for the structure of roles in the social field in which the mobility takes place, for individual behavior, and for the larger social structure. These analyses are then "tested" in—or more nearly, applied to—upward mobility in large industrial organizations, with particular emphasis on differences and

tensions between various rational and extrarational aspects. The last chapter, "Reality and Consciousness of Upward Social Mobility," deals with ideologies concerning the phenomenon and the possibility of their removal. Causes of "ideologization" are the tension between hope and fulfillment and the desire to legitimate the results of mobility processes. In connection with all of these analyses, the author refers to and often examines relevant literature in several languages.

Within the space of this review, it is impossible to do justice to the important insights or the important theoretical questions attendant on the book, or to consider linguistic phenomena, such as international sociologese—or, finally, to analyze the ideological elements of a study which is unusually sensitive to ideology. Instead, I recommend translation; but the author would probably increase the clarity or visibility of his enterprise by expanding it in the sense alluded to in the first sentence above.

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ROY LUBOVE. *The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1890-1917*. Pp. xviii, 284. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963. \$6.00.

Professor Lubove's book is subtitled "Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1890-1917," and viewed in these terms it is an admirable job. There is much to commend his initial hypothesis, that an intensive examination of the development of social problems in a particular area and of the efforts to cope with them in this limited context can be of great benefit in the analysis of these problems in a wider arena. In this case, Professor Lubove has chosen to concentrate his attention on the rise of the tenement in New York City, on the methods chosen there to cope with the problem, and on the men who led the reform movement in the Progressive era. In two initial chapters he traces the spread of the tenement in Manhattan as

the immigrant population moved further up the island, the origins of the notorious "dumbbell tenement" as a prize-winning plan for tenement construction, and the formation of the Association for the Improvement of the Conditions of the Poor and the Council of Hygiene as two early efforts to cope with the problems which beset the burgeoning urban community and which soon found the tenements absorbing much of their attention. We see that very early tenement reform was molded by the environmental determinism which permeated much of the early thinking on urban social problems and which suggested that housing was a prime factor in character development.

Lubove views the publication in 1890 of *How the Other Half Lives* by Jacob Riis as awakening the city as never before to the burgeoning slums. Riis stressed restrictive legislation, the development of model tenements, and the Octavia Hill principle of "friendly and enlightened rent collection." He traces the efforts to deal with the tenement slum by these and similar means through the Tenement House Committee of 1894 and the Tenement House Commission of 1900 and comes at last to the man and the approach which was, in Lubove's view, of greatest significance in early tenement reform in New York. The man was Lawrence Veiller, and the approach was the development of restrictive housing legislation, in the form of housing codes, coupled with adequate enforcement machinery and eternal vigilance against the special-interest groups which continually threatened to undermine both the laws and their enforcement. Veiller had little use for the notion of model tenements, but concentrated on leading a brilliant campaign to obtain restrictive legislation which would guarantee that tenements would meet minimum standards, though he was careful to recognize the right of the real estate interests to a fair return.

Finally, Lubove attempts in his final chapters to indicate the relationship between New York tenement reform and the social-work and city-planning movements, because the slum tenement was one of the

first concerns of these social reform movements. In many ways this is the most unsatisfactory part of the book, because it tries to do more than can be accomplished in so short a space. It tends, further, to blur the focus of the work, which deals primarily—and admirably—with one aspect of the slum, the tenement. The book considers attendant problems, such as medical care, crime, recreation, and education, only fitfully. Clearly these problems are involved in the analysis of the relationship of social work and city planning to the slum. One is tempted, therefore, to say that Mr. Lubove has done too little and too much. The last two chapters open up many areas which make the reader long for fuller treatment of these matters in the earlier chapters, but this treatment would not have served Professor Lubove's purpose, which was to view tenement reform in New York as something of a case study in social reform. As such, it will be of interest to all social scientists, as well as public health officials, legislators, and many others.

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ROBERT A. WOODS and ALBERT J. KENNEDY. *The Zone of Emergence*. Edited by Sam Warner, Jr. Pp. 183. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, for the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1962. \$4.00.

At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the old cities of the United States were undergoing rapid change. Increasing industrialization, recurring waves of immigrants, rapid growth in total population, and the coalescence of the urban center with what had once been independent outlying towns and villages were profoundly altering the character of urban life in America. To many thoughtful persons, the changes taking place were disturbing. Life in the city was losing much of the character attributed to life in the small, homogeneous

community. In the process, social problems seen as unique to the city were coming to the fore. Poverty, slums, crime, and the difficulties of immigrant assimilation received increasing emphasis both in novels and in scholarly studies. At the same time, the settlement-house movement developed as one way of combating these problems.

One of the best known of the settlements was the South End House in Boston. Here, between 1898 and 1922, a major series of studies on the city slum and immigrant adjustment was published. The manuscript of *The Zone of Emergence* was completed between 1907 and 1914 but, for a variety of reasons, has only now been edited and published in an abridged version. Its authors are several former members of the staff of the South End House who set out to study the districts of Boston then emerging from slum conditions, those between the inner core and the outer suburbs. In the process these authors have produced a fascinating statement of the way of life of the working-class areas of Boston in the early part of the century. External conditions had improved over those of the slum areas, but the result was not the expected improvement in intelligent community participation. Rather, community life had diminished, and personal satisfactions had declined. This was a conclusion which threatened the very premises on which the settlement programs operated, and it led the authors to a number of confusions, as well as to judgments about what should be done to effect solutions which we would consider moralizing today.

As social history this is one of the rare accounts of working-class life. It is equally valuable as a description of community structure in a period of change. The authors place emphasis on two factors as of greatest consequence in determining the character of the local area: transportation and the pattern of industrial development. Changes in the latter become possible as new transportation forms develop. Different types of industries have differing labor requirements, which do much to change the nature of the local

working population and, through this, the character of the area itself. Moreover, these changes create shifting, mobile populations which lack consensus and the solidarity necessary, in the authors' view, for organized community life. The breakdown of family life and delinquent behavior follow. Thus, the new working class is overwhelmed not by poverty but by monotony, apathy, and *anomie*.

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SCOTT GREER. *The Emerging City: Myth and Reality*. Pp. v, 232. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. \$5.75.

This book is a deliberate attempt to reformulate current perspectives on the city. The argument begins with a blanket indictment of the current state of theory about the city, good political as well as polemical strategy. The tail of the ecological beast is twisted. Blind men describe the organizational elephant—economists who see only its location, markets, or organization as a complex of firms; political scientists who see it as a struggle of interest groups or an administrative organization without politics; and sociologists who see it only in its mass characteristics as a spatially defined segment of the total society. These blind men have created an intellectual crisis where images of the city are partial and based upon assumptions about the total society which "are unexamined and frequently outmoded." What is more, they are not "empirically relevant." Let us put away the intellectual blind men!

The panacea is a "reformulation of the urban image. . . . Such a reinterpretation must have a wider scope, a more specific empirical reference, and a greater theoretical integrity than those discussed" (p. 27). In short, like all good sociological theory, it must be the author's theory. And, what must it do? "It must emphasize the study of the urban complex as a structure, but a structure intimately related to the nature of the carrying society. . . . The approach must yield an

empirically relevant image, one that can be tested at many points. It must be based upon the data available, particularly those data free from the limitations of sampling bias and uncontrolled inference. . . . Finally, it must be guided by a concern for theoretical integrity" (pp. 27-28).

A major shortcoming of this book is that it is not about *the* emerging city. What Greer does is to bring together writings of his own and of others and weave them together in a running, often perceptive commentary. The latter writings are divided into two types of popular heroes. Those he likes, the good ones, are drawn together to show that we have an "embarrassment of freedom" and Janowitz's "community of limited liability" in the local area. Those he does not like, the bad ones, like the community decision-making studies, are drawn together to show that they do not provide an understanding of the municipality. The polity, he argues, is not a pyramidal structure, but a pluralistic world of corporate citizens contending for power. Furthermore, the studies are bad because for Greer, as for Janowitz, they misstate the issue. The issue is not the manipulation of the citizenry by a small elite but the inability of elites to create conditions for democratic consensus. Clearly this is a book which shows the author's concern not so much with the intellectual quality of the theory and empirical research as with a concern over its relevance for what he calls the moral crisis stemming from the Great Social Change which bedevils American local government. The corporate city is obsolete.

In the end, he would have us cast down our brazen images of the city, including that concept of local government as a democratic polity, and fall, unfortunately, before the ecologists' mammon. The structure of the American city as we know it will probably end as a consequence of the increase in scale resulting from population density. "The process of increase in scale, nurtured in cities and once thought of as unique to them, will have so transformed the society as to eliminate any need for urban centers" (p. 206). But, be ye

comforted: "For the average man, the contemporary metropolis is a vast improvement over his share of the older city" (p. 208). *La dolce vita!*

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T. R. BATTEN. *Training for Community Development: A Critical Study of Methods*. Pp. viii, 192. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. \$3.60.

The title of this book might seem to indicate that it will be of interest only to those who are interested in what has come to be called "Community Development" as a method of involving the village people of newly developed countries in their own and their countries' development. It will be of primary interest to such persons, but it will be of great interest to all persons who are interested in group methods of training, or, indeed, in group methods in and of themselves. It is, in fact, a report of twelve years of laboratory experiences, and experiments, of a person and his colleagues who have for two decades or more had experiences in preparing personnel to staff action programs in newly developing countries. Mr. Batten not only has participated in Great Britain's colonial development programs, but has taken occasion to study a goodly number of other community development programs.

The experiences reported on in this book are those of the University of London's Institute of Education in training paid personnel for work in community development programs in what has come to be called "newly developing countries"—which paid personnel must in turn train thousands of volunteer personnel. The elaborate experiences of the British colonial office in Africa and the West Indies, plus the additional accumulating experiences of other countries, has pretty well demonstrated that academic training in technical assistance or administration, or in these two combined, does not prepare

field workers to deal effectively with the problem of securing the willing and enthusiastic, and necessary, co-operation of local community or village people, that the need is for training in "Social Skills." The value of this book is in its significant contribution to this task. The reason the contribution is significant is that the laboratory out of which the accumulated experience of twelve years came is not artificial. The trainees are field workers and their supervisors, each of whom contributes what he has learned in trying to do a practical job.

The contribution of this book, however, goes beyond the type and content of the Institute Course of the University of London. The author has meticulously studied the training programs of other countries, visited a number of other developing countries, interviewed those in charge of training in these countries, observed their methods, and assessed their results. The author, therefore, makes one of the few major contributions to the whole area of community development methods. His more than ten pages of detailed references to materials used in preparation of the thirteen chapters of the book and his excellent index will be valuable to those interested in learning more about the rapidly expanding field of community development programs and methods of newly developing countries. Part Three of the book, which deals with the training institute at the University of London, will be of primary interest to those interested in a report of twelve years of laboratory experiences in group-training methods.

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STANLEY H. KING. *Perceptions of Illness and Medical Practice*. Pp. 405. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962. \$6.00.

This is the latest in a series of books sponsored and published over the past ten years by the Russell Sage Foundation and concerned with the application of social science concepts and knowledge to the

work of medical and paramedical professions. Writing for students and practitioners in medicine, public health, nursing, and social work, Dr. King has ably summarized and synthesized an impressive amount of recent social science research and has organized his materials within a format that should enhance their interest for his intended audience, as well as for the general reader.

The book opens with the development of a conceptual scheme based on the idea of perception and its psychological and sociocultural determinants. This scheme is then applied as a framework for the descriptive-analytical discussions that make up the remainder of the book. Three broad topic areas are treated: belief systems and attitudes about health and disease; role relationships and role expectations of those who treat disease and those who are treated; and the influences of hospital culture and hospital social structure on both patients and staff. Dr. King has used lively examples and illustrations drawn from a wide range of research sources, and he has consistently—and in the main successfully—attempted to show the implications of social science research for practical problems of the health professions. An excellent index and numerous notes elaborate the text and point the interested reader toward more detailed sources.

Recently there has been a rapid convergence of interest between the social sciences and the health professions, accompanied by a growing conviction that the sociocultural aspects of health, its maintenance and restoration, must be understood and taken into account along with the more familiar biological and psychological factors, if medicine is to attain maximum effectiveness. The significance of this convergence for members of the health professions is the theme that Dr. King skillfully develops and illuminates. Some years ago, the late Clyde Kluckhohn gave his prize-winning review of anthropology the title, *Mirror for Man*. It may be that Dr. King's book may also function for many physicians, nurses, and social workers as a mirror in which they may

see themselves, their patients and clients, and their work in a new and revealing light.

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MARGARET KEENEY ROSENHEIM (Ed.).
Justice for the Child: The Juvenile Court in Transition. Pp. xiv, 240. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. \$6.95.

This volume on the juvenile court movement is the product, appropriately enough, of the fiftieth anniversary year of the School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago: both the school and the first juvenile court in the United States were generated largely by the same leadership. It is a timely work, too, for, as authors remark at the start and at the close of the volume, the court appears recently to have entered upon a new phase in its evolution. The ten contributors reflect the somewhat diverging views among lawyers, judges, and social work authorities who are concerned with the movement, but they display a considerable consensus on the issues that are paramount today.

A deep disparity of opinion is exemplified in Judge Alexander's plea for "a fair trial for the juvenile court," defined in terms of benevolent paternalism *cum* case work, and Judge Ketcham's admonition that the state play fair with the child and his parents. The former supports what he describes as the child's "supraconstitutional rights," the application of the social sciences and, most of all, benevolent personal contact. "Justice" is pictured as "stark," "naked," and "punitive." While he finds that an incredible number of so-called juvenile courts have never become "true juvenile courts" because of their deficiencies in vital resources, he nevertheless decries the present "expansionist movement" in the application of constitutional protections. Legal counsel, for example, is conceived as unnecessary to represent the "99 per cent" who freely admit

their guilt. The "legal bull" in the juvenile court "china shop" may tend to discourage a child from "making a clean breast of it," and this is unfortunate because "confession is a primary requisite" to the effectiveness of the dedicated and therapeutic judge.

Judge Ketcham, in a more critical piece, suggests that state control as a substitute for parental control may well be considered a compact under which, lacking state performance of its obligation to enhance the child's welfare, "the juvenile and his parent should have a right to consider the agreement broken and insist upon their constitutional rights." He finds fundamental deficiencies on the part of the state in fulfilling the promises inherent in the *parens patriae* doctrine to (1) prevent criminal stigma from attaching to the child, (2) provide prompt and fair hearings, (3) strengthen family ties and remove the child from his home only when this is essential, (4) provide treatment approximating that which he should receive from his natural parents and (5) minimize the deleterious effects of imprisonment where the child must be deprived of his liberty. Judge Ketcham's candor is refreshing.

Commissioner Elson, in his article on "Juvenile Courts and Due Process," argues that the provision of procedural due process and the reintroduction of an adversary procedure to determine the fact of delinquency are not only compatible with the underlying protective philosophy of the court, but are needed to strengthen the position of the child before the court. He argues cogently for a series of principal safeguards that should be incorporated into juvenile court statutes, including, *inter alia*, the restriction of detention, a right against double jeopardy, a right to counsel, the separation of fact determination from treatment decision, tightened rules of evidence, and a right to appeal (pp. 100-101).

Elliot Studt's contribution, "The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court," is one of the most fresh and suggestive analyses of social psychological problems inhering in juvenile court operations that this reviewer has encountered. She centers her

discussion on three images of the court that are observed with disturbing frequency among juvenile court clients, images which appear to be associated with the structure and organization of the court, and that are commonly damaging in effect: "The first is an image of a confused and confusing organization, in which it is difficult to know what to expect from whom. A second image, held chiefly by elder teenagers, is that of a naive and unrealistic organization. The tone associated with this image is a mixture of boredom, impatience, and contempt; it stems from the feeling of the older adolescents that to be dealt with as a 'child' is both foolish and degrading. A third image, found among parents, is that the juvenile court, as 'parens patriae,' usurps all parental rights and responsibilities, leaving the parents bereft and helpless" (p. 202). Her perceptive analysis should be of special interest to students of behavioral science who have been tempted by the seductive rationale of *parens patriae*.

It is impossible in a brief space here adequately to review the scope of this compact but comprehensive and generally perspicacious volume. It begins with a fine survey, by the editor, of the juvenile court movement and the major issues it has engendered and concludes with an excellent analysis of the relationships of the court to the community and its non-judicial agencies by Alfred J. Kahn. There are chapters on court jurisdictional problems by Monrad Paulsen, on dispositions by Howard Fradkin, and on administrative approaches to child welfare problems. The volume was skillfully edited. It should be more valuable to scholars and practitioners than the majority of publications on children's courts.

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HAYNES JOHNSON. *Dusk at the Mountain: The Negro, the Nation, and the Capital—A Report on Problems and Progress*. Pp. 273. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1963. \$4.50.

A Washington newsman has written a book about the position of the Negro in the District of Columbia. He depicts the manner in which the colored majority of the nation's capital are kept as "second class citizens" at a time when the law accords them full status. As such, it is, among other things, an interesting essay in the discrepancy between the aspiration that is embodied in legislation and the judge-made law of the Constitution and the unhappy reality of a caste system. This is not a pretty picture, and one of the merits of Mr. Johnson's human-interest presentation is that he does not try to paint over the warts. Neither does he overdramatize. His account is a restrained chronicle, well-written and graphically presented. The result is that *Dusk on the Mountain* is recommended to those who wish to understand, as well as to have opinions about, this most troublous domestic question.

It is manifest that the great majority of white Americans have no desire to accept the person of color into the mainstream of white social relations. A similar conclusion must be drawn for employment relations. The evidence thus far available does, of course, reveal some recent betterment of these conditions. From slavery to formal legal equality in a hundred years does represent some progress, although it is heartbreakingly slow. The unanswered question of the day is the extent to which this record of improvement will be continued and accelerated. To this question, Mr. Johnson's book provides little to indicate an affirmative answer. The jury is still out on the question of the ultimate position of the Negro in American society. But what does seem to be clear, even now, is this: the question is of such magnitude and importance that it will be at the center of political attention for decades.

Midway in the book a Negro newspaperman is quoted as saying: "It's an exciting thing to be a Negro today. We're on the move, we're in the ascendancy. We've got a future." I agree that the Negro does indeed have "a future." But what Mr. Johnson makes so clear is that

the white person, generally, has not accepted that idea.

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GEORGE W. BAKER and DWIGHT W. CHAPMAN (Eds.). *Man and Society in Disaster*. Pp. xiii, 442. New York: Basic Books, 1962. \$10.00.

Seventeen practicing researchers in the area of disaster study have written fourteen original contributions in their areas of specialty. In general they have addressed themselves to social science issues and eschewed the practical concerns of military, civil defense, and other disaster-oriented occupations. Most of the contributors either worked with the Committee on Disaster Study of the National Research Council or were stimulated by the Committee to undertake research. While it is impossible in one volume to provide an adequate substantive overview of the entire field of human behavior in disaster situations, this effort does provide a representative benchmark of the relevant contemporary social science literature.

The volume is organized around four broad areas: the behavior of individuals in disaster, the behavior of social units in disaster, the methodology, and the theory of disaster study. Ignoring traditional academic boundaries, both sociologists and psychologists have contributed to all major sections of the book. Moreover, almost all of the authors who wrote substantive chapters also addressed themselves to the pertinent theoretical and methodological problems in their special areas.

For example, in an important essay dealing with reaction to uncertain threat, S. B. Withey evaluates a number of alternative formulations dealing with phases of threat awareness, and derives one of his own. I. L. Janis—though concerned with a wider range of disasters—is also concerned with a similar problem in his essay dealing with effects of warning. In a provocative chapter dealing with dimensions of models used in disaster research, Chapman, by considering both Wolfen-

stein's and Withey's models, demonstrates how to evaluate the adequacy of disaster-research schemes. It is unfortunate that he analyzed only two cases. Guetzkow suggests that disaster theory and research may be improved if disaster researchers work in tandem with those engaged in studying noncrisis situations.

Most of the remaining chapters attempt to place rather than review the significant literature within broad schemes. Thus A. H. Barton considers a wide range of emergency social systems for cues to increase their output and effectiveness, while J. D. Thompson and R. W. Hawkes attempt to discern a theory of how disaster organizations pass through a cycle of relations before achieving operational synthesis. Similar approaches are evident in chapters dealing with the family and the aged in disaster situations.

Lamentably, the contributors did not become acquainted with each other's work, for questions raised in one section were at least partially answered in another. Fortunately, the issues raised are clear, and the reader can follow the collective contributions of all the social sciences in this important field.

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ALBERT D. BIDERMAN. *March to Calumny: The Story of American POW's in the Korean War*. Pp. 326. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. \$5.95.

Shortly after the bulk of the United Nations prisoners were taken by the Communists, evidence came to light of brutal callous treatment of these prisoners of war (POW's), wholesale exploitation of them for political propaganda purposes, and systematic attempts to indoctrinate them with the Communist philosophy. We protested the atrocities officially before the United Nations and attempted to find an explanation for seeming collaborative behavior on the part of the POW's in alleged Communist brainwashing or physical mistreatment. The fear that the men had been indoctrinated culminated in care-

ful intelligence and psychiatric interviews of each repatriate at the 1953 prisoner exchanges, with the resulting conclusion that this phase of Communist operations had been almost completely unsuccessful.

In 1956 and 1957 two accounts purporting to reflect official army views were published and disseminated by an army psychiatrist, Major William Mayer, and by a staff writer for the *New Yorker*, Eugene Kinkead, which construed POW behavior to have resulted not from Communist mistreatment at all, but from a moral failure of the men themselves. Our society was indicted for having gone soft, and a call for more traditional autocratic values was made by these authors. Between 1957 and 1962 the dissemination of this version of the events of North Korea reached fantastic proportions, with tape recordings of the Mayer speech being used by college Reserve Officer Training Corps units, Military Reserve Units, Parent-Teachers' Associations, and training programs in industry.

A number of students of the Korean POW episode, however, felt that the Kinkead-Mayer position rested on erroneous information, misinterpretation, subtle distortion of known facts, and outright falsification of data. Yet the Kinkead-Mayer line was very appealing, and difficult to refute in a brief rebuttal, making it necessary to launch a more full-scale counter-argument and refutation. The Biderman volume does this brilliantly in giving voluminous well-documented evidence in refutation of most of the allegations of the Kinkead-Mayer position. It exposes the distortions, the falsifications, and the frequent demagoguery of the attempt to support a highly negative view of United States institutions by alleged failures in Korea. Finally, Biderman suggests some hypotheses as to why the negative view of POW behavior has been so popular in our society in recent years and some implications for military training of the future.

This book is essential reading for the student of the methodology of history, the analyst of contemporary United States society, and anyone desiring to have some

genuine information about what really happened in Korea.

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ANSELM L. STRAUSS and LEE RAINWATER, with MARC J. SWARTZ and BARBARA G. BERGER, and with a contribution by W. LLOYD WARNER. *The Professional Scientist: A Study of American Chemists*. Pp. xiv, 282. Chicago: Aldine, 1962. \$6.00.

To gain a better perspective on the extent to which chemistry can be viewed as a unitary profession, and on the ways the American Chemical Society (ACS) could serve the diverging interest of its membership, ACS requested Social Research, Incorporated, to do a study of its membership. Preliminary qualitative interviews were held with: (1) 200 ACS chemists, (2) 75 non-ACS chemists, and (3) 25 businessmen and 25 scientist-engineers. Subsequently, 9,981 questionnaires were mailed out in an effort to reach every ninth member of ACS. These were coded and tabulated. Of the 44 per cent returned, 2,789 were used and divided as follows: (1) academic chemists, (2) research administrators, (3) research Ph.D.'s (4) research non-Ph.D.'s, (5) bench chemists, (6) chemical engineers, and (7) others. Almost all the survey findings are reported as frequency distributions for these seven categories.

The many separate studies and population samples included in the design and the efforts of all those who worked on the study are at best only partially integrated in this volume. In an effort to give all the contributors due credit, there is an explicit reference at the beginning of nearly every chapter, and footnote citations within chapters, to the person or persons responsible. But the result is often discontinuous and even disconcerting. Despite this, the basic structure of the book is fairly clear-cut. The twelve chapters are evenly divided into three parts. The middle part is largely based on the mail survey and deals with such topics as recruitment, career patterns, work morale,

and perceptions of chemistry and chemists. The first part of the book sets out some theoretical considerations for the study of the professions and of chemistry in particular, describes the methodology and design of the study and the background and locale for chemical research in the United States, and provides us with some background characteristics for each of the seven major types of chemists distinguished by the investigators. The last part of the book deals with the imageries of professional status, the professional organization and its role, the "symbolization of homogeneity in diversity," and a final concluding note of a theoretical nature on the professions.

This is an ambitious book about a very important topic. Perhaps it is much too ambitious in terms of the financial resources and time available. Space permits us to do little more than express serious reservations concerning the adequacy of many of the procedures employed, the questionnaire items used, the analysis of the data, and their presentation. In the light of this, it is perhaps just as well that there is relatively little relationship between the empirical studies and the various theoretical discussions interspersed in the book. Were it not for these occasional bright spots—especially the opening and closing discussion of the professions by Strauss and the provocative eight or so pages by Lloyd Warner on the symbolic significance of chemistry as a profession and of the ACS to chemists—I would have no difficulty in dismissing the book entirely.

NORMAN KAPLAN

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BASIL S. GEORGOPOULOS and FLOYD C. MANN. *The Community General Hospital*. Pp. xiv, 693. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. \$12.50.

Hospitals are not just places for sick people. They are administrative entities to co-ordinate technically complex services. They follow an authoritarian model, but without a single line of organizational authority. Hospital power is shared,

though not equally, by a board of trustees, doctors, most of whom are not hospital employees, and the hospital administrator. Other influentials are the various categories of hospital employees, especially the nurses and the consumers of hospital services—patients and their relatives.

Hospitals have a single manifest objective: maximum and optimum service to patients—which must be pursued while other objectives are also pursued, such as the economic and security aspirations of hospital employees. Twelve Michigan community hospitals were studied from the point of view of these sociological assumptions. Many of the demands made on hospitals are of an emergency nature and nondeferable. This places a heavy burden of moral and ethical responsibility on the staff. It takes the form of much emphasis on accountability. The authors suggest there is little official tolerance for either ambiguity or error.

To accomplish such tasks within a very loose and diversified power system represents planned administrative "schizophrenia." Little standardization of the nature of work or the volume of work is possible. The principal workers of the hospital—doctors and nurses—are professionals who resist any organizational expectation that they act like employees who are concerned only with the expectation of their employer. To the contrary, they are very much subject to professional expectations of their own reference groups. There also is little control over patients. This book analyzes the interaction of these various forces as well as the problems of measuring their operational effectiveness.

The study deals gingerly with the latent functions of each of the interest groups in the hospital system. It evades clear-cut discussion of such facts as that hospitals are an extension of the physician's essentially private practice of medicine. Many of the normative controversies inherent in hospital administration are avoided. Why, for instance, is it that patients who are the object of service have so little direct power to influence organizational policies? How are power conflicts negotiated, ameliorated, or otherwise dealt

with? How are errors dealt with, when they do occur, as inevitably they must? There is almost no mention of such pervasive problems of hospital administration as the generally poor standards in emergency rooms. How do patterns of service for private patients compare to those whose care is paid for by insurance or who are unable to reimburse the hospital.

The book presents much factual information for raising these questions. It is based on a methodologically complex design, a comparative series of case studies, in depth, of twelve different institutions. It makes the reader see them as social systems, not just buildings where people go when they are ill.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

WARREN B. WALSH. *Perspectives and Patterns: Discourses on History*. Pp. xi, 148. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962. \$4.50.

A label for this book could be: "Modest Essays by a Modest Man." This characteristic of modesty deserves notice, where the field is one in which overconfidence and sharp assertiveness abound. Honest to the point of confessing "frequent difficulty" in trying to relate what the philosophers of history have said about the subject of history, yet sure enough of himself to disdain jargon in discussing their work, Walsh, who has been on the history faculty of Syracuse University since 1935, examines a number of age-old questions, speculations, and interpretations concerning the nature and purpose of history and candidly evaluates them according to the standard of his own experience. The latter exercise, almost wholly subjective, is one that would profit all historians to attempt to make.

The first of the four essays of the book, "Every Historian His Own Historicist," amplifies the proposition that the his-

torian, without rejecting the suggestions and criticisms of the philosopher of history, should turn occasionally to a consideration of history in its wider sense and so become his own historicist. "Cheney's 'Laws' Reconsidered" would reduce Cheney's laws to postulates, or better still, to cues, not to the future, but to a better understanding of the past. In "Is History a Science?" Walsh stands with the consensus and shows that the answer to this now somewhat tedious question derives from the qualitative and quantitative differences in the information with which scientists and historians work. In the final essay, "Recurrent Patterns in History," Walsh defines six such recurrent patterns or probabilities, recognition of which would doubtless do much to help the historian to keep his footing. Social scientists will find provocative the pattern Walsh describes as the concept of the reality world, that is, the psychological world of perception based on experience which controls individual and group behavior. Walsh gives a lucid brief explanation of this promising analytical tool, which is yet unknown to most historians.

Through his talent for translation, Walsh effectively bridges the worlds of the philosopher of history and the historian as regards a number of points of mutual interest. Analytical as well as descriptive, with no pretense to originality other than in the structure of the compilation and in the author's pronouncement on the general balance as he sees it, the essays are to be recommended as up-to-date, well-ordered introductions to their respective themes.

W. N. DAVIS, JR.

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-FELIX E. OPPENHEIM. *Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis*. Pp. 242. New York: St Martin's Press, 1961. \$6.50.

This work is an application of the analytic approach to the domain of the behavioral sciences. Specifically, the author is concerned with the construction of an adequate vocabulary for the description of social phenomena and takes the word

"freedom" as an object-lesson in methodology. The author does not deny that other approaches are possible—outside his own value-free social science study—but that is not his present concern.

This concept freedom is interrelated with other notions, and so related terms, for example, "influence," "constraint," "power," and "unfreedom," are also investigated. Professor Oppenheim takes Mortimer J. Adler to task for overlooking—in his work on *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom*—the fact that "freedom often functions as a relational concept," so that, as Oppenheim notes, liberty is not some kind of immaterial thing that men may—or may not—possess. As part of this social behaviorism approach, Oppenheim gives us a careful analysis of the linguistic subtleties of freedom in its various contexts—psychological freedom, social freedom, and so on. This exercise in semantic analysis shows the over-all influence of the type of philosophy of science of Carl Hempel, B. F. Skinner, and Herbert A. Simon.

While the author avoids the normative problem of what kinds of freedom constitute the good society, he does seek to demonstrate how current arguments about the values and limitations of freedom arise out of ambiguities in language, which can only be resolved through a logically antecedent and agreed-upon definition of freedom in nonvaluational terms. For this reason, the author affirms that his own work lays the groundwork for an answer to the question: "What combination of freedom and control relationships is best suited to build a political order which will strike an optimal balance among social and political values?" But, one wonders, why "optimal balance"? Are we smuggling ethics back into our objectivist social behaviorism?

All this verbalism piled on verbalism illustrates some sort of law of diminishing returns: we must use language to analyze our language behaviors, and only a creative semantics can get us out of the cul-de-sacs of a descriptive semantics such as the ordinary language analysts give us. And if

this be so, are we not back to Plato again?

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HERBERT J. STORING (Ed.). *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*. Pp. vii, 333. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962. \$5.50.

In this book of essays, Professor Leo Strauss leads some of the ablest products of his teaching at the University of Chicago in conducting a vigorous combined critique of behaviorialist political science. Except among persons professionally concerned with the state of political science as a discipline, the volume is not likely to arouse interest, but many of the scholars and students who do have reason to be concerned will find it an important work, dealing incisively with many problems of methodology that are central and controversial within the profession and maintaining, for the most part, a fairly dispassionate mien.

Many of the strengths and weaknesses that are common to most of the essays derive from the method the authors use for criticizing the behavioralists, namely, to pick a few outstanding exemplars of the latter persuasion and to subject their writings to elaborately detailed textual exegesis. Only Professor Strauss himself, in the concluding essay, makes the scale of attack vividly grand; in doing so, however, his stance is clearly that of his own personal natural-law philosophy, and readers who cannot accept it may find themselves more comfortable with the narrow scope of the other essays.

Much of the textual exegesis in them is powerful and should be useful to interested readers of any persuasion. Some of it, however, is rather nit-picking, and much of it seems so concerned to demonstrate the inadequacies of seminal works by behavioralists that it gives too little attention to more recent, more sophisticated writings coming from that school.

Walter Berns does avoid the latter pitfall—at some cost, however, in loss of focus in his essay. He begins with a critique of the leading survey analyses of

voting behavior, and they are clearly vulnerable to his unsympathetic probing. But at the end he adds a postscript conceding some value to the recent offering of the Michigan Survey Research Center, *The American Voter*. Leo Weinstein, in contrast, is content to rest a critique of Bentleyism on little more than an elaborate demonstration of the inconsistencies of Arthur Bentley's first major work, published in 1908. Competent as the exegesis is, one wonders whether it can in any important way suffice for a critique of the group theory of politics.

Robert Horwitz, on the other hand, is quite willing to write an interesting intellectual biography of his subject, Harold Lasswell, but is so determined to emphasize the development in Lasswell's thought of a manipulative side—the ambitiousness of which Horwitz both admires and fears—that he largely avoids discussing what many contemporary political scientists consider Lasswell's major contributions to the discipline: his various methodologies and analytical language tools. In addition to editing the whole book, Herbert Storing has himself written the most impressive essay in it, a stylistically elegant, highly critical exegesis of the whole body of Herbert Simon's published work. Although occasionally the essay descends to trivial criticism and is somewhat intolerant of the evolving character of Simon's thinking, the challenge Storing offers to Simon is decidedly powerful—more so than the challenge the book as a whole, even with Leo Strauss's epilogue, offers to behavioral political science.

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C. B. MACPHERSON. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Pp. x, 310. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. \$6.75.

In producing this volume, the author, professor of political science at the University of Toronto, has partially relied on literary string-saving; over one-third of the text consists of material that has appeared substantially in articles in the

Western Political Quarterly in 1951 and 1954, and in *Past & Present* in 1960. In seven postulates, Professor MacPherson develops succinctly a socio-politico-economic doctrine called "possessive individualism," built largely on the assumptions of the market economy. His book is devoted to examining the part played by Hobbes, the Levellers, Locke, and Harrington as its common carriers. Obviously sympathetic with an "unacquisitive society," he writes of his subjects with a refined and sophisticated air of disapproval of their championship of "individual possessive rights," though granting such as being a viable basis for a "valid theory of political obligation," at least down to contemporary times.

His long essay on Hobbes is perhaps the best part of the book, though excessively repetitious. Most interesting to this reader is his essay on the Levellers, whom current general history texts still describe as radical egalitarians. Professor MacPherson, at least, effectively disposes of them as exponents of universal manhood suffrage. He sees them as liberals, not radicals, with a less-developed property sense than Hobbes and Locke, interested in a less unequal socioeconomic system, perhaps, but in the chain of "possessive individualism," nevertheless; "The Levellers paved the way, unwittingly, for Locke and the Whig tradition, for their whole doctrine . . . could be converted as readily to Locke's purposes as to any more radical ends" (p. 158). Professor MacPherson produces some shrewd second thoughts on the significance of Locke. He concludes that the *Second Treatise* contains more evidence to cite him as a champion of "collectivism" than of "individualism"; "Locke's individualism, that of an emerging capitalist society, does not exclude but on the contrary demands the supremacy of the state over the individual" (p. 256).

Concluding the book with a leap from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, the author's closing speculations are unimpressive. Granting that "possessive individualism" is immensely vigorous and flourishing in today's "liberal-democratic" states, he nevertheless thinks it incapable

of supporting political validation in any integral way. His cautious exploratory observation, on the other hand, that it is no longer expectable "to get a valid theory of obligation of the individual to a single national state alone," and that this may be the time for recognizing that the day has arrived when such may be accorded "to a wider political authority," suggests a restrained restatement of the hope in the great liberal mirage, the world state.

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MARTIN E. MARTY (Ed.). *The Place of Bonhoeffer: Problems and Possibilities in His Thought*. Pp. 224. New York: Association Press, 1962. \$4.50.

Unless the reader has some knowledge of who Dietrich Bonhoeffer was, and some acquaintance with his thought, he will have hard work enjoying this book. Before beginning this set of scholarly essays, he will need to know that Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the brilliant son of a successful doctor and university professor. Born in Breslau, he grew up in Berlin. By the age of 21 he had won his doctorate at the University of Berlin and by 25 he had begun to lecture in theology at the same university.

Gifted as a scholar, preacher, pastor, and interpreter of social issues, he served in a great many different posts. He traveled to the United States twice and studied a year at Union Seminary. He served churches in England and taught in a Confessional—or nonstate-approved—seminary at Zingst, later at Finkenwalde and Köslin. When the seminary was closed by order of the Gestapo, he engaged actively in the underground movement to overthrow Hitler. His death by hanging in the Flössenburg prison on April 9, 1945, marked the end of one of the true Christian martyrs of World War II. The fact that he regarded his approaching death as "the beginning of life" makes his life and death almost as vivid as that of martyrs in the scriptures.

Perhaps Bonhoeffer was a more significant symbol of opposition to the brutal

materialism of the Nazis than Martin Niemöller. The latter is still at work as an active pastor, and he is probably better known to the general public than Bonhoeffer. But Bonhoeffer was an important link of the Confessional Church and the Protestant churches of England, Sweden, and the United States during the war. He could have escaped Nazi capture by finding easy refuge in any of these countries. Yet he felt called to help the church of Germany face its struggle with the enemy on its home grounds.

Marty has called together seven other competent scholars to set out "problems and possibilities" in Bonhoeffer's thought, as the subtitle states. It may be unfair for seven specialists to expect Bonhoeffer to excel in each of seven fields. Since he died at the age of 39, his thought probably had not had time to reach its most mature stages. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer still offered insights prized by theologians, church historians, biblical scholars, moralists, and liturgists. He is given few permanent and basic achievements by these writers. But they are all still urging that his views be considered!

While Bonhoeffer's conception of the church as a kind of collective person (p. 61) implies a realistic—in the Platonic sense—view of institutions, it still involves the lives of its members in ways few Christians have supposed since Luther. The church is "Christ existing as community" (p. 92). The basic question that "keeps coming back" to Bonhoeffer is "What is Christ, for us today?" (pp. 9, 148). Bonhoeffer's effort is constantly to accomplish the "Vergegenwärtigung"—representation, or contemporaneity—(p. 115) of the Bible, and hence of its central figure, Christ. To weigh the validity of each treatment by these eight writers would require a discussion of each separate chapter. Suffice it to say that they turn over some important puzzles for technical theologians, but do little to entice the layman to read Bonhoeffer.

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EDUCATION

HAROLD ORLANS. *The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education: A Study of 36 Universities and Colleges*. Pp. xvi, 361. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1962. \$5.00.

This work is the report of a questionnaire survey of 3500 faculty members in thirty-six universities and colleges of "the effects of federally supported research programs upon selected departments of science, social science, and the humanities" in those institutions. The survey seems to have been competently conducted and is well reported. The complaisant co-operation of the "faculty members" was really quite extraordinary; we now know their opinion of the effect of the federal government's employment of university facilities to do odd jobs for it on the small fragment of American education investigated. It is that this effect has not been so deleterious as many had feared; no really radical departure from current practice within this context is proposed.

This reviewer recognizes the difficulty of devising a succinct title for a complex subject matter. He has no disposition to criticize an author for not doing something that he did not set out to do; he realizes that in this case the scope of the undertaking was not determined by the author. Nevertheless, he confesses disappointment at picking up a work titled in such a manner as to promise discussion of the effects of all existent and possible federal programs on all higher education and finding only consideration of a very tiny part of the total spectrum of federal government-American higher education relations.

Federal government impingement on American education can take place at three levels. First, federal government can and does employ the facilities of American universities to do odd jobs for it; on this it is spending something like a billion dollars a year. This is not aid to education; its effect on education, good or bad, is quite incidental, a fact which the author of the work under discussion fully recognizes. Second, federal government could have a program for the creation of a national

educational establishment appropriate to the richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known, aspiring to leadership in the crowded and complex world of the second half of the twentieth century. Such a program, of course, could not be confined to schools, colleges, and universities; the generations that need education most are the postuniversity Americans. So far, the federal government has shown little interest in such a dream, though it has from time to time exhibited a disposition to subsidize existent educational inefficiencies. Third, there is a thoroughly negative impingement, like the federal government program over this last decade or so to keep Americans helplessly ignorant about what is going on in China and other places. Let us have the book which will discuss federal government-American education relations in something like these terms.

MORTIMER GRAVES

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FRANK J. MUNGER and RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. *National Politics and Federal Aid to Education*. Pp. vi, 193. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962. No price.

SIDNEY C. SUPRIN. *Issues in Federal Aid to Education*. Pp. xiv, 64. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962. No price.

The first of these studies is another in the rapidly enlarging list of valuable empirical analyses after the classic model established by Stephen K. Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law*. It might well have been subtitled "Congress Does Not Make a Law." After a brief review of proposals in previous periods, Munger and Fenno concentrate on the failure of bills for general federal aid to education during the period from 1945 to 1961. They identify the proponents, opponents, and neutrals in the legislative struggle, show their positions on the substance of the various legislative proposals and on the tangential issues that have thus far wrecked all such measures: federal control, aid to parochial schools, and racial

integration. They trace the actions taken by federal agencies, the major political parties, the last four presidents, and the committees and houses of Congress.

The presentation is in the best tradition of realistic political analysis. Here we see how the proponents of general federal aid were weakened not only by internal disputes but also by their failure to win significant support from either the Parent-Teachers' Associations or the National School Boards Association. We see the effective nature of the opposition by the United States Chamber of Commerce and its allies. We note that "by insulating its position against political pressures," the United States Office of Education has "isolated itself from the centers of political power." We find repeated illustrations of the principle that the strongest critics of federal control of local education have "been responsible for the most far-reaching proposals for controls." We learn how in 1961 the House Rules Committee succeeded in blocking a conference committee consideration of the differing bills that had already passed both Houses. We see that because of higher priorities on other measures, "President Kennedy consciously refrained from committing his full resources of time and effort to the struggle for federal aid." All this is handled by the authors with a degree of brevity and precision that make their study eminently suitable as illustrative reading in courses on the legislative process.

The authors purposefully concentrate upon legislative proposals for general aid to elementary and secondary education. They therefore ignore the successful legislative struggles which led to special forms of federal aid: college education for veterans, school lunches, vocational education, aid in "impacted areas," the National Defense Education Act, and the rapidly growing appropriations for scientific research and teacher training. To provide a broader perspective, Munger and Fenno point out that the failures which they document often led to "specific grants for special purposes . . . which avoid the problems that block the approval of Federal aid." But by not dealing directly with proposals

for special forms of aid to education, they do not enlighten us on the interesting question as to the extent to which the interplay between general and special measures was an integral part of legislative strategy. The presentation of overall strategy is therefore incomplete. For this reason it is probably fortunate that the authors did not attempt to direct evaluation of the various strategies used by the federal-aid proponents.

A good starting point for such an evaluation—and a high-level indirect attack upon the United States Office of Education—is provided by Sufrin's basic theme that "a national interest in public elementary and secondary education requires something more than the provision of funds." Although a professional economist, Sufrin develops an approach far broader than that of economics. He argues that "a major consideration in the educational program of the United States as a cultural entity is that the standard of accomplishment and the ideals of excellence have not been set sufficiently high" and that "unless some educational standards are not being met, or are threatened, the Federal government has little reason for entering the field." He identifies the kinds of action that the United States Office of Education might take to raise local and state goals and standards. He thus deals constructively with one of the most important strategic factors underlying both the enactment and the administration of special or general measures of federal aid to education. Judged by Sufrin's standards, the legislative strategy of federal-aid proponents has, indeed, been rather myopic and uninspiring.

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ALAN NEVINS. *The State Universities and Democracy*. Pp. vii, 171. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. \$2.95.

1962 is the centennial year of the Morrill Act, which led to the establishment of the land-grant colleges, a movement which was

probably America's greatest single contribution to the whole field of higher education. The lectures which comprise this volume were delivered by Professor Nevins at his alma mater, the University of Illinois, both a state university and a land-grant college, as part of the celebration of this Centennial. They constitute a most interesting and informative account of the origin and early struggles of these colleges, supported presumably by the grants of land by Congress to the several states, and designed to broaden the curriculum of American colleges to include agriculture, the "mechanic arts," and military science.

Dr. Nevins is properly fascinated by the obstacles which these colleges faced and by the heroic performance of the many titanic individuals who eventually overcame the obstacles. He includes in his account the developing state universities, some but not all of which were also land-grant colleges, and he underscores properly the tremendous role which both groups played in their dedication to the ideal of democracy and the essential relevance of a broadly based educational system to the realization of this ideal.

The story which Dr. Nevins tells is a vitally important part of the history of the United States, and he tells it with genuine understanding and enthusiasm. There are still too many influential people in higher education who are apt to scoff at "cow colleges" or who have never grasped, for example, "the Wisconsin idea," which identified the limits of the campus with the borders of the state—and this fifty years ago.

It is perhaps overexacting to regret that Dr. Nevins has lumped together the land-grant colleges and the state universities. These are really two separate movements which often overlap, as in the case of some of the greatest—Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, California, and so on. But the extraordinary success of Ezra Cornell and Andrew D. White in building a magnificent land-grant college for New York State has to be set against that State's failure yet to achieve an equally significant state university. Dr. Nevins is

weak in his account of the eastern colleges and their problem in an area pre-empted by private colleges, and he passes over, in his enthusiasm for democracy, the separate but hopefully equal Negro land-grant colleges.

A few errors mar the work of a distinguished historian, such as giving Dr. Waksman the first name of Selden rather than Selman. And the title of the book is somewhat misleading.

MASON W. GROSS

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JOHN D. MILLETT. *The Academic Community: An Essay on Organization*. Pp. xi, 265. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. \$5.95.

The author of this book is a practicing university president, a political scientist, and a former professor of public administration. The book is not, however, an application of traditional political-science concepts of administration to the special field of higher education. Rather it is a personal account of the observations and interpretations of a university president who also has a political-science background and perspective.

Millett's basic premise is: "*I believe ideas drawn from business and public administration have only limited applicability to colleges and universities*. More than this, the essential ideas about business and public administration, such as they are, may actually promote a widespread and unfortunate misunderstanding of the nature of the college and university in our society" (p. 4).

Millett points out that most traditional analysis of organizational structures has to do with governmental and business organizations and has relied heavily on the concept of hierarchical administrative responsibilities. Millett believes that it is most useful to look at the organizational structure of colleges and universities not as an example of hierarchical authority, but as based on the principle of "community of authority," with power shared by four different groups within the

academic community—faculty, students, alumni, and administration. The Board of Trustees, which in more traditional hierarchical analysis would be described as the peak of the hierarchy from which all other power is delegated, is treated by Millett as just one of a number of different agencies under the “administration” category.

The faculty is seen as exercising great power, both through decisions of individual faculty members about their own professional careers and through group decisions in committees and in various meetings. Students share power in three areas—economic, academic, and social; faculty and administrative decisions must take account of the economic fact that if students choose not to attend a given college it will not prosper, and student attitudes toward general-education requirements influence the academic operations of colleges. Alumni exercise power through participation in selection of trustees, by fund-raising on a scale which forces institutions to be sensitive to alumni interests and desires, and by influencing public understanding of the aims and needs of the institution. Millett sees administration as sharing in the “community of authority” and not as being “a supreme echelon in a hierarchy of authority” (p. 181). He points out that “the power invested in administration is frequently exaggerated. The prestige and status of administration are believed to be substantial. The limitations of both power and status are usually poorly defined, yet quite real” (p. 179).

It should also be pointed out that the book deals with institutions of higher education as a general group. Differences which undoubtedly exist between colleges and universities, between public and private universities, between liberal-arts and technical institutions are played down or disregarded entirely. The author chose to concentrate on what seem to be the common elements of most institutions and not to be particularly concerned with the elements of diversity.

Faculty members and administrators from well-run institutions, which really

operate according to principles of “community of authority,” may feel that some of the presentation is pedestrian and belaboring of the obvious. But even such fortunately situated persons should be able to find occasional new thoughts or new emphases in this essay.

KENNETH EELLS

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BRIAN JACKSON and DENNIS MARSDEN.
Education and the Working Class: Some General Themes Raised by a Study of 88 Working-Class Children in a Northern Industrial City. Pp. ix, 268. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962. \$6.75.

In “Marburton,” a small and prosperous industrial city in northern England, roughly three-quarters of the 1951 labor force was working-class. Yet working-class families supplied only one-third of the students successfully graduating from the city’s best academic high schools. For most British young people, those State-supported high schools—called “grammar schools” in England—are the main avenue to universities and the professions. Despite the 1944 abolition of fees for grammar school, the middle-class character of those schools has evidently not been greatly altered. Why do so few working-class students get through the academic high schools? To cast light on this problem, the authors undertook an intensive study of 10 middle-class and 88 working-class graduates of Marburton grammar schools. They chose their cases from the lists of those graduating around 1950, to permit follow-up of their subjects’ higher education and job careers. Lengthy interviews were conducted separately with the graduates and their parents.

Middle-class families, the authors found, have educational traditions and resources to pass on to their children “in a host of small but telling ways” (p. 42). Usually working with the school, but sometimes against it if necessary, these parents could steer their children through many a threatening social and educational crisis.

They would endow their offspring, not with money, but with "social capital," in the form of ability to use the educational apparatus as an avenue to middle-class jobs and status.

What were the parental families of the 88 working-class students like? In general they were smaller families, from mixed residential districts permitting contacts with middle-class children or families. A few were "sunken middle-class," re-establishing themselves by State education of their children. More often, they were upper working-class—for example, foremen. Sometimes one parent had been to grammar school. Another index—the parents were often leaders in local voluntary organizations. In brief, the successful working-class children had important family pressures behind them. The educational success of these 88 children moved them from working-class to middle-class status. What this upward social mobility—symbolized by new manners, new accents, new friends, new values—meant for relations with parents, with the home neighborhood, with the Labour Party—these complex problems are traced by the authors with profound and sensitive insight. "Most wish to forget" (p. 193).

This book is notable for its concern with practical public policy, as well as for its keen analytical insights. This is in keeping with the orientation of the sponsoring organization, the London Institute of Community Studies. Part II of the study offers socially useful suggestions on school record-keeping, giving more information on schools and careers to parents, extending student leadership and responsibility downward a year or two from the senior year, and so on. Above all, say the authors, let us accept working-class life as part of the broad "culture" which Matthew Arnold saw as "the best knowledge and thought of the time." Let the school be less exclusively a screening and indoctrinating device for narrowly middle-class values.

So, we say again, this is a notable book. It deals, though on a small scale, with a great issue. It introduces the reader to

key British studies on that issue—for instance, the Crowther and Floud Studies. The questions it confronts, and perhaps some of the answers, are relevant to North American experience, and it is a clear, simply written book.

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GEORGE BARNETT and JACK OTIS. *Corporate Society and Education: The Philosophy of Elijah Jordan*. Pp. x, 297. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961. \$7.50.

Max Fisch's brief introduction accords Elijah Jordan, long-time professor at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana, a proper place in the history of American philosophical thought. Jordan's point of view was an attempt at the grand synthesis. In any event, Fisch felt it defied a ready label. He further maintained that Jordan's metaphysics contained aspects of Hegel and Aristotle, but without the Hegelian dialectic and optimism. The authors, George Barnett and Jack Otis, on the other hand, point out the strong relationship between Jordan and Plato.

As there are elements present in Aristotle's conception of the actual and the potential, of form inhering in matter, the view that man reflects his institutions, and that man is a sociopolitical animal, so there are elements present in Plato that the state is the individual writ large, the end of the state is justice, and the goal of education reflects the state's goal, that is, education is the moral endeavor which aims at the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Finally, Hegel's influence is present in that the institution, or institutions, are objective mind, and the state is an organic unity, a corporate person, or a concrete universal in its relationship with the individual. The authors' analysis leaves one with the feeling of Jordan's objective idealism, his view being a synthesis of metaphysics and experimentalism—metaphysical experimentalism. Further, their analysis reveals strong elements of

the positivistic, rationalistic, and empirical in his thought.

Barnett and Otis seem to make clear to the reader Jordan's reasons for attempting the grand synthesis as it related to education. In their opinion, he believed that without an adequate metaphysics, the political, social, and cultural realities that surround us cannot be fully understood. A world war can hasten this understanding. Jordan stated that he himself was rudely awakened from his own dogmatic slumber in such a way. In short, "Jordan was struck by the unrelatedness of mind to objective fact" (p. 2). Any planning, in regard to man's institutional life, must, according to Jordan, rest upon the solid foundation of a theory of the nature of cultural reality. Education, as an institution, must be related adequately to such a theory of culture. For Jordan, education rested on cultural rather than on social foundations.

The limitations of this review do not permit extended explication of Jordan's metaphysical claims; theory of moral action; modern liberalism and reconstructionism; objective view of an Absolute, which was culture; governing principles of corporate life; and educational views. To be sure, his educational theory, like Plato's, was, for the most part, implicit. In conclusion, the authors might have dealt more directly with Jordan's notion that modern science and logic needed to be reshaped with his metaphysical scheme. Bradley warned that metaphysics can be the finding of inaccurate reasons for what might come from human instinct, thus the folly of infusing an artificial harmony on life that may not be open to such a harmonious end. This tendency was Jordan's.

Barnett and Otis tease from Jordan's vast intellectual repertoire those facets which reveal him as wisely prophetic, probing, sincere, and deeply concerned about the ultimate end of education. To him, this was the moral realm (p. 213). The appearance of the Platonic-Hegelian blend was reinforced when Jordan stated that "the content of education is the world of culture, the world objectified and objectifying value . . . the corporate

world, for [this] is objective mind and the student develops a mind as he is related to it" (p. 224).

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

MALCOLM E. JEWELL. *Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy*. Pp. viii, 214. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962. \$6.00.

At a time when President Kennedy's foreign policies are assuming increasing political importance, much can be learned from Malcolm E. Jewell's well-documented and perceptive study of the role of senatorial politics in foreign policy from 1947 to 1958. In his conduct of foreign relations, Mr. Jewell observes, the president of the United States has "additional handicaps not found in all democratic governments. The decision-making process in this country resembles John Calhoun's 'concurrent majority': a large number of groups both within and outside the government must, in practice, approve any major policy."

Clearly the paramount group whose approval is needed is the Senate—vested as it is with "advice and consent" functions by the Constitution. And within the Senate, the president must seek support for his policies from all substantial factions, geographic and ideological, if he is to succeed in bringing controversial issues to a vote in a body which clings to the luxury of unlimited debate, and in obtaining the two-to-one majority required for ratification of treaties.

Separating fact from fiction concerning the operation of bi-partisanship in foreign policy, the author shows conclusively that the president had much to gain—and lose—by the continuing operation of partisan politics. Analyzing all roll-call votes on foreign aid, reciprocal trade, and collective

security during Truman's last six years in office and Eisenhower's first six, Jewell shows that (1) 90 per cent Democratic support of Truman's foreign-policy requests dropped to 74 per cent under Eisenhower, while (2) a majority of Republican senators supported Truman on only 37 per cent of the votes, but backed Eisenhower on 83 per cent of the roll calls. He notes the significant anti-internationalist tendencies of Southern senators in recent years.

The extraordinary dependence of the president on existing political leadership in the Senate itself and on the Foreign Relations Committee is dealt with skillfully. "Leadership in the Senate is a highly personal affair," Mr. Jewell writes, and he indicates how little the chief executive can do across the traditional executive-legislative gulf to change that leadership. The characterizations of key senators of both parties in leadership positions in foreign affairs and the factors which lead to their choice are developed with considerable accuracy.

The book also contains important information about the techniques of persuasion available to presidents and the varying uses made of these techniques; the wide latitude of action permitted by public opinion on complex foreign-policy issues; and interesting suggestions for increasing party responsibility in order to promote policy support in the Senate.

Long on statistics, but well worth perusal, Mr. Jewell's book will be a useful addition to the reading list of all those concerned with foreign affairs. One wishes that the author would update his study to cover the years since 1958, when many vital shifts of personalities and viewpoints in the Senate have taken place.

JOSEPH S. CLARK

United States Senator
from Pennsylvania

WAYNE S. COLE. *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations*. Pp. 293. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. \$5.75.

Essentially, this book shows that an agriculturally oriented background can strongly influence a United States sena-

tor's attitudes about how our nation's foreign relations should be conducted. Born in Hortonville, Wisconsin, Gerald P. Nye was for fifteen years a newspaperman in small Iowa, Wisconsin, and North Dakota towns. As such, he was intimately acquainted with farm problems. Consequently, his editorials often dealt with them. His concern, reflected in these editorials, drew him inexorably toward trying to find some solution to the complexities of a farm economy. And it was the deep thought preceding his editorials that ultimately set him on his course to the United States Senate, a forum from which he could espouse the cause of the mid-western farmer. Professor Cole describes Senator Nye as "a particularly striking representative of agrarian-based isolationism." Cole reports in admirable detail many instances in which Nye's agrarian-based isolationism caused him to take particular courses of action.

Reaching the Senate in 1926, Nye had established himself by 1935 as a leading voice in behalf of progressive Republicans from the agrarian West. Cole portrays Republican Nye as a representative of the little man. Despite many Roosevelt programs to help the so-called little man to emerge from depression, Nye denounced the New Deal as favoring wealthy interests at the expense of small business, labor, debtors, and farmers. His concern for the "little man" was evident in his investigation of the munitions industries. If the profits could be removed from wars, the little man would not have to march off to battle, Nye felt. Neutrality he saw as a means to keep our people from being drawn into the wars of other nations.

Nye was not a pacifist, but he believed that excessive military forces lead inevitably to war. He fell into disfavor with many because he led the noninterventionists in trying to keep America out of World War II. History shows that it was impossible for America to stay out of the war. However, events indicate that even those who disagreed with Nye believed in his sincerity. Nevertheless, following Pearl Harbor, his career headed downhill.

Author Cole has done a remarkable job of documenting the public life of a dedi-

cated United States Senator. The book should do much to place onto the pages of history a better understanding of Senator Nye.

JOHN SPARKMAN

United States Senator
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MALCOLM E. JEWELL (Ed.). *The Politics of Reapportionment*. Pp. xii, 334. New York: Atherton Press, 1962. \$6.75.

In seventeen studies of fourteen states, Jewell and his colleagues convincingly demonstrate that legislators, unrestrained by the courts, can be relied on to design districts that maximize partisan, sectional, and personal advantages at the expense of equal representation. Their evidence is mainly from 1961 and earlier years, before the Supreme Court intervened in *Baker v. Carr*. Except when affected by the rare and difficult popular initiative, state legislators imperiously overrode equality in favor of their own interests. These interests were various. The only constant was that legislative majorities could be counted on to take care of their own in both congressional and state legislative apportionment.

Usually this meant the preservation of rural dominance, by Republicans in the North and by Democrats in the South, but occasionally a large city was overrepresented at the expense of more rapidly growing suburbs. Methods also varied. A particularly effective method involved state constitutional provisions, often of fairly recent origin, freezing one house's representation to ensure rural dominance. Even without such a provision, simple failure to reapportion a state legislature sufficed for the same purpose, as when Tennessee's well-known sixty-year delay allowed one-third of the voters to elect two-thirds of the legislators. Gerrymandering, however, was often necessary in order to secure partisan advantages, especially in congressional districting when the decennial distribution of seats changed the size of a state's delegation. New York and California are illuminating cases.

States seem, in this work, to compete for the most unequal arrangements. It

turns out that California and Florida are rivals here as in climatic conditions. In 1962 Californians claimed that their senate was the most unrepresentative upper house in any of the fifty states. But Florida topped this because its two houses, taken together, constituted the least representative legislature in the country.

What price do we pay for having allowed legislators the privilege of reapportionment despite their obvious conflict of interest? Perhaps, as this book suggests, it is more than the sacrifice of the principle of equality. Another consequence has been to reduce the arena of electoral choice, as politicians have taken care of each other by creating more safe districts. Still more apparent has been the likelier division of state government between one party able to win a state-wide majority for governor and another party able to control a malapportioned legislature. Whether there are also results by way of policy outputs is uncertain. Without systematic evidence, as Jewell notes in his useful introduction, we cannot be sure that a malapportioned legislature adopts policies less congenial to populous areas than does an equitably apportioned legislature.

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CHARLES W. JOINER. *Civil Justice and the Jury*. Pp. xviii, 238. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. \$6.95.

The serious congestion of many of our metropolitan courts has given new impetus to the move for abolishing or curtailing jury trial in civil cases, particularly those resulting from personal injuries. Professor Joiner's book is an effort to put before the reader the arguments for the retention of the civil jury. The first part is an original essay; the second part is an anthology culled from essays by law teachers, judges, trial lawyers, and political scientists, from Blackstone to our day, and presented under the title "What Others Say About the Jury." This anthology is the less satisfactory part of the book, partly because a much more

systematic survey of the debate has been available for some time, but is not even cited—Dale Broeder's *The Function of the Jury: Facts or Fiction?* in the *University of Chicago Law Review*. In his own essay, Professor Joiner argues for the jury in these terms: (1) its general acceptance, (2) the desirable balance between jury and judge, (3) its greater fairness in applying community standards, (4) 'citizen participation in the governmental process, and (5) by indirection, the jury reduces the dangers of bureaucratization.

He also suggests several areas in which he would like to see our jury operation strengthened: Jurors should be more representative of the whole of the population, not only of those who are unable or unwilling to excuse themselves from service; he recommends obligatory pretrial to clarify and shorten our trials; majority verdicts should be permitted to reduce the number of hung juries; six-men juries, to reduce costs; less technical legalism, more lay language in the judge's instructions; greater use of the special verdict, to insure that the jury does not exceed its mandate to be only the finder of the facts; adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence; better training of lawyers and judges; and, finally, separate trial—and verdict—on the question of liability and on the size of the damages, to save trial time.

Professor Joiner has done a good job of advocacy. He has organized a vast area of facts and arguments, and has presented them simply and modestly so that the nonlawyer citizen can follow the argument with ease. It is in the nature of such an effort that many of the perplexing complications can only be touched upon, and the questions are made to appear simpler than they are. For example, Professor Joiner recommends a six-man jury. Offhand there would seem no reason why twelve ought to be a magic number. But if six is a better one, why not five—as an eminent federal judge recommends—or even less? The savings aspect is clear. But if we lose six jurors, do we not also reduce thereby the chance of having particularly good, that is articulate and wise, jurors on the bench, since obviously not all jurors but only a few fall into that cate-

gory—especially if we insist that the jury be taken from all citizen strata, irrespective of education and background? And perhaps more important: the quality of a jury deliberation often depends on an adequate re-argument from both sides, but the chances of finding a spokesman for the losing side are greatly reduced by curtailing the number of jurors. The smaller the jury, the more likely is a unanimous position at the outset of the deliberation, hence no serious debate.

And pretrial may be a good thing, but it is also an expensive thing to do in terms of precious court time. Thus in one of our most congested courts, almost one-third of all judges do nothing but pretry cases. They could instead try cases, and for a long time nobody bothered finding out whether such investment is a wise one. Research evidence since collected would indicate that it is not.

Thus the book puts into focus the dilemma of the investigator who wants to be also an advocate. How much weight is he to give to one pursuit and how much to the other? Perhaps the question becomes moot, if facts and opinions are set clearly apart and the nature of their connection remains visible. But in this case the weights seem a bit out of balance: the advocacy outweighs the analysis. But since recent years have seen a mounting attack on the civil jury—much of it rather ill-founded if persuasive—Professor Joiner's book is perhaps a justifiable counterweight.

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Governmental Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities. A Report of the Municipal Manpower Commission. Pp. 196. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. No price.

Governmental Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities is the title of the report of the Municipal Manpower Commission, which devoted two years to the first nationwide study of the problem of recruiting a sufficient number of competent administrative, professional, and technical (APT) personnel to meet the future manpower needs of municipal governments.

Although the Commission's major finding—that there is a serious shortage of APT personnel—is not surprising, its report is valuable to governmental and civic leaders because it documents the shortage and contains recommendations for concerted action by the cities, the states, the federal government, professional associations, universities, civic leaders, and political leaders to solve the problem.

To collect data for its study, the Commission's staff interviewed in excess of 600 local officials and civic leaders in 60 metropolitan areas and mailed questionnaires to 3,000 executives in cities over 25,000 population. Appendix 1 contains a statistical profile of municipal executives—their occupational origins, education, career patterns, tenure, age, motivation, and attitudes—based upon the results of the questionnaires mailed to 3,000 executives. Sources of dissatisfaction expressed by municipal executives in order of importance were salary, advancement opportunities, fringe benefits, job security, and retirement benefits.

A number of recommendations to improve the municipal manpower situation are made by the Commission. It urges improved governmental structure, vigorous recruiting at the college level, establishment of postentry training programs, revision by universities of graduate and undergraduate programs relating to metropolitan affairs, insistence by civic and political leadership upon quality APT personnel, abolishment of the independent civil service commission or its conversion to an advisory body, and placement of the chief executive in charge of personnel administration. If all the recommendations of the Commission are adopted and implemented, the municipal personnel problem should be greatly alleviated within a few years. To be realistic, however, many of the Commission's recommendations, in spite of intrinsic merits, will not be adopted in the near future.

The importance of the profile of municipal executives which reveals their attitudes and motivation cannot be denied, yet it must be pointed out that the attitudes and motivation of college undergraduates differ from those of municipal executives.

It would have been extremely valuable if the Commission had surveyed a representative group of college students with respect to what they are seeking in life, the type of work they wish to do, the working conditions they desire, and the type of position they wish to hold five, ten, twenty, and thirty years subsequent to graduation.

Surveys of undergraduates undertaken by this reviewer indicate they tend to associate unfavorable images—politics, inefficiency, unethical conduct—with municipal governments. Unless municipalities undertake corrective actions to dispel these images from the minds of students, municipalities will experience great difficulty in recruiting the ablest college graduates even if the municipal salary scale is raised to or above the salary scale in the business world.

In conclusion, this reviewer strongly recommends the Commission's excellent report as required reading for all individuals concerned with the future of our municipalities.

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FRANCIS BIDDLE. *In Brief Authority*. Pp. x, 494. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1962. \$5.95.

In this second volume from his memoirs, the author covers his years with Roosevelt and Truman from his appointment as chairman of the National Labor Relations Board in 1934 to his service as the United States representative of the International Military Tribunal which tried the German war criminals at Nürnberg. It is always fascinating to read the personal account of a participant in a political era as significant as that covered by this volume, and especially so when the story is as interestingly told as this one is.

This reviewer found the early chapters telling of the difficulties of the Labor Board during the days of the National Recovery Administration and of the events leading up to the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 particularly revealing. The latter statute is characterized as representing "a point of view common to much

of the New Deal philosophy—that a free people should not hesitate to use their government to protect them from the unregulated energies which threaten that freedom.” Later chapters recalling his defense of civil liberties while serving as Solicitor General, his work as counsel for the Congressional Committee investigating the Tennessee Valley Authority, his associations with other members of the President’s cabinet while he was Attorney General, the evacuation of the Japanese during World War II, and the attempted deportation of Harry Bridges also were of special interest.

The closing chapters provide a vivid account of the Nürnberg trial. The author’s admiration for Justice Robert Jackson who served as chief prosecutor for the United States, and who had preceded him as Attorney General, is much in evidence. Throughout the book, one gets glimpses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who is characterized in the Preface as “an intensely human man with his faults as well as his strength.” The central quality of his leadership was that “he gave the people a vision of what their country could be, of what their government could mean to them.” This is good reading, especially for those who would like to get behind the scenes in the New Deal era.

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RUTH C. SILVA. *Rum, Religion, and Votes: 1928 Re-examined*. Pp. ix, 76. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962. \$5.00.

In case you did not know already, you can now learn from this ingenious book that Al Smith was not defeated in 1928 because he was a Catholic, a wet, and a city slicker. He lost to Herbert Hoover mainly because he was a Democrat. Democrats in 1928 were in a minority everywhere save only in the solid south and in a few northern urban-industrial outposts where ethnic, racial, and religious minorities combined to keep them in the state house or the city hall. The fact is that Al Smith, a Roman Catholic, a wet,

and the very model of an alien-tainted city slicker, was probably the strongest candidate the Democrats could have found. In any case, he polled a larger percentage of the total vote cast for President than either of his two immediate Protestant predecessors, James M. Cox and John W. Davis. Indeed, the Smith candidacy brought a net increase in the Democratic percentage of the total Presidential vote of more than 6 per cent over the Cox candidacy of 1920 and 12 per cent over the Davis candidacy in 1924. How strong the Smith candidacy was may be seen also if one compares the Happy Warrior’s vote with that of Democratic Congressional candidates in 1928. Although he trailed the Democratic Congressional ticket in the nation by 1.27 points, he led the ticket in eighteen states. “With the exception of William Jennings Bryan in 1900,” says Professor Silva, “Woodrow Wilson in 1916, and the four Franklin Roosevelt elections, Smith ran better in relation to his Congressional ticket than has any other Democratic Presidential candidate in this century.”

None of this will come as a surprise to students of American politics. But Professor Silva’s analysis goes beyond these more obvious aspects of the 1928 election to examine with rare statistical subtlety and sophistication the relative weight of the Catholic and liquor issues as factors of strength or weakness for Smith’s defeat. By computing coefficients of partial correlation and regression among the multiple variables for which statistical data are available, she is able to measure the weight of rum and religion in this most controversial contest. “There is,” she concludes, “simply no statistically significant association between the index of Smith’s gains and either Protestantism or Catholicism.” As for the liquor issue, she says that “only 1.1 per cent of the variance in Smith’s strength can be explained in terms of the liquor vote . . . like religion the vote for liquor had virtually no impact on Smith’s strength at the polls in 1928.”

Among the multiple variables examined, including religion, liquor, foreign white stock, big city, urbanism, population density, “foreign white stock is the only

statistically significant correlate of Smith's strength." It was, indeed, as Lubell and others have pointed out, the firm beach-heads among the ethnic racial minorities of the great cities that Smith consolidated in 1928 which helped lay a foundation for the convulsive realigning election of 1932. The conclusions to which Professor Silva's study leads are neither surprising nor terribly significant. But the statistical methods she uses in this analysis may point the way to similar and more careful studies of other campaigns and elections. Hers is more than an exercise in methodological legerdemain, but a striking example of what statistical literacy can contribute to the study of political behavior.

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ALLEN GUTTMANN. *The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War*. Pp. ix, 292. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. \$5.95.

ROBERT PAYNE (Ed.). *The Civil War in Spain, 1936-1939*. Pp. 342. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962. \$5.75.

Mr. Guttman has for the most part gained the objective which he sets for himself in the opening paragraph of his book: "No public event of the years between 1919 and 1939—excepting the Great Depression itself—moved Americans as did this Spanish conflict. My concern here is not to recreate these thirty-two months of crisis nor to settle the historical controversies that have arisen nor to justify one or another of a multitude of contentious factions. My concern is analysis. How did Americans see the Spanish Civil War? Why did they, in Camus' phrase, 'feel the Spanish drama as a personal tragedy'? Why has the Spanish war become the last great cause?"

Out of the polemical turmoil which surrounded the war Mr. Guttman has emerged with a victory of synthesis and analysis. His synthesis consists of the examination of the bulk of the literature about the war produced in America be-

tween 1936 and 1939 in periodicals and in the form of novels and plays. Mr. Guttman also includes references to other forms of art, including cartoons. His analysis is contained in his argument that with few exceptions Americans interpreted the war in the framework of America's liberal democratic inheritance. The author examines the spectrum of partisanship from the lunatic right to the Stalinist left, showing, for example, how the latter clad itself and the Spanish Republic in the American Heritage of 1776, complete with Earl Browder as drummer boy for George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.

Sometimes naive in analysis, as in the strained chapter entitled "Primitivism versus Progress," which is a rather reptitious effort to make the simple point that some American and European writers have distrusted the machine and that the Spanish Civil War was fascinating in part because it represented a horrifying triumph of technology over flesh, sometimes naive in style—the overuse of italics is no substitute for emphatic construction—young Mr. Guttman, who does not remember the Spanish Civil War, has managed the feat of writing a book on a subject which his elders have either overlooked or, more likely, not had the courage to undertake.

The thesis that the war was viewed in terms of our own liberal democratic ethos is successfully presented, and leads the author to such conclusions as—on the United States Catholic press—"Our own Catholic press developed a pro-Franco argument based mainly on condemnations of the Republic as 'Red communism' and on an alleged similarity between the *Movimiento Nacional* and the classic movements of liberal democracy" and that contained in the final sentence of the book: "One sometimes feels that the men who named their volunteer unit 'The Lincoln Battalion' were closer to the traditions of liberal democracy than are those public men who persistently include General Franco's *Nuevo Estado* within the limits of that oddly gerrymandered jurisdiction, 'The Free World.'"

Those who object to liberal democracy may object to *The Wound in the Heart*.

Nonetheless, the wound is there, deep in American hearts. And it is like a fresh wound, although now a quarter-century old, because the war still goes on which was first fought on the ancient soil of Spain in the third decade of this century.

Robert Payne's book, *The Civil War in Spain*, is, from one aspect, an answer to the question: "Who lost the Spanish Civil War? Here is the tragic roll call of the victims, physical and spiritual, that is, ideological. Mr. Guttman's book is an image of the wounded Spanish heart; Mr. Payne's book is a description of the wound itself. Mr. Payne is an enormously talented and prolific author who moves with equal ease from Communist China to translations of Chekov to studies of Greek *hubris*; it now seems that he was for a time a correspondent in warring Spain. Out of the writing about the war he has made an international selection which includes Orwell, Barea, Malraux, Moscardó, Dos Passos, Matthews, Regler, and Koestler. Just as the war was dreadfully vivid, so too are these extracts from its literature.

The two books dealt with in this review well supplement each other, and provide insights for those who may remember the war as well as for those who do not.

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ROGER DANIELS. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*. Pp. ix, 165. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. \$3.50.

The focus of this historical study is on the generators of prejudice against the Japanese in California rather than upon their victims. The author believes he has uncovered two patterns in the larger complex: (1) the hypothesis that Californians developed a "frontier psychology" akin to that found in the border marches of Europe—not that formulated by the Turner historical school; and (2) the role of the more "democratic" groups—labor unions, progressives, socialists—in instigat-

ing and developing this most undemocratic of movements. The skill with which this has been done demonstrates how valuable such studies in the "dust-bins of history" can be. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the first "pattern" is an interpretation of a different order from the second which is more demonstrable. However, given the capacity of man to inflate his fears, and the vogue of the "Yellow Peril" slogan—the term itself appears to have come from Kaiser Wilhelm II's "vaporings about a *gelbe gefahr*"—it seems to be a plausible hypothesis.

The study confirms other studies which show that the Japanese, like the Chinese before them, were at first welcomed in California as students and workers. As they became economic competitors and strove to improve their position, public sentiment changed into hostility. The spread of this hostility into the middle classes produced a more sophisticated reasoning in which the so-called "racial" traits of the Japanese were regarded as forever preventing real assimilation. Racialism, already generalized widely in the nation, was intensified in California and seemingly embraced all but a minority of educators and missionaries. The needs of political campaigning drew both parties into anti-Japanese positions. However, the presidential candidates, once elected to office, felt compelled to alter their public expressions of policy. Thus a kind of political "double-talk" ensued, as was exemplified especially in the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.

This study, accordingly, throws interesting light on the interaction of the political and social processes, in which the maneuverability possible on the political level made it possible at times to delay legislation restrictive of the Japanese. In the case of antialien land legislation this resulted in locking the barn door after the horse had been stolen. In the case of the Gentlemen's Agreement it fomented suspicion and discontent because of the "picture brides." When combined with "secret diplomacy," it may have been determining in the victory of the exclusionists over the moderates who wanted a quota restriction

on immigration. The "might have beens" become numerous. This well-written study ends with the 1924 victory for exclusion.

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Skidmore College

JOHN M. HUNTER. *Emerging Colombia*. Pp. 116. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962. \$3.25.

The author, a member of the Department of Economics at Michigan State University, describes this work as a "professional adventure" book recounting his impressions as an economist, and, as he states in the Prologue, "it is not a systematic and comprehensive study and reveals no great truths regarding Colombian society or its economic development." Disclaimers aside, several chapters analyze Colombian phenomena. Chapter 11 tells of the sparsely settled *llanos*, or grazing lands, and of the coffee- and cattle-producing areas in other sections of the country. The author is impressed by striking contrasts between the temperate high-altitude plateaus and the tropical Magdalena river valley: flora and fauna change in the space of a few miles' travel, varying according to the altitude. There are also great disparities in wealth, and in the means of transportation—ranging from an air freight network to burros or primitive dugouts in remote mountains and river tributaries.

A chapter on "Political Trends" tells of a unique National Front arrangement by Liberals and Conservatives, providing for a sixteen-year truce with alternating presidents and parity of party representation in legislative, executive, and administrative positions. An additional aspect of this effort to get away from the past bitterness and violence of party strife, which has in two decades cost tens of thousands of lives, is the requirement for a two-thirds majority to pass legislation. The author is skeptical of the duration of the National Front for the planned four presidential terms. He believes that "the oligarchy is still in power but it has become more sensitive to pressure from below. As the government has become more sensitive to the power of the masses, the masses have naïvely become tools for

pressure groups . . . with resultant inconsistent and foolish policies."

Dr. Hunter offers data in chart form on the labor force, national income, and categories of imports, and raises the question whether Colombian industry may require capital-saving devices rather than large capital investments in machinery and tools, compared to the United States emphasis on labor-saving devices. Stress is laid on the readjustments inherent in the rapid urbanization of the country. Agriculture faces many difficulties, both in its *latifundia* and its *minifundia*, as well as lacks in marketing, storage, and credits. The author is severely critical of the universities with unqualified absentee professors and outmoded traditions. He does not approve of frequent strikes by students, who, in their inexperience and immaturity, share in making university policy decisions. In a chapter on "Research Resources" there is entirely lacking any mention of the important yellow fever, low-cost housing, and agricultural and medical research that goes on in the country under many different auspices.

Considerable decentralization of government activities and an increased exploitation of the tourist potential are advocated by the author, as well as the development of new agricultural exports, increased educational facilities at all levels, and more trade with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. The discussion of Colombia's grave coffee export problem ignores the inter-American coffee agreement, and the commitment of the Alliance for Progress to work on surplus commodity problems.

There is no index and no bibliography, as such, although footnotes point to a few United States titles, and to a number of Colombian statistical works and monographs. Part of the force of the author's judgments is lost for their being all but hidden in the footnote references at the end of the book. Passages descriptive of Colombia are followed by accounts of earlier experiences in Vietnam, then by the posing of basic issues in the theory of democracy or of the stages of economic growth, interspersed with paragraphs on the norms of taxation and sections dealing with the history of North American gov-

ernmental institutions. This melange of many facts, piquant observations on professorial families living abroad, and economic theories ends with recommendations reaching to fundamentals, albeit based on brief observations of only limited aspects of Colombian life.

WILLARD F. BARBER

Lecturer in International Affairs
University of Maryland

JOHN C. DREIER. *The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis*. Pp. xii, 147. New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962. \$2.95.

The considerable value of this small volume derives from the authority of the author, who, for ten years, served as United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). He therefore brings to this study of the main features of the OAS—its achievements and weaknesses, as well as the main issues on which its future depends—the benefit of active participation in the affairs of the Council of the Organization.

This is not by any means an account of Mr. Dreier's mission. With only one or two exceptions he has refrained from any mention of his own activities as United States Ambassador. Also, he does not mention any personalities from the other American republics. In short, this study is strictly institutional. Also, and this we regret greatly, it is not concerned with the behind-the-scenes operations of the Council and other bodies of the OAS. Only an individual like Mr. Dreier, an actual participant, could describe for us how the OAS really functions. Instead, most of what he presents is factual information of more or less general knowledge. Evidently it was not the former diplomat's intention to abuse a freedom from official responsibility.

The special contribution of this book is to be found in the author's frankly expressed opinions of the inter-American system. He doesn't feel, fortunately, that the inhibitions concerning a former diplomatic mission extend to institutional criticism. The constructive views of the

"insider" carry great weight, and in this instance, coming from one who served his country with distinction, should be heeded by those who would gain a better understanding of our serious dilemma in Latin America.

Nonintervention, the keystone of the Pan American arch, is at the same time the single greatest obstacle to a more successful and effective inter-American system. This is because of a never-say-die Latin-American suspicion of the United States' intentions. The fact of this issue permeates the whole volume, for certainly its constant injection into Council discussions must have caused Ambassador Dreier many a headache. Now, he expresses his view: "Fear of U. S. political domination, rather than any sympathy with Communism, has been a main reason for the reluctance of the OAS . . . to take a stronger position against Communist infiltration and subversion. Defense against Communism is recognized as desirable; but this does not, in the Latin American view, justify the risk of opening the door to U. S. political domination."

Because of this serious dilemma, which has seemed to paralyze the OAS, Ambassador Dreier declares: "This situation naturally faces the United States with the necessity for a thorough re-examination of the international arrangements with the other American republics on which it has pinned such great hopes for the orderly and fair achievement of its national objectives. . . . Is a major reformation of the hemisphere system called for?"

We must not lose sight of the fact that the United States abandoned unilateral supervision of the peace of the hemisphere with the belief that this obligation would be assumed multilaterally.

J. LLOYD MECHAM

Professor of Government
University of Texas

ADOLF A. BERLE. *Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality*. Pp. xii, 144. New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962. \$2.95.

This book is a package, a favorite word of Mr. Berle's, of consummate skill. A critique should make clear that the study

"is an American statement" (p. ix), and 135 American corporations "own . . . nearly one-fourth of the manufacturing volume of the entire world." This quotation is from the 1954 paperback edition of *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution* (p. 25) by Mr. Berle. Democracy and these 135 corporations may be united in a marriage of cold-war convenience. They were less companionable in 1932 in *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* by Berle and Means. "The inter-American system is in crisis" (p. 97) introduces Chapter VI of Mr. Berle's work on Latin America. It deserves a Congressional imprimatur. This proposal is warranted as the 1961 *Congressional Directory* (p. 416) lists Dexter Perkins as chairman of an advisory committee on our foreign relations. His *The United States and Latin America* (1961) is superior to Mr. Berle's work.

Mr. Berle's book has seven synoptic, conventional chapters. We allocate "\$100,000 annually toward making American and Western books available to 185 million Latin Americans"! Why not at once say that more than half of Latin America is illiterate? Mr. Berle seems uninformed about Fondo de Cultura Económica's output of Western social science works in Spanish. He welds together the Alliance for Progress and Operation Bootstrap, not emphasizing Puerto Rico's uniquely beneficial links to the mainland. "In possibility, Catholic organization offers the greatest single base for popular education" (p. 137). Once Ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Berle appears unaware that some Latin Americans are anticlerical and that many are *pro forma* Roman Catholics. Not citing *Tratado de economía agrícola* (1961) by Flores, Mr. Berle says we have "only a shadowy understanding" about "agrarian reform" (p. 51). He is also a layman in the matter. A "predominance of industrial employment over agriculture" will be achieved by 1987 (pp. 134-135). This recalls Keynes' surmising that we shall all die in the long run.

Since 1959, works by Quirk, Furtado, Hirschman, Zamora, Alexander, Hanke, MacEoin, and a symposium on *Social*

Change in Latin America Today (1960), by using some sources in Spanish and Portuguese, have given their studies an indigenous quality. Mr. Berle's principal sources are United Nations affiliates. He fails to mention Senators Cato and Goldwater. Yet Mr. Berle shares the latter's apprehensions, as evidenced by his using *Communists, Moscow, Red China, Castro*, and other words of these familial connotations three hundred times.

BYRON WHITE

Professor of Latin-American Economics
University of Puerto Rico

JOHN MEISEL. *The Canadian General Election of 1957*. Pp. xiv, 313. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. \$6.50.

HOWARD A. SCARROW. *Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data*. Pp. x, 238. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962. \$12.00.

The study of election in Canada has usually been general, or if at all intensive has been fragmentary. The student of Canadian politics has, in consequence, been hampered by lack of accessible data and of considered and documented opinion. These two books do much, and in a commendable way, to end the lack. Professor Meisel's book is one of a pair, and it is to be hoped that two swallows and one coming may constitute a spring after a more than Canadian winter.

The election of 1957 undoubtedly deserves the attention that Professor Meisel gives it. It does mark an epoch in Canadian politics. Whether the changes that proceeded it in the Conservative party made up a "Diefenbaker Revolution," is a question that invites the gentle scepticism with which he treats it. But the election, even if only by bringing to an end twenty-two years of power by one party, does mark a dividing line in Canadian politics. A little longer perspective in time may reveal it as a being of a period in which national parliamentary politics as practiced in Canada since 1867 became impossible either under a two-party, or a multiparty system. The rigidity of the Canadian party system, necessitated by the role of



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maintaining the executive in the legislature, tends to make either the continuous functioning of national parties or the independence of members of Parliament practically impossible.

Professor Meisel properly contents himself with noting the immediate importance of the election. His analysis of the national and parliamentary election between 1953 and 1957 and his discussions of the four parties, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit as well as the Liberal and the Progressive Conservative; of the effects of the system of representation with its exaggeration of the power of the rural vote and its distortion, so marked in 1957; and of the relation between the popular vote and the representation of the parties in Parliament are conducted in an urbanely scientific spirit. Few, I imagine, will disagree with either the substance or the expression of his conclusion as to why the Liberal government fell or the number of Conservative representatives increased. The Conservative party, with a new "image" of progressiveness and vision, won 79,571 fewer votes than the Liberals, but thirteen more seats; they did so because the Liberals seemed both stale and arrogant, while they themselves seemed fresh proponents of Canadian destiny.

Mr. Scarrow's book is a full and laborious compilation, and an extensive, if not complete, analysis of Canadian election returns, national and, since 1921, provincial, by electoral districts. The work is carried out logically and with care. It is an excellent reference work and will no doubt be thumbed intensively by all students of Canadian electoral trends.

W. L. MORTON

University of Manitoba

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

HARRISON E. SALISBURY. *A New Russia?*
Pp. 143. New York: Harper & Row,
1962. \$3.50.

The ephemeral quality of most journalistic accounts makes the placing of them

between the covers of a book a hazardous undertaking. It is a measure of Harrison Salisbury's penetrating understanding of forces operating in Soviet Russia that much of the analysis which he made almost two years ago, following a trip to that country, still holds valid today. He has succeeded in capturing and describing in succinct prose some of the changing elements on the social landscape unleashed by the de-Stalinization campaign.

Especially effective and pertinent is Salisbury's characterization of the revolt of the younger generation of intelligentsia, the "men of the sixties," against the stifling patterns of thought and behavior of the Stalinist era. The phrase "men of the sixties"—chosen by the new Soviet writers—carries, of course, an allusion to a similar era in the nineteenth century. The refreshing struggle of the rebels to recapture what Salisbury calls "the pure line of the great Russian heritage," even while fully accepting the essentials of Communist society, is a vital factor in Soviet life, and explains the sharpening public clashes with the literary neo-Stalinists.

It is, however, misleading to assert—as Salisbury does—that the struggle in the intellectual sphere mirrors a conflict raging in the political sphere between "liberals" backing Khrushchev and conservative neo-Stalinists. Only recently, Khrushchev chastised independent-minded intellectuals and warned them against thinking that there is a "conflict of generations" as had "existed in Turgenev's day." Salisbury also oversimplifies the complexities of Soviet politics by declaring that further liberalization and democratization of Soviet life will ineluctably flow from a *détente* between Russia and the West. The launching of the de-Stalinization process, after all, was less a product of external developments than it was of urgent internal needs.

The continuing manifestations of deep-rooted anti-Semitism in Russia is expertly probed by Salisbury, although he probably errs in suggesting that anti-Semitism is on the rise. Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the current scene is the emergence of a kind of philo-Semitism among intellectuals and a determined effort on

their part to remove this ancient blot of prejudice.

The author's comments on the boredom and alienation of wide segments of the youth, the revitalizing of the church, and other facets of the contemporary scene of a "nation in flux" will prove illuminating for the general reader. Of particular interest is his examination of the Moscow-Peking conflict in Outer Mongolia and elsewhere. Less satisfying are Salisbury's few excursions into the Russian past. He mistakenly attributes to Dostoevsky Gogol's mystical concept of the Russian troika galloping across the earth. More serious is his incorrect observation that the Russian Orthodox Church "never underwent a reformation. It had retained its liturgy, its forms, its ceremonials in almost untouched purity from medieval times." Salisbury evidently does not know about the extensive liturgical and ritualistic reforms of Patriarch Nikon which had been formally adopted by the Great Church Assembly in 1667, and which gave rise to the revolt of Avvakum and the "Raskolniki."

WILLIAM KOREY

Lecturer
Department of History
Columbia University

DAVID FOOTMAN. *Civil War in Russia*. Pp. 328. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$7.50.

The civil war is one of the many aspects of modern Russia that has been awaiting its historian, but Mr. Footman has not ventured to meet this need. His introductory chapter presents a concise summary of the main stages of the civil war, however, and he then goes on to discuss, in essay form, five phases that have attracted his particular interest and includes a brief separate discussion of the beginnings of the Red army.

These essays are well written and draw effectively on the available published sources in Russian and in the Western languages, and Mr. Footman gives a realistic impression of the physical and ideological confusion in which the various contending groups struggled. In a treat-

ment which is essentially episodic, he has selected the Volunteer Army in the Don region, the Czech Legion in Siberia, the role of the Allies in Murmansk and Archangel, and the careers of Kolchak and Makhno as the focal points of his narrative. While these episodes admittedly represent only selected aspects of a vast panorama, the author succeeds in conveying a vivid sense of a struggle in which considerations of ideology were inevitably subordinated to the realities of military training, supply, and organization.

In his brief conclusion, Mr. Footman notes that the contending forces resembled each other in many ways. Both the Reds and the Whites were led in the main by men of middle- and lower middle-class origin; both found it difficult to work with the Socialist Revolutionaries, who occupied something of a middle ground; both found it necessary to rely increasingly on authoritarian methods, after attempts at "democracy"; both armies were staffed by former regular officers and manned primarily by peasants; both had a hard time preventing their armed forces from melting away as a result of mutinies, defections, and general confusion. The essential difference lay in the quality of leadership. Lenin and Trotsky and their colleagues were single-minded, practical, and desperate. The White leaders were divided, romantic, and plagued by wishful thinking. In this judgment, most Western historians will agree with Mr. Footman.

CYRIL E. BLACK

Princeton University

JOHN N. HAZARD and ISAAC SHAPIRO. *The Soviet Legal System: Post-Stalin Documentation and Historical Commentary*. Pp. 235, 174. Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana, for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, 1962. No price.

Professor Hazard and Mr. Shapiro have presented a wealth of materials on the Soviet legal system hitherto available only to persons who read Russian, and often not easily accessible even to them. The materials are designed primarily for teaching courses in Soviet law. Such courses

are now taught in about a half-dozen leading American law schools. Also the materials will prove very useful in courses on Soviet government which are offered in scores of American colleges. In addition the editors deserve the gratitude of all persons who are eager to enrich their reading on Soviet political, economic, and social institutions by consultation of original sources, including basic legislation, court decisions, and commentaries by Soviet jurists.

The book also contains a comprehensive bibliography of books, articles, and documents on Soviet law and government in the English language, as well as a selected bibliography of Soviet books and articles. The bibliography of English-language materials is itself a revelation. There are some 25 books and over 290 articles in English on Soviet law alone, not to mention the far larger number on Soviet government, economy, social institutions, political theory, and the like. In addition, the bibliography lists a very considerable number of translated Soviet codes, statutes, cases and other source materials. These books and articles and translations, together with the "post-Stalin documentation" provided in the present work, form a body of literature sufficient to enable a diligent student to form a fairly good idea of the theory and practice of Soviet law.

The editors have divided their materials into three parts. Part I, "The Soviet State and Its Citizens," is concerned with Soviet concepts of law, the structure of the legal system and its relation to other aspects of Soviet public order, civil rights, criminal and civil procedure, and criminal law. Part II, "Administering Soviet Socialism," is concerned with the role of law in regulating land use, production and distribution of goods, labor relations, and inventions. Part III, "Legal Relations between Soviet Citizens," treats of personally owned property, contracts between citizens, inheritance, torts and social insurance, and family law. An appendix to the third part contains standard forms of various legal transactions.

HAROLD J. BERMAN

Professor of Law
Harvard University

JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. *John Anderson, Viscount Waverley*. Pp. ix, 430. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962. \$10.00.

John Anderson was an exception to several of the rules which normally apply in British political life. He entered the civil service after a scientific education at Edinburgh and Leipzig. Brilliant at mathematics and the natural sciences, when he took the civil-service examination his paper on political science received low marks and scathing comments. Starting his career on the administration of the radical National Health Insurance Act of the 1906 Liberal Government, he became a proconsul when, in 1932, he was appointed Governor of Bengal. On the death of Ramsay MacDonald in 1937, he stood for Parliament and was elected as National Government candidate for the Scottish Universities and became, in due course, one of the most powerful members of the War Cabinet.

To every adult inhabitant of the United Kingdom his name is remembered for the domestic air-raid shelter for which he was responsible when he had become a Minister in the very department, the Home Office, in which he had held the top civil service position.

Anderson's reputation was for immense ability and administrative capacity, but he was no politician and would never have achieved the parliamentary position that he attained except in a time of national crisis. Tall, heavily jowled, and seemingly without humor, his reputation among liberals suffered from the fact that he was given two of the most difficult assignments in modern British history. The first was as Under-Secretary for Ireland during the last terrible years before the granting of independence, when he found himself at the end responsible for handing over the administration to those he had been fighting. The second was as Governor of Bengal. In both cases he was dealing with nationalist movements and with terrorism; but, in a farewell speech he made in Bengal in 1937, he disclosed that he had advised the release of political prisoners in Ireland sixteen years before and implied that he would do so again.

Anderson had been Permanent Secretary at the Home Office during the General Strike of 1926, and his courage and independence of mind are demonstrated by an incident quoted in this book. Winston Churchill had urged the despatch of Foot Guards, armed with ball cartridge, to clear the docks. Anderson said clearly: "I would beg the Chancellor of the Exchequer to stop talking nonsense" and Churchill stopped. Not many civil servants address cabinet ministers in these terms. He also understood better than his political masters at that time the importance of maintaining the principle that, in an industrial dispute, the police do not help either side. It is, therefore, ironical that he should have been the man on whom fell the unwelcome responsibility for the emergency legislation—introduced at the moment when England faced invasion—under which a number of people were imprisoned without trial.

When Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, Anderson was given an overriding responsibility for harnessing the resources of the nation to the war effort. Here his vast administrative experience, his scientific education, and his respect for expert advice were invaluable. It was these qualities which also made him the obvious choice to be sent to Washington when collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom on the development of the atomic bomb was in danger of breaking down. As far as atomic development for immediate war purposes was concerned, he was completely successful in restoring it. He was less successful when he accompanied Mr. Attlee to the abortive discussions which took place in 1943. They failed to prevent the passing of the McMahon Act, and Anderson became chairman of the United Kingdom Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy and so the father of Britain's nuclear weapons.

The persona of a civil servant is veiled by his anonymity, of a colonial governor by his seclusion, and of a cabinet minister in wartime by the extent and secrecy of his activities. It is one of the merits of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett's book that he discloses the essential humanity of a man

who was perhaps the greatest British public servant of the century. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the charming story of his second marriage at the age of fifty-nine.

AUSTEN ALBU

Member of British Parliament
for Edmonton

EDWARD R. TANNENBAUM. *The Action Française: Die-hard Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century France*. Pp. viii, 316. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. \$7.50.

From 1899 until 1944 a resurrected dinosaur, the Action Française, thrashed about in a topsy-turvy world. The land of the Bourbons, which it had dominated in an earlier incarnation, was hostile. It was harried by former prey, scorned by former friends, wooed by former enemies. Catholic in spite of the Pope, monarchist in spite of the pretender, it preached order and "the simple virtues of rural life," yet sponsored the rowdy *Camelots du Roi* and centered its activities in the cafés of Saint-Germain des Prés. Germanophobe, militarist, and nationalist, its ideas were largely borne to power on the bayonets of the *Reichswehr* over the shattered French Army and the prostrate nation. Yet the movement itself was driven still farther into the wilderness.

This bundle of frustrations and paradoxes is disentangled, dissected, and digested in Professor Tannenbaum's superb study. Using all the standard documentary and published sources plus voluminous new material, he has painted a more complete picture of the movement than has previously been available. The strongest sections deal with the period before 1917, partly because he has mined much new information from the files of what must have been a very active secret police. He has also dissipated a flock of widespread misconceptions and uncertainties about the place of Action Française in Vichy.

One excellent chapter shows convincingly that it found its most eager recruits among *déclassés*. Others pick their way skillfully through its labyrinthine relations with Catholicism and across the barren desert of

its phantom labor organization. The Vatican's vacillation is shown to have been a product of its spastic reconciliation with the twentieth century and intriguing courtesans. The labor wing was supported more by sterile nostalgia for medieval corporatism and sheer venal opportunism than by callouses or greasy hands. There are other good sections, but also occasional blind spots. Professor Tannenbaum misses the irony that the largest monarchist movement in twentieth-century France was republican when the restoration was closest at hand. Similarly, after contending that Maurras was convicted on false charges of treason by a Liberation court, he denies the truth of the sour old man's cry: "This is the revenge of Dreyfus!"

One may also regret that his chapter on the psychology of reaction is overly ambitious, inadequately documented, poorly structured, impressionistic, and unbalanced by the author's preoccupation with anti-Semitism. One may stumble over an occasional imprecise word or obscure passage and disagree with certain interpretations—such as his belief that the post-Liberation "purge helped to reunite Frenchmen from all political camps"—yet conclude that this is a sound, scholarly study that will henceforth be essential reading for an understanding of the French Right before 1945.

WILLIAM G. ANDREWS

Assistant Professor of Political Science
Tufts University

RICHARD VAUGHN. *Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State*. Pp. xv, 278. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. \$5.50.

This is the first in a projected four-volume study of the Valois dukes of Burgundy. It is neither a biography nor a purely institutional study. Rather it is a series of chapters organized more on a topical than on a chronological basis in which emphasis is placed on Philip's political activities and on the institutions through which he worked, but in which economic and social factors, as well as the ducal domain, are omitted. Other matters such as the crusade of Nicopolis

and the patronage of the arts that are less pertinent to the main theme of the book are treated.

The author contends that Philip the Bold, not Philip the Good, was the founder of the Burgundian state. Whether his view is accepted may depend in part on what criteria one establishes for the late medieval state, but surely, to qualify, the prince must have normally resided in his own territory and have devoted much of his energy to the governance of his people; surely he must have created some central institutions other than his council and his household, established primogeniture, and tried to halt judicial appeals from his own courts to those of the parent kingdom. Philip the Bold did none of these. Rather, the evidence cited by the author shows him to have been the ablest and most fortunate of a group of French magnates who used their influence to milk the revenues of the crown and who chose their wives as well as the mates of their children and grandchildren with the idea of increasing their territories, influence, prestige, security, and wealth, but not primarily with the idea of creating independent, contiguous territorial states.

This rejection of the author's thesis is not to be interpreted as denying the value of the book. Mr. Vaughn has utilized the French and Belgian archives, as well as a number of excellent but little known articles in provincial journals. He has provided good accounts of the acquisition of Flanders, the Burgundian civil service, the ducal finances, and a number of other matters. He has also given an idea of how Philip used fief-rents and pensions to secure the support of key royal officials and to ingratiate himself with the leading figures in the Low Countries. The book is attractively printed and contains seven illustrations and four maps.

J. RUSSELL MAJOR

Professor of History
Emory University

KARL MARX. *Manuskripte über die polnische Frage (1863–1864)*. Edited by Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode. Pp. 202. The Hague: Mouton, 1961. No price.

In this volume are published for the first time two manuscripts from the literary remains of Karl Marx which deal with the subject of the division of Poland among the powers surrounding it. Ever since the territory of the previous Polish state had been annexed by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the late eighteenth century, the so-called "Polish question" played a prominent political role. Liberals and socialists in Germany and western Europe raised frequent and often loud protests against the fate extended to the Polish people by the political actions of the more conservative powers of Europe. In fact, the attitude on the Polish question became almost a test case of the readiness of various groups in opposition against the more conservative governments to consider a revolutionary development in the political order of Europe. Hence, it is not surprising that Karl Marx, who was concerned throughout his life with political matters, also examined at repeated intervals the Polish question and concerned himself, in particular, with the problem of what was the meaning of the fate of the Polish people for the political collaboration of opposition groups in various countries of Europe. He maintained the opinion that the socialist movement of Europe could attain a lasting success only if the block of conservative powers of central and eastern Europe was broken by the political reconstitution of an independent Poland.

The two previously unknown manuscripts presented in this book were written by Marx in 1863 and 1864 at a time when he was drawn to reflect upon Poland by the unsuccessful revolt of 1863. They contain a mass of very interesting and enlightening opinions on the the Polish question. One manuscript is entitled by him "Poland, Prussia, and Russia"; the other has no title, but is called by the editors of this book "Poland and France." The first is written almost entirely in German, the second almost entirely in English. Although both have remained unfinished manuscripts, they reveal very clearly Marx's views on the political relations in eastern and central Europe from the end

of the seventeenth century on. In the first manuscript, Marx tries to show that there is a conflict between a German unification and Prussian power, and that the Polish question is a decisive issue in this conflict. The second manuscript was written about a year after the first. It flowed out of the discussion which occupied the leading members of the International Workingmen's Association at the time of its foundation in September 1864, and was a reaction to the proposal by the British member of the First International, Peter Fox, which stated "that the Polish war of Independence was made in the general interest of the peoples of Europe, that in its defeat the cause of civilization and human progress suffered a severe shock; that Poland has an unimpeachable claim upon the leading nations of Europe to contribute by every necessary means towards the restoration of her national sovereignty." Marx's central point in this second paper is to trace the history between France and Poland from the period preceding the French Revolution to the days of Napoleon III, and his main intent, as expressed in a letter to Engels, dated December 10, 1864, is to present by this historical essay "an historically irrefutable picture of the constant treason committed by France against Poland from the time of Louis XV to that of Bonaparte III."

In addition to the text of the two manuscripts with all the changes, erasures, and variant expressions included by Marx, this volume contains ninety pages of valuable introductory matter by the two editors. Conze contributes a general introduction on Marx's position on Poland which is a very fine essay on an important set of political considerations by Marx, and Hertz-Eichenrode presents an extensive discussion of the shape of the manuscripts, their origin, Marx's method of working, the literature he used, and similar problems. The edition is clearly printed, and the book may be regarded as a model of how important, but formerly unknown, manuscripts by a great thinker should be presented. Whether one reads the portions by Marx or those by the two

editors, one is certain to receive a stimulating and exciting experience. This is a fine book.

BERT F. HOSELITZ

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SHERMAN DAVID SPECTOR. *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C. Brătianu*. Pp. 368. New York: Bookman Associates, 1962. \$5.00.

A scholarly examination of Rumania's participation in the Paris peace conference of 1919 has been lacking for many years. This need has now been substantially met by the volume under review. The official records of the Rumanian peace delegation, headed by Ioan Brătianu, were not available to the author, but from the extensive documentation of other delegations and the published records of the conference the author has presented in all essential details the diplomatic developments attendant upon Rumania's entry into the war in 1916 and her role in making the peace.

As the subtitle indicates, the work is basically a study of the diplomacy of Ioan Brătianu, leader of the Liberal party and a member of the family that for two generations was "the real ruler of the country." There is little to admire in the man, the family, or their policies. Rumania was allied with Germany and Austria from 1883 to 1914, assumed a neutral position on the outbreak of war, intervened on the Entente side in 1916 after a period of Balkan haggling, was defeated and concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers, and re-entered the war on November 10, 1918, in order to become a belligerent and win the right to be represented at the peace conference. Serbia and Belgium, be it noted, suffered years of occupation but never abandoned the alliance.

Despite this record, and without a strong case or a good cause, Rumania, of all the beneficiaries of the Allied victory, emerged as the recipient of the greatest spoils. Under Brătianu's leadership Rumania

achieved the unique distinction of gaining territory from former allies as well as foes—Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania and the Banat from Hungary, Bukovina from Austria, and Southern Dobrudja from Bulgaria. Although the treaty of 1916, which brought Rumania into the war and foreshadowed the partitioning of Hapsburg lands, was invalidated by conclusion of a separate peace, Rumania was able to realize most of the inflated claims advanced at the conference. And this despite the fact that Brătianu was disliked to the point of positive loathing by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson.

How was this possible? That is what the author explains in this solid and objective study. He finds the explanation in the divergent aims and policies of the major powers at Paris, in the absence of Russia from the peace conference, in the policy of the *cordon sanitaire* in eastern Europe, and especially in the unwillingness of the Paris statesmen to enforce wiser decisions in delimiting the frontiers of the successor states. Indeed, this study highlights how slightly the discussions and decisions of the Big Four influenced the territorial settlement in eastern Europe and the Balkans. For these settlements were achieved largely by forcible seizure, by default, and by "spontaneous plebiscites." While this work is rather narrowly diplomatic in its conception, within its limits, it is a job well done. It is expertly and thoroughly documented and presents an extensive bibliography.

ORON JAMES HALE

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FRANCIS R. PREVEDEN. *A History of the Croatian People*, Vol. II. Pp. xi, 240. New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. \$7.50.

The first volume of Preveden's *History of the Croatian People* dealt with the formation and development of the medieval Croatian Kingdom and with the union of the Croatian and Hungarian kingdoms; the second volume deals mainly with the "times of trouble" for the

Croatian people—the period between the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century in the course of which Croatia was reduced to the “remnants of the remnants of the former glorious Kingdom.” That is, Croatia was reduced to a small section of its peripheral territory in the northwest while most of its lands, including Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Slavonia, were in the hands of the Turks and of the Venetians. But even within that small section left in the hands of the Croatian authorities, a prolonged battle was fought against the centralizing tendencies of both Vienna and Budapest seeking to reduce and destroy the sovereignty of the Croatian state. It was a long struggle for national survival in the course of which Croatian people were split not only territorially, but religiously as well. A large number of Croatian people in Bosnia and Hercegovina became Islamized as a result of Turkish conquests. Also, owing to administrative separation of several parts of Croatia, various Croatian regions became exposed to different cultural influences. Thus in addition to Turkish influences in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Italian influences in Dalmatia and German influences in Upper Croatia were felt. The volume ends with the account of the first beginning of liberation of Croatian lands from foreign domination as a prelude to national unification, a theme which will be discussed in the forthcoming volumes. The second volume, like the first, contains a good number of illustrations showing the land, the towns, and the people of various Croatian regions. The author writes in an easy and interesting style, yet his writing is scholarly and based on historical source materials. Preveden’s *History of the Croatian People* is the only scholarly history of Croatia in English, and fills a gap in historical literature. Most references to Croatian history in English historiography before Preveden could be found only in histories of Austria, Hungary, the Byzantine Empire, Italy, and Yugoslavia. In such histories, Croatian lands were not given full consideration and were seldom if ever treated on equal


footing with the rest as they were seen from the point of view of the ruling powers.

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ANDREW F. BURGHARDT. *Borderland: A Historical and Geographical Study of Burgenland, Austria*. Pp. xii, 365. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. \$8.00.

This well-done study is a pioneer in several respects. In its methodology it presents a constructive synthesis of two disciplines, geography and history. The scholarly apparatus is exhaustive and useful to social scientists in general. The subject matter, the Austrian Burgenland, is so comprehensively presented that no German-language publication approaches it, although in 1961 Burgenland and Austria celebrated forty years of union, accompanying the event with a spate of publications. Incidentally, the following, though not strictly and solely scholarly publications, seemingly could not be included in Burghardt’s extensive bibliography, yet deserve mention: the best treatment to date, *Das Werden des Burgenlandes—Seine Angliederung an Österreich vor 40 Jahren im Lichte teilweise unbekannten Materials*, edited by Otto Guglia; *Festschrift “40 Jahre Burgenland”*; Egon R. Loew’s *40 Jahre Burgenland, Land und Leute—Wirtschaftlich und politisch gesehen*; and former Socialist Minister of Interior Oskar Helmer’s *40 Jahre Burgenland—Ein Land wählt die Freiheit*. Finally, half of the study is in many respects an extraordinary survey of parts of East Central European history, surpassing much that has been written on the subject. This ill-fated area, to mention only one example of insight, experienced five centuries of greatness, a “golden age” from 1000 to 1500 (Chapter 7), for which geographical history seems to elucidate the “fortuitous blending of historical developments and geographical facts that favored the early rise to power of the states of East Central Europe” (p. 98).



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In such a survey from prehistoric times to the present, one might be inclined to look for factual flaws. Burghardt not only keeps these to a minimum, but presents all contending viewpoints and interpretations in an honest effort at objectivity. Thus the rise of linguistic nationalism among the Magyars (p. 144) is treated fairly by the author, who at times seems personally tempted by the Magyar apologia. The creation of Burgenland as a province, its viability, its political geography, elections, minorities, as well as the Burgenländers' ties across the Border—see the Hungarian uprising, 1956—are described with the unparalleled care that has been distinguishing for a number of years the work on Austrian affairs by American scholars.

Burghardt, who collected the material for the study during two grant-periods—National Research Council and Fulbright—has caught the spirit of the place, concluding: "Because of its successful amalgamation of elements from both East and West, Burgenland may serve as an inspiration to the nations of East Central Europe. . . . Whatever the problems facing a future East Central European federation might be, they could scarcely be much greater than those surmounted by Burgenland" (p. 283).

ERNST F. WINTER

Salzburg-New York

H. N. BRAILSFORD. *The Levellers and the English Revolution*. Edited by Christopher Hill. Pp. xvi, 715. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961. \$10.00.

The many works written by Henry Noel Brailsford throughout his long career bear witness to his zeal in advocating peace, liberty, and social justice. A veteran Fabian, he devoted himself, for the most part, to contemporary themes, among them the internal British social problem, the international situation, and questions relating to the status of subject peoples. Toward the end of his career he turned to the revolutionary period which spanned the two middle decades of the seventeenth

century, and found in this hotbed of religious, political, and social radicalism a group whom he was able to accept as kindred spirits. These were the Levellers, of whom he writes in this substantial, posthumous volume.

The Levellers drew their strength largely from the lower middle class in the cities and from the yeomen in the country. This was in part a civilian movement, but derived much of its cohesion from that extraordinary military body the New Model Army, probably the most politically minded military group in all history. For a time, freedom of speech was accorded the rank and file in impressive measure. They elected their representatives, the assistants, who conferred with the officers on matters of policy. The Levellers had a number of colorful leaders, but the hero of this story is clearly John Lilburne, a brilliant, courageous and dedicated man, who paid for his devotion to the cause of liberty by spending a third of his adult life in prison. If this story has a villain, it is Oliver Cromwell, who destroyed the Leveller movement. Brailsford is not ungenerous in his treatment of the greatest English man of action of the age, but emphasizes his opportunism and the extent to which his policies were motivated by considerations of property. Indeed Brailsford, after an ingenious analysis of other possible theories, comes to the conclusion that the ownership of real estate was really the fundamental issue in the English Civil War.

While their programs were not identical, the Levellers may be said to have anticipated the demands for reform made by the Chartists two centuries later. Perhaps the most stimulating and provocative idea in this book is Brailsford's insistence that this program of the Levellers was not necessarily premature; that it might just as well have been realized in their day, and that if it had been, untold human misery would have been averted. It may, of course, be insisted that there did not exist in seventeenth-century England the socioeconomic foundation for the democracy which the Levellers were seeking to establish. It is to be noted,

however, that the Levellers, like the Chartists, clearly thought of political reform as a prelude to social and economic reform. Had they triumphed, the class structure of England would presumably have been subjected to substantial modification. But all this lies in the realm of the might have been, where the philosopher walks with more confidence than the historian.

LEONIDAS DODSON

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DENIS P. BARRITT and CHARLES F. CARTER. *The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations*. Pp. 163. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. \$4.00.

This book is a social survey of the religious, political, social, and educational problems of a divided people. Ulster is not only separated from the rest of Ireland but also lacks internal unity. The authors are Englishmen who evidently have a deep affection and understanding of Northern Ireland, for they write with neither condescension nor partisanship. They show how Protestant domination operates in the social structure and particularly how it is maintained by the difference in economic status which leads to a higher rate of emigration among Catholics whose higher birth rate would otherwise assure them a majority in time. The facts of inequality are dealt with realistically. Despite their complaints, the minority have few grievances in law. Discrimination is practiced by both sides although naturally more injurious to the minority, and much of it as a consequence of social segregation. Here the Catholics are at least in part the victims of their own stand on separate education.

From this local situation of Protestant privilege a problem arises which the authors do not take up. The morale of Protestant Ulster being thus based on an instinctive feeling of superiority it is clear that they fear above all submergence in a united Ireland where they might lose their morale. This might well be so even without any injustice and lead to an in-

creased rate of Protestant emigration with progressive loss of influence. Fear of the consequences of democracy is clearly enough to guarantee indefinite division of the country.

There are many borderlands in the world where differences of language and religion and mixed allegiance cause strains and tensions such as exist in Northern Ireland. Some have had their problems brutally sorted out in our own time by genocide and expulsions. Ireland, indeed, has been fortunate to have had only a single great power as a neighbor, at least in this century. The book makes no suggestions of a possible reunion but rather of an end to isolation on both sides in a Europe which turns hopefully to a common Christian faith and economic partnership.

E. R. R. GREEN

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AFRICA AND ASIA

EZEKIEL MPHAHLELE. *The African Image*. Pp. 240. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$4.95.

Am I, as a white man, I wondered, qualified to comment on this volume, its contents a personal testament, an inner struggle, presented straight and without frills, telling us what we have known for long: the degradation of colonialism and racialism—"the tight and deadly squeeze." But there is hope, and Mr. Mphahlele points the way.

The author, South African-born but now resident in Nigeria, is known to us via his autobiography *Down Second Avenue*. He now follows up with an attack on contemporary clichés about Africa, an exposition likely to disturb many an African leader. Why? Mphahlele is not a nationalist, a sentiment "motivated by a primitive instinct of fear," and because of the "cold realism of it." Instead he endeavors to "civilize a large mob of white tribalists" and aims at a "common society and to prove that multiracial societies can thrive and become a glorious reality in

Africa." He appeals to the "nobler elements of human nature, even when we know that the white ruling class is far gone." Having thus declared himself, he rejects outright the idea, and the fact, of *negritude*—the response to the preposterous view that "there is no culture other than the West's, no universal values that are not hers"—as antiwhite. Likewise the cliché "African personality" is dismissed as an ethnocentric—"we are not the only section of the human race who are full of passionate intensity"—and "charming phrase" which can "remain but a glorious myth" particularly for the African artist standing far removed from African politicians.

This is the raw meat of controversy, and the honesty of the struggle is sharp and clean: "the white man has poisoned my life at the spring; it goes against me all the time, this anger, in my dealings with white people." But, he concludes: "Excessive protest poisons one's system, and thank goodness I'm emancipated from that. The anger is there, but I can harness it." Yet Mphahlele has rejected the paralyzing force of liberal "gradualism," which isolates the educated black man struggling with freedom, an intellectual revolution which cannot be averted, even in South Africa where the "ironic sense of permanence with which the black man sticks it out" wears down the oppressors.

The second part of the book is no less penetrating. Here Mphahlele uses his considerable knowledge of literature to analyze the European image of the non-white and the African's image of himself using for the latter often little-known—to us—writers. In this treatment we become fully aware of the deep penetration of Western values which, far from being rejected, might be part of the destiny of Africa.

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MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS. *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*. Pp. lv, 500.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, \$6.95.

The death of Professor Herskovits, after forty years' work as a pioneer in African studies, makes this book a testament. Sometimes such a work, culminating a lifetime's devotion to a complex subject, brings its many detailed problems into focus in terms of a few fundamental principles—not so in this case. Perhaps Africa is too complex, with fascinations which involved the author too personally. Certainly complexity and personal involvement have left their mark on this work, with the consequence that it is vastly informative without being fully satisfying.

The main value of this volume lies in nine chapters on special topics, including the land, education, economic change, the intrusive religions, and the like. These are valuable expositions, although two—on non-African immigrants and the movement to independence—are rather routine. Each of these chapters is well fortified with references to the literature and overly fortified with quotations from other writers.

The real difficulty of the book lies in the first four chapters, which present a general framework. The problem is obvious: contemporary Africa reflects the impact on innumerable traditional societies of the terrifying power, immense wealth, and disruptive ideologies of Western culture. Knowledge of the traditional societies is basic, because the problem rests on their response to us. Herskovits saw this clearly, but his immense knowledge of the subject, with all its complexities and exceptions, did not provide him with a satisfactory framework for exposition of the problem. Attracted to the historical approach, he recognized its limitations from our ignorance of Africa's past. Thus he fell back on an inadequate analytical approach.

Such an approach must reflect the interrelationships between basic human needs and the ecology of the African environment. Instead, the author's great knowledge of his specialty—cultural anthropology—hampered his efforts to organize his subject. He makes a stab at the

historical approach, reveals its inadequacy, and turns to an analytical approach in terms of six "culture areas" in sub-Saharan Africa. This does little with the African environment and even less with basic human needs. The "human factor" so prominent in the title is lost in an almost exclusively institutional approach. Even the minor helps provided by our present knowledge of African history are generally omitted. For example, his repeated statement that West Africa is agricultural and East Africa is pastoral has numerous exceptions—such as Kikuyu and Fulani—which have historical explanations, but the general rule is stated unmodified by either the exception or its possible explanation. Even race and language are largely omitted because they detract from the institutional approach.

The key to all this appears in Chapter 2 where Herskovits defends Africa against all the clichés of the last generation: that it was backward, savage, isolated, lacked initiative. The book as a whole shows that its author was emotionally involved with a desire to defend African culture and its right to an independent development even under the powerful impact of alien cultural intrusions. It is a sensible conclusion to a great career in African studies, but it is unfortunate that it is not presented in a more convincing framework.

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W. K. HANCOCK. *Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919*. Pp. xii, 618. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. \$10.00.

Jan Christiaan Smuts, one of the great world figures of the twentieth century, has found a worthy biographer in Sir Keith Hancock, who brings his deep knowledge of Commonwealth history and his high standards of objective scholarship to bear upon the man who in his own country was undoubtedly the most controversial figure in its history—revered as its great leader and savior by some, derided as a traitor to his people by others. Sir

Keith, who is an Australian, has been able to maintain an impartiality which would have been well-nigh impossible for any South African or Englishman.

This first volume takes us from Smuts' birth in 1870 to his assumption of the South African premiership on the death of General Botha in 1919. Hancock writes with great sensitivity of the farmer's son with his intense love of nature and the soil; next we see a very serious-minded student at Stellenbosch, who was saved from becoming a prig, perhaps, by his love of Shelley, followed by the lonely young recluse at Cambridge where he achieved the highest academic honors and developed a deep and abiding interest in philosophy. At this time Smuts seemed destined for a life of scholarship and eminence in the world of learning, and few would have expected him to become a great man of action. Perhaps it was fortunate that the University of Cape Town rejected his application for a lectureship in law.

Disillusioned by the Jameson Raid, Smuts left the Cape for the Transvaal where as State Attorney of the South African Republic he soon became the leading personality after the President. He worked with all his tremendous power to modernize the administration of the Transvaal, and to avert war with Britain. When war came, he threw himself into military preparations, and when he took the field his daring and tactical skill soon made him pre-eminent among the Boer generals. When all else was lost and his country in ruins he never lost his inner faith, and even in the final agony of defeat he could write to his wife: "Let us do our best to bind up the old wounds, to forgive and forget, to make the future happier than the past has been." To this task he dedicated his life and, assisted by the change of government in Britain, he realized his goal, at least in outward form, in the Union of South Africa in 1910. Unfortunately, some South Africans could not "forgive and forget," and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 again tore South Africa asunder. Smuts' loyalty to the British cause led him to be branded

as a traitor by extreme Afrikaner Nationalists. As he moved increasingly on to the greater world stage as member of the Imperial War Cabinet and played a part in shaping the peace and laying the foundation of the League of Nations, the gulf between his international thinking and that of his countrymen became wider. His experiences in London and Paris were perhaps not the best to equip him to take over the government of South Africa when Botha died.

Hancock leaves many questions unanswered, and the second volume is eagerly awaited. If it is equal to the first, this will rank as one of the great biographies of our time. Already it has the form of classical Greek tragedy—the great man about to be overwhelmed by his fate.

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ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK. *British Relations with Sind, 1799–1843: An Anatomy of Imperialism*. Pp. ix, 161. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. \$4.00.

"*Peccavi!*" "A very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality." Such aphorisms recall the bitter controversies aroused among the British by the conquest of Sind in 1843. The causes, course, and consequences of that conquest have already been examined in great detail by Mr. H. T. Lambrick in his *Sir Charles Napier and Sind* (Oxford, 1952). The previous period of sporadic diplomacy that followed Wellesley's attempt to establish closer relations with Sind in 1799 has been more neglected by historians. The first part of Professor Huttenback's book is, therefore, of particular interest, and contains some new information. But in the subsequent chapters dealing with the events leading up to the conquest his conclusions are in substantial agreement with Mr. Lambrick's, though he has no room for much of the latter's supporting evidence and argument.

Napier's dealings with the Mirs, the unfortunate rulers of Sind, are again shown to be both devious and ruthless. Professor Huttenback quotes from a letter in which one of the Mirs elaborated upon the disadvantages of a closer relationship with the British: "Our Hunting preserves will be destroyed, our enjoyments curtailed; you tell us that money will find its way into our treasury, it does not appear so, our contractors write to us, that they are bankrupt, they have no means of fulfilling their contracts; boats, camels, are all absorbed by the English troops, trade is at a stand; pestilence has fallen on the land." Professor Huttenback omits the sentences that followed, though they are quoted by Mr. Lambrick and help to explain the attitude of those who thought with Napier that Sind would benefit from British rule. The Mir continued: "You have talked about the people, what are the people to us, poor or rich? What do we care, if they pay us our revenue? You tell me the country will flourish, it is quite good enough for us, and not so likely to tempt the cupidity of its neighbours."

Professor Huttenback is greatly concerned with the seeming "paradox" that territories were conquered in spite of the wish of the authorities in England to avoid further conquests. A detailed analysis of the proceedings of those authorities, which were comparatively neglected by Mr. Lambrick, might well have given Professor Huttenback something new and significant to say on the matter. However, even if his conclusions are not very new, his account is clear and to the point.

Harford Jones was not sent to Persia by the governor-general (p. 125) but by the home government. It is a little misleading to imply (pp. 14–17) that dispatches signed by Francis Warden, as Secretary of the Bombay Government, expressed his own views rather than those of that government. George IV, not William IV, was on the throne in January 1830 (p. 20). Napier is criticized for choosing Brown and Richardson as his assistants (p. 77), and they certainly had their defects, but they had after all been Outram's choice as well. The spelling

Jaswant is preferable to *Juswunt* (p. 12), and *Astall* (pp. 19, 127) should be *Astell*.

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HUGH TINKER. *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis*. Pp. 228. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$4.50 cloth-bound; \$1.75 paper-bound.

For anyone who is generally familiar with the history and institutions of contemporary South Asia, a reading of this brief but sophisticated analysis of political trends and developments in India and Pakistan since independence will be a sheer delight. As would be expected from a leading authority on local government and administration in South Asia, the treatment of the forces that are at work on state and local levels is particularly suggestive. This makes the book doubly valuable, for it is precisely at these levels that new patterns are emerging. As Professor Tinker observes: "The attainment of a broad-based democracy may come about not so much by the actual functioning of democratic institutions, such as parliament, but more by social and religious change; by the demand of lower caste people for social and economic parity; by the spread of adult education, or the gradual emancipation of women from domestic immolation."

Doubtless Professor Tinker is correct in predicting that "inevitably, State politics will be caste politics throughout most of India for many years to come," but he should have pointed out that today caste is taking on a new complexion, in politics as well as in social life. Professor Rajni Kothari has made a penetrating observation which should serve as a needed qualification of Professor Tinker's generalization about caste: "The important thing to notice here is that although use may be made of caste solidarities in the winning of votes, castes are shedding off their most characteristic features, are becoming interest-oriented and behaving more like pressure groups than status groups in a fixed hierarchy." Some of the most interesting pages in this book deal with "the politics of language and

caste," basic democracy in Pakistan and Panchayati Raj in India, the press in India and Pakistan, and the evolution and characteristics of political parties in both countries.

With the wealth of acute observations, the failure to do justice to a number of important topics, notably foreign policy and the political aspects of economic planning and development, may surely be forgiven. The unnecessarily large number of errors of fact may be attributed to the carelessness of the author or the proof-readers. More serious, however, is the surfeit of generalizations which are exceedingly questionable, if not completely erroneous. Here are a few samples: in the first three years of independence, "Congress still commanded the loyalty of all political literate elements in the population"; Maulana Azad "took virtually no part in decision-making after independence"; the period 1952-1957 "was an era of Nehru's dominance in world affairs"; in the North Bombay election in February 1962, Acharya Kripalani was "the candidate of a Leftist coalition"; "the great cities have largely abandoned Congress for the C.P.I."; "in South India, the Brahmin is supreme"; "the forces of public opinion cannot exercise much influence on the government"; at Ayub Khan's "right hand stands General Azam Khan"; strong Russian support to Afghanistan is "a development that does not appear likely."

Statements like these may raise doubts about Professor Tinker's reliability as a political analyst, but they do not detract seriously from the value of his book. In such a masterpiece of condensation, sweeping generalizations can hardly be avoided, and some of these are bound to be of questionable validity. Indeed, without them the treatment would not be so thought-provoking or stimulating.

NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

LOUIS J. WALINSKY. *Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960*. Pp. xxvii, 680. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. \$10.00.



U Nu of Burma

Richard Bulwell. Based largely on personal interviews with U Nu and other Burmese leaders, and on previously unused Burmese-language sources, this book describes and evaluates the role of U Nu as the most important member of the political elite that governed Burma during the first fourteen years of Burmese independence, and depicts the broad outlines of the Burmese political process.

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Burma was a pioneer in inviting separate teams of economists and engineers to participate in a co-ordinated economic development program. Walinsky was chief of party for Robert R. Nathan Associates, the economic consulting firm, during most of the decade, and thus was able to view Burmese development from the inside, while having access to cabinet-level officials. This arrangement has obvious advantages, for the government concerned feels that the consultants are working for them, rather than being loaned to them by an outside body; the Nathan firm was paid from United States aid funds at first, but later was employed directly by the Burmese government.

Walinsky has provided a most detailed and well-documented story of a decade of development. Like all other foreigners, he is charmed by the Burmese, but nevertheless does not hesitate to discuss frankly many failures which resulted from shortcomings within the government. In fact, he emphasizes in chapter after chapter that the failures, which were many, were nearly always the result of weaknesses in public administration, rather than of lack of capital or technical skills, important though these factors are. A particularly pertinent observation (p. 478) is that the colonial regime was organized to run smoothly, raise revenues, maintain order, and resist change. The Burmans, on inheriting this system, saw little reason to change it, notwithstanding the very different objectives of their regime.

Private enterprise was nearly always associated with foreigners or resident aliens in the preindependence period, and the resulting—and understandable—bias against such enterprise caused the government not only to attempt more enterprises than it could adequately manage, but also to hold over the heads of rice millers and others the threat of nationalization at a later date, resulting in very poor maintenance of plant and equipment. The foreign specialists proved more satisfactory in some cases than others, but it took the Burmese a little while to realize that no foreign expert can perform the miracles at first expected of him.

Every major industry is discussed in

detail, with appropriate economic, political and sociological factors duly considered. Careful analyses are made of different Western, Soviet, and United Nations programs. For instance, the large and well-publicized Soviet "gifts" turned out to be very costly to Burma! The over-all results, during the decade, were mildly encouraging, with an average increase in gross national product of 5 per cent or a 4 per cent annual increase in per capita output. Perhaps the chapter most likely to interest those working on African development problems is Chapter 34: "Significance of the Burma Experience for Economic Development in Other Countries."

Walinsky makes the rather surprising suggestion that, for a neutralist country, the World Bank might be the best co-ordinating agency, at least for planning and evaluation. Difficulties resulting from the Cold War prevent the United Nations Technical Assistance Board from performing that role successfully, and experience has shown that despite the able and dedicated efforts of several able civil servants, Burma needs such outside help in maximizing the benefits of foreign aid. Perhaps the busy reader will wish the book were a bit less detailed, and did not repeat so often the theme of shortcomings in public administration, but a good index enables the reader quickly to find the passages relating to his own specialty.

J. RUSSELL ANDRUS

Representative to Iraq

Agency for International Development

PING-TI HO. *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911*. Pp. xviii, 385. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. \$8.00.

One minor mystery in contemporary historiography is why so few historians of China write history. Edited translations, scholarly monographs, academic symposia, and textbook summaries are regularly produced and assiduously reviewed. But of the larger works which combine precision in primary source research with original imagination regarding the dynamics of

historical change, we still have notably few. Professor Ping-ti Ho has here confronted a large problem in Chinese social and institutional history, treated it with diligence and boldness, and produced an important contribution to Western understanding of the life of a complex society of a period of five and a half centuries.

This book is a study of the "blood circulation," the social composition of the ruling class in China during the last two dynasties (1368-1911) of the imperial period. Primary sources are lists, selected from the years between 1371 and 1910, covering members of the official class in Ming-Ch'ing China. Founded in the National Library of Peking, the National Central Library of China, and the Library of Congress, these sources list holders of the academic degrees required for entry into officialdom: *sheng-yuan*—the lowest degree; *ch'ü-jen*—the second, or intermediate, degree; and *chin-shih*—the third, or highest, examination degree. Ho also consulted a wide variety of other primary materials; secondary sources in Chinese and Japanese; and relevant Western works on social structure, mobility, and stratification.

These data are described and analyzed in six fact-filled chapters on: (1) social ideology and stratification, (2) the fluidity of the status system, (3) upward mobility: entry into officialdom, (4) downward mobility, (5) factors affecting social mobility, and (6) regional differences in socio-academic success and mobility. Several significant conclusions emerge. The central goal in traditional Chinese society was academic-bureaucratic success, that is, the national elite was the ruling bureaucracy. The principal channel for entry into this ruling elite and a vital factor buttressing political and social stability was the competitive examination system established in T'ang times and lasting until 1905. During the Ming-Ch'ing period as a whole, the mobility pattern was fluid and flexible, and there were no effective legal or social barriers preventing the movement of individuals and families from one status to another. Within the limits of traditional Chinese life and thought, the examination system remained by far the most impartial

and efficacious method for recruiting men of merit into the public service. The fundamental difference between social mobility in Ming-Ch'ing China and that in modern Western industrial societies appears to lie in the long-term trends. In the modern West, sustained technological innovation and economic expansion have brought about steady upward mobility in terms of income and occupation; in Ming-Ch'ing China, the momentum of population growth, combined with technological and institutional stagnation, made a long-term downward mobility trend inevitable. Of particular interest is the detailed analysis in the sixth chapter of the geographic distribution of academic success, measuring the changing fortunes of the economically and culturally advanced provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Fukien from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth.

Some professional sociologists and social statisticians will criticize the rigor of Ho's methodology and his failure to utilize the new techniques through which the International Business Machines Corporation is revolutionizing research in the sciences, both physical and social. Some conventional historians will cavil at the sociologizing and abstract analysis. Some scholars will be irritated at the editors' failure to delete interludes of conversational style and to recheck the statistical compilations—on page 70, the percentage figure should be .71, not 7.1. Few, however, will deny that the range of unused sources covered, combined with the thoughtful and imaginative analysis, marks this as a major work, and all will hope that Professor Ho will now proceed to write the historian's history of Ming-Ch'ing China which he is so well qualified to produce.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

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JAMES CARY. *Japan Today: Reluctant Ally*. Pp. x, 211. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$4.95.

Mr. Cary, for six recent years an Associated Press correspondent in Japan, de-

votes the first brief part of his interesting and well-written diagnosis of the country's problems to historical background, mainly post-World War II, the second part to contemporary forces and personalities, the third to the riots of May and June 1960 against the revised security pact with the United States, the fourth to "peripheral" issues related to military intelligence and United States-occupied territories, the last to speculation on Japan's future.

Parts II and III, which comprise about two-thirds of the book, add appreciably to our knowledge of Socialist leaders Asanuma, Suzuki, and Nishio, the extreme rightist Akao Bin, self-styled appointee of God to become the Hitler of Japan, and Liberal-Democrat premiers Kishi and Ikeda. Communist Nozaka receives some attention. Communism, labor, teacher and student organizations, and the intellectuals are quite fully analyzed but with less evidence of personal contact with them. In his description of the antitreaty rioting, which is the central topic of his study, Cary paints a detailed and vivid picture of mob methods, party participation in unparliamentary procedures, police hesitancy to use force, and other aspects of the hectic Tokyo scene. He takes readers into the Diet to observe the government's maneuvers to push through the treaty, the milling crowds in the corridors, the plight of House Speaker Kiyose penned up in his office by Socialists determined to prevent a vote for ratification, the snake-dancing "beast in the streets," and the airport episode involving James Hagerty.

Cary sees Japan today as the arena of a "struggle" of which the "ingredients" are "powerful forces pulling from the East, powerful forces pulling from the West, and psychological unrest—a volatile and dangerous mixture" (p. 36). His emphasis is upon danger from the former, though he notes the present strength of the latter, embodied in business organizations, the rural population, and the army (p. 140). He recognizes the trade motive as primary in *zaibatsu* acceptance of the security treaty, but regards the embarrassments involved as divisive of business opinion regarding it. These embarrass-

ments he faithfully includes, but appears not to view them as explanatory of the violent riots. Nor does he criticize the Kishi Government's tactics in disfranchising a third of the members of the House of Representatives. In these and other aspects of interpretation this useful work reads more like a thesis to be proved than a careful investigation.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

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RONALD M. BERNDT. *Excess and Restraint: Social Control among a New Guinea Mountain People*. Pp. xxii, 474. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. \$8.95.

This study is based on about a year and a half of field work, carried out in two periods, during 1951–1952 and 1952–1953, by Ronald and Catherine Berndt, in the New Guinea's eastern highlands, southwest of Kainantu. Four language groups were represented in the area studied: Kamano, Usurufa, Jate, and Fore, but the bulk of the research appears to have been conducted among the Usurufa and Fore, who are of great medical interest because of the disease known as "kuru."

The present study is primarily concerned with sex and aggression, with special emphasis on their more violent modes of expression. Initiation rites, nose-bleeding, penis-bleeding, self-induced vomiting by swallowing long strips of cane, the exhuming and eating of their own dead, and the orgiastic aspects of cannibalism and sexual violence associated with warfare are all illustrated with abundant and graphic case materials, mostly as reconstructed by informants from events of the fairly recent past.

The book recounts traditional forms of social control and shows how the expansion of Australian political authority has led to the formation first of "embryonic courts" by local natives and then "informal courts" under the jurisdiction of government appointed headmen, territorial policemen, and native missionaries. It concludes with a more general discussion of social control in the light of the material presented.

Berndt frankly adopts an "outside" view, looking at the area studied as a hierarchy of interaction networks in relative equilibrium. From this point of view, warfare, feuding, and other forms of violence are interpreted as processes contributing to the existing equilibrium—the orthodox approach of "social anthropology." The sociological orientation is not balanced by a serious account of the local culture. We have a lot of examples of what happens from an observer's point of view, but no serious effort to determine the local cultural principles that serve as the guidelines to native behavior. Berndt often fails to make clear which of the several languages and culture groups he studied is being talked about, a lapse that will prove highly frustrating to New Guinea specialists. This is especially important, too, because the peoples described seem to present a remarkable behavioral contrast with their immediate neighbors to the west, who speak a closely related language, according to Leonard Glick, recently returned from two years of field study there. Such extreme variation among neighboring and closely related peoples poses an interesting problem that deserves close investigation.

Thus Berndt has provided us with a rich, well-documented account that raises important problems for further study in New Guinea's eastern highlands.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH

Professor of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania

COLONEL NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO and
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES T. R.
BOHANNAN. *Counter guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*. Pp. ix, 275. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$5.95.

If one contrasts the Army's manual on guerrilla warfare with this excellent story of an actual campaign fought in the Philippines in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the gap between orthodoxy and reality becomes quite awesome. It seems that, as yet, we have not agreed that guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare is at least as important as nuclear warfare and is far

more complex, with even fewer carry-overs from orthodox concepts. We urgently require particularistic studies, which on the one hand search for new ideas, and on the other delve into specific situations in depth. This book goes some distance toward meeting both requirements and makes a valuable contribution to a subject which, because it is timely, has attracted far too many flamboyant generalizations from journalists and politicians and not enough serious and perceptive study.

The authors themselves are somewhat symbolic of the amalgam that is required to meet a guerrilla situation. Both have been soldiers and have operated in the guerrilla milieu. But one author has extended his purview into the disciplines of anthropology and geology. The other, being a native of the Philippines, has a vital understanding of the land, the people, and the politics of that region. All of these qualities have permeated the study. In dealing with general concepts the book sounds at least one timely warning. Many observers are fascinated and indeed overwhelmed by the writings of Mao Tse-tung on guerrilla warfare. But has Mao Tse-tung enunciated a universal formula? His concepts may have been applicable only to China at a particular time, and his views could, as the authors observe, be a distinct handicap to those who accept them without regard to specific conditions.

Other general factors are also highlighted, some of which are beginning to take on the character of "principles." The authors discuss the impelling problem of formulating new intelligence patterns, the need for new attitudes on the part of soldiers in the field, the peculiar difficulties and importance of communications, the need for revised politico-military organizations, and the assets and liabilities of foreign assistance. Above all, this book clearly outlines the fundamental of all counter guerrilla operations, namely the interrelation between political and military factors, not only at the highest policy-making levels, but also among the rank and file. The authors also emphasize the need for particularism in assessing specific situations, and this is perhaps the most

important lesson of the book. Similarly, those sections dealing with specific Philippine experiences make the most rewarding reading and leave one with the feeling that even greater use might have been made of these resources. Mention should also be made of the Appendices, one of which sets out details of a counter-guerrilla organization, for the first time, it is thought, in an open publication.

Although it is not the purpose of the book, its advent does pay a long overdue tribute to the government and armed forces of the Philippines, for fighting the most successful campaign against Communist guerrillas yet undertaken in the Free World. Many in the West, perhaps misjudging the significance of their own technological eminence, tend to underrate the military capability of the small Asian states and fail to remember that we have yet to prove ourselves in the oft-times primitive field of counter-guerrilla operations in the way that our Philippine allies have.

R. C. NAIRN

Yale University

S. ENCEL. *Cabinet Government in Australia*. Pp. xi, 367. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. \$11.50.

Dr. Encel, a Melbourne Ph.D., is a conspicuous member of that postwar generation of academic students of politics in Australia which has engineered a veritable revolution in political science, upgrading it to a status that would have seemed fantastic thirty years ago. Like so many of his academic fellows, he is active also as an intellectual in general practice, an aspect copiously illustrated by his topical journalism. Although well-posted on the structural aspects of politics, whether defined by law or by convention, his self-defined orientation is sociological. In this, his first book, which is also the first on Australian cabinets, he is concerned to show how cabinet government in Australia, although derived directly from the United Kingdom precedent and carried on in full knowledge of United Kingdom practice, has by the influence of sociological circum-

stances in Australia developed into a form decidedly Australian. The book is therefore of a genre now remarkably common: a study—the particular subject matter not being the point—that helps define the Australianness of Australia. The risk is that in emphasizing the peculiar the identities may be underplayed.

While Encel has been impressively diligent in his business, it, nevertheless, comes out that the materials for such a study as this are not exactly copious, especially if “sociological” is the operative criterion. Mr. Encel is heavily dependent upon data which I was once taught to regard as “journalistic” or even as high-grade “political gossip,” not that as a journalist I look down my nose at either. But it is amusing to find so much data of both varieties in an academic study. The obvious explanation is the relative absence in Australia of candid writing about politics, especially cabinet practice, by active or former politicians.

Everyone who has lived in Australia and attended to politics has become aware that life in cabinets is not for the thin-skinned or puristic theorists. Whether single-party or coalition, whether labor or conservative, they are forums for bickerings, power struggles, efforts to effectuate extra-cabinet political purposes. For information about these internal cabinet goings-on, whether for “practical” or theoretical purposes, the normal dependence is upon “leaks,” the revelations made when disagreements get carried out of cabinet rooms into the public arena, or the revelations incident to the airing of irrepressible scandals. How the cabinets work under routine conditions is less easily illustrated, as the Encel book makes clear. Yet, if we are to understand Australian cabinets, it is necessary to know in considerable detail how they work routinely, especially in their managerial aspects, whether the reference is to managing them by Prime Ministers and Premiers, to their management of policy and administration, to how these are related to the supporting parties, and operating pressure groups outside, or to how the sociological predicaments of the persons in cabinets affect their thought

and action as cabinet members. Man does not live by crises alone.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

Katonah
New York

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYDNEY D. BAILEY. *The Secretariat of the United Nations*. Pp. 113. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962. \$3.50.

This monograph is in the best traditions of the Carnegie Endowment for timely contribution to the understanding of international organization. It is also in the tradition of the Quakers who present many sides of a question objectively—the author has directed their program at the United Nations—and of the members of the Hansard Society who are well aware of the processes of parliamentary democracy—the author has been its secretary.

Mr. Bailey has chosen to highlight a few central issues, rather than to write an organization and management study or the technical report that might result from an administrative survey. He first succinctly puts into perspective the purposes of a world organization, and gives the setting for the emerging role of the Secretary General as an "organ," along with the Security Council and the General Assembly. He then devotes a chapter to "An International Civil Service: The Growth of an Idea." To him the central issue is whether the world is ready for the concept of "loyalty" to an international institution of a kind different from the commonly accepted loyalty to one's culture, traditions, values, nation.

His main chapter, on "The Secretary General," shows a good balance of understanding both of the formal relations of the Secretary General with the other organs of the United Nations and the member states and of the dynamic informal relationships that arise when the other organs are blocked by "The Limits of Parliamentary Democracy" and hand over a controversial problem to a Secretary General with a sense of responsibility

to maintain the peace. Mr. Bailey's last chapter deals with three "Organizational Questions": top-level organization, geographical distribution, and recruiting.

It is one of the difficulties of writing about current problems of the United Nations that they shift before even a small monograph can be put through the press. When Mr. Bailey wrote, the Soviet "troika" proposal dominated the scene. "There are no neutral men." By the time the monograph went to press, U Thant had been in office a month, with the support of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it may well be assumed that a similar proposal may be put forth again at a convenient future time, so that it is well to have its implications lucidly analyzed.

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ARTHUR J. WASKOW. *The Limits of Defense*. Pp. 119. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1962. \$2.95.

RICHARD FRYKLUND. *100 Million Lives: Maximum Survival in a Nuclear War*. Pp. xii, 175. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. \$3.95.

After "massive retaliation," the concept of "finite" or "balanced" deterrence. After balanced deterrence, "counterforce." Not that Western official policies, reforming after the first fine careless rapture of nuclear hegemony, have ever quite come into line with any of the rival modernisms. The official American posture is still what Mr. Waskow calls "The Mix"—a bit of everything, to satisfy service rivalries, tending, he argues, toward the worst of all worlds. The signs are, however, that President Kennedy and Mr. McNamara are now more and more shifting the emphasis towards a counterforce strategy.

Mr. Fryklund writes as an avowed advocate of counterforce, and his book comes with a recommendation by Herman Kahn. It does not pretend to be anything but a popular exposition of counterforce arguments, gathered from defense specialists. But it is an able and informative exposition, a very useful basis for assessing the

strategy: its limitations are those of the case it presents—it would seem, without any reservations. Counterforce, we are told again and again, could save 100 million American lives if it came to a nuclear war: no more than 10—or 25 or 40—million American lives might be lost in a counterforce war. Conceding that these estimates could be wrong by two or three times, Mr. Fryklund notes in passing that “if the figures increase to 80 million dead . . . then probably the difference between war and surrender loses its significance” (pp. 132–134). Since, in spite of these impressively open-ended estimates, Mr. Fryklund regards such warfare as “rational”—“It is more logical to start planning for survival, not suicide”—he also claims counterforce as an advantageously credible deterrent. At the same time, however, he believes that “nuclear war is becoming more, not less likely” (p. 151). And since “only complete nuclear disarmament will solve the problem”—a contingency barely receiving a polite nod, here—“common sense dictates that we face up to the increasing possibility of nuclear war and do something to save our hides.” It is surely significant that, at one point, Mr. Fryklund is led to remark: “Find a disarmament enthusiast and you will usually find a ‘kill-the-cities’ fan” (p. 168); perhaps “no-cities” fans are not usually disarmament enthusiasts?

Mr. Waskow is no sort of nuclear fan at all, but his enthusiasm for disarmament is infectious. The *Limits of Defense* is not only one of the most keen-eyed exposures of nuclear fallacies that have appeared, offering a lucid intellectual map of rival strategic doctrines, but presents, with extraordinary compactness, a series of original proposals towards general disarmament. Some of these proposals—especially those directed towards the “no neutral men” problem—are of the utmost potential importance, and one must hope that they will receive the attention they ought to have; others—like his concept of an armed civilian resistance—are perhaps more vulnerable to scrutiny. But all should be carefully examined and discussed. Meanwhile, it is Mr. Waskow’s critique of nuclear deterrence policies,

including counterforce, that demands the most immediate response. His criticisms of game-theory, in relation to nuclear war, are decisive, and with this critique of its methodological basis, the rationale of counterforce theory collapses once and for all. Further, the tendency of counterforce strategies to intensify the tempo of the arms race and the pressures towards pre-emption, without being able to ensure the aimed-at limitations when war occurs, are clearly demonstrated.

100 million lives are an awful lot of lives. But so, we are rapidly learning to forget, are 10—or 25 or 40—million; so, for that matter, are the corresponding millions on the enemy’s side; so are the multimillion margins of uncertainty which even the most optimistic computations invite us to accept as rational. It would seem that the notion of rationality is now bursting through its ultimate limits—or that defense is.

WALTER STEIN

University of Leeds

QUINCY WRIGHT, WILLIAM M. EVAN, and MORTON DEUTSCH (Eds.). *Preventing World War III: Some Proposals*. Pp. 460. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. \$6.95.

This book might be described as a snapshot, or a sample as of a given moment of time, of a rapidly developing stream of thought. For this reason it will unquestionably have some historic interest. For the ordinary reader, however, who is not familiar with its antecedents or with its hoped-for successors, the sample may be a little unsatisfactory—rather like a cross-section of a river in flood. The difficulty is heightened by the fact that the book includes a mixture both of authors and of styles. The authors, of whom there are twenty-eight, may be divided roughly into writers and researchers. The writers, those whose professional competence generally lies in some other field than international relations or peace research but who have been compelled by their sense of the urgency of the problem to spend some time on it, come forth either with exhortations or with what might—perhaps un-

kindly—be described as bright amateur ideas for this urgent and desperate problem. By contrast, the researchers are more professional in tone, take a long-run view, are more concerned with general principles and the application of broad theories, and are also concerned to develop a professional competence in that area of the social system which revolves around threats, weapons, the interaction of armed forces and nation-states, and the dynamics of peace and war.

I would not be ashamed to call the movement of which this volume is a sample “the peace research movement,” though some contributors to it might be embarrassed by the name. It is multidisciplinary in scope, aims at a useful mix of basic and applied research, and seeks rather deliberately for the replacement of the folk wisdom which has so largely governed this field by a more securely based body of knowledge armed with adequate conceptual tools. There are economists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, and engineers, as well as political scientists and historians, who are more conventionally identified with the study of international relations. These people are beginning to develop a subculture among themselves, a certain common language and common theoretical tools, as well as a common end in view. This new subculture is well represented in this volume, and the reader will at least get the idea that something is going on. Anybody who expects to find “the answers” will be deservedly disappointed, and those who are familiar with the field will not find much in this book that will surprise them—indeed, a number of the articles are reprinted from previous publications. Those, however, who wish to sample a new stream of thought, as well as those who are concerned about the avoidance of the disaster which is threatening us, will find a great deal of interest in this volume. The three concluding essays by the editors are particularly recommended; this is one of the books that one should probably begin at the end and read backwards.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

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JOHN W. SPANIER and JOSEPH L. NOGEE.
The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship. Pp. ix, 226. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. \$5.50 clothbound; \$1.95 paper-bound.

The two authors have written a clear, concise, and well-arranged book. They have accurately summarized the diplomatic encounter between the West and the Soviet Union from 1946, when Bernard Baruch submitted the United States plan to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, to President Kennedy's dramatic challenge to the Soviet Union before the United Nations on September 25, 1961. It is difficult to resist the conclusion of the authors that the negotiators on both sides consistently made proposals which at one and the same time were designed “to have wide public appeal” and to “enhance military posture” and that every plan submitted had a “joker.” Hence the subtitle of the book: “A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship.”

The present reviewer will not be accused, I hope, of failing to appreciate the stimulating character of the book, if he suggests that in the interpretation of the events which they have so well set forth the authors have raised certain questions for which their answers are not altogether convincing. They state (p. 13) that “to attribute wars to arms is to confuse cause and effect. Arms races do not precipitate international tensions; they merely reflect them,” and yet (pp. 19–20) they speak of the unprecedented destruction which nuclear weapons may inflict and write that “the state of modern military technology adds greatly to international tensions and may in itself be the cause of war; armaments can be the precipitant of hostilities independent of the nations' other quarrels.” The general thesis of the volume is that gamesmanship is employed and that propaganda plays a major role (p. 181) in order to influence world public opinion. Disapproval of world public opinion is, however, unlikely to be an effective sanction, for which only military force can be relied upon (p. 26). Although American effort should be devoted to “molding world

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opinion" (p. 190), "the neutrals' unfavorable reception cannot be allowed to deter the United States from following policies that are in the national interest. . . . American policy-makers should always seek a favorable climate for their policies, but they should realize in advance that the nonaligned nations will not always support them—and that it is not important that they do so at all times" (p. 191). It would appear that clarification on these points is called for.

It is perhaps not too much to say that many, if not most, neutral powers are aware of the gamesmanship of both sides and for this and other reasons have, rightly or wrongly, tended to criticize both the East and the West. If they read the present book they could hardly be blamed for adopting a cynical attitude toward the two giants, for the authors themselves suggest, by implication at least, that the neutrals are to be "molded." Indeed, they set forth nine proposals for American gamesmanship (pp. 195–200).

The reader cannot help asking whether these proposals are part of the gamesmanship designed only for propaganda purposes or whether the United States is to be sincere in its proposals; whether it would support the idea of complete and general disarmament because it believed in it, whether it would help to establish a United Nations force for peace because the idea is inherently sound, or whether these matters are primarily steps to gain "a great propaganda advantage" (p. 199). The United States is asked to conduct negotiations "effectively" (p. 200), but because of the tense political conflict the future will witness "the continuation of disarmament diplomacy as both the Soviet Union and the United States continue to dance their almost courtly 'disarmament minuet'" (p. 200).

The outlook is indeed perplexing, for in this gamesmanship governments must not only outsmart or deceive their major adversary; they must also deceive neutrals and even their own citizens many of whom, while appreciating the almost infinite difficulties attending partial or total disarmament, have reasons for suspecting that mutual deterrence holds no answer

either. Moreover, one should examine the long-term effects of the power struggle, which enters into every aspect of national life, to see if it is compatible with democratic values and the enjoyment of traditional political rights. Finally, the whole concept of power and the incompatibility of different types of power needs to be analyzed much more carefully than the major writers on international politics have done, as well as the all-too-common generalization that the national interest is necessarily best served by an indefinite multiplication of national nuclear and conventional military power. This is, perhaps, the most important challenge to the political science profession, for a faulty analysis of the nature of power and the perhaps unanalyzed assumption of the *terminus ad quem* durability of the sovereign state may lead to disastrous policy decisions.

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EARL E. T. SMITH. *The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution*. Pp. x, 242. New York: Random House, 1962. \$5.00.

The basic thesis of Ambassador Smith's book consists of three elements: (1) policy is often made not at the top of the diplomatic establishment but at lower levels; (2) the lower levels made the mistake of considering Castro a kind of "political Robin Hood" (p. 6) rather than "an unstable terrorist" (p. 29), a "dictatorial egomaniac" (p. 37) and a "would-be Leftist dictator, who could be a communist" (p. 38), contrary to the Ambassador's warnings and protests; and (3) the Castro accession to power need not have occurred. None of these elements of the Ambassador's thesis have been created since the period of his official service in Cuba. They formed the basis of his whole operation as our principal diplomatic representative in Havana. His book, therefore, does not seem to justify the caustic criticism of 20-20 hindsight, but to reveal a good deal of current alertness to American diplomacy and Latin temperament.

The first two elements of the Ambas-

sador's thesis seem to me undeniable. While the very top level of the diplomatic establishment gets the spotlight, makes most of the speeches—which lower levels generally draft—and makes the decisions on the limited number of crises and issues which can be edged into their crowded schedules, it is the vast personnel layer under the very top that carries the burden of decision-making and decision-interpretation, providing the nuances which, as Ambassador Smith says, can have “a devastating effect” upon other governments and other peoples. While regrettably on the thin side and often baffling the reader with unsupported statements, the Ambassador's book nonetheless suggests a defensible case as to the second element. From all available evidence, there seems no question but that the “fourth floor” of the State Department sided with Castro against Batista and failed to give due weight either to Castro's background and personality or to Latin temperament in general, and hence failed to support and broaden the Ambassador's effort to develop a “third force” in the disintegrating Cuban situation. Just as American diplomacy under Sumner Welles' guidance made Machado's position untenable and eventually brought Batista into power, so our diplomacy during the period of which Ambassador Smith writes contributed to making Batista's position untenable and facilitated Castro's accession to power.

As to the third element, there is no certainty of course. But neither was there an all-out effort made to evolve a “third alternative.” The Ambassador made the effort, but his exertions, he says, were not supported by the Department. Sheer accident aside, he who fails to make the effort, quite obviously, cannot succeed.

Apart from our Cuban diplomacy from 1957 to 1959, the flickering light of the Ambassador's somewhat sketchy book picks up long-lurking, persistent deficiencies in our diplomatic and intelligence establishments explanatory not only of Cuban but of other diplomatic failures: the Department's wholly indefensible casualness in the briefing of our diplomatic representatives; the irresponsible activities of Central Intelligence Agency representa-

tives, which sow confusion abroad as well as within our own government; the strong tides of conformism in the diplomatic service, leading, among other things, to a slanting of reports so as to support the establishment's prevalent thesis; inadequate thinking and planning ahead by officers overly immersed in the daily job and, therefore, all too prone to select those “solutions” of problems proposed by equally hard-pressed colleagues who can scarcely see beyond the incoming cables; and the failure—the obdurate failure—to call upon the techniques and resources of the behavioral sciences in making judgments of people and personalities. All these are weaknesses. They are serious weaknesses. They have persisted through the years. The Ambassador inferentially suggests that we do something about them. I, for one, agree—and not inferentially.

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R. N. ROSECRANCE. *Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951*. Pp. xv, 288. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. \$8.50.

This is a “diplomatic” study, largely based on official material of the Australian government, the United States government, the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied Council for Japan, and General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters. One of the study's principal limitations, as the author himself candidly admits, results from its almost exclusive dependence on “released” documentary material and the impossibility of tapping primary material still concealed or withheld from public scrutiny. Limited in verisimilitude and depth of approach by this factor, it is not primarily the fault of Mr. Rosecrance that the work reads somewhat like an official history, stamped with the imprimatur of the United States State Department and the Australian Ministry of External Affairs. It is a book, to be sure, that will offend no one who was, or is, associated with either the Australian or American governments.

Disappointing to this reviewer is the absence of a proper perspective of Japan

as a nation whose historical conduct, all things considered, was basically no better or no worse than that of her conquerors, including Australia; disappointing, also, is the author's almost complete failure even to attempt to penetrate the pompous, slick, and condescending language of the diplomacy in United States and Australian primary materials and the demagoguery for home consumption of so much Australian diplomatic talk during the period covered by the study. It is to be regretted that Mr. Rosecrance did not delve into the severely punitive, and even highly vindictive, policies both the Australian and the American governments had in mind during the early months of 1945 when the final cruel and devastating blows were being directed against Japan. Certainly American and Australian policy toward Japan from the beginning of 1945 to September 1945 should have been fully treated in a study of this nature. Did the ascendancy of the "moderately punitive" element over the "stern peace" element in Washington have any significant influence on Australian policy, and did it contribute toward making Australia's attitude toward Japan milder in September 1945 when the Occupation began? These and a host of other significant questions that might be raised concerning the important period from January to September 1945 are, of course, unanswered by Mr. Rosecrance's study. Notwithstanding these criticisms, this reviewer feels that Mr. Rosecrance has made a very valuable contribution to the literature dealing with the Occupation period. The omissions excepted, Mr. Rosecrance has made a thorough and well-balanced study of Australian diplomacy concerning Japan from the latter part of 1945 to the conclusion of the San Francisco peace treaty in September 1951. His mastery of the subject and the interpretations of his source materials are impressive.

Mr. Rosecrance's main point is that in six short years, from 1945 to 1951, "Australian diplomacy shifted from the most stringent repression of the Japanese to the most liberal restoration of Japanese sovereignty." This shift, he concludes, was occasioned by a number of factors, principal of which were the following: (1) the

persistent American pressure after 1947, as a result of the Cold War, to accept Japan as a friend and possible ally; (2) the security against Japan offered by the negotiation of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty; (3) the development of the so-called Communist threat in the Pacific area; (4) the greatly reduced power-position of a beaten and stripped Japan; and (5) a budding realization on the part of Australia that geography bound her to Asia and that the time had come to become accepted by and even somewhat integrated in the Asian world. All of these major conclusions have been amply and conclusively demonstrated by Mr. Rosecrance's study.

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